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ABSTRACT
Polish history to date has been dominated by a primacy of external 
relations over domestic affairs. Poland's geo-political position in 
the centre of Europe has meant that it has always had to take into 
account the intentions of its neighbours to the east and to the west. 
German and Russian designs over the Polish nation have inevitably 
associated its internal fate to the very survival of the nation as a 
whole, with the result that throughout the ages, a close link has 
appeared between the domestic and foreign variables shaping the life 
of this country. In the twentieth century, this remains a crucial 
determinant in analysing the processes taking place there. The present 
study aims at highlighting the perceived inseparability of domestic 
and foreign inputs into the socio-political life of the Polish nation. 
In particular, the period following the imposition of a state of war 
in the PRL on December 13, 1981, would seem to present a prime example 
of how this link can be demonstrated.
Chapter 2 traces back the major determinants which shaped the 
1980s* events in the PRL and their significance for the post-1981 
period. Polish policy-making was characterized by a tripartite set of 
relationships: a link between domestic and foreign policy, a strong
connection between political and economic interests and a western and 
eastern-oriented policy-making. Of all the actors present on the 
Polish stage, the Catholic Church has grown to play a fundamental role 
in the life of the country, a factor of pluralism which seems abnormal 
in a society submitted to Marxist-Leninist principles. Any serious 
analysis of the Polish nation cannot exclude its importance, 
especially in recent times, and it is for this reason that its role is 
here discussed at length. With the August 1980 Agreements began the 
'500* days of the Solidarity movement. The impact of these events was 
of enormous importance, not only for the PRL, but also for the Soviet 
Union. Soon, it became clear that an end would be put to the Polish 
experiment in democracy. Though an usual degree of tolerance 
characterized the Soviet Union's reactions to the Polish events, 
behind the scene, it strove to put the Polish house into order. With 
the deterioration of the internal situation in the PRL, a climax soon 
was at hand. Faced with no other alternative, the Polish authorities, 
answering Moscow's desires, and acting under a facade of 'co-operative 
intent' prepared their next move. When a state of war was proclaimed
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in December 1981, it took practically everyone by surprise at home and 
abroad.
Known as the 'War' by the Poles, the state of war saw the military 
appearing on the Polish political stage. Chapter 3 looks at the 
mechanisms and determinants which resulted in the militarization of 
Polish society and the internal and domestic consequences of this 
unprecedented military take-over in a Soviet bloc country. It analyses 
the aims of the Jaruzelski regime and highlights the bankruptcy of the 
Polish Communist Party. The impact of Polish domestic events on the 
PRL's foreign policy-making was enormous. It is argued that, with the 
December 1981 proclamation, Warsaw was compelled to re-assess its 
external relations both in the East and in the West. Faced with 
isolation from non-communist countries, the PRL sought, in the first 
months of martial law, to regain the confidence of the Kremlin 
leaders. At the same time, it had to cope with the economic and 
diplomatic sanctions imposed against it by the West, with the US 
leading the onslaught. Despite its phillipics, Warsaw was careful in 
the beginning to avoid severing all its links with capitalist 
countries. But such efforts proved unfruitful, even despite a certain 
lack of unity in the Western camp.
With the imposition of a state of war, the Polish military 
authorities proceeded to consolidate their power over society. At the 
same time, their domestic policies continued to have important foreign 
implications. In Chapter 4, attention is focused on the 'fraternal 
context* and examines the immediate reactions of the PRL*s allies. 
Succession problems in the Soviet Union contributed to undermine 
Warsaw's ability to undertake fundamental steps in improving the 
internal situation. The overall aim was to restore ' socialist 
normality* and ensure the stability of the country within the Soviet 
bloc. Moscow's restraint and caution underlined the fact that it saw 
Jaruzelski*s coup d'£tat as a temporary measure, designed to pave the 
way for the restoration of orthodox Party rule. The first months of 
martial law witnessed efforts by the authorities to eliminate any 
organized oppositional structure and its determination to reinforce 
its repressive policies. Such policies directly affected the PRL*s 
relations with its former Western economic and diplomatic partners. 
Needing more than ever financial aid from the capitalist countries, 
Warsaw .was faced with the dilemma of reconciling its economic needs
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with the the political necessities of returning to the status quo 
ante, a situation the Western governments were unwilling to support.
, The decision to suspend the stringencies of the state of war in 
December 1982 changed little to the overall situation. The process of 
restoring the primacy of the Party was proceeding at a slow pace. 
Jaruzelski's calls for a 'national reconciliation' went unheard for 
the majority of Poles. Without public support for its policies, the 
Polish regime was compelled to strengthen its position and do little 
else besides. The decision to suspend the state of war is examined in 
chapter 5. Though it was an attempt to convince the outside world that 
the situation was returning to normal, it failed to achieve this goal. 
After a period of forced inactivity, underground 'opposition' began to 
reappear on the political stage. The second papal visit, in June 1983, 
was an attempt by the authorities to support their claims, at home as 
well as abroad, that their policies had been vindicated. It also 
opened the road to the formal lifting of the state of war.
After some eighteen months of martial law rigours, the decision to 
de-militarize the country, indicated that the regime was now feeling 
confident enough that the worst had been weathered. It now began in 
earnest the process of 'internal and external normalization'. On the 
Western front, the situation remained unchanged. Chapter 6 examines 
the Polish ruling establishment's vain efforts to implement a coherent 
policy in this respect and its endeavours to extricate the PRL from 
its international isolation. It pays also special attention to two 
crucial events affecting the internal situation in the country, 
namely, the 1984 People's Council elections and the death of father 
Jerzy Popieluszko, an event which represented, a turning point in the 
PRL's history. The same year, it became increasingly clear that the 
Western sanctions were beginning to outlive their usefulness. Contacts 
between the PRL and Western officials improved slightly, especially in 
the wake of the 1984 amnesties. But still, it was far from 
satisfactory to Warsaw. Showing no signs that he was prepared to 
implement far-reaching reforms, Jaruzelski*s intransigence to Western 
demands for a dialogue between * the authorities and the Church and 
Solidarity, ensured that the process of external normalization would 
be a slow one. Though the country had been pacified, it was still far 
from having been 'normalized'. The Western stand inevitably forced the 
PRL to look eastward. Though the process of external normalization was
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primarily directed at the West, it was also aimed at the Soviet Union 
and its allies. With the stabilization of the internal situation, 
Warsaw sought to regain its coveted number two place within the 
socialist community. On the whole, however, the Kremlin leaders, beset 
by succession problems, were only concerned that the situation in the 
PRL should remain stable. Meanwhile, the Jaruzelski regime was at 
pains to form a coherent policy-making.
With the advent of Mikhai'l Gorbachev, the primacy of external 
relations in the PRL's policy-making once again surfaced in all its 
importance. Chapter 7 describes the consequences the new Soviet 
leadership had on Soviet-Polish relations and the effects the new mood 
in the Kremlin had on the internal processes in the PRL. For the first 
time since December 1981, the Polish leadership was forced to 
radically alter its domestic policy-making and adapt it to the changes 
taking place in the Soviet Union. For Moscow, the best way to ensure 
that the Polish problem would not impede the domestic developments in 
the USSR was to allow the Polish General a greater level of 
independence in the running of internal Polish affairs. Gorbachev 
promptly pledged full support for Jaruzelski, and ensured the return 
of the PRL as the Soviet Union's closest ally. The 10th PZPR Congress 
marked the apotheosis of the normalization policies in the PRL and an 
alignment by Warsaw on the new directions set by Soviet policy-making. 
After nearly 5 years of rule, the Jaruzelski rdgime was still in a 
quandary as to how to implement the necessary changes in Polish 
society and ensure the continuity of the system. The first signs 
appeared that the leadership was considering greater public 
participation the running of the country, but this 'liberalization* 
was taking place against a background of reticence by the ruling 
establishment to relinquish any of its control and power over society. 
Continuing economic problems were making the* more urgent radical 
structural changes in the PRL. With a new ddtente emerging between the 
superpowers, the PRL's task to regain its international status was 
eased. Following new amnesties, the Western powers decided to slowly 
lift the curtain of isolation over the PRL.
With perestrol'ka and glasnost shaping the internal developments in 
the Soviet Union, the Polish rdgime followed the lead by implementing 
its own version of the 'socialist renewal'. The implications of the 
Gorbachev phenomenon opened new ways for the Polish regime to deal
Xwith the stagnant situation in the PRL. The domestic situation was 
still causing problems to the Polish leadership, with renewed attempts 
to counter the Polish Church's influence in Polish society, and the 
realization that all efforts' to muzzle the 'opposition* had failed. 
The third papal visit emphasized the continuing deadlock between the 
authorities and society. Just as external factors greatly influenced 
the conduct of the PRL's internal policy-making, the evolution of the 
internal situation played an important role in solving the continuing 
deadlock in Warsaw's relations with the West. Chapter 8 highlights 
this link and describes the Polish leadership's successful bid to 
return the PRL on the international stage in 1987. It was only in 
1988, however, that the authorities finally began making concrete 
steps to achieve a compromise with Polish society. With the signing of 
the April 1989 Agreement, the Polish political scene saw the re­
appearance of Solidarity as a legal organization, allowed to conduct 
its own campaign in view of the forthcoming parliamentary elections. 
By itself, the Round Table had a significant effect on Western 
perceptions and attitudes to the PRL, and foreshadowed a general 
Western re-assessment of its policy towards the Soviet bloc. The more 
recent developments in the PRL, once again have ramifieations extending 
well beyond Polish borders. In many ways, what is now happening in the 
PRL is of great importance, not only for the future of the European 
continent, but also, in particular, for Gorbachev and his policies. 
Perhaps never before since 1945, has the fate of the Polish nation 
been so crucial to the Kremlin leaders.
Ktdry skrzywdzlied czlowieka prostego 
Smiechem nad krzywdg jego wybuchaj§c,
Gromadg blazndw kolo siebie maj§c 
Na pomieszanie dobrego 1 zlego,
Chodby przed tob$ wszyscy si$ klonili 
Cnot§ i mgdrodd tobie przypisuj^c,
Ztote medale na twoj§ czesd kuj$c,
Radzi ie jeszcze dzieh jeden przeiyli,
Nie b§dd bezpieczny. Poeta pamigta.
Moiesz go zabid - narodzi si§ nowy.
Spisane b§d$ czyny i rozmowy.
Lepszy dla ciebie bylby dwit zimowy 
I sznur 1 ga2$d pod ci$2arem zgifta.
Czeslaw Milosz 1950
(You who wronged a simple man,
Bursting into laughter at the crime,
And kept a crowd of fools around you,
Mixing good and evil to blur the line,
Though everyone bowed down before you 
Saying Virtue and.Wisdom lit your way,
Striking gold medals in your honour 
And glad to have survived another day,
- Do not feel safe. The poet remembers.
You can slay him, but another is always born.
The words are written down, the deed, the date.
You could have done better with a winter's dawn,
And a rope, and a branch bent down beneath your weight. )
These words have been carved on the Gdahsk monument 
outside the Lenin shipyards in memory of those workers 
killed during the 1970 troubles. *
* Czeslaw Hilosz, 'Ktdry Skrzywdziles', Swiatlo dzienne, Poezje, Czytelnik, Warszawa, 
1988. The English translation is froo Noraan Davies, Heart o f Europe, Oxford, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 1986, p, 384.
- 1 -
Kto sif dzis jeszcze w dzieje nasze uczyta 
Powie o polskiej "pospolitej rzeczy"
"Niepospollta".
C. Norwid (1795-1862)
(If still today, somebody would 
read [ wcyta] into our history, 
he would see that the 'Common- 
Polish-Wealth' was not common.
CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION
1. 1 Thesis.
For now over 200 years, and apart from a short interlude of 21 
years of independence, Poland's fate has hung in foreign capitals. To 
this day, Poland's internal affairs have been dominated, to various 
degrees and according to the times, by external pressures. Ever since 
the First Partition (1773), the main political debate in Poland has 
centred around ways of resisting and eventually throwing out of the 
country the oppressive invaders, in other words how to regain 
independence. Years of oppression made particularly intense the 
Romantic experience in Poland, with its fascination for folklore, 
historical traditions, medieval legends, the supernatural, heroes and 
heroines larger than life, and the cult of freedom. To this day this 
has remained a lasting characteristic of the Polish national 
consciousness. This romantic vision (also referred to as Idealism) 
frequently used to explain the Polish insurrectionary tradition, found 
in Positivism its greatest adversary. The so-called realists rejected 
the poetry and drama of the Romantics and turned instead to social and 
economic themes, often advocating a conciliatory, more constructive 
and pragmatic approach to the nation's ills. Ever since, the Polish
political debate has been divided between these two camps. Despite 
their differences, whether Positivists or Romantics, Poles have always 
associated their lack of independence and sovereignty to their 
country's geo-political position and to the nature of their 
neighbours.’ The country's destiny thus became intertwined with 
changes in the international scene and in particular on the European 
continent. This relation, therefore, between Poland's domestic affairs 
and the wider stage of international developments has become a complex 
and separate factor in the history of the Polish nation. Indeed, one
may identify the origins of this enduring trait in the year 1386 when
Jadwiga of Anjou married Jagiello, Grand Duke of Lithuania. This 
single union implied much more than the usual type of dynastic 
marriage so often celebrated in European history. It gave rise to 
enormous changes in both countries. Their formal Union into the Polish 
Commonwealth, sealed by the Treaty of Lublin (1569), was in itself, 
and to use a fashionable term, a complete 'restructurization' of the 
internal lives of both nations. Ever since, the great periods of 
Polish history have always witnessed a strong link between domestic 
and foreign variables. The two centuries of war with the Turkish 
Empire were identified as a religious duty. It differed from the
Crusades by taking place on Poland's borders and thereby was touching 
upon the very survival of the nation. The period of the Partitions 
(1775-1795) also emphasized the inseparability of domestic and foreign 
determinants in the Polish struggle to regain its independence and
found its best description in the famous slogan Za wasza wolno£d 1 
nasz§ - for your freedom and ours. The most extreme form of the 
foreign-domestic linkage was to be found in the Messianic 
interpretation of Poland's role in the international affairs of the 
time. More recently, the short existence of the independent Poland of
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Marshal Jbzef Pilsudski (1921-1939) demonstrated the crucial 
importance of external developments for the future of the internal 
well-being of the Polish nation. Thus, this prymat polityki 
zewnftrznej or primacy of external relations, is an unusually 
determinant factor in explaining and understanding the internal 
developments of this country. This persistent primacy of external over 
internal developments has been and remains the major characteristic of 
Polish policy-making.2 Its permanence stems from a Polish tradition 
whereby, for centuries, Poles have been linking the fate of their 
internal affairs with external ones. This can of course be explained - 
but only partly - by Poland's geo-political position on the European 
continent. This was, however, a sufficient but not a necessary cause. 
One can easily think of states whose position on the map resembled 
that of Poland's, and where in fact this tradition does not exist. For 
instance, in the case of the independent state of Hyderabad, in the 
British Indian Empire, the foreign-domestic linkage was hardly 
noticeable, domestic events in the state being of no interest to the 
British (unless they affected British interests outside the state). 
The Polish prymat polityki zewn§trznej may also be explained - though 
more vaguely - by the specific Polish national character, shaped, 
among other things, by centuries of fighting to preserve the national 
identity of a nation repeatedly invaded and subjected to geographical, 
cultural, political, and military assimilation by the invading powers.
On the eve of the year 2000, the link between foreign and domestic 
policy remains unchanged. The Polish People's Republic (PRL3) forms 
part of a political bloc led by the Soviet Union, where the lesser 
countries can be compared to vassals in their relation with their 
Soviet overlord. Accordingly, the influence of Moscow's policies on
- 4 -
the PRL has meant that Warsaw* s room of manoeuvre had always been
fairly limited, and at times, totally constrained. Soviet tutelage
remains the norm. At the same time, to seek an explanation of
developments in the PRL solely in terms of Soviet policies, would be
too limited to fully understand the existing complexities which shape 
the nature of the country's internal and external developments. The 
exclusive focus on the Soviet Union as the arbiter, for instance of 
the foreign policy process, precludes the analysis of otherwise 
interesting problems. It ignores areas where the interest of the
Soviet Union and its allies converge; it excludes by definition any 
change that the individual Eastern Central European states (ie. the 
European countries presently members of the Soviet bloc) might be 
relatively successful in legitimately implementing to defend their own 
interests in the 'bargaining process' with the socialist alliance. 
Last, but not least, it excludes all possibility that events and
policy concerns in East Central Europe might have a reciprocal 
modifying impact on Soviet policy.* It is for this reason, therefore, 
that socialist Poland policy-making in the 1980s must be seen above 
all in the light of a complex relationship between foreign and
domestic policy issues. It will be argued here that the link between 
domestic and foreign policy-making in the case of the PRL is essential 
to study if a thorough analysis of the country's internal and external 
politics is to be attempted. Unlike other countries, it is difficult 
to have a clear picture of Poland without grasping the importance of 
this link. Even the slightest internal or external event has its 
importance for the fate of this country, much more for instance, than 
in the case of Great Britain or France. Even if we dismiss this
comparison, since these are independent and sovereign states, it is 
easy to see that the foreign-domestic link in Romania and Bulgaria is
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insignificant when compared with the PRL. The difference may be a 
matter of degree but this distinction alone is very important. In 
Romania, often described by Western analysts as possessing 'an 
independent foreign policy', this so-called greater 'independence' in 
the conduct of foreign affairs has meant very little for the internal 
life of the country (except perhaps for the Ceaucescu dynasty). Just 
as for Bulgaria, the link between domestic and foreign policy remains 
practically non-existent. In the PRL, on the other hand, it would seem 
to be an intrinsic factor essential in determining and explaining the 
social, political and economic life of this country.
This thesis is thus an attempt to highlight and demonstrate this 
perceived inseparability of the two sets of policy-making and their 
interdependence on one another. Its central purpose will be to look at 
the relationship between Polish foreign and domestic policy-making in 
the aftermath of the 1960s events up to the present time. Covering a 
period starting in December 1981, with the imposition of a state of
war in the PRL, and ending seven years later (1987), with the return
of normal (ie. pre-December 1981) diplomatic and economic relations 
with non-communist countries, this study will attempt to highlight the 
correlation between the PRL's objectives at home and abroad.
From the beginning, it was clear that the topic in question would 
be a very large one indeed to tackle. Recent developments in the PRL 
and the rest of the socialist bloc have further made this study, 
almost a never ending task to accomplish. All the same, the
conclusions drawn seem to be Confirmed rather than refuted and 
therefore the self-imposed limitation on the scope of this study
should not be seen as detrimental to the value of the dissertation as 
a whole. For the purpose of a case-study into the domestic-foreign
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linkage, the period under consideration would therefore appear to be 
well-suited for such an analysis. Domestic developments within the 
country had a profound impact on the nature of Polish foreign policy 
and similarly the impact of the latter determined significant aspects 
of the domestic policy-making. The regime's attempts to regain a more 
respected international image were pursued alongside an internal 
desire and need to return to 'socialist normality'. Because of the 
slowness of this process of 'internal and external normalization', the 
evolution of the policy-making has been fairly easy to follow and has 
showed a clear relationship between domestic and foreign objectives. 
For the PRL, in the aftermath of the imposition of a state of war, the 
Kremlin leaders had to rely on the ability of General Jaruzelski to 
re-assert the Polish Communist. Party's primacy over society. At the 
same time, the Polish leadership engaged in an ' external 
normalization' of its relations with non-communist countries (at the 
beginning, the PRL also had to pursue such a policy vis-6-vis its 
Eastern European allies). Both objectives became inter-locked and were 
actively pursued by the Polish regime from January 1982 to December 
1987, and indeed later on.
The study of Soviet type political systems is often handicapped by 
the inevitable constraints resulting from a lack of access to needed 
materials. Yet, this has not and should not preclude any attempts to 
analyse them. It is for this reason, despite the fact that much 
information remains still uncovered, that the conclusions one can draw 
from analysing Polish policy-making in the 1980s, do justify the 
analysis presented here* While numerous studies of the foreign policy­
making in communist countries have been produced over the years5, 
those works concerned with a study of the domestic input into foreign
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policy have often only briefly touched upon the other side of the 
relation, namely the impact of the foreign input into the domestic 
context and the nature of the interdependence between the two
processes. In particular, the case of the PRL has not been examined in
any great detail as far as this relation is concerned. Possibly to 
date the most interesting analysis relevant to the PRL would be that 
of J. F. Morrison's short but helpful study of the PRL's foreign 
policy. c Morrison identifies the main determinants of the country's 
foreign policy-making and draws attention to the close relationship 
between foreign and domestic policies. While aware of the 
particularity of Poland's geo-political position, he makes the valid 
point that the combined effects of international changes and the 
domestic developments in the country since the Second World War have 
greatly influenced the nature of the PRL's policy-making vis-^-vis the 
international community and most significantly toward the Soviet
Union. These various inputs have not changed the basic political
framework but they have showed that in certain circumstances, the 
PRL's policy-making can be said to be displaying a distinct national 
flavour (the Gomulka line in the 1950s and the early Gierek years for 
example), where its interests may rejoin those of the Soviet Union. 
The signature of the Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the PRL concerning the Basis for Normalizing their Mutual 
Relations on December 7, 1970, recognizing among other things the
Oder-Neisse line as the PRL's Western border, was the culmination of a 
major objective of the post-war Polish communist government. This 
goal, however, had required the continued support of the PRL*s Eastern 
neighbour, itself eager to have the European geo-political 
configuration recognized by the West for reasons which differed from 
the PRL's own desire to settle the 'Western Territories' question de
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Jure. In fact in some instances Soviet foreign policy may actually 
support and strengthen Polish policy objectives even if these may not 
be identical with the Kremlin's perceived policies. The PRL*s position 
in the socialist community actually enables it to force some degree of 
compromise on the part of the Soviet Union especially due to its 
military-strategic importance within the Warsaw Treaty Organization.7 
For Moscow, the PRL is both a vital strategic country for Soviet 
military planners and the WTO's most vulnerable link. East Germany 
obtains most of its oil from the USSR via a pipeline which runs across 
Polish territory. The economic and military link between the USSR and 
the GDR also depends on the Polish rail system. Any major internal 
disturbances in the PRL may therefore always jeopardize not only this 
link but also the security interests of the whole socialist bloc. This 
has not, however, stopped the successive PRL leaderships from 
regarding as one of their primary foreign policy objectives, the 
maintaining of contacts with the West. In fact if one looks at the 
1970s, it is easy to notice the rise of the PRL's standing both in 
relation with the Soviet Union and the West in general, a situation 
greatly determined by the climate of detente. While it is not the aim 
here to analyse this period®, it is interesting to note how closely 
related were the PRL*s foreign and domestic policies during that time. 
The opening to the West and the massive influx of foreign investments 
were the inevitable results of a domestic concern to improve the 
everyday life of the Poles through a programme of extensive 
modernization and thereby demonstrate the viability and strength of 
the ruling communist system. At the same time, this economic foreign 
policy orientation meant that when the gross mismanagement of the 
Polish economy started producing its drawbacks, the country was 
already plunging into the depths of a catastrophic debt problem
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resulting in a rapidly deteriorating domestic situation: "the Polish
crisis [was] the first crisis of a consumer society, where there [was] 
nothing to consume".® To this day the PRL's foreign economic policy in 
the 1970s has left its sequels, so much that it is hard to visualize 
how the country will manage to extricate itself from its present 
economic problems before the end of the century. Yet it is currently 
and will remain for a long time, an intrinsic preoccupation of the 
regime to solve the economic crisis and through it, to try and contain 
the ever— present volatile character of the Polish society, to pursue a 
policy, both in the political and economic fields, largely dependent 
on a successful foreign policy orientation, both in the East and the 
West. In fact, the Polish domestic situation and the legacy of the 
1970s has made almost unavoidable the need for the leadership to 
pursue an active Western foreign policy. Of course this is heavily
dependent upon many factors such as the willingness of the West to 
develop diplomatic and economic contacts and the extent to which the 
Soviet leadership will allow 'experiments' within the socialist bloc, 
both in the domestic and foreign contexts. In the end, however, the
nature and vigour of the PRL's foreign policy will always be dependent 
upon the asymmetrical interdependence between socialist Poland and the 
Soviet Union. This will continue to remain the crucial parameter from 
which to observe the PRL's successes and/or failures.10
It may be argued that in the case of the PRL, the study of its
foreign policy can only be reduced to an analysis of the 
implementation of foreign policy decisions as communicated by Moscow 
and therefore can reveal very little of any significance. Add to this 
the fact that the traditional character of foreign ministries as 
institutions - stability and repetition - is probably the most
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enduring feature of socialist states, and one can see the difficulty 
in analysing the PRL's foreign policy. While the foreign policy process 
in the European countries within the Soviet sphere of influence is 
heavily burdened by geo-political and ideological constraints and may 
display little independence in its formulation, the degree to which 
compliance with Moscow is followed has often varied. Indeed, at times, 
this compliance has even turned out to be more of a burden than an 
asset for the Soviet Union. In the case of the PRL, as far as
economic, ideological and political matters are concerned, it was 
nearly always more of a burden for the Kremlin leaders. More generally 
though, the PRL's role as a Soviet proxy was somewhat more ambiguous: 
it simply never really seemed to be either a burden nor an asset.11 
This partly explains why Polish internal developments have often
determined many facets of the country's relations with its eastward 
neighbour. Moreover, the PRL's foreign policy objectives vis-A-vis the 
Western democracies have had a profound domestic significance which in 
turn contributed in altering in part its standing with the Soviet
Union. The foreign policy field is therefore not an area to be
dismissed as non-informative of contemporary Poland. On the contrary 
it provides an interesting and revealing medium through which it is
possible to identify crucial determinants of the PRL's policy­
making. 's
1.2 Method.
As it is not the goal of this study to provide a theoretical
framework of analysis due, among other things, to the recognized
difficulties of generalizing about a state's foreign policy over a 
long time, the intention here is rather to concentrate primarily on 
the linkage between the two sets of policy-making discussed above. For
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this purpose, the method of analysis will draw some guidance from
Rosenau's concept of linkage politics..13 The conceptual framework 
offered by Rosenau is not meant to be exhaustive or self-limiting and 
will be used only to identify certain essential elements and present 
them in a clear light. Consequently, the study will attempt to 
identify the main sequences of behaviour inherent in the linkage
between the foreign policy and the domestic dimensions. In identifying 
the various linkages, six main sequences will be implied throughout 
the text. Here are some examples contemporary to the period under
consideration:
a) Inputs, or the initial stage of a linkage - eg, the
imposition of a state of war in December 1981.
b) Outputs, or the terminal stage of a linkage - eg. Poland
under martial law up to July 1983.
c) Policy Outputs, direct or indirect, or the sequences of
behaviour that originate within a polity tie. the national 
political system as opposed to the society of which they are 
part] and that either culminate in or are sustained by its 
environment - eg. the militarization of Polish society.
d) Environmental Inputs, or the behavioural sequences in the 
external environment to which the polity outputs give rise - eg. 
the threat of a Soviet invasion.
e) Environmental Outputs, direct or indirect, or the sequences 
of behaviour that start in the external environment of a polity
- eg. Western sanctions against the PRL following the imposition
of a state of war.
and finally,
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f) Polity Outputs, or the behavioural sequences within a polity 
to which environmental outputs give rise - eg. The gradual 
release of political prisoners in the PRL.
These sequences of behaviour will be identified primarily through the 
perceptions, the attitudes, and actions of the ruling Polish political 
establishment although great care will also be made to include into 
the study the other crucial actors involved (the Church and the 
opposition). The theoretical framework thus may look something like 
the following diagram:
Inputs Outputs
>  e n v i r o m e n t  - - - >
outputs
In the interest of clarity the second schematic representation that 
follows attempts to sum up the methodological framework along which 
lines the study will evolve. Here only specific determinants have been 
included as an example. The model should be read as showing one 
possible way of demonstrating the interplay between domestic and 
foreign variables and should be only seen in a broad sense. The 
interaction between the two has been captured in a schematic form 
recalling a double-helix:
Policy-iaking
domestic domesticv \
-> Environnental >  environiental >  P O L I T Y - - - - - - - ^  policy outputs -
outputs inputs 'K
f !
foreign foreign
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It might be argued that the relation between foreign and domestic 
variables as it is presented here is another version of the action- 
reaction model of international politics.While opponents of this 
model might point out that this is only one aspect of a more complex 
relationship, the model hereby suggested is not meant to describe 
solely a causal relation between events. It simply hopes to serve as a 
guide for the understanding of the complex relationship between 
foreign and domestic policy in the PRL.
1. 3 General Remarks on Foreign Policy Making.
Domestic policy essentially takes place within the the boundaries 
of a given state. It is above all an internal process. On the other 
hand foreign policy is a political process which takes place between 
states (foreign economic policy is regarded here as part and parcel of 
this process). Both types of policy-making are regulated by different 
aspects and exhibit different objectives and methods of attaining 
them. Foreign policy is primarily intended to affect, and is limited 
by, factors outside the national political system (although of course 
internal determinants play an important role in the formulation of 
foreign policy objectives). This distinction however, is subject to 
several grey areas: the dichotomy alluded to above is valid only to a
certain point. How are the two interrelated? What similarities or 
distinctive features can one identify between the two? What is the 
relationship between the. foreign policy of a given state and the 
domestic policy of other states? One way of answering these questions 
is to look at the objectives of foreign policy formulation. When such 
objectives are identified, they will cast a light on the degree of the 
relationship between foreign and domestic policy and enable us to 
compare the two more adequately.
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Bearing in mind that they are primarily directed at the outside 
world, there are basically three types of objectives which can be 
pursued by an active foreign policy: fundamental, middle-range and
immediate. Fundamental objectives are objectives without which all 
other cease to exist and accordingly they become those for which 
maximum expenditure from the state can be expected (Survival of the 
nation, the defence of the state's sovereignty and integrity; 
ideological aims may also be included in this category). Middle-range 
objectives are less urgent by virtue of their aims. At the same time 
they cannot be ignored. Politically they may be concerned with the 
acquisition of new territories, about issues of national security. 
Materially they may include concerns for economic matters, for the 
general growth and development of the nation as a whole. Ideologically 
they may be concerned with the maintenance or spreading of ideals 
relevant to the ideological nature of the state. Lastly, such middle- 
range objectives also include the desire to develop the image of the 
country and its prestige, in itself a very important aspect of any 
foreign policy strategy. It should be noted here that nation-state 
security or the protection of the state from threat or use of force 
against it, is only one of three sub-types of security concerns. The 
other two are regime security (the pursuit by the state's ruling elite 
of safety in their position of political dominance or the search for 
legitimacy) and system security (the safeguarding and improvement of 
the state's capacity for mobilization of human and non-human resources 
and for value allocation). As the Polish case in the 1980s amply 
illustrated, each of these three aspects of security had both domestic 
and external perspectives. 1 c Immediate objectives represent short term 
goals. The state is primarily concerned with the realization of 
certain ends requiring immediate action as in the case of crisis
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situations for instance. These are usually at the forefront of a 
state's foreign policy priorities.
It is easy to see from this summary list of objectives that foreign 
policy aims rejoin, to a large extent, many domestic policy concerns. 
In fact the main difficulty of trying to differentiate between the two 
precisely hinges upon their similarity in terms of objectives. Further 
still, very often, foreign policy orientations have a clear domestic 
goal: raising the prestige of the state abroad for instance enhances
the policy-makers' own standing at home and contributes to the 
strengthening of their legitimacy (real or perceived). At the same 
time, foreign successes may act as a substitute for unsuccessful
domestic policies. Since domestic interests among the population rank, 
unsurprisingly, markedly higher than external ones, successful
developments in the external sphere are a potentially strong source of 
support in favour of the ruling elite: they can be presented in such a 
way as to raise the government's image and standing within the 
country, in the knowledge that few will be fully aware of all the 
issues. Emotional issues concerning the sovereignty of a country can
only too often be manipulated in order to distract the nation from
.domestic issues and/or influence it in a determined way. The Falklands 
War is a prime example of this, both from the Argentinian and British 
sides. The degree to which this holds true depends therefore largely
upon the state's own successes and failures in specific fields and at
specific times. The less successful are the domestic policies, the
more important are the results of foreign policy activity for the 
rulers, either to contrast domestic difficulties with foreign
successes or to explain domestic problems in the light of foreign 
developments.
This brings us to consider the general influences on foreign policy 
making which hold true for all types of society with an active foreign 
policy. First, of all there are the influences of the past, one of the 
most important constraints on governments. They either set limits to 
the policy making or stimulate developments. Second, there is the
quest for security, or the sum of security policies. These tend to 
blur foreign policy matters with that of defence. Thirdly, there is 
intelligence. 'No foreign policy can be stronger than the information 
it is based upon'. Once intelligence has.been 'collected', 'analysed' 
and then 'disseminated', it will start affecting foreign policy 
making. Finally leadership can play a crucial role in the conduct of 
any state's foreign policy.
While these factors represent broad influences on foreign policy, 
more specific determinants can be identified. Basically they come 
under two categories, external and internal. There are four main
external factors influencing foreign policy making: International law, 
international morality, external commitments and interdependence. 
While the first two have effectively a limited if not sometimes almost 
irrelevant influence, the last two are important. They comprise 
alliance restraints, investments limitations, the protection of one's 
own residents abroad, duties with respect to international 
organizations. All states are nowadays interdependent, some more than 
others. It involves some costs and depends essentially upon the nature 
of the relation between the states concerned. Internal determinants 
affect the making of foreign policy by determining what the state can 
do. An analysis of its capabilities determines a state's power. Four 
main conditions will determine this: geographic conditions (location;
terrain; borders; space, etc. ); material conditions (natural
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resources; industrial development; capital; technology, etc.); human 
resources (population size; national character; ethnic and political 
homogeneity, etc.); organizational capabilities (political 
institutions; adaptability; military preparedness, etc.). Finally a
mention should be made of the importance of values in the shaping of 
foreign policy. While it may be difficult to pin down exactly what a 
particular ideology really is, ideologies possess certain 
characteristics: by nature they are authoritarian, they are highly
systematized, very distinctive and deny the values of other 
ideologies. In relation to policy making, ideology (or the practical 
application of general rules) fulfils certain basic functions. It 
offers a specific view of history, presents an explanation of current 
events, lays down a set of values according to which the individual
must live his life, offers a social goal, lays down priorities and
justifies the loyalties of the people in the state. As a tool to study 
foreign policy, ideology should neither be under-emphasized, or seen 
as ’the sole factor determining policies. When ideology has only a 
minor role in justifying certain actions before they take place, it 
may have an important role in justifying the result after the actions 
themselves. On the whole, however, ideology can be more adequately 
described as 'the decoration of policy'. It fulfils a very important 
role for the ruling elite as a. justification tool.
Bearing all the above in mind it is thus clear that the following 
thesis will be prone to several limitations. A reliance on policy 
outputs as, the best indicators of the system's performance may, to 
some, appear too limited. There is also the problem concerning the 
central relation analysed here, namely, the foreign policy-domestic 
policy linkage. It is for these reasons, among others, that it is
- 19 -
important to stress again that the aim here is less to demonstrate a 
direct causal link between domestic and foreign policy making than to 
present a broader understanding of the different ways in which these 
two sets of policy-making interact in the case of the PRL. The fact 
that there can be no certain expectation that the linkage in question 
will be found to be either predictable or consistent does not 
nonetheless mean that it can be ignored. Indeed, it is hoped to make 
convincing the argument that, in the period under consideration, the 
foreign-domestic link in the PRL's policy-making was a determinant 
factor for a complete understanding of the country's behaviour and
actions. To assume that it did in fact exist is different from 
demonstrating it.
1. 4. Dramatis Personae.
In the period under consideration, one can identify four groups of
actors who play a definite role in the PRL's socio-political life.
Their respective importance varied with events, but all of them had a 
crucial part to play as the situation evolved. These groups can be 
summarily broken down into five distinct categories:
a) The ruling establishment in the PRL;
b) The Polish Catholic Church;
c) The 'opposition';
d) The Soviet Union;
e) The West.
Each of these groups (I stress the notion of grouping since in each, 
it is easy to see differing views and opinions) may be best identified 
in light of their respective aims. This ' differentiation may be of 
course open to criticism since very often their respective goals and
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interests can be identical or at least similar. However, for the 
purpose of presenting the actors of the Polish .scene, the following 
general comments may be nonetheless useful. Identifying the aims of 
these groups has the advantage of providing the base for a clearer 
comprehension of their actions, either as initiatory or as responses 
to particular happenings.
For the ruling establishment, embodied by the Polish United
Workers* Party (PZPR), the one main enduring aim has been to stay in 
power. Its role within the Polish state has been the function of 
international realities, not domestic ones. Through ideological 
justification and the use of forceful means to rule, it seeks to
ensure its own durability and stability. "The Party is the decision 
maker and the watchdog, the executive and the legislator and the 
control mechanism over the public and the private aspects of societal 
existence".,e Its degree of tolerance for oppositional views to its 
legitimacy have varied, but on the whole, it has always sought to 
eliminate any potential opponents.
The Polish Catholic Church has traditionally adopted an attitude of 
prudence. Particularly since the communist take-over after the Second 
World War, It has feared upheavals that might sweep away the gains it 
had managed to achieve. It has repeatedly demonstrated a concern to 
consolidate its position and defend its acquisitions. This has led it 
to adopt at times an attitude of compromise with 'the authorities in 
order to be able to act as freely as possible within the PRL system.
It has sought to introduce a societal plan in accord with the social
doctrine of the Catholic Church. Lastly, though this should not be 
seen as a short-term objective, it has sought to make some progress in 
the Christianization of Russia (the introduction of Catholic
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institutions, missionary activity, support for the Orthodox Church, 
help for the Uniates, etc.).
Political opposition is a notion deriving f rom a political system 
which is ruled by the principle of choice, competitive elections, in 
other words, a parliamentary system. These things are therefore 
incompatible with the hegemony of a single party. Thus when the term 
'opposition* in the PRL is used, one has in mind a certain range of 
independent thinking and action which has its own institution and 
personalities and not a societal group in the Western democratic 
sense. The term 'civil society' is often used to describe the 
existence of extensive groups and networks organized independently of 
the authorities, fighting in their own respective way against the 
model of social organization imposed by the PRL*s rulers. In the PRL, 
the 'opposition' comprises various tendencies, often at odds with one 
another on certain specific points, the main differences concerning 
the means rather than the ends. However, one long-term goal has always 
united them, namely, the independence of Poland as a state. A second 
long and short-term objective has been Freedom. A prevailing view has 
been that since those general but definite aims are realizable only in 
the absence of the Soviet Union, progress can only be made by small 
steps, in an evolutionary manner.
For the Soviet Union, the main aim is that the PRL should remain in 
the socialist bloc. During the Polish crisis, it was determined to
stop the 'Solidarity infection' from spreading. At the same time, it
C
was anxious to avoid direct intervention even if this meant the need 
for some compromise between the ruling establishment and the
population at large. As long as the PRL remains stable and projects 
the image of a loyal ally in ideological, political and military
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events were for some, an ideal opportunity to destabilize the Soviet 
empire. Others pinned hope in the first signs of a new socio-political 
movement arising in the whole of Central Eastern Europe. Yet, it 
remains true that for most Western states, upheavals behind the 'iron 
curtain' are a source of great concern for the safety and stability of 
Europe as a whole, although this preoccupation may be stronger among 
non-governmental agencies such as commercial banks which have invested 
capital in this area of the globe, than for governments. On the whole, 
Polish affairs remain of circumstantial interest for the West. 
Nonetheless, "in the international context, a source of Poland's 
misfortune is that the country is too small to impress the major 
actors in European politics, yet too big to be left alone".17 To the 
annoyance of some European powers, more motivated by their own 
interests of the preservation of the status quo, than by any moral 
criteria applicable to a nation constantly suffering the effects of 
their indif ference, the 'Polish question' remains to this day as 
actual as ever - much more than is often admitted.
1. 5 Sources.
Standard techniques of scientific research in the case of the PRL 
are naturally difficult to apply. Nowhere is this more true then when 
one attempts to gather Polish material. Although recent times have 
witnessed a marked 'liberalization' of the press and publication 
houses in so far as what is now being published in the country was 
unthinkable only two-three years ago, this 'Polish gJasnost' still 
represents only a minor step on the road to full democratization of 
the printed word. More often than not, political analysts studying the 
PRL have to wade through kilograms of material, deciphering all along, 
the veiled hints, the oblique references, the hollow metaphors, the
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hundreds of omissions, all of which speak louder than the actual
superficial content. It is imperative to stress here the overall 
unsuitability of Western terminology to describe the situation in 
Soviet-type systems. This is most strongly apparent with regard to 
economic data. The propensity of Western analysts to discuss the 
economic situation in a country like the PRL, drafting 'capitalist 
wording' on a system where they are meaningless (apart perhaps from 
the import-export distinction), had all too often rendered a very
inaccurate and sometimes distorting picture of the real situation. For 
political scientists, the main problem has been to come to terms with 
the official language and its plain disregard for truth. This reality 
should be underlined. In a closed society where a single all-pervading 
ideology dictates all of society's values, there is an inherent need 
for lies. Lies remove constraints: logically, from a false proposition
one may draw either a false one or a true one; from a true
proposition, only a true one can follow, and this immediately implies 
a constraint when this implication is transposed to a Soviet-type
system. Since communist authorities abhor all constraints, it follows 
naturally that they should encourage the 'institution of lying'. It is 
for this reason that a 'double-language' has emerged in Soviet type 
systems. A lack of accurate and reliable information therefore plagues 
the would-be Western researcher accustomed to the facility of studying 
his own country un-hindered by the kind of restrictions found in 
Soviet-Bloc countries. Inevitably, at times, a certain measure of 
frustration and disappointment may arise in the course of the
research. It is of course true that any study of the contemporary
foreign and domestic policies of a given country is often a thankless 
task. Though there may be an abundance of material available, its
nature often lacks the needed historical distance for an in-depth
analysis. At the same time, official documents may also not be 
available for consultation and therefore a lot of research work will 
involve a great degree of subjective analysis and the forming of 
conclusions which only time will confirm. Apart from official 
statements, ie. emanating from the ruling establishment, there is 
little elsewhere to look for authoritative commentaries or for other 
sources of independent information. For Poland, this is a problem 
which in many ways is not insurmountable as for instance in the Soviet 
Union. However, it remains obvious that in studying such traditionally 
'discreet subjects' as foreign policy, and especially in the Polish 
case, a great deal would have to be hypotheses based on a subjective 
analysis of the facts available. In this respect then, this thesis 
does not claim to have found magic sources of information. On the 
other hand, a careful analysis of primary source materials, here the 
flood of official statements and speeches, can all the same reveal 
many interesting facets of the policy-making process in the PRL. I 
have therefore based my research primarily on the contents of articles 
in Polish newspapers or journals printed in the PRL which form here 
the bulk of my primary sources. Contrary to what might be expected, 
they do not all reflect similar views, even if on the whole, the 
censorship office work ensures a certain uniformity of information. In 
the case of such publications as the Catholic weekly Tygodnik 
Powszechny, the censor's deletions are indicated in the text. Other 
available material published in the PRL appears with the mention 'for 
internal use only', meaning that it is restricted for viewing within 
the publishing institution in question, as is for instance the case 
for the Press Bureau of the Polish Episcopate. The reading of the 
official press is often monotonous, repetitive and tedious, 'the 
quality far from equalling the quantity'. Yet, quite a lot can be
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gleaned from this 'brick' language, enough to substantiate the present 
study. I have also relied to various degrees on numerous discussions 
with Poles during the year I spent in the PRL, gaining thereby often 
new revealing insight on particular questions, something not otherwise 
obtainable. This inevitably also lead me to consult the so-called 
niezaleine (independent) or Drugi obieg ('second circulation') 
publications, which have flourished in the PRL to a level unparalleled 
in the whole Soviet bloc. Although this bibula (the name given to 
underground pamphlets before the advent of Pilsudski's Poland) should 
technically be regarded as secondary sources, they form an essential 
part of the needed material to study contemporary Poland. Without it, 
no accurate picture of the PRL can be satisfactorily drawn. All 
translations are mine apart from the various quotations taken from 
Russian sources (and not available in Polish) and the occasional use 
of a fitting English translation. Western secondary sources were used 
selectively to enhance certain particular points. In cases where 
particular information was not available to me, I have relied then on 
such 'banks of information' as the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty publications and Uncensored Poland 
News Bulletin (London).
Chapter 1 Notes.
1. Some commentators sometimes make the distinction between the 
idealist and realist schools in Polish politics (for instance, 
Adam Bromke, Poland's Politics: Idealism versus Realism,
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1967). Idealism and 
realism are terms which imply too many definitions and for this 
reason are perhaps less informative than the 
positivism/romanticism distinction. Though this last distinction 
has equally not always been easy to sustain, on the whole it does 
convey more accurately these two main currents of Polish political 
thought. Mickiewicz (1798-1855) differentiated between the use of 
force in accordance with one's aims (positivism) and the aims 
according to one's force (romanticism): Mierz sil§ na zamiary nie
zamiar podlug sil!
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It is difficult to understand 
the history of a nation that for 
nearly three hundred years £. . . J 
has been in a hopeless position 
and whose only chance has been 
the stubbornness of people 
offering resistance to save the 
country from spiritual death. 1
CHAPTER 2.
THE ROAD TO THE IMPOSITION OF A STATE OF WAR
The 1956 Polish events heralded a series of domestic crises which 
have been regularly shaking the PRL since the end of the Second World 
War. The recurring nature of the 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976 and 1980
crises has rightly earned the PRL the attribute of the most volatile 
and unstable country of the socialist bloc. With the extraordinary 
events which led to the legalization of the first independent trade 
unions in Eastern Central Europe since the end of the war, the PRL 
became the centre of international attention. The impact of the 1980
events went well beyond Polish borders, with their implications not
being solely confined to the Polish domestic environment. At the same 
time, all along, question marks appeared, underlining the uncertainty 
concerning the future of the 'Polish experiment'. Already by the 
beginning of 1981, the first signs appeared that Soviet patience - 
until then remarkably controlled - was wearing thin, and that soon 
the day of reckoning would come.
2. 1 The 1970s and Beyond: Determinant Factors.
Since 1970, one can identify several distinctive periods of the 
PRL's contemporary history. Each one presented its own
characteristics and despite the inevitable continuity one would
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expect, each new period markedly differed from its previous one.
1970-1976. The first one, starting in 1970 and ending in June 
1976, saw the fall of Wladyslaw Gomulka and his replacement by the 
new head of the PZPR, Edward Gierek. His pragmatic and somewhat more 
open style allowed him to consolidate political power and restored a 
measure of stability and purpose to Polish society. 2 Under his 
leadership, the PRL underwent profound changes both in the domestic 
and external spheres. At the beginning of 1971, the new PZPR leader 
faced four main tasks: he had to consolidate his position within the 
Party, alleviate continued workers* unrest, increase popular support 
and finally he had to gain the confidence and support of the Soviet 
Union and the rest of the socialist bloc. Gierek's policies aimed at 
steering the PRL away from the inward looking, 'self contained* 
policies of Gomulka by re-opening its markets and re-establishing 
firmer economic relations with the West. One of the main points of 
the new Polish economic policies which were initiated at the turn of 
the 1970s, had been the official acceptance of the fundamental 
principle that the economy had to serve the needs of society, 
including the goal of bringing about a continual and systematically 
felt improvement of the material and cultural living conditions of 
the masses. Gierek was hoping to create a consumer society on the 
base of which he would build a 'Second Poland'. While the Polish 
Catholic Church argued that there could only be one Poland, the Party 
was now seeking to explain how a system basing its existence on a 
materialistic ideology was incapable of producing the goods needed by 
society. Thus, one of the goals of the ruling establishment under 
Gierek was to reconcile Poles with the principles of Marxism- 
Leninism. The main practical way of achieving this was through a
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restructurization of the economy by increasing both investment and 
consumption through large injections of Western technology, financed 
almost exclusively by Western credits and external sources. A rate of 
economic growth which became one of the highest in the world in the 
early 1970s <11% when the world average was 6%) created a dramatic 
consumer boom and contributed to raising standards of living (+ 40% 
in the first 5 years) in an unprecedented way; the growing climate of 
detente provided the opportunity for an opening to the West in all 
fields and significantly accentuated the PRL*s stature on the 
international level. In this respect the signing of the Helsinki 
Agreement in 1975 provided the Polish leadership with a framework of 
crucial importance in its attempts to balance the image of a country 
faithful to the socialist bloc and that of a willing and able partner 
determined to intensify all kinds of communication processes with the 
West.3 East-West detente had began in earnest in December 1970, when 
the Polish-West German Treaty was signed. It gave de jure recognition 
by Bonn to the PRL's post-war frontier on the Odei— Neisse. At the 
same time it removed the one profound justification for the alliance 
with the Soviet Union. However, by the mid-1970s hopes for a 
continued improvement in socio-economic aspects of Polish life were 
dashed, mainly through gross mismanagement of the national economy 
and irrational planning. Gierek* s main aim had been to convince the 
Polish nation that communism was compatible with high standards of 
living, comparable with those found in the capitalist countries but 
he apparently ignored the advice of his advisers who were somewhat 
less optimistic on the feasibility of this project. A In order to 
achieve this, he launched his own brand of Westpolitik. Favouring an 
import-led growth of the economy, the Polish government hoped to 
raise the Polish society's living standards as well as providing the
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necessary infra-structure to develop an export-oriented national 
capability, capable of competing on world markets. Export hopes were 
pinned on raw materials, coal and lignite, sulphur and copper and 
agricultural products like sugar, meat and other foodstuffs. Industry 
too was to play a bigger part, in particular shipbuilding and ship 
repair services, building equipment and the budding electronics 
industry. By the end of Gierek's time in office, the PRL had borrowed 
the equivalent of $ 20 billion, a sum equal, in real terms, to that 
received by some Western European states under the Marshall Plan. s 
But already by 1973, the Polish leadership were becoming aware of the 
pitfalls entailed in such a strategy which, in the absence of strict 
regulations, was beginning to create increasing deficits in both 
trade and current accounts. PRL relations with the West have always 
been asymmetrical - just as with the Soviet Union. The PRL is 
substantially more vulnerable to changes in market conditions or 
policy in almost any one of her Western trade partners than vice- 
versa. In the 1970s it sustained a large proportion of its imports of 
Western technology through trade surpluses in two main commodity 
goods, energy and food. But its vulnerability to market conditions 
ensured that import changes from Western countries became far more 
critical to its economic well-being than to theirs.e The failure of 
exports to grow in line with expectations (the so-called import- 
export gap) compelled the Polish government to impose cuts in imports 
and investments. Soon, sharp food price increases followed. By then 
the population was growing increasingly disillusioned with the vision 
of the ' Second Poland' Gierek had promised them. The price increases 
triggered a wave of serious domestic unrest. The June 1976 events 
announced the end of a dream for the Gierek regime. They highlighted 
the latter*s inability to implement a rational programme of economic
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development and provide adequate measures to offset the growing 
inadequacies of the national economy. The stage was set for a new 
period in Poland's post-war history. Growing domestic difficulties 
and the developing climate of ddtente between East and West combined 
to foster the foundations of a "deep transition of the [Polish] 
political system". 7
1976-1980. The next five years witnessed desperate efforts by the 
PZPR to halt the steadily deteriorating situation within the country. 
Growing indebtedness to the West, deteriorating conditions in the 
world economy, corruption on a huge scale and at every level, 
continuing planning inefficiency, domestic instability, all 
accelerated the day of 'reckoning* . The PRL* s economic crisis 
paralleled a crisis of political authority as the PZPR became totally 
divorced from the realities of everyday Polish life and entered a 
stagnant period. On September 23, 1976, a Workers' Defence Committee
<KOR) was formed, to defend and help persecuted workers by providing 
them with legal, financial and medical aid. It began publishing 
information on persecution and assistance and acted as an 
intermediary in collecting and distributing funds donated to help the 
persecuted workers.0 This was one of the first concrete indications 
that the Polish society was determined to organize itself against the 
ruling elite. Throughout the next four years, oppositional activity 
increased noticeably. Based primarily upon the disseminating of 
uncensored information and publicizing abuses of law, gross 
incompetence and private profiteering of public officials, it forged 
the social links useful for the creation of Solidarity in 1980. 
Another important event was the election of Cardinal Wojtyla as the 
new Pope in 1978. His visit to the PRL in the Summer of 1979 was an 
extraordinary event which transformed Polish society:
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It acted as a catalyst on a number of processes which were 
changing the position of the Polish society and its view of 
itself. It brought to a head the growing sense of the power 
of that society in the face of coercion, a sense that had 
been evolving over a dozen years at least. It brought 
millions together at rallies and open-air masses: people
came forward and counted each other. ... It was the crowning 
element in a build-up of the Polish presence in the world.
The Polish question once more hovered over the international 
stage. 9
1980-1981. In July 1980 new food price increases for meat were 
announced. This triggered the first strikes in Gdartsk and the Ursus 
tractor factory in Warsaw. On August 14-th, the 17 000 workers of the 
Lenin shipyards stopped working. Four days later they had adopted a 
charter of 21 points asking, among other things, for the right to 
strike and to form independent trade unions. Soon the movement had 
swept the whole of the country forcing the authorities to negotiate 
with the strikers. In August the government commission and the 
Interfactory Strike Committees in Gdarisk, Szczecin, and Jastrz^bie 
signed a series of agreements thereby answering the workers' 
demands. 10 In an unprecedented step for a communist regime, the 
existence of an independent trade union was officially sanctioned by 
the authorities. By September 1981, the Polish workers' movement had 
moved beyond the Gdarisk Charter to become institutional, both in 
independent trade unions and the trade-union federation Solidarity. 
(It should be stressed here that the term federation should not be 
understood in the western sense. Solidarity was organised on the 
basis of regions and not of trade. This was particularly noticeable 
when the banners unfurled during demonstrations always bore the name 
of a region rather than the name of a particular workforce). In 
August 1960 Solidarity had an estimated 190 000 members; by November 
its membership had swelled to 10 million of the Polish work force. 
The Polish workers' victory was due to the fact that their challenge
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to the communist regime had been much more difficult to counter than 
previous eruptions of discontent. A second factor was that they had 
learned from the experiences of 1956, 1970 and 1976 when their
confrontation with the authorities in street demonstrations had 
quickly turned into violence and defeat. Their use of sit-in tactics 
in 1980 were most helpful in this respect. Another important factor 
for the workers' victory was that for the first time in Polish 
history, the two streams of the opposition to the authorities became 
effectively joined, namely, the workers and a widespread movement of 
intellectuals. It is worth noting that for all the novelty such an 
alliance was creating, conflicts did occur, even if on the whole, 
they should be regarded as minor ones against the contemporary 
background. The workers-intelligentsia alliance did not go smoothly 
all the time. One may recall for instance, the accusation of 'acting 
like a dictator' thrown at Walesa when he decided in 1980, that two 
academics, B^dkrowski and Gruszewski, should be on Solidarity's 
presidium. These same voices were claiming then that the 
intellectuals were not needed.11
In 1980, the unthinkable had become reality. It will probably 
remain one of the greatest paradoxes in modern history, that in a 
state whose political system professed to represent the so-called 
' working class' , it was this very ' working class' which rose to 
challenge the raison d'etre of those who had now ruled the PRL for 
some 35 years in their name. In this sense, Solidarity had been the 
Polish Crondstadt for the regime. Like the szlachta, the Polish 
nobility who had in the 16th century coined the famous slogan, nic o 
nas bez nas (nothing concerning us can be settled without us), the 
Polish workforce, in the second half of the 20th century, expressed
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its determination to be involved in the shaping of its own destiny.
While the West apparently welcomed the rise of Solidarity (though 
perhaps more for what it stood for than for its potentially explosive 
consequences), the Soviet bloc looked at the Polish events with 
growing apprehension. Moscow in particular feared that the collapse of 
the PZPR and its capitulation to demands for a more open society could 
infect other countries in Eastern Central Europe. The Solidarity 
events represented for the Soviet leadership a clear deviation of the 
socialist norm and a true danger of directly affecting Soviet domestic 
affairs. This concern by the Kremlin was all the greater because of 
the worker roots of the movement and its potential attractiveness for
the rest of the socialist bloc. As Roman Laba described it,
Solidarity [was] the ultimate refutation of the Leninist 
model of the state. It [could] also be perceived as a 
refutation of the operative intellectual justification of 
the Leninist system - namely, the belief that the working 
class, acting alone [was] capable of serving its immediate 
material interests and incapable of anything beyond limited 
trade unionism. 12
Although the "threshold of Soviet tolerance for developments in the 
PRL was relatively high"13, the Soviet leadership grew increasingly 
nervous. Following Kania's re-election as First Secretary of the PZPR 
at the 9th Extraordinary Congress in July 1981 ^  Soviet media 
activity subsided for a few weeks. On June 5, 1981, the PZPR Central
Committee received a letter from its Soviet counterpart (it was made 
public on September 17). In it the Polish leadership was accused of 
losing control over the mass media and failing to oppose the enemies 
of socialism. This, the letter continued, resulted in a wave of anti­
communism and anti-sovietism. At the time, Kania's standing with the 
Soviet leaders was very low and all indications were that he would 
soon be replaced. Amid rumours of imminent direct Soviet military
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intervention, changes within the Party hierarchy were implemented and 
General Jaruzelski found himself at the head of the PZPR. Following 
the first (and last) Solidarity Congress in the Autumn of 1981, the 
internal situation grew worse, due in part to the authorities' bad 
will in their negotiations with the trade unions, and in part to the 
growing dissension and lack of unity among the Solidarity leadership. 
Impeded by its growing inability to absorb the huge growth in 
membership, as well the failure to politically socialize its expanding 
membership (I mean here the failure by the Solidarity leadership to 
clearly define a concrete socio-political programme understood and 
acted upon by the workers), the trade union soon became prey to 
personality conflicts. Jaruzelski, already pressed by Moscow to 
redress the situation, was further pressurized into action by 
Solidarity's National Committee ultimatum, threatening to call for a 
national referendum. In it, the public would have been asked to decide 
whether the communist government should be replaced by a provisional 
one unless the regime acceded to its demands for free local elections 
or not, to give its opinion on a proposal for union-state management 
of the economy and the drawing of new pro-trade union laws to be 
passed by the end of the year. External and internal pressures 
combined to hasten the impending climax.
1981-1983. On December 13, 1981, a state of war was declared
throughout the country. The question whether, and in what manner, an 
independent working class movement could be integrated within the 
social and political structure of state socialism, had finally been 
answered. During the 17 months of the duration of martial law, the 
military regime proceeded to ban all 'illegal' independent 
organizations and implement the foundations for a return to socialist
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normality. While repression dealt expediently but not entirely
effectively with Polish society, Jaruzelski used every opportunity to 
reassure his ' fraternal allies' that the situation was now under 
control. The Military Council for National Salvation (WRON) toiled to 
re-assert control by the authorities and supervised a thorough 
crackdown on Solidarity and all other forms of opposition. At the same 
time, the economic situation remained unchanged and despite initial 
aid from the CMEA countries, the PRL was forced to try to renew its 
contacts with the West, primarily in order to obtain the necessary 
credits vital for its development as well as for repaying a.steadily 
growing debt. Its hard-currency foreign debt was now reaching
phenomenal heights with a total debt of $ 28.77 billion ($ 15.5
billion to banks). It owed some $ 23 billion in long- and medium-term 
to Western countries. IS The military solution further excluded any 
rapid improvement in this sphere. Naturally the martial law episode 
had isolated the country on the international arena and increased 
thereby its dependence, economic and political, on the Soviet Union.
1983-1987. With the lifting of martial law, little changed. It 
wasn't until the summer of 1984 that the first signs of a thaw in PRL-
West relations appeared. Even so, the catastrophic state of the
economy remained unchanged as the external debt continued rising, with 
Warsaw even unable to pay the interest on the principal. Numerous re­
scheduling agreements were passed with Western banks and governments, 
but with apparent insignificant influence on the overall state of the 
Polish economy. Domestic reforms of the economy have failed to be 
decisive, partly because of the authorities' apprehension in 
elaborating too drastic measures susceptible of causing domestic 
unrest, partly because of the very limited scope of the reforms
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themselves. While oppositional activity has continued underground on a 
comparatively large scale considering the difficult conditions created 
by martial law, its effects remained limited. One has to wait until 
1987 to see the 'opposition* attaining new heights of real influence 
and action. The enthusiasm and commitment of the 1980s has been 
replaced by a greater degree of political apathy within the Polish 
society. This period of reduced activity, however, came to an end most 
significantly in May 1988 with important industrial unrest in some 
major Polish cities. Again in the Autumn of 1988 new strikes shook the 
country. The most immediate effect has been the wholesale removal of
the entire Polish cabinet later in the year. The extent of the Summer
and Autumn 1988 troubles, though important as they were, was far from 
resembling the 1980 events. A lot had changed since December 1981. 
This time much of the credit went to young workers, the so-called 
post-Solidarity generation. As such they expressed the impatience of a 
part of society which had become somewhat disillusioned with the
efforts of compromise by the Solidarity leadership and best
illustrated by Walesa's attitude in his contacts with the authorities. 
At the same time, they forced the authorities into altering their 
stand against the 'opposition'. The moral bankruptcy of the Jaruzelski 
regime and its inability to improve the situation, together with the 
general apathy, had resulted in a stagnant situation between the 
ruling establishment and the population. For the regime, inability and 
uncertainty in implementing long-needed reforms have stalled hopes for 
a rapid improvement. Further, there remains the crucial question as to 
how far it can pursue a policy of compromise with the people without 
endangering its own existence. The imposition of martial law had been 
one of a series of devastating blows to the Party's credibility in the 
1980s. That changes have to be implemented became evident, for society
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as well as tor the PZPR. By the beginning of 1989, it looked as if the 
regime had finally accepted that it had to come to a compromise with 
those forces traditionally opposed to its policies. In an 
unprecedented way, on February 6, 1989, there opened in Warsaw a
'Round Table', where representatives of practically all sides in the 
Polish society met to discuss ways of co-operating to solve the PRL's 
outstanding problems. The re-legalization/legalization of Solidarity 
once again, after several years of 'illegality', was on the agenda.
Developments in the neighbouring Soviet Union have had much to do 
with the PRL's domestic and foreign affairs. With the arrival of the 
Gorbachev team in the Soviet Union, there seems to have developed a 
greater degree of initiative within nearly the whole of the socialist 
bloc. Gradually the East Central European leaderships are being 
rejuvenated and a new breed of leaders emerging. Their ability and 
margin of manoeuvre will still, to a large extent, be shaped by 
developments in the USSR. Already there are signs that the Gorbachev 
card is also being played in Hungary. For Jaruzelski, the Soviet 
'new thinking' has been both an asset and a burden. It had given him
greater possibilities for independent action and for the pursuing of
the Polish 'renewal', with the support of Gorbachev. At the same time, 
it has put pressure on him to pursue a policy of constructive dialogue 
with those very forces which, not long ago, he was sending to
internment camps. The arrival of Gorbachev and his increasing
denunciations of the Stalinist era, has also further contributed to 
erode the^ Polish regime's capital of what it can give to appease 
Polish society. Despite all this, it seems that in the second half of 
the 1980s, the PRL had finally regained its place as the number two in 
the socialist bloc. This was amply evidenced recently, in July 1988,
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when Gorbachev paid his first official Party-state visit to the PRL. 
Then the Soviet leader said of his Polish colleague that he was 'a 
great friend'. He envied the Poles for having "at this difficult stage 
for Poland a man of great moral capacity, enormous intellectual 
capabilities, who loves this land, a great internationalist".,G The 
relations between the two countries had witnessed a turning point with 
the signing, in April 1985, of a Polish-Soviet treaty of co-operation 
on cultural matters. The concern of both parties to clarify some 
aspects of their joint history, was seen as heralding a new era of 
Polish-Soviet relations. It remains to be seen how far this will be 
the case. With the failure of a first economic reform, the apparent 
ineffectiveness of a second, and the irrelevance of a 'stage of 
consolidation', the Polish economy remains in shambles. A resumption 
of normal contacts with the West in 1987 may give the General some 
short-term help, but in the long-run, he will need a lot more than 
just Western credits to pull his country out of the catastrophic 
situation in which it finds itself presently.
2. 2 Some remarks.
Each period mentioned above can be characterized by three definite 
sets of interrelationships: 17
1. Domestic and Foreign Policy. While it is obvious that in any 
sizable state, the external and internal policy processes are 
interwoven to different degrees, the case of the PRL shows a very 
clear and mutually dependent relation between the two. The domestic 
policies of the 1970s relied heavily upon a fundamental foreign policy 
re-orientation to the West. In the 1980s, the impact of Polish foreign 
objectives and constraints had a direct effect on the internal 
policies of the country. The dominant presence of neighbouring Soviet
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Union has always ensured that Polish policy-making has thrived to 
respect Moscow's wishes and interests. But when interests for the two 
countries rejoined, the PRL showed definite signs of pursuing a Polish 
policy as opposed to a Soviet one. The direct effect of this has been 
used by the authorities predominantly for internal purposes.
2. Economic and Political Interests. For a centrally planned economy 
like the PRL's, ' economic successes' are of a vital political 
importance for the leadership. The more successful the leadership is, 
the more will its legitimacy be accepted. The crisis in the PRL in 
1980/81 clearly showed this: it wasn't purely an economic one but also
a political crisis. It had its roots in a gradual de-politicization of 
the Polish society prior to 1980 and a re-orientation of the Polish 
people towards a consumer-type society. Alongside this, there was also 
a deep crisis of confidence between the people and the ruling elite. 
The PZPR not only failed to win over the populace by dialogue and
consensus but also failed to bridge the growing gap between the rank 
and file and the party rulers. In the PRL, and indeed in every Soviet- 
type political system, the pursuit of legitimacy plays a major part in 
governmental planning. A certain degree of economic success ensures 
stability at home and creates an environment where the Party's 
leadership is less likely to be challenged. In more recent years, and 
especially since the Solidarity events, political and ideological 
arguments have fallen on deaf ears with the result that the regime, in
spite of itself, has found itself compelled to deliver the economic
goods if it hoped to regain popular confidence. Naturally this has
remained a very difficult task and all the signs point to its 
ineffectiveness. Amid the catastrophic economic situation, only 
drastic improvements in everyday life will bridge the gulf separating
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the rulers from the ruled. However, with the evolution in the 
population's consciousness and its distrust of the ruling 61ite, 
political gains will be extremely hard to achieve, even if economic 
improvements arise.
3. Western and Eastern-oriented policy-making. The PRL belongs to the 
socialist bloc. This reality ensures that the nature of its policy 
objectives can never fully be discussed without a consideration of 
Soviet interests. The nature of the regimes is similar in both 
countries and their relations resemble that between a vassal state and 
a centralized autocracy. In such circumstances, the PRL's main 
attention will predominantly be focused toward the East. However, by 
its very position and historical traditions, Socialist Poland cannot 
ignore the proximity of Western Europe. Culturally Warsaw is closer to 
Paris than it is to Moscow. This has meant that in many respects, the 
PRL stands astride East and West, being psychologically close to the 
West and physically attached to the Soviet empire. Thus the PRL has 
repeatedly sought to balance its objectives between East and West. On 
the one hand, careful not to upset Moscow, the PRL has attempted to 
keep and expand ties with capitalist countries while stressing its 
loyalty to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Polish efforts to
retain continued Soviet support for its policies and the desire to 
occupy the coveted place of 'number two' in the bloc, have been
balanced by a careful handling of PRL-West links. This Western and 
Eastern-oriented characteristic of the PRL's policy-making was best 
encapsulated by a respondent to the Do£wiadczenie i Przyszlosd (DiP -
Experience and Future) discussion group, who said that,
Poland cannot afford to cut its ties with either side 
(East/West). The ties to the East cannot and must not be 
broken. The same applies to our bonds to the West. The first
split would upset the European balance of power and would
have catastrophic political consequences. The second would 
contradict the whole of Polish cultural tradition and Polish
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history: it would strike at Poland's national identity,
leading to serious social upheaval. It would also be harmful 
to Poland's economy. We therefore have to maintain a 
specific form of equilibrium that distinguishes us from some 
of our political partners, but in no way threatens them. 10
2. 3 The Polish Catholic Church: the background.
One of the most important actors on the Polish scene is undoubtedly 
the Church. It may therefore be useful at this stage to peer into a 
short historical account of its role in the PRL. Although this will 
not have the pretension of being a complete picture, it nonetheless 
should give part of the essential background needed to fully analyse 
the period under consideration.
In 1926, Roman Dmowski, the founder of the National Democratic 
Movement and J6zef Pilsudski's lifelong rival and detractor, made the
following remark:
Catholicism is not adjunct to Polishdom, merely colouring it 
in some special way, but is inherent in its very core and to 
a large extent constitutes its very essence. Any attempt to 
divide Catholicism and Polishdom, to separate the Nation 
from the religion and the Church, then, strikes at the very 
essence of our Nation. 19
Nearly twenty years before the advent of communist rule in his 
country, Dmowski had identified a possible situation which 
materialized itself in the post-World War II period. Ever since the 
PRL's provisional government declared the 1925 Concordat null and void 
on September 12, 1945-20, Church-State relations in the PRL have been a
long story of conflicts. Overall the new communist regime concentrated 
on three main areas in order to break the opponent it saw in the 
Polish Church: a) to cut off the Church's relations with Rome, b) to
undermine the homogeneity of its clerical structure and lay 
organizations and c) to speed the secularisation of the PRL. Bearing 
this in mind, one may then identify in the post-war era three main
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periods of Church-state relations up to the imposition of a state of 
war in December 1981: 1947-1956, 1956-1970 and 1970-1981. In the first
period, the Church fought off attempts by the government to destroy it 
as an independent organization. The Church press was banned, its land 
confiscated. By 1953, several hundred priests and eight bishops had 
been arrested. The Polish primate, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyhski was 
jailed. The Church managed to survive this onslaught and went on, in 
the second period, to resist successfully all government's efforts to 
circumscribe its religious and educational activities. In 1956, the 
Polish primate was released and the 1953 Church-state agreement which 
had given the authorities the right to appoint bishops was abolished. 
A new agreement was signed by which the state recognized the Church's 
right to administer its own affairs while the Church agreed to respect 
existing laws and regulations. Yet, the thaw in Church-state relations 
was ephemeral, and administrative pressure now replaced the terror 
which had been used to break the autonomy of the Church. In 1970, the 
new Party First Secretary, Edward Gierek, showed signs that he was 
prepared to 'normalize' relations with the Church although the tactics 
now used were aimed at bypassing the Polish hierarchy and establish 
links with the Vatican. In December 1977, the first meeting between 
the Pope and a PRL Party leader took place in the Vatican. Throughout 
this third period, the Church insisted on the unhindered exercise of 
religious rights and came to be the rallying point and defender of 
human rights activists.
In 1978,the election of Cardinal Karol Wojtyla as Pope John Paul II 
radically altered the balance of power between the State and the 
Church. It is often said that the election of a Polish Pope and his 
subsequent visit to Poland in the summer of 1979 had an enormous
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impact on and was even the catalyst to the rise of the independent 
trade union Solidarity. Undoubtedly, the prestige of the Polish 
Catholic Church was enormously enhanced and since the vast majority of 
future Solidarity members were practising catholics, the new Pope 
became their embodiment of hope and gave many the confidence required 
to lose their fear of the regime. For many Poles, centuries of 
humiliation and oppression had now been put right by the election of a 
Polish Pope. As Helena Szczepariska, who had looked after Karol Wojtyla 
as a baby, was reported to have said: "This is the reward for so many
sufferings, deportation, massacres, all the indescribable torments of 
the twentieth century. We have been rewarded for not having lost 
hope".*1 The Pope's visit to his native Poland in June 1979 convinced 
the Polish people that they could organize the independent trade 
union: "it was precisely the experience of organizing the Pope's visit 
which became the psychological experience which facilitated the birth 
of Solidarity".** From then on, the Church found itself a new role in 
that of a mediator between the regime and the Polish people. It should 
be noted that the millions who gathered around the Pope during his 
first visit were not only believers. The visit was an opportunity for 
many to demonstrate their opposition to the regime and the 
totalitarian system as a whole as well as an occasion to display their 
immense pride in the fact that a Pole was the head of the Catholic 
Church. The Pope's election and visit also represented a milestone in 
the acceleration of the erosion of the Party power base which had by 
now well and truly lost 'the battle of souls'.
The unique position of the Polish Catholic Church in the socialist 
bloc has been the subject of admiration and incomprehension. Its 
existence and activity represents a factor of pluralism which seems
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abnormal in a society which is submitted to Marxist-Leninist 
principles. The extent to which this apparent paradox is a reality is 
one of the main differences between the PRL and other Eastern Central 
European states. In a political system advocating atheism as the state 
religion, nearly 95% of its population have been baptized as Catholics 
(by 1978) and a 1983 census counted some 34-id million baptised Poles 
out of a population of 36te million. 23 How has it been possible that 
despite attempts at destroying its influence, the way it was achieved 
in Czechoslovakia for instance, the Polish Church withstood all 
attacks against its autonomy and even reinforced its position as a 
major factor in the PRL's public and political life?2"4 To study Poland 
and especially its more recent history it is essential to grasp the 
significance of the Church's role throughout the centuries. In 
Poland's history, the Catholic Church has traditionally come to 
represent resistance to foreign dominance and oppression by non­
catholic powers (for instance, the 18th century partitions between 
protestant Prussia and orthodox Russia).26 One is reminded here of 
Mickiewicz famous verse describing his country as Polska Chrystusem 
Narod6w - the "Christ of Nations". As such, Catholicism soon became 
analogous to Polish patriotism and the Church the rallying point for 
all national sentiment. After the Second World War, the Polish 
Catholic Church emerged with its authority perhaps greater than ever. 
The Church had shared the sufferings imposed on the Polish nation and 
had itself lost more than 2500 members of its clergy. 26 Furthermore 
many priests had participated in the fight against the German invader 
and joined the Home Army (Armia Krajowa). 27
Although the Church's involvement in the country's public life was 
not new and reflected its traditional view of its role as the
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spiritual and moral guardian of Poland's destiny, the Church's 
approach to social problems and issues has always been basically 
indirect until the establishment of the Solidarity trade union. Since 
the 1960s the Church has gradually assumed more and more the role of 
champion of human rights of all citizens, regardless of their 
religious affiliations.20 In the past it had often refused to 
interfere in the political process conducted by other established 
institutions. However, with the advent of the 1980 social upheavals 
and the rise of Solidarity, it changed its methods of action and 
heavily contributed in the process of negotiations between the 
government and the workers. This represented a new and major 
development in the PRL's political life. Further, the growing dissent 
within the Polish population in the late 1970s and early 1980s found 
an echo in the values upheld by the Church which it came to regard as 
the only moral authority in the PRL.29 This convergence of views had a 
tremendous impact on later developments and contributed to cement a 
formidable alliance against the authorities. It should be stressed 
that the Church's role was very much limited to that of advising and 
despite its probable sympathies, it took great care to avoid being 
identified with the independent unions in any political sense. Yet the 
signing of the Gdarisk agreements in 1980 had required a direct 
intervention on the part of the Polish primate: the authorities had
agreed to the setting up of a three-men arbitration committee under 
Cardinal Wyszyhski's authority in order to break the deadlock in the 
Gdahsk negotiations. This committee successfully influenced both Lech 
Walesa and the government negotiators.30
Under Stanislaw Kania, the new Party First Secretary, an important 
development happened in Church-state relations: after an interruption
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of 13 years the Joint Commission of the Government and the Episcopate 
resumed its work. Set up in December 1957, it had met only seven times 
before being discontinued by the authorities in January 1967. On the 
other hand during its short revival, it convened five times between 
September 1980 and March 1981. This reflected in part the regime's 
attempts to use the influence of the Catholic Church to persuade the 
workers' unions to moderate their demands. What was significant at the 
time was the shifting of the balance of power in the PRL. The Party's 
disintegration was creating an enormous political vacuum which the 
newly registered union (January 1981) eagerly began filling. As the 
strength and confidence of Solidarity grew, so did the polarization. 
The primate's efforts at calming his flock's excited spirits were 
becoming more and more difficult. In a new climate of almost 
unrestricted freedom of speech and publication, and the existence of a 
10-million strong organized union, it was inevitable that the Church's 
role as the traditional refuge and sole basis for legal opposition 
should diminish. And the more this was the case the less would the 
Church have a direct influence on internal developments. Until the 
signing of the August Agreements in 1980, the Church's position and 
function had been exclusively defined in terms of its relationship 
with the state and the Party. It was now finding itself in a novel 
position, where the most important problems for the religious 
institution had been discussed, and in some cases solved by other 
social groups without the direct participation of Church officials. 
For the first time, the Church had ceased to be the sole 
representative of the interests of the whole nation in dealing with 
the Party.31 The illness and subsequent death of the Polish primate 
(on May 28, 1981), coupled with the attempted assassination of the
Pope in Rome (May 13)2*2, contributed to erode some of . the influence
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the Church had been perceived to have had over the previous months.
Nonetheless, the Polish episcopate continued to pursue a policy of 
mediation between the PRL government and the independent trade unions. 
On November 4, 1981, a meeting took place between the new primate,
Cardinal Glemp, General Jaruzelski and Lech Walesa. For the
authorities this encounter served as an exchange of views on ways of 
of overcoming the crisis and the possibility of forming a Front of 
National Accord that would serve as a permanent forum for dialogue and 
consultations among political forces on the basis of the PRL's 
constitutional principles. While the Church hierarchy welcomed the 
meeting and attached great importance to it, it was careful to stress
its own non-political involvement in the current crisis:
The Church and the episcopate are not a political force. On 
the other hand they have a moral authority. It is for this 
reason that their representatives, by their participation in 
the meeting which concerns the whole nation, are fulfilling 
a special mission, not a political one. . . . The whole of the 
Episcopate expresses the certainty that there will be 
national understanding, both in the form of finding a
solution to concrete problems and in the creation of a new 
necessary structure, one which would make possible the 
concentration of all efforts by the citizens and would
guarantee for the future, that misfortune will not repeat 
itself.33
The meeting achieved very little but was symbolically extraordinarily 
significant: by gathering Glemp, Jaruzelski and Walesa together it was 
consecrating the equal or at least comparable status of the Church, 
the Party and Solidarity in determining the future of the PRL*s socio­
political life. In a state where the omnipresence and 'leading role' 
of the Communist Party was supposed to be the norm, the November 1981 
meeting was truly remarkable and reflected explicitly the 
institutional divisions within the country.
The last direct involvement of the Polish Church prior to the 
imposition of a state of war took form in the sending of separate but
- 50 -
related letters by Primate Glemp to all deputies of the Sejm, to 
General Jaruzelski, to Walesa and to the Independent Student Union on 
December 7. The primate appealed to the deputies to refrain from 
passing the recently proposed legislation giving the government
extraordinary powers in dealing with social problems. Such a law, he
argued, would make it possible to restrict civil rights (including the 
right to strike) and would undermine the unity of the nation. The 
letter to Jaruzelski contained a call for the continuation of the 
trilateral talk on ways of finding solutions to the current crisis. 
Glemp again stressed the need for a dialogue between Solidarity and 
the regime in his letter to Walesa. Finally he appealed to the 
Students' Union to end protests at universities and colleges, for the 
sake of preserving the accomplishments achieved by the union in 
defending justice and freedom for science and research.34
The picture of Lech Walfsa wearing on his lapel a reproduction of 
the celebrated Black Madonna of Czestochowa or his use of an oversized 
pen bearing the image of John Paul II when he signed the August
agreements, bore witness to the importance the leader of the 
independent trade unions attached to the Catholic faith. Throughout 
the '500 days', evidence was abounding of the Polish Catholic Church's 
influence and presence during this crucial period. The Church's role 
as a mediator was accepted by everyone, Solidarity activists and Party 
members alike, yet the momentum gained by the unionists soon 
overshadowed the importance and traditional function of the Polish
Church. While Primate Glemp did make attempts to convince the 
authorities and Solidarity of the necessity for a dialogue, his own 
contribution was often muffled by the clamour of competing interests 
and viewpoints. The apparent regression of the Church's authority,
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especially since the summer of 1981, explained perhaps partly by the 
new primate's rather uncharismatic stand (to follow into Cardinal 
Wyszyriski's footsteps was not an easy task), must have been somewhat 
worrying for the Church hierarchy. At the same time, the Church's own 
experience throughout the centuries had amply demonstrated the old 
English adage of 'wait and see'. As the recognised moral guardian of 
the nation, the Polish Church's traditional posture had always 
emphasized the necessity for outliving all potential dangers to its 
homogeneity and slowly but surely strive for gains and hold on to 
them. From the beginning, it had consistently called for patience and 
restraint and although the Church did gain substantial benefits as a 
result of Solidarity's pressure (the inclusion in the Gdahsk 
Agreements for a live broadcast of the mass on the national radio 
network is one good example) it sought to limit its own contribution 
to the political turmoil of the times. Inevitably involved, the Church 
sought to portray, itself as a neutral actor and while this may have 
resulted in its losing some of its authority and influence to the 
advantage of Solidarity, the new force in the PRL*s life, subsequent 
events confirmed that while social movements may come and go, the 
Polish Catholic Church remains an immutable factor in the society's 
destiny.
2. Ar Tertiua non datur.
As Sun Tzu once said, "all warfare is based on deception".33 The 
road to the imposition of martial law by the Polish military was a 
well-orchestrated process which took practically everyone by surprise. 
Deceived in expecting a Warsaw Pact intervention, the West looked on 
helplessly as Polish tanks rolled through Polish streets. The Polish 
'opposition' left itself wide open to the military's round-up that
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preceded the announcement that a state of war had been declared in the 
PRL. For the authorities, apart from from a few mishaps, the operation
was swiftly conducted with a minimum of casualties. By then the
options left to Jaruzelski had been reduced to a choice between having 
someone cleaning his house or doing it himself. He chose the Polish 
solution to a Polish problem. As he confided in an interview, this had
been his most difficult decision as a mature man and soldier:
It was a very dramatic decision. But the further we are 
removed from this date, the more I am certain that it was a 
necessary and correct decision. Poland was threatened with a 
catastrophe. It could have set all of Europe or maybe even 
the whole world on fire.33
By Autumn 1981, all the signs seemed to converging in one direction, 
namely, that a climax to the Polish experiment in trade union 
democracy was in the making. Relations between Solidarity and the 
authorities were growing worse by the day with rising fears of an 
imminent confrontation.
On November 27, 1981, the last Central Committee plenum sat before
the dramatic turn of events of December. 37 It did not meet again for 
another three months, not until February 1982. The Vlth KC Plenum was 
meeting amidst a continuing deteriorating domestic situation. Even the 
Party was not left unruffled by the turn of events, with reported 
disagreement occurring within its ranks opposing the 'hardliners’, led 
by Olszowski, and the 'moderates' headed by Jaruzelski. No agreements 
between the authorities and the independent trade unions were being 
foreseen either. In fact the ruling elite appeared to be deliberately 
dragging its feet, perhaps a conscious move to resist the further 
erosion of its power and control over society and a reflection of its 
increasing inability to formulate a coherent policy in the face of 
seemingly unsolvable problems. The summer of 1981 had been a landmark
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in this respect: not only did it consecrate the extraordinary success
of the Solidarity movement, but it also testified to the 
organizational collapse and the morale degeneration of the Polish 
Communist Party whose hold over the primacy and monopoly of power had 
been seriously compromised. It is true that more than a month after 
the Solidarity Congress, rifts among the union leadership were also 
surfacing and this had the effect of weakening the movement's unity.33 
Nonetheless, the whole period was characterized by the apparent 
helplessness of the Party apparatus to come to terms with the overall 
situation.39
Replacing Stanislaw Kania by General Wojciech Jaruzelski as the new 
head of the PZPR during the October plenum (16th-18th), changed 
little. However, evidence that the situation was edging towards a 
climax was demonstrated by some of the actions taken by Jaruzelski 
only a few days after his nomination (by that time he was combining 
the three most important positions in the country: First Secretary,
Minister of Defence.and Prime Minister, historically an unparalleled 
attribution of power for an Eastern Central European leader). His 
appointment to the premiership in February 1981 can be said to have 
marked the beginning of the military's ascendancy in the PRL's 
politics, culminating in the establishment of its almost total 
domination of the policy-making and society in the course of 1981. 
Throughout the months which preceded the imposition of the state of 
war, the military gradually took over functions traditionally reserved 
for the Party. On October 23, Operational Army Groups or TGOs were 
being dispatched to over 200 communes and rural towns, ostensibly to 
check up on food distribution and assist the local authorities in 
maintaining public order. As subsequent developments testified, these
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measures were implemented largely as a preliminary step in preparing 
the ground for a military take-over. The deployment of these army 
groups was primarily an action to desensitise the population to 
military actions in general and also a method of gauging public 
reaction to them. According to a bulletin from the Information Bureau 
of Solidarity, on September 30, 1981, A. Siwak, a Politburo member,
informed those present at a meeting of a Party branch union in Krosno 
that a six-man Committee of National Salvation had been set up and was 
headed by Jaruzelski and General Kiszczak. It was also mentioned that 
special units of the army and the militia had been assigned the task 
of suppressing expected popular resistance. The Polish leadership 
would wait another two months before using these forces, until popular 
support for Solidarity had weakened enough to ensure the success of 
the operation. 40
The operation was repeated the next month, but this time it took 
place in all major towns and voivodeships. While the authorities were 
clearly engaging in such moves as a prelude to the implementation of a 
state of war, their actions and intentions appeared to have been 
carefully disguised behind what has been described as "a facade of co­
operative i n t e n t " . I f  one rightly assumes that the decision to 
impose a state of war had been taken months before its actual 
implementation, then it becomes quite apparent that the regime 
carefully prepared its final move against Solidarity, both on the 
domestic and the international level. The first signs of this strategy 
appeared when, on October 30, 1981, General Jaruzelski proposed the
broadening of the National Unity Front. As Thomas Cynkin writes, "this 
represented the initiation of a deliberate policy of deception on the 
part of Jaruzelski, with the connivance of the Soviet leaders, to lull
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Solidarity and the West into a false sense of complacency as a 
counterpart to the plans the Party was meanwhile hatching towards the 
implementation of martial law". 442
This policy of deception was expanded when on November 4, 1981, in
an unprecedented meeting, General Jaruzelski, Archbishop Glemp and 
Lech Walfsa agreed to discuss the October proposals. The meeting alone 
was enough to fuel rumours of an impending settlement. On November 10, 
the PRL formally applied to join the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank. There was an economic rationale behind this 
application: by adhering to the IMF, the PRL wanted to utilize its
financial resources in order to reduce the shortage of credits 
necessary for the functioning of the economy. It also hoped to use the 
prestige and the IMF advice to implement its new economic policy. 
Socialist Poland would be particularly interested in receiving credits 
from the IMF since they represented financial aid at the time 
unavailable on the capital markets. The costs of the credits would be 
less than those of commercial banks. It was also hoped that the PRL*s 
membership in the IMF would enable it to participate in the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development [IBRD] and 
benefit from sources of credits, even long-term ones in the field of 
investments, and particularly in agriculture. 43 But the application to 
join the World Bank was less understandable since the PRL would not be 
able to qualify for loans under this organization as its GNP per 
capita exceeded the maximum limit fixed by the World Bank. What was 
here significant related to the historical Soviet opposition to such 
moves by its socialist allies, effectively de facto vetoing any 
attempts by the Eastern Central European Countries to involve 
themselves as members of Western economic organizations (Romania being
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the exception). However, in 1981, this reticence seemed to have been 
waived, or at least this was the impression given. IMF membership for 
the PRL required the authorities to reveal data normally considered to 
be state secrets: central bank reserves accounts, monetary flows and
so on. It would also indirectly encourage a Western orientation of the 
economy. Seen by the West, such a move might have been interpreted as 
a genuine effort to resolve the Polish crisis in a manner highly
favourable to the governments and banks concerned. However, the fact
that negotiations for the PRL* s entry in IMF were expected to last
several months, and would surely be interrupted by the imposition of a 
state of war in the PRL, cast doubts as to whether this was not simply 
a way for the PRL*s authorities to mislead the international community 
as to the course the crisis was taking. Nothing revealed more the
extent to which this was successful than the American agreement on a $ 
100 million package for the PRL by the Commodity Credit Corporation 
two days before the imposition of a state of war\AA
The Vlth Plenum also gave some indication that the Jaruzelski 
leadership was now seriously considering the military option. The 
following excerpts from Jaruzelski's final speech at the plenum
clearly pointed this out:
Let all those who dream of a Poland without Socialism, 
without the Party, know that the Party is an organic and 
unshakeable part of the working collective, its ideological 
and political vanguard. This is how it has been and how it 
will be. ... There are only two ways for Poland and the 
Poles, ...| one leads straight to doom through further 
strikes, tension, chaos, anarchy and lawlessness: through
destroying the country, with ever worse living conditions 
for millions of people, through smashing respect for social 
order, kindling psychoses, hatred and aggression. That road 
ends in confrontation. ... The second road will lead 
gradually to overcoming the crisis. . . . This is the way of 
national accord.- ... The process of disintegration must be 
stopped. Otherwise it should inevitably lead to 
confrontation, to a state of an emergency-type (.Do stanu 
typu wojennego). At the same time it is necessary, in line 
with the resolution of today's plenary meeting to give an 
appropriate course to the draft of the law "on Emergency
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Measures of Action in the Interest of Protecting the 
Citizens and the State.AG (My italics)
It should be noted that this threat was not the first of its kind. 
During the night of March 29-30, 1981, a government emissary was sent
to Cardinal Wyszyhski with the warning that in the event of the 
general strike planned for the 31st not being called off by midnight 
on the 30th, the Council of State would proclaim martial law.443 More 
recently, in an interview for the Paris monthly Kultura by Colonel 
Ryszard Kukliriski who defected in early November 1981, it was learned 
that the idea of martial law had been first enunciated on August 24, 
1980. According to him, the first Soviet reconnaissance groups entered 
the PRL on February 14, 1981, followed on March 27 by the arrival of a
further 30 KGB functionaries specialized in defence and planning 
matters.46 A study of Soviet decision-making concerning the Polish 
crisis showed that the USSR had undertaken the costly preparatory 
process for intervention twice prior to the imposition of martial law, 
once in December 1980 and again in March 1981. In deciding what do to 
in the PRL, according to this analysis, the Kremlin leaders were 
guided more by calculations about their own particular interests - 
that is by power relations within the Politburo - than by 
considerations of internal repercussions arising from their actions. 
The most telling evidence of conflict in the Politburo over the 
military intervention in the PRL was the thorough reshuffle of the 
Soviet Ground Forces High Command which took place in December 1980 
and January 1981. From Brezhnev's point of view, allowing the Polish 
reform movement to go on for a time, was, at the time, preferable to 
intervention. 47 With hindsight many other signs showed that the Polish 
authorities had also taken early steps with a view to a confrontation: 
the military call up period was lengthened for those who were due to
- 58 -
finish in the autumn of 1981; a large proportion of the military units 
that were later to be used as support groups for the police in their 
dealings with the Solidarity movement and the striking workers were 
moved to isolated camps; the separation, into special units, of those 
conscripts of the 1981 call up who had membership of the free trade 
unions.
In fact, the closer we approach the actual declaration of a state 
of war, the more alarmist became the official line. On November 28, 
1981, speaking bn Warsaw television, Marian Wozniak, Central Committee
Secretary, said that,
Social unrest is being unceasingly fanned. Strikes are being 
organized and continued. This already constitutes a direct 
threat to the existence of the state. Forces hostile to 
Socialism, acting to the detriment of the real interests of 
the working people and of the state, are embarking on 
further actions with the aim of blocking and sabotaging the 
government's efforts and delaying the implementation of the 
anti-crisis programme. (My italics)
The same day the chairman of the government planning commission, 
Zbigniew Madej, speaking a couple of hours later on Polish radio, 
showed how much the possibility of a state of war was being discussed
by the leadership:
If the economy is anarchized to such an extent that we have 
to resort to confrontation based on force, then we will have 
to resort to this. But no-one will resort to it of his own 
free will because a war economy is also a decaying economy 
as many of us know from experience. Consequently a war 
economy cannot be salvation for ever. A war economy might be 
a necessity, a periodic necessity, but when all is said and 
done, one must try to make sure that an economy 
flourishes. 49 (My italics)
The Vlth KC Plenum's final resolution stressed the overriding theme 
which prevailed throughout the session, namely that the continuing 
unrest was presenting a direct threat to the Polish nation. The veiled 
references to the eventuality of a Soviet invasion, probably under the 
cover of a Warsaw Pact intervention, were legion at this time. Yet,
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and however real this possibility was (the massive naval and military 
manoeuvres in the Baltic - ZAPAD-81 - lasting 9 days at the beginning 
of September 1981, was seen as a preparation for what might be), the 
nation tended to regard this threat as more of a propagandist exercise 
on the part of the authorities to frighten it into submission. This 
does not mean that the Solidarity leadership had no consciousness of 
this danger. On the contrary, this was even the subject of bitter 
discussions among the leaders of the union who were often divided as 
to the correct position to adopt on this matter. While Walesa and the 
moderates within Solidarity tried to pin the discussion down to 
matters concerning the union and the Gdarisk Agreements, many of the 
delegates, disillusioned by the government's bad faith, kept raising 
issues which went beyond these confines. One of the documents in the 
final resolution of the Union's Congress in October 1981 was a message 
to the workers of Eastern Europe which spurred a vilifying campaign 
from the PRL's allies in the Soviet bloc, with the Soviet Union 
claiming that the Congress had been "an anti-socialist and anti-Soviet 
orgy". It is believed that the presence of this text in the final 
resolution was the result of intensive debating at the Congress, with 
the more extremist members of Solidarity insisting and obtaining its 
inclusion in the final draft.00 While Solidarity was mindful of the 
Czech and the Hungarian precedents, the possibility of outside 
intervention would have represented the end of everything it had 
managed to achieve in the last few months and as such had to be 
ignored, at least on the surface, for fear of constraining even 
further its scope and decisiveness of action. It must be also added 
that the Solidarity leadership's current perceptions of world affairs 
were giving them some indication that any Soviet invasion was unlikely 
or at least highly debatable for the Kremlin: international pressure
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might be a strong deterrent for the Soviet Union against intervention, 
especially since it was already heavily involved in Afghanistan; the 
presence of a Polish Pope in Rome and the military involvement of the 
Red Army whose battle against the mujahedins appeared to be turning 
into a Soviet Vietnam, further contributed in giving Solidarity its 
apparent sense of over-confidence. Indeed, apart from the Politburo 
in-fighting mentioned above, there were numerous additional factors 
which contributed to Moscow's relative passivity towards the PRL, 
especially during the two months preceding the imposition of a state 
of war: a) there were Soviet worries about the military success of the 
operation and uncertainties about the reliability of the Polish armed 
forces; b) there seemed to be an absence of any new ideas among the 
Soviet leadership as to what to do: "The most striking conclusion to
draw from Poland was that the Soviet Union was not any better prepared 
for the Polish crisis than was the Polish government or the West";31 
c> there was the question of the economic and logistics burden of a 
military intervention. If an invasion of Czechoslovakia had required a 
combined WTO force approaching some half a million soldiers, and 
considering that resistance had been minimal, then Soviet military 
planners considering the PRL, with twice the territory and almost 
double the population, had to envisage the use of a force of even
greater dimensions, the more so since all the signs showed that 
determined resistance was likely to greet the intervention; d)
diplomatic and strategic considerations on the international level,
particularly with the US as there was the need for the Kremlin leaders 
to turn their attention to relations with Western Europe in view of 
Brezhnev's impending visit to Bonn (November 22-25) and to the
resumption of US-Soviet arms limitation talks in Geneva (November 30). 
An invasion might also have strengthened NATO's unity on the Pershing
Missiles issue. There was also some concern that a WTO intervention 
would encounter Chinese opposition and reinforce the growing links 
between the Carter administration and the PRC. e) the influence of the 
Polish Catholic Church and the Vatican. Moscow was conscious that the 
Church might induce fierce resistance against an intervention, while 
the Vatican might well have encouraged the Church to take sides in the 
resulting conflict. The Pope had even allegedly intended to fly to his 
homeland in the case of an invasion.32
At the end of the Vlth KC Plenum, the final resolution recognized 
the need to equip the government with full powers and asked the Party 
members of the Sejm to seek a bill on this matter. These powers would 
include the banning of all strikes, of all gatherings except religious 
services, the transfer of civil court cases to military tribunals, the 
suspension of some censorship laws deemed too lenient and the 
tightening of restrictions on telecommunications and international 
travel. Already the day before, the TGOs had been removed from the 
countryside and dispatched to all major cities, one further step 
towards the impending climax. As if to confirm the firmness of tone 
expressed throughout the plenum, the authorities were soon able to 
test their resolute attitude by conducting what became a warm-up 
operation prior to the imposition of a state of war. On December 2, a 
combined force of army and ZOMO units (a special branch of the police 
used in crowd control) stormed the Warsaw Firemen* s Academy. It had 
been occupied since November 18 by students demanding that their 
school be attached to the Ministry of Education rather than to the 
Interior Ministry. The action was an operational success for the 
authorities and was significant on two major accounts. In the first 
instance, and this would be of great importance in view of later
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events, it had showed that the riot police and the array could co­
operate successfully and that a politically sensitive objective could 
be cleared with minimum violence and more significantly without 
provoking social unrest. Secondly, by causing the angered reaction 
from the Solidarity leadership and their understandable yet ill- 
tempered statements at the Radom meeting of the union's presidium the 
next day, the military authorities were later able to justify their 
'well-founded* decision to impose a state of war. What was surprising 
was the marked contrast to the spontaneous unrest which had been 
triggered in March by the Bydgoszcz incident. In December 1981, the 
public's reaction was low-key in comparison. For the authorities it 
indicated that a more passive national mood was prevailing at the time 
and that there seemed to be a growing resignation to their use of 
force. Answering questions in an interview conducted by Oriana 
Fallaci, Deputy Prime Minister, Mieczyslaw Rakowski described the
Radom Conference as the turning point:
The momentus of rupture was Radom, not before, when the 
Solidarity Congress had asked for free administrative 
elections, etc. Radom simply scared us. Because Radom was 
not only words. 33
On December 7, the authorities released an edited recording of the 
Radom Conference which suggested that the union leaders were bent on 
bringing about radical changes in the PRL using, if necessary, 
violence to attain these aims. In their efforts to discredit their 
leaders and divide the Solidarity rank and file, the authorities tried 
to make capital use of these tapes, laying in the process the 
groundwork for the crackdown of December 13.34 In his autobiography, 
Lech Walesa explained the unfortunate tone of the Radom meeting as 
unavoidable:
We had no chance of escaping martial law. Not one. Its 
imposition had been prepared ages ago; all that was needed 
was a good excuse to install it. Whatever we might have
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done, they were going to declare it, but they still needed 
to make us responsible. Therefore I chose the following 
variant: At Radom I became the most radical of all radicals,
I let myself be carried by the atmosphere in the room so as 
not to be excluded from future.events. Probably, I would not 
have been interned had I not pronounced that speech.ss
Solidarity's '500 days' came to a brutal close ten days later. An 
extraordinary period in Polish contemporary history ended when General 
Jaruzelski imposed military rule over the country. It signified that 
the independent trade union had partly failed to achieve its aims
(while 'material defeat' was inevitable, it may be argued that in many 
respects the 'Solidarity experience' had been a spiritual success). 
This was partly because it had underestimated the ruling apparatus' 
ability to respond to the deteriorating situation and partly because 
it had overestimated its own possibilities of manoeuvre. The
organisation had failed to develop constructive and partial approaches 
to ensure concrete remedial measures to the Polish crisis. A conflict 
soon arose between those advocating a compromising attitude towards 
the authorities and those proclaiming such attempts as weaknesses on
the part of the union. By overrating its own political position the
union made a fundamental error of judgement when it came to the 
perceived capabilities of the armed forces. Despite the remarkable but 
short-term achievements of the Solidarity movement, the inexorable
logic of Realpolitik saw to it that this would only be an ephemeral 
experiment. In retrospect, however, one can say that the one
significant result of the Solidarity era has been to change the
political awareness of the Polish society, a far cry from the initial 
victory aspired to, but nevertheless a significant enough achievement 
for Poles. It is often said that Solidarity won a moral victory even
if it was defeated politically:
Since the first Gdarisk Agreements, the Party won a political 
battle but lost a moral one. On the other hand, Solidarity 
achieved a moral victory though it lost the political
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battle. From this war no-one came out the winner: the
victors are the subject of a quasi-universal reprobation, 
and the vanquished are entering through the main door in the 
world of human fraternity. SG
Adam Michnik described the Solidarity events as the landmark 
signalling the beginning of the destruction of the communist system. 
He also pointed out that one of the greatest achievements of 
Solidarity had been "to educate our communists". &7 Writing in February 
1982, he summed up the situation in an admirably simple, yet accurate, 
way:
Solidarno6<£ knew how to strike but not how to be patient; it 
knew how to attack head-on but not how to retreat; it had 
general ideas but not a programme for short-term actions. It 
was a colossus with legs of steel and hands of clay: it was 
powerful among factory crews but powerless at the 
negotiating table. Across the table sat a partner who could 
not be truthful, run an economy, or keep its word - who 
could do but one thing: break up social solidarity. This
partner had mastered that art in its thirty-seven years of 
rule. This partner - the power elite - was morally and 
financially bankrupt, and because of its political frailty 
was unable to practise politics of any type. Solidarno§d
took this political weakness for overall weakness, 
forgetting that the apparatus of coercion which has not been 
affected by democratic corrosion can be an effective 
instrument in the hands of a dictatorship that is being 
hounded. The Polish communist system was a colossus with 
legs of clay and hands of steel.
Clearly passion had come to replace reason (the Solidarity Congress 
was the catalyst) and when the PRL's political leaders found
themselves with their backs against the 'Soviet wall', they acted
decisively, perhaps for the first time since August 1980: either they 
did nothing and their fate would be sealed by the 'fraternal
assistance', or they decided to deal with the crisis themselves. For 
the Polish leadership, the choice stopped there. They put into action 
the vast means of repression at their disposal and embarked upon an 
historical act which the Polish nation will remember as the ' War' .
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W innych krajach, jak slyszf, 
trzyma urz$d drabdw 
Policyjantow roinych, iandarmdw, 
konstantow
Ale jesli miecz tylko 
bezpieczeiistwa strzeie 
2eby w tych krajach byla wolnosd 
- nle uwlerz§.
Adam Mickiewicz, 1834.1
(In countries other than Poland, 
I hear, the government provides 
for thugs, various policemen, 
gendarmes, constables, where 
security is kept by the sword; 
that there, freedom exists, of 
this I will never be convinced.)
CHAPTER 3 
THE 'WAR'.
The mere fact that Soviet tanks had not entered Polish territory at 
the head of a WTO invasion, and that instead it was the Polish 
military which undertook the task of returning the PRL onto the path 
of 'socialist normality', seemed to indicate that an internal solution 
had been deemed more satisfactory to resolve the Polish crisis. The 
Polish card, much to the surprise of most analysts, had been played by 
, Moscow. But what may have looked like a solution to a specific Polish 
problem was in fact a solution to the wider problem of the security 
and stability of the whole Soviet bloc. It differed from the Czech or 
Hungarian examples mainly in its form and unorthodox implications. By 
allowing a Polish military take-over, the Kremlin was acknowledging 
the complete rout of the PZPR. Unwilling to draw the Soviet Union into 
a costly invasion, it had decided to commit one of the cardinal sins 
in the Marxist-Leninist book: to permit that the military supersede
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the Party.
The militarization of Polish society had numerous effects on both 
the PRL*s domestic and foreign policy-making. Internally, the state of 
war had been implemented with the main objective of giving the 
authorities an ideal opportunity to pacify the country and restore 
'socialist order'. Despite the severity of the war-like conditions, 
this process was a slow one, relying on force rather than on a well- 
worked out strategy. Externally, the PRL found itself completely 
isolated (except with the 'fraternal camp' ) in the wake of Western 
economic, diplomatic and political relations. After the brightness of 
the Solidarity era and the hopes it had engendered, a great ominous 
darkness fell over the Polish nation.
3. 1 The Domestic Dimension of Martial Law.
Almost eight years have now passed since what has been without any 
doubt one of the most important events in post-war Central East 
European history. On December 13, 1981, General Wojciech Jaruzelski,
First Secretary of the Polish United Workers Party, Prime Minister and 
Minister of Defence, addressed the Polish nation and proclaimed the 
imposition of a state of war. In an unprecedented manner, the Polish 
leader was introducing a coup a la Brumaire in the heart of Europe, a 
feat made more extraordinary by the fact that it was taking place in 
one of the member countries of the Warsaw Pact Organization.
That the military coup of December 1981 was undertaken with the 
tacit approval and support of the PRL's eastern neighbour is a 
certainty. Even if hard data on the exact level of this 'aid' remains 
unattainable, it is obvious that it would have been highly unlikely 
that the decision to militarize the social, political and economic 
life of the PRL could have been taken without prior consultation
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between Warsaw and the Kremlin. The mere 'miraculous* filling up of 
Warsaw's shops with Soviet and East German food within days of the 
proclamation of the state of war was one, among many other 
indications, that the fraternal neighbours had been consulted before 
hand.2 Indeed, it is in fact unimaginable that the second largest army 
of the Warsaw Pact would have been able to undertake such a complex 
and well synchronized operation without prior knowledge, approval and 
operative support of the Soviet Union. Yet at the same time there can 
be no doubt that the implementation of martial law in the PRL was a 
genuine Polish affair. As one observer astutely described it, it was a 
"specifically Polish solution to a task which had been assigned by the 
Soviet Union".3 In this sense the Polish Winter was markedly different 
from the Hungarian Autumn or the Prague Spring. The tanks of the Red 
Army were not to be seen in the streets of Polish cities.* Further, in 
the case of the PRL, the military take-over resulted in relatively 
fewer deaths when compared with the Czech and Hungarian tragedies. 
Official figures put the deathtoll at some fifteen people.5 Of course 
these deaths cannot bring any comfort . to those involved but they 
underlined the difference in human cost between a strictly Polish 
affair and a massive intervention from the Warsaw Pact troops. In fact 
the speed with which the Polish army took control of the country 
demonstrated not only the well-planned character of the operation6 but 
also the concern by the military authorities (by that time party and 
governmental decision making were virtually non-existent) to avoid at 
all costs . a bloodbath. In all probability its consequences, both 
domestically and internationally, would have been incalculable. Some 
doubts must be voiced as to the exact role played by the army and the 
militia. To this day it is still not entirely clear who controlled who 
and what exactly was the relation between the various institutions
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(Party-state-military) involved in the repression after the 
declaration of the state of war. In any event December 1981 marked the 
active involvement of the Polish military in the domestic affairs of 
the country, thereby elevating it to the foremost political actor in 
the PRL. Party-military relations in Poland since the end of the 
Second World War have moved from a stage of co-optation to 
subordination, accommodation, and eventually participation.7 By ’the 
end of 1981, a new stage could be added: domination. ° Although the
state of war was imposed out of a predominantly domestic concern on 
the part of the ruling elite, foreign policy considerations played an 
important part in the fateful December decision (the decision had in 
fact been taken several months before and its implementation had 
depended largely on the evolving situation). In this case the most 
obvious influence came from the Soviet Union. Despite the appeals to 
patriotic values in Jaruzelski's proclamation of a state of war, the 
strong and repeated references to the Polish raison d'etat highlighted 
the other eventuality which might have taken place. If this had been 
the case, there is no doubt that the Polish leadership would also have 
suffered the consequences of a WTO intervention. Though obvious, this 
is a factor which should not be underestimated in trying to analyse 
the decision-making process which led to the militarization of the 
Polish society.
Ever since 1980, the PRL's fate had been attentively watched by the 
West. During the months which preceded the imposition of martial law, 
and especially after the Solidarity congress, the possibility of a 
Soviet Pact intervention captured everyone's imagination. This was so 
much the case that this concentration of world's opinion's attention 
on the eventuality of a Soviet invasion contributed both to lower the
- 1 2 -
general interest in the fate of the PRL and to make any other solution 
seem relatively acceptable. Because of that, the proclamation of a 
state of war was seen generally by Western governments as a lesser
evil than a full scale intervention by the Soviet Union and its 
allies.
At 06: 00 on December 13, 1981, General Jaruzelski announced that
the State Council had declared, under Article 33, Paragraph 2 of the 
Polish Constitution^, a state of war for the whole country. The 
announcement, broadcast live, came some six hours after units of the 
riot police and the security forces had effectively captured 
practically the entire Solidarity leadership in one nationwide swoop. 
When the Poles woke up that day, they found themselves isolated from
the rest of the world. In an . unprecedented manner for a communist
state, the military was taking over power in a desperate and final bid 
to restore 'normality' to a country which General Jaruzelski described 
as being on "the edge of the abyss". 10 In December 1982 the film
Apocalypse Now was being shown in Warsaw'' and for a moment it 
appeared that the action was taking place outside rather than on the 
screen.
Before examining the causes and effects of the proclamation of the 
state of war, it may be interesting to note that legally speaking the 
application of martial law may be the effect of two situations. 
Firstly it can interpreted as a State of Emergency (Stan wyj^tkowy) or 
a "situation resulting from a decision by higher state authorities 
(head of state, Prime Minister) that brings various limitations of 
political and personal freedom in connection with a dangerous internal 
situation caused by actions, political demonstrations, terrorist 
actions, strike waves, attacks on the police, and other acts that
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threaten the security of the state and public order". 12 The Poles also 
use the term Stan Wojenny or State of War. In accordance with the 
Constitution, the Council of State may introduce the state of near war 
on the whole or part of the country's territory and proclaim full or 
part mobilization. The introduction of a state of near war is, as a 
rule, linked with a declaration of a state of war. The state of war 
may be introduced by a law (Martial law) or decree that describes in 
detail the legal consequences.13
One commentator argued that the imposition of a state of war was 
not a coup d'dtat but "a legal act by a totalitarian system incapable 
of solving a political crisis by democratic means".1'4 He supports 
this view by citing the existence, since a decree of November 21, 
1967, of a secret institutional body called the Komitet Obrony Kraju 
or KOK (since 1981 KOK has in fact made public the, announcement of its 
working sessions). On the basis of that decree a network of military 
and civilian cells was organized and covered the whole administration 
from top .to bottom throughout the country. This network was
constructed in such a way that the life of the country could be 
switched over from peace to emergency operation at short notice
without any special organizational c hang e s . W h a t e v e r the legal 
implications, the Polish military conducted a nationwide operation 
which effectively gave them the reins of power, setting the scene for 
a return to 'socialist normality'. Martial law was devised in such a 
way as to leave the authorities free to apply forms of repression of 
whatever scale and duration they considered necessary. Law was to
become an instrument of pacification and of normalization, a means of 
crushing all independent social initiatives, restoring the monopoly of 
the Party and strengthening its position. 'e There is a school of
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thought in the underground opposition which claims that in effect it 
was Solidarity itself which enabled the authorities to act in the way 
they did in 1982. This claim is supported by the fact that throughout 
the country, Solidarity activists were implicitly deterred, by the 
union's leadership, from using violence. After the Radora conference 
notes were circulated to this effect in all major and even less 
important factories and institutions. Despite some exceptions this 
self-limitation was observed and, so the argument goes, the regime was 
fully aware that the real possibilities of violent confrontation were 
minimal. Therefore, Solidarity's own stand on this question allowed 
the Jaruzelski leadership to act in the way it did with the confidence 
that there would be little opposition to the imposition of a state of 
war. It was clear throughout that Solidarity had never had any 
intentions of waging a physical battle with the authorities. Yet, 
since the military manual is full of so-called contingency plans, it 
is practically certain that some preparations at least were made by 
the Polish military in the eventuality of a civil war breaking out. 
Equally, it would be underrating the Solidarity leadership by 
crediting it with being unaware of the possibility of the use of force 
by the ruling establishment. Nonetheless, the imposition of a state of 
war seemed to have taken Solidarity leaders completely by surprise. 
Writing from the internment camp where he was at the time, Michnik had 
concluded that:
It was clear that the system would not willingly give up one 
iota of its power and that conflicts were therefore 
unavoidable. We thought, however, that things would run a 
different course. We did not believe that the power 
structure would seek to resolve social conflicts with 
military force by substituting the argument of force for the 
force of the argument. 17
Speaking nervously on television (observers noted the trembling of 
the General's hands throughout the broadcast), Jaruzelski repeatedly
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appealed to the nation's patriotic values. 13 In retrospective, the 
regime's manipulation of national symbols as a means to persuade that 
the interests of the Party were identical with Polish national 
interests was relentless throughout this period. 19 Never reminding the 
public that he was head of the Polish Communist Party, he described 
himself instead as "the chief of the Polish government", as "a soldier 
who remembers well the cruelty of war" and addressed his audience as 
"brothers and sisters", "brother-peasants", "citizens of the older 
generations", "Polish mothers, wives and sisters", as "fellow- 
countrymen". Stressing the Polish raison d'diat, he emphasized the 
critical state of the country, which, had it lasted longer, "would 
have led to a catastrophe, to absolute chaos, to poverty and 
starvation". "The self-preservation instinct of the nation must be 
taken into account", he added. What was obvious throughout the speech 
was the recurrent theme stressing the PRL's independence and 
sovereignty. Playing on public apprehensions, his performance 
suggested that the decision to impose a state of war on the country 
had been determined as a choice between two evils, and while the 
present situation could not be interpreted as satisfying, it 
represented the penultimate option before what everyone had been led 
to believe would happen, namely, the possibility of a Soviet invasion: 
"We are a sovereign country, so we must get out of this crisis by 
ourselves". 20 By implicitly identifying the imposition of a state of 
war in the PRL with the beginning of a period of stability and 
internal peace, Jaruzelski was acknowledging, in his own way, Orwell's 
interchangeable ' Newspeak' formula: "Peace is War, War is Peace".
It should not be surprising, however, that most people saw the 
decree proclaiming a state of war as a bitter reminder of Targowica, a
symbol of national shame.21 One can suspect that, while obviously the 
General had been given by Moscow the go-ahead to resolve the Polish 
crisis, presumably because from the Soviet point of view this still 
represented the last but one option, Jaruzelski still had every cause 
for concern should the operation reveal itself a fiasco. "Not days but 
hours separate us from a national catastrophe" he said, a catastrophe 
which almost certainly would also have involved the whole of the 
current Polish leadership as well, not a prospect he could look upon 
with serenity. In the end, however, it is perhaps unrealistic to claim 
that the whole operation had been little more than a gamble both for 
the Poles and the Soviet Union. There probably were few doubts, both 
in Warsaw and in the Kremlin, that the 'socialist pacification' of the 
country would be a success. The only grey area concerned the human 
costs and the extent of the international community's outcry. 
Apparently, huge field hospitals were prepared in the vicinity of 
major towns in the anticipation, not of hundreds but of thousands of 
casualties. Barracks were also emptied to make room for an expected 
increase in the numbers of prisoners to the tune of 350 000 people. 22 
Whereas such preparations seemed to have indicated that the regime was 
expecting a 'bloody operation', it should be stressed that this was 
part of a deliberate campaign to strike fear within the Party 
apparatus and members of the Party, terrifying them in closing ranks 
against the Solidarity 'menace*. The military take-over would then be 
seen as a needed and greeted with relief. Bearing in mind this last 
point, it seems that there were three principal objectives which 
motivated the Polish authorities into imposing military rule in 
Poland:
a) First of all, it was obvious that they were aiming at restoring
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the basic elements of the political status quo ante. Only by restoring 
the primacy of the Party and its control over society, as well as 
strengthening the state apparatus could any centralized reforms be 
implemented with any chance of success. It must be stressed that by 
this time the 'leading role of the Party' had been seriously eroded 
and that as a political force, it had virtually ceased to exist. The 
morale of the Party was seriously affected as well by a prevailing 
fear among Party activists who saw (and were made to believe) in 
Solidarity a movement intent on physically eliminating them, recalling 
the fate of those Hungarians who had been lynched in the streets of 
Budapest some twenty six years earlier. As David S. Mason aptly 
described it, "by imposing martial law, the army had provided a crutch 
to the injured Party. But the Party was still not able to walk without 
at least leaning on the army". 23 It must also be added, however, that 
the increasing place of the military within the Party structure at 
nearly all levels was further accentuating the demoralization within 
the Party. It has been suggested that the encroachment by the army in 
the political life of the nation, displacing the PZPR as the main 
decision-making body, was creating a new cohesive group within the 
Party, defined through common experience, easy identification, and a 
strong esprit de corps, thereby introducing a new and significant 
factor in the PRL's politics.24
b) Secondly, and naturally, the aim of martial law was to force the 
Polish society into submission. There can be no doubt that the 
imprisonment (the authorities called it internment) of all leading 
activists within the Solidarity union was a primary goal of the 
military. Once the head of the opponent was removed, the body would be 
left helpless. As such, this objective also attempted to stop and
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contain the recent movement of social self-organization. In the 
aftermath of the state of war, it was clear that this goal was not as 
successful as expected: regional Solidarity leaderships were replaced 
very quickly throughout the country, hours only in some cases, after 
the leaders had been interned. Thus, while at the national level the 
Solidarity leadership had effectively been muzzled, at the regional 
level the union retained an organized structure which was to prove 
itself still capable of mustering support and be quite active in the 
following months (though it took a couple of years for a real national 
underground structure to finally emerge).
What was significant in the mechanics of martial law was that the
role of the regular army in dealing with the social unrest was in fact
very limited. Unlike 1970, when conscript troops had been used to 
quell down the unrest in Gdartsk, and had been ordered to fire on the 
demonstrators, in 1981, the Army was detailed principally for patrol 
and cordon duties. Obviously, great care was taken by the Polish
Generals to avoid a repeat of the 1970 tragic events which had so much
discredited the Polish military. Most of the 'dirty work' was
undertaken by the paramilitary services and the special police units. 
Weydenthal sees in this respect, the "picture of an intricate
political ploy", by which, the military announced martial law but
hardly participated in its repressive activities and the Security 
Services were actively involved but only because they were obeying 
orders to do s o . T h e  truth was that they saw themselves as facing 
only two alternatives: either Solidarity was destroyed or they would
lose their lives. In fact, such fears (the result of propaganda
internal to the Party) were wholly unfounded. Despite their access to 
industrial dynamite and demolition expertise, the ten million strong
Solidarity movement never once resorted to terrorist tactics. Its 
ethos had always condemned the use of violence, something the 
authorities may have regarded as a sign of weakness. But it was 
precisely this non-violent characteristic which gave Solidarity its 
strength and source of moral superiority, making it a formidable 
opponent for the Polish ruling establishment.
c) Thirdly, the restoration of the political status quo ante would 
be near impossible without some concrete economic achievements. The 
process of odnowa or renovation called for in the summer of 1981 
placed economic performances . and successes as a high priority. 
Further, the military regime, in its quest to legitimize itself in the 
eyes of the population, was most concerned to bring about some degree 
of improvement for the Polish society. The need for economic reforms 
was therefore obvious but first, the country had to return to a state 
of affairs where these plans might be feasible. A militarization of 
the economy, by reinforcing control by the centre and introducing more 
discipline, would further this aim. Under martial law, some 300 to 350 
enterprises and public services were militarized. ■2G From December 13, 
1981, in all militarized enterprises the work contract of all 
employees was immediately suspended and they automatically were 
declared to be on active service like soldiers.27 Another way of 
exacting greater discipline from the labour force was the restrictions 
imposed on labour mobility and the increase in administrative control.
An article in Rzeczpospolita spelled this out clearly
The state of war put an end to the activity of the extremist 
force of "Solidarity" which had the aim of paralysing the 
Polish economy and render impossible the realization of any 
programme to resolve the crisis. With the imposition of a 
state of war much was brought about in the economic sphere: 
the chance was created to put a brake on the collapse of the 
economy and begin the difficult process of the reforms.
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In order to co-ordinate the implementation of these objectives, 
Jaruzelski announced that until the termination of the state of war, 
the country would be administered by the Military Council of National 
Salvation (WRON), headed by himself and consisting of twenty other 
military men (see Appendix). Described officially as a "military-
political institution independent of the state but at the same time 
strengthening the state administrative structure, inspiring at all
levels through its various activities", it also "watched over the 
observance of martial law regulations, initiating and ensuring the
effective implementation of acts serving the socio-political stability 
and the normalization of the country's life".29 This would be, during 
the coming months, the highest authority in the land. This military 
council became responsible for the successful implementation of 
Jaruzelski's policies aiming at a return to 'socialist normality' and, 
"the broker and guarantee of Soviet interests in Poland". 30
Incidentally it should be noted that WRON was already in full control 
when the Council of State was formally requested to approve the 
decrees which formed the basis for the state of war. Its legitimacy 
was then questionable as it ran counter to the PRL's constitution 
which does not envisage the existence of such a body. Moreover, WRON 
and its commissars (komisarze wojskowl) were not subject to any 
control by either the Sejm or the People's Councils. In many ways, the 
military take-over should be interpreted as a political defeat for the 
Party, and as a clear sign that the PZPR had ceased to be a political 
force to be reckoned with. Some 15 000 professional officers were 
placed throughout governmental and economic administration.31 
Nonetheless, it must be remembered that the Party is not an agency 
separate from the army or the police, all senior members of which must 
belong to it (85% of armed forces officers are Party members).32 It
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should also be noted that in fact all senior ranks of the Polish 
military are required to undergo training in Soviet Military 
Academies, and that their nominations are subject to Moscow's 
approval. While the state of war did create a situation where 'the 
leading role of the Party' was put in a state of hibernation, its 
influence in the corridors of power remained a determinant factor in 
the policy-making process. Equally, one should be cautious in 
ascribing too much importance to the military factor. Although 
ostensibly the country was being run by the armed forces, the system's 
infrastructure comprising among others, the People's Militia (MO) and 
the Secret Services (SB), was still functional, as much as ever if not 
more. Above all, the state of war instituted an iron rule over the 
country, turning it into a fully-fledged police-state. Described as a 
temporary institution, WRON's activities were in no way meant "to
undermine the competence of and '[ replacing] any bodies of civilian 
authority in performing their work". 33 In theory it was supposed to be 
only a policy-inspiring body as well as a policy-co-ordinating centre. 
However it proved to be neither. The implementation of policy was co­
ordinated by KOK and the Regional Defence Committees (WKOs). Apart 
from issuing the occasional statement, in the form of exhortations 
rather than authoritative announcements, WRON's role appeared to be 
devoid of defining political or economic strategies for the
government. This vagueness of purpose further highlighted two major
areas of uncertainty, namely the relationship between the military and 
the Party, especially at the decision-making level, and also the
relationship between the authorities and the population. One had to 
wait until December 30, 1981, to observe the first signs of Party
activity in the form of a series of meetings taking place throughout 
the country and intent on demonstrating that Party organizational
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functions had not suffered unduly because of the emergency. It also 
reflected a first attempt to reorganize and consolidate Party ranks. 
On December 15, 1981, the leaderships of four voivods (Elbl^g,
Katowice, Koszalin and Radom) were replaced by military men, along 
with the nationwide dismissal of many senior industrial managers, all 
accused of having failed to perform their duty in line with the 
requirements set by martial law. 34 These were the first steps taken by 
the authorities to militarize the state apparatus in order to try and 
invigorate through accrued discipline and military methods, the ailing 
state of the nation's economy.
As far as social unrest was concerned, the days following the 
imposition of martial law demonstrated amply that the situation was 
not evolving as smoothly as the military authorities might have hoped. 
The wave of arrests and the continuous reports of incidents opposing 
workers and the police forces indicated the regime's inability to 
quell completely all forms of opposition and foreshadowed the 
difficulties ahead. This was the unavoidable result of a dilemma 
facing Jaruzelski: to control the restless society, the regime's
favoured option was to exclude, through repression, all those elements 
it saw as opposing its policies; at the same time, this method could 
only be valid in the short-term for soon or later, a certain amount of 
support would have to be mobilized for desirable national or social 
goals. What happened in 1989 with the Round Table debates between the 
authorities and Solidarity representatives, among others, showed what 
everyone already knew namely, that the PZPR was unable on its own to 
achieve any tangible successes. Only a real dialogue had a chance of 
improving the situation. But in 1982, one was still a long way from 
even imagining that the two sides who confronted each other in the
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wake of the proclamation of martial law, would one day be seating at 
the same table and discuss their country's future. As George Sanford 
put it, "The dilemma is that control is best attained by exclusion but 
that the building up of legitimacy is best achieved by inclusion". 
This was to become a major problem for the authorities and partly 
explains the duration of martial law rule. It lasted almost two years 
and though it was suspended in December 1982, it was only formally 
lifted in July 1983.
3. 2 The Party.
What had happened in the PRL in 1980-81 was that the Party 
apparatus had ceased to operate as a political body. As far as the 
Soviet Union was concerned it was still loyal to the CPSU, but it
simply had become unable to dictate the policy of the country anymore. 
Jaruzelski may have been a military man but at least he was loyal to 
the Soviet Union and had the means to enforce the latter's will. It 
represented a deviation of the orthodoxy, but it also had its own
advantages. One of the priorities of the Jaruzelski regime after the 
imposition of a state of war was to rescue the PZPR from its 
organizational disarray and political demoralization. The leadership 
emphasized the need to return the party to 'Leninist' organizational 
practices. The stage was set by an instruction prepared by the Central 
Committee's Secretariat sent to provincial party secretaries a few 
days before December 13. Defining "the activities of the Party in
conditions endangering the security of the state", it drastically 
reduced the role of effective party bodies and imposed strict control 
over rank and file members. 3C The practical effects of the
instruction, implemented in full under martial law, were fai— reaching. 
Numerous party bodies in factories, offices and universities were
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dissolved. Within two months almost 100 000 party members had been
expelled from the ranks; several provincial first secretaries were 
replaced; 349 secretaries of provincial and town committees were 
removed, along with 307 secretaries of factory committees and 2 091 
first secretaries of basic party organizations. If one adds to these 
figures the some 2 000 members of various town and provincial
committees and scores of party activists, most of whom had been 
elected in 1981, then the scale of these purges was massive. The
purpose of the campaign was to effect a thorough change of personnel
in various party bodies in order to make them compatible with the
leadership's concept of a unified, disciplined and efficient Party. On 
January 8, 1982, the Party daily called for a "purification of the
ranks" and the return to "the pure ideals" of the early years.37 Jerzy 
Urbanski, the head of the Central Party Control Commission, in an 
article setting the conditions for the consolidation of the PZPR, 
wrote that,
The fundamental principle guiding the consolidation of the 
Party must be that there can be no return to the situation 
prevailing in the country before the 13th of December of 
last year. ... The reality of the consolidation of the Party 
must be fulfilled on the grounds of scrupulously observing 
the leninist norm for the Party life - in particular the 
principle of democratic centralism. 30
The state of war provided an ideal environment in which to implement 
the renovation of the PZPR and a speedy return to the ideals of 
democratic centralism, the pyramidal structure briefly damaged by the 
development of the struktury poziome or horizontal structures which 
followed the 9th Extraordinary PZPR Congress in July 1981. On April 
23, 1962 took place the first National Ideological Conference of the
PZPR. It initiated the process of rebuilding a revised theoretical 
base for the Party's 'leading role' and for its combative ideological 
character. At the time, Jaruzelski was faced with the problem of
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ensuring that unity would remain within the Party. His resolution to 
clamp down on divisions within the Party and eliminate factionism in 
its ranks39 was directed at the hardliners, who were whole-heartedly 
supporting the imposition of a state of war as the means to further 
their own goals. The most widely publicized example of this surfaced 
towards the end of 1982 with the disclosure of a letter which had been 
circulated among Central Committee members. Written by former 
Politburo member and CC secretary, Tadeusz Grabski, it criticized the 
Jaruzelski leadership for failing to revive the Party and destroying 
the ' counterrevolution'. "The Party is dying, losing its leading role 
in society and its managing role in the state", declared the letter 
which then went on advocating a four-point programme of action: the
use of the strongest possible force to destroy Solidarity; a purge 
throughout the Party to eliminate the present vague mixture of 
Marxism-Leninism, Social Democracy and Christian philosophy; the 
elimination of the Solidarity-inspired aspect of economic reform ie., 
the privatization of industry, and finally to oppose attempts to 
transform the Church into an active political force in the PRL.40 The 
challenge was weathered by Jaruzelski and the 'rejuvenation' of the 
Party, or the tightening of central control over all aspects of Party 
life, went ahead unimpeded. Along with changes in the Party, the 
leadership imposed wide-ranging transformations in the work of other 
institutions and in their relations with the population. This was 
carried out by changes in the PRL legislation which provided central 
administration with greater powers of control and action. This was 
accompanied by a campaign of 'verification', particularly among the 
ranks of the administration, aiming at weeding out all those not 
politically loyal to the regime and replacing them with personnel 
compliant with orders from above. The purpose of these changes was to
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"create a strong and effective administration that would be capable of 
efficiently performing in the service of the socialist state".41
In 1989, speaking at the 10th KC Plenum, a reminiscent Jaruzelski 
said that "the state of war Chad been] the closing of a certain era 
and, at the same time, the opening of a new one". 42 It was clear that
despite the clamp-down and the offset of an internal 'normalization'
of Polish life, too much had changed for a return to the pre-martial 
law situation. Efforts by the authorities to re-invigorate Party life 
proceeded at a slow pace, in spite of all attempts to re-build the 
base for its power domination. The slogan, Partia ta sama, ale nie 
taka sama ("the Party remains one and the same, yet it has changed"), 
which surfaced in later years, best illustrated the fact that a return 
to the political status quo ante, though desired by Jaruzelski, was 
not an entirely feasible task. Indeed, a study of provincial First 
Secretaries in post in 1984, revealed that the post 1981 changes had 
not meant a return to the same situation that had pertained under 
Gierek. The character of the former apparatus was not restored, with 
the influence of life-long party officials in it now greatly 
diminished.43 The Party, whether it liked it or not, had to adapt 
itself to the evolving situation, incidentally not only in the PRL but 
also abroad, and especially later on, in the Soviet Union.
3.3 The Polish Church and the State of War.
With the imposition of a state of war the Polish Catholic Church
once again reverted to its traditional position as the country's 
second (some would argue foremost) most important institution both in 
the sense of its physical presence and of its moral leadership. It is 
often stated that a true understanding of the Polish nation cannot be 
attained without consideration of the importance the Church holds in
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virtually all aspects of the Polish society. Indeed, the first few 
months of martial law clearly reflected this and as subsequent events 
showed, the Church's role and activities were predominant inputs into 
the life of the country.
After December 13, 1981, the Polish Catholic Church was faced with
possibly the most challenging task of its history. The very nature of 
the unfolding events put it to the test. At the heart of the matter 
lay a dilemma: how should the Church react to the new situation
bearing in mind that, which ever way it decided to respond, it 
incurred the risk on the one hand, of alienating a majority of its 
followers and on the other, jeopardizing whatever leverage it might 
still have on the rdgime? For the soke of safeguarding some of its own 
institutional interests it might decide to temper its overall response
and delay its moment of action, with the possible result that it would
then lose the support of a great number of believers and also non­
believers attracted to the Church. However, any decisive and forceful 
attitude, rejecting outright, for instance, any possibility of
dialogue with the authorities would equally put it in a situation from 
which the holding of many gains won over the last few months might be 
seriously endangered. In this sense then, the overall credibility of 
the Church was under the spotlight. 44
From the beginning, the Church hierarchy seemed to adopt a
restrained attitude to the events. This was partly explained by the
fact that, as the situation in the country became easier to assess
(admittedly there was a great deal of confusion and uncertainty in the
first week of the state of war), the Church found itself having to
balance its position between defending the rights of society and 
ensuring that peace prevailed. To side overtly with the population
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against the regime would inevitably have signified that it too would 
have become the target of official repression. However, at the same 
time, the pursuit of peace at all costs would have severely damaged 
its moral authority among Poles. One should also remember that the 
Church's own 'social doctrine' had its part to play in influencing the 
Polish episcopate's acts and words.45 It is such considerations which 
determined the Church's stand throughout the state of war. It was also 
why it spent almost the entire period urging a dialogue between the 
authorities and the various groups in society.
The Church' s main aim in the early period of the state of war was 
the avoidance of bloodshed at all costs. Here the plea was addressed 
to both the military and police authorities and the social groups 
opposed to them. In his sermon, broadcast repeatedly on the Polish 
radio network in the days that followed the proclamation of a state of
war, the Polish Primate stressed this point:
The Church wants to defend each human life; and therefore in 
this state of martial law, it will call for peace whenever 
possible; it will call for an end to violence and for the 
prevention of fratricidal struggle. There is nothing of 
greater value than human life.45
Yet the sermon failed to give listeners a forthright response to the 
country's internal developments. By calling the imposition of a state 
of war, "the choice of a lesser rather than greater evil", Glemp was 
seen to be accepting something inevitable and of course, in many ways 
he was. But this did not strike a cord among the frustrated Solidarity 
members. As the state of war continued, the term 'Glempic' appeared: 
'to say nothing at length in soothing terms', an unflattering 
reference to the seemingly uncommitted attitude of the Polish Church's 
leader.47 Yet such a view point may have been rather unfair: on
December 16, the Polish episcopate issued a statement to be read in
\
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all Polish churches on the 20th. In undisguised terms, the Polish 
bishops criticized the regime's current policies and called for the 
Church and society to concentrate on the following two questions: a)
the freeing of all internees and b) the revival of independent trade 
unions and above of Solidarity's statutory activity.40 It is 
interesting to note that the PRL*s embassy officials throughout Europe 
were busy distributing to the media copies of Glemp's sermon a day 
before it was due to be read in Polish churches. This was an obvious 
attempt to show foreign observers that there was an identity of 
purpose between the regime and the Polish church's objectives, thereby 
giving some legitimacy to the imposition of a state of war in the 
PRL. 49 However the statement itself was not read in Polish parishes, 
presumably as a result of pressure from the authorities. A toned down 
pastoral letter from the Polish primate replaced it instead. On 
December 28, Archbishop Glemp sent an open letter to General 
Jaruzelski condemning the practice of exacting oaths of loyalty to the 
regime from all state employees accompanied by a threat of dismissal 
for those refusing to leave Solidarity.90 At one point, the Archbishop 
directly blamed the state apparatus for the current situation: "The
responsibility of the crisis is incumbent to the impassive 
bureaucratic apparatus which has functioned to this day". 91
Despite the fact that throughout the state of war, at a time when 
public gatherings were banned, the Churches remained open, the martial 
law restrictions did affect the, activities of the Polish clergy. 
Several priests had been interned (but were quickly freed after 
intervention from the episcopate), the publication of Catholic 
journals and newspapers wa6 suspended, as well as the activities of 
the Lublin Catholic University and the weekly radio broadcasts of the
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Mass. Yet the authorities on the whole refrained from explicit attacks 
on the Church, presumably because they recognised the contribution 
which it could give to the process of 'renewal' by helping to 'pacify' 
the country. Besides this would not be the first time that the
communist authorities had sought to manipulate the Church's influence 
on the population.
With reports of continuing unrest throughout the country and the 
imprisonment of thousands of Solidarity activists, the Church' s 
activities centered around providing humanitarian aid to the internees 
and their families. On January 21, 1982, the Polish episcopate
formally established the Primate's Committee for Help to Internees and 
was allowed to visit many internment camps. 92 On January 9, a meeting 
occurred between Archbishop Glemp and General Jaruzelski, the first 
such meeting since the imposition of a state of war. Nothing filtered 
from the encounter except that the two men exchanged views on the 
current situation and expressed intentions related to the 
normalization of life in Poland. Equally secretive was the communique 
issued at the end of the Church-state commission which met on January 
18. Both sides stated that they "had recognized the need to find
political solutions to current problems".93 In the circumstances, it 
was inevitable that the Church would attempt to mediate between the 
authorities and the suspended unions but its efforts to renew the 
dialogue fell short of everyone's expectations. Increasingly, it was 
becoming obvious that the Jaruzelski regime had no intention in
returning to the pre-December 13 situation. In fact the Church 
hierarchy had been faced with a fait accompli (although it never 
explicitly recognized this) and its goals were now restricted to 
negotiating with whoever was in power for as long as this could serve
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its own role as the guiding force of the nation's destiny. The 183rd
plenary conference of the Polish episcopate which took place on
February 25, was in many respects an authoritative statement of the 
Church's position. Having returned four days earlier from a visit to 
the Vatican where he had met the Pope as head of an important Church 
delegation (February 4-11), Archbishop Glemp informed the bishops of 
John Paul II's anxieties concerning the situation in the PRL.
Obviously endorsed by the Pope, the final statement stressed that "the 
activities of the Church are non-political" and reiterated a call for 
a dialogue between the authorities and society. They pointed out that 
the suspended union Solidarity had a role to play and could not be 
absent from the implementation of a social accord. They asked for the 
release of detainees, an amnesty for those convicted, freedom of 
religious life, cultural pluralism and the reactivation of youth
organizations. At the same time, they called "for a sense of realism
and prudence" in assessing the situation:
Social accord makes demand not only on the authorities, but 
also on the whole of the society. ... A sense of realism and 
prudence requires that we do not accept the principle of 
"all or nothing". Just the opposite - we ought to strive 
systematically, persistently and gradually towards the 
implementation of our aims. ... It .. . requires us to define 
wisely our individual and social demands, taking a long-term 
view of our national future.5*
In other words the Church was appealing for restraint and was echoing 
the late Cardinal Wyszyriski*s social and political teachings which had 
always stressed the paramount importance of Poland's sovereign 
existence. Only when the country* s sovereignty was guaranteed could 
the Church make an effective contribution to the nation's religious, 
intellectual and cultural life. For the Church must operate in 
different time scales to that of the contemporary social groups. Its 
aspirations must remain above the political plane and should not be
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involved in the struggle between social groups. This type of reasoning 
had tended to be forgotten in the heydays of Solidarity when the 
population's self-confidence had risen to new heights. As soon as 
repression became once again the dominant factor in the PRL's life, a 
return to a more pragmatic approach was required, even if in the minds 
of some of the clergy and laymen, the Catholic Church was appearing to 
be too 'soft' in its dealings with the ruling establishment. In April, 
the Polish episcopate issued a 10-point report entitled "Theses of the 
Primate's Social Council in the Matter of Social Accord". 55 It fuelled 
controversy and was widely criticized within the Church's own ranks. 
While the report condemned the imposition of a state of war as an act 
that dashed the hope for genuine social, political and economic 
reforms, it also went on putting some of the blame for the crisis on 
the suspended Solidarity union. The Council urged the union to 
consider critically its own share in the responsibility for the 
current situation and urged it to be apolitical. The report reflected 
the Archbishop's thinking that dialogue, dialogue and more dialogue 
was needed. It also gave an opportunity for the authorities to respond 
and demonstrate some of their supposed good intentions. Finally it 
showed that the Church hierarchy still believed that some degree of 
conciliation could be attained between the various social groups. Yet, 
at a new meeting between Jaruzelski and the Polish Primate on April 
25, it became clear that all the hopes for a revived Solidarity had 
been dashed. The official media was increasing its barrage of attacks 
upon the suspended independent unions and all signs pointed to a 
reinforcement of the authorities' will to enforce 'socialist 
normality' upon the country. Violent clashes occurred in various 
cities on May Day and May 3, effectively putting an end to any chance 
of dialogue between the regime and the population. The Church's role
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as a mediator lost then most of its raison d'etre.
One issue which occupied most of Church-state relations at the time 
was the planned visit by John Paul II in the PRL. The second papal
visit had been planned for the summer of 1982. On June 11, the 
Politburo met to discuss the prospects of the Pope's visit, which the 
Church was confident would take place on August 26. Yet no decision 
was taken. On the contrary, it was evident that the authorities were 
making the visit dependent upon two main determinants: in the first
place, the situation inside the country had to be peaceful and unrest 
stifled. Secondly, the Church had to co-operate with the authorities 
in bringing about the right conditions for a Papal visit. For
Jaruzelski, a successful visit by the Pope would have greatly helped 
him in legitimating the regime* s aims and would have given him an 
opportunity to convince the outside world that the situation in the 
PRL was now back to 'normal'. However, such a visit would have had to 
be carefully controlled by the authorities. The memories of the Pope's 
first visit to the PRL in June 1979 and its impact on society were 
still fresh in everyone's mind. The regime, in the uncertain current 
situation, wanted to avoid any opportunity of allowing the morale of 
the population to be boosted again. At the root of the matter lay the 
fact that it was probably too early for the authorities to permit such
a visit since their hold over society was still unsteady as the May
and August demonstrations throughout the country amply demonstrated. 
In the event, an unexpected visit by the PRL's Foreign Minister, Jbzef 
Czyrek, to the Vatican on July 19 (he was eventually received by the 
Pope on the 20th) confirmed the authorities' desire to postpone the 
visit. This decision was probably welcomed by most of the PRL's 
allies and in particular the Soviet Union whose media had harshly
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criticized the Polish Church in its columns, especially in the summer 
of 1982:
New trends in the behaviour of church representatives 
disturb many people here. People ask themselves: Haven't
certain church dioceses succumbed to the temptation to take 
the place of Solidarity, which suffered defeat six months 
ago and compromised itself, and to take its place in 
influencing public opinion in order to strengthen their own 
positions? Haven't they given up acting as merely spiritual 
guardians and taken to acting as apolitical organization 
that opposes the socialist regime? Reflections on this 
subject are all the more timely since there is much talk in 
Poland at present about whether the visit of Pope John Paul 
II, which is planned for late August, will take place or 
not.SG
The cancellation of the visit was formally announced by Primate Glemp 
on July 22, 1982. It wasn't until November that a new date was fixed.
After a meeting between Jaruzelski and Glemp on November 8, a joint 
Church-state communique mentioned as a possible date for the Pope's 
visit, June 16, 1983. While it seemed that at last some progress had
been made to facilitate the Papal visit, the Church's apparent co­
operative mood with the authorities was coming under increasing 
scrutiny and was sparkling arguments among believers. At a meeting of 
Primate Glemp’ with the priests of the Warsaw archdioceses on December 
7, the head of the Polish Church came under heavy criticism for being 
too conciliatory with the authorities. Individual priests argued that 
the people were feeling that the Church was making politics with the 
authorities, that not enough references were made of the means of 
repression used against the population, that the episcopate spoke a 
language different from that of the Vatican.57
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the Polish primate continued to 
pursue a cautious policy in its dealings with the state apparatus. In 
February 1983, he was nominated Cardinal, thereby dissipating rumours 
that the Pope had been dissatisfied with the Archbishop. On the 19th,
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a pastoral letter named the date of the Pope's arrival in the PRL as 
of June 16, an announcement incidentally made without a formal 
invitation having been sent by the government. It was only after a new 
meeting between Jaruzelski and Glemp, in March, that the head of 
state, Henryk Jablortski, finally issued an official invitation to the 
Pope to visit the country between June 16 and 23.
From the time when the state of war was suspended to the Pope's 
second visit in June 1983, Church-state relations deteriorated 
significantly. At the heart of the matter lay the Church's position in 
society perceived by the Party as being too influential. As the PZPR 
regained its confidence in the long months of 'normalization', it 
increasingly tried to pressurize the Polish episcopate in complying 
with the authorities' 'national renewal' policies.
3. 4 The Interplay of Domestic and Foreign Policy.
A central argument often used in official Polish analyses is that 
the stabler the domestic environment the greater the possibility and 
the incentive for the PRL to have a more active foreign policy.50 Only 
if the domestic situation is relatively calm and gives no great cause 
for concern to the leadership, can it afford to make initiatives on 
the international scene, especially towards the West. Similarly, the 
stabler the international environment, the more opportunities are made 
available to develop closer contacts with non-communist countries.
For what it is worth, this argument has a ring of truth to it. 
Certainly, Poland's geo-political position has meant that its scope of 
action in the foreign field has always come under certain constraints 
which has limited its ability and wish for a more assertive role on 
the international scene. Aside from the obvious limitations imposed on 
the PRL due to its membership of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and
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its conformity to the political line of the regional sub-system in 
which it has to evolve, the range of options available to the Polish 
leadership is also heavily dependent upon the overall domestic 
situation within the country. As long as the Polish nation exhibits 
the two fundamental concepts essential for the preservation of the 
Soviet model in Europe namely, cohesion and viability in the context 
of the Socialist Bloc59, and appears to be successful in balancing the 
two, then it may find some limited measure of autonomy. But in order 
to reach this position, the Polish leadership has to convince the 
Kremlin leaders that it is capable of pursuing such a policy without 
calling into question the principles governing the bloc alliance. 
Stability at home is one way of doing this. If the Party is seen as 
firmly in control, the Kremlin's watchdogs might even relax their 
attention and allow the pursuit of Polish national objectives which 
may not be directly identical with their own (the early Gierek years 
and the massive influx of Western investments and ideas may be cited 
as an example here). Further, Polish national interests may also be 
identical to those of the Soviet Union's, in which case, Polish 
foreign policy may actually seek the support of its ally (the 
' Recovered Western Territories' question for instance, where the PRL's 
efforts to have the Oder-Neisse line officially recognized by the Bonn 
government found a helpful ally in the Kremlin).
While the PRL-Soviet context is of primary importance in assessing 
the nature and scope of the PRL's foreign policy-making, another 
factor is also highly relevant. The regime's diplomatic and economic 
relations with non-communist countries (here the attention is 
predominantly focused on the Western democracies) depends largely on 
the various contemporary Western leader's perceptions of the PRL.
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Naturally, the overall international context partly determines the 
nature of relations between Socialist Poland and the West. In fact,
the leading Western countries have a tendency of dealing with this
country against the broader background of East-West relations. This 
surfaced only too clearly during the martial law period although this 
attitude has never significantly changed ever since the end of the 
Second World War.60 It has meant that the successive Polish communist 
leaderships, in their dealings with Western states, have repeatedly 
sought to project a favourable image of the PRL abroad in order to 
obtain from them what they needed for their own internal purposes.
Indeed, a large aspect of this public relation objective was intent on 
altering the traditional Western perceptions of socialist Poland as a 
Soviet puppet state. The 'independent satellite' description once 
given to Gomulka's Polande1 was in this sense a success for the Polish 
establishment. More recently, the Jaruzelski's regime has shown
clearly the priority this objective holds for its policy-making, 
although in this case, the process has been long and arduous (only in 
1984/1985 did the first signs of the PRL's break from international 
isolation appear). In fact, the slowness of this process and the 
various factors which affected it provide ample evidence of the nature 
in which the leadership sought to extricate itself from the position 
of an international pariah to that of a more respected state.
What is most interesting here is the relationship between the PRL's 
Western-oriented and Eastern-oriented policy-making. Obviously any 
analyses of the Polish regime's objectives cannot be fully discussed 
without consideration of Soviet interests. It would then appear that 
the PRL has little choice but uphold a consistently eastward 
orientation. However, the geographical proximity to Western Europe has
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meant that it has never been able, nor has ever wanted, to sever its 
traditional links with non-communist Europe. It is almost a truism to 
say that Poland is culturally closer to Paris than it is to Moscow. 
Political and geographical reality has meant that in many respects, 
the PRL sits astride East and West through psychological closeness to 
Western Europe and physical attachment to the Soviet bloc. A direct 
consequence of this has been the careful balancing of the PRL's 
objectives between East and West. The continuous efforts of the 
authorities in the attainment of this goal have largely been 
determined by the contemporary international situation and the
domestic environment. Since the imposition of martial law, the PRL's 
policy-making has taken a more distinctive eastward orientation, due 
partly to the virtual isolation it experienced as Western countries 
imposed sanctions in protest of the militarization of the Polish 
society.
Western attitudes towards the PRL in the first half of the 1980s 
had originated in the perceived abandonment of the hopes created by
the Solidarity era and reflected a concern that they should not be
allowed to disappear. Three main demands were communicated to the 
Jaruzelski leadership in order that normal relations be resumed: the
end of martial law, the release of all political prisoners and the
resumption of a dialogue between the authorities and both the Church 
and the workers' union. As long as these conditions were not
fulfilled, the PRL's contacts with the West would be curtailed. While 
the sanctions themselves were applied in a variety of ways and
intensity, reflecting in large the indecision of Western nations as to 
the most appropriate conduct towards the PRL, their overall effect has
been to isolate socialist Poland from the non-communist world and
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restrict considerably its leadership's scope and range of activities 
on the international scene. However such a result was not without its
dilemma for the West. As Timothy Carton Ash wrote,
If [the West] refused to afford further help to Poland, then 
it would force the Polish people deeper into economic as 
well as political misery, thus probably shortening the 
interval before the next explosion of working class protest.
If, however, it aided the regime, then it would facilitate 
the process of "normalization".52
As the martial law and post-martial law periods showed only too 
clearly, the regime's attempts to re-integrate the international 
community proved unsuccessful as long as they failed to alter Western 
perceptions concerning the internal situation of the country. It was 
only when Jaruzelski felt confident enough with the internal process 
of 'normalisation', that a definite foreign policy line was taken to 
improve the PRL's image on the international stage. Indeed, this 
became one of the PRL's most important goals in the 1980s. In fact 
appearances would seem to confirm the closeness, indeed the 
inseparability, between domestic and foreign policy-making during that 
period. Faced with the task of giving some credibility to its position 
both at home and abroad, the rdgime initiated a series of would-be 
socio-political reforms. These, it hoped, would convince both, on the 
domestic side, the Polish people and abroad, their former Western 
partners, that the PRL leadership once again was a credible
interlocutor. The way that the USA have responded to the domestic 
policies of the PRL in the aftermath of the imposition of martial law 
seemed to confirm the link between PRL domestic and foreign policy 
successes in the second half of the 1980s. Only when the American 
administration became convinced that the domestic situation in the
country was improving (the release of the last political prisoners in
September 1966) did it gradually renew diplomatic and economic
-100-
contacts with the authorities. In many ways then, the PRL's domestic 
policy-making, while directly aimed at specific internal problems, was 
also indirectly aiming to change the attitudes outside the country's 
borders, incidentally both in the West and in the East.
3. 5 The Foreign Dimension of Martial Law.
The imposition of a state of war in December 1981. represented a
dramatic development in the PRL's socio-political life and was in this 
sense the climax of perhaps one of the most if not the most,
significant event in post World War II Eastern Central European 
history. The climate of Detente which had characterized the 1970s and 
had fostered economic relations between East and West had resulted for 
the PRL in a brief period of apparent prosperity. However, very soon, 
Gierek's foreign economic policy began backfiring. Massive Western 
investments in forms of credit loans became an increasing burden on 
the national economy which had been unable to use this financial
assistance in a rational way and which was now facing an increasingly 
larger debt to repay. When Edward Gierek became Party First Secretary 
on December 19, 1970, he embarked upon an ambitious economic
programme. As we saw, the two keys elements which formed the basis of 
Gierek's strategy were centred upon two goals: a) to satisfy the
consumption aspirations of the Polish people and b) to modernize the
Polish industry and build a 'Second Poland'. This policy led the
leadership in abandoning many planning constraints with, as a result, 
an investment policy which soon outran its own objectives: in the
1971-1976 5-year plan, investment spending exceeding planned 
investments by 12. 6% in 1972, 30. 6% in 1973, 45. 67, in 1974 and 85. 2%
in 1975.53 Although this had the immediate result of increasing the 
standards of living by some 40%. and providing a greater variety and
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quantity of goods on the market, it soon became apparent that there 
were serious flaws in Warsaw's economic policies. Throughout the 
1970s, Poland became over-dependent on Western imports and the legacy 
inherited in the 1950s to favour the heavy industry sector of the 
economy ensured that the traditional ministries (ie. heavy industry, 
transport, etc.) would receive a lion's share of Western imported 
capital. Bad management, the absence of a market, a high degree of 
waste and the importation of Western technology as a substitute for 
real economic reforms opened the door to a looming economic disaster. 
By 1978, there was a 2.2% decline in real wages and by 1979, for the 
fist time in the post-war years the official statistics noted a 
decline in the Polish national income. Borrowing on increasingly 
unfavourable terms, Poland's foreign debt with the West took 
formidable proportions and by 1980, it stood at some $25 billion.
PRL's Hard Currency debt, 1971-1980.
Total Long Medium Short
($bn> (as % of each type)
1971 0. 99 64. 6 34. 3 1.1
1972 1. 25 64. 8 34. 4 0. 8
1973 2. 63 62. 4 35. 0 2. 6
1974 5. 22 55. 9 20. 5 16. 6
1975 8. 39 56. 3 25. 7 17. 8
1976 12. 15 ' 54. 5 29. 2 16.3
1977 14. 33 49. 8 37. 0 13. 3
1978 18.63 44. 1 41. 9 14. 2
1979 23.06 41. 2 46. 6 12. 1
1980 25.09 39. 8 51. 8 8. 3
In December 1976 a new economic policy was agreed upon to restore 
some order into the economy and shift from a policy of expansion to 
that of a sharp deflation. Investments and imports were cut down 
dramatically, wages growth was restrained and a major export drive was 
launched:
Impact of economic manoeuvres on Investments and exports, 1971-79.
(as the annual average % of growth rates)
1971-75 1976 1977--79
Investment volume 17. 8 1. 0 -0. 9
Import volume 27. 3 11.4. -5. 8 (with the West only)
Money wages 9. 8 9. 4 7. 6
Export volume 8. 5 12. 3 3. 0 (with the West only)
Cost of living 2. 4 4. 7 6. 8
By 1981, the situation was getting out of hand. The volume of total 
exports to the West fell by 22.1% while imports declined by more than 
30%. At the end of August 1981, the total hard currency debt had 
passed the $bn 28 mark with medium and long-term debts up to nearly $ 
23& billion. Although the reduction of the working week from 6 to 5 
days as a result of Solidarity demands had a profound adverse effect 
on Polish industrial output, especially coal output, most of the blame 
should be directed at the long-standing deterioration in the supply 
system which was never properly handled by the relevant ministries. In 
addition the very nature of coal exploitation (the premature 
exhaustion of easily accessible coal reserves often inferior in 
quality to other fields) contributed to the continuing crisis of the 
coal industry. The world economic recession of the mid-1970s further 
fuelled a continuously deteriorating situation for the country. And it 
was almost with a sense of dej& vu that Polish observers witnessed 
Gierek's fall. It was triggered off by what had traditionally always 
been seen as a cause of popular dissatisfaction and usually 
culminating with the fall of the policy-makers, namely the rise in 
meat prices and other essential 'commodities. From the time of the 
first disturbances, occasioned by this decision and Gierek's departure 
from the political scene, unique developments had taken place in 
Socialist Poland. For the first time in a communist country,
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independent trade unions had been legalised. The famous Baltic
Agreements of August 1980 were to become a milestone in the country's 
history.
Naturally the Polish situation was developing into a massive 
headache for the Kremlin policy-makers whose appreciation of the 
dramatic changes taking place at their borders, and the challenges 
which they were creating, must have been that of complete disbelief 
and shock. For both strategic and ideological reasons, developments in 
the PRL represented a clear threat to the cohesion and stability of 
the European Soviet sphere of influence. The Soviet Union's main 
political-ideological objectives in the PRL (as elsewhere in Eastern 
Central Europe) have always been to safeguard the existing communist 
political system. However, in the case of the Polish regime, the 
Kremlin's approach has often seemed limited at containing Polish
heretics within manageable limits, while at the same time imposing the 
prescribed orthodoxy. ^  Moscow's choices towards its Polish ally at 
the height of the crisis would soon become restricted between two
alternatives: the disagreeable and the intolerable. To be fair, the
rise of Solidarity took everyone by surprise. The speed with which the 
movement was born and then developed was phenomenal and it is most 
probable that Poles too were overtaken by their own designs and failed 
to realize what was happening until it had happened.
In the West the signing of the Gdahsk Agreements and the whole 
evolution of events was followed attentively and for months the PRL 
became the focus of attention of the International community. Yet, 
there was a general attitude of caution towards the Polish events. It 
was more a case of wait and see, a case of waiting for the Poles to do 
something else and seeing what the Soviet Union's reaction might be.
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In fact, throughout the period under consideration, the West fulfilled 
to a large extent the role of a passive spectator. An exception here 
was the US, which reacted very strongly against the proclamation of a 
state of war. Almost without consulting the rest of the Western camp 
(the West European governments bitterly complained that President 
Reagan had barely consulted them, prior to announcing the American 
sanctions), the US administration decided to press on with ' immediate 
sanctions' against the PRL. On December 23, 1981, 16 days after the
generals had taken over in Poland, President Reagan publicly announced 
his administration*s decision and threatened a similar move against 
the Soviet Union should the crisis persist. A day earlier, a statement 
had been issued by the EEC denouncing "the grave violation of the 
human and civil rights of the Polish people". On the whole, however, 
the American stand on ' the Polish question' and the general
passiveness of the other Western nations were unable to prevent the 
crushing of the Solidarity movement nor the implementation of an 
effective retaliatory policy against both the PRL and the Soviet Union 
once this action had taken place. It is true that in crises touching 
East Central Europe, the West (and particularly the US) has never
seriously attempted to question the legitimacy of Soviet security 
interests in the region. Further it has also refused to provide 
military aid to local resistance. In fact it has often sent signals
indicating that it would not intervene militarily. ^  As one
commentator, describing the attitude of some Western states towards 
the Polish developments, put it: "The Americans believe in sticks, the 
Germans in carrots and the French in words". American apparent 
inability to do anything was surprising in so much as it seems that 
the Reagan administration was well aware of the details of the plan 
for the military crackdown, having a spy at Polish Army Headquarters.
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Yet it chose not to warn Solidarity leaders, giving as an excuse 
'fears for the spy's own security'.67 Apart from the ulterior motives 
behind the American's silence, it is of course difficult to say
whether this information would have helped in any way to solve 
anything and whether it would have helped the Solidarity leadership. 
Whatever the motives, they were certainly clear for the Polish 
authorities: "Washington hoped that the bid to impose martial law
would set off internal strife in Poland which would ignite the
situation in Europe".66 In the end, the Reagan's administration acted 
the way it did for there probably was little else it could really 
achieve. As someone said, "cold realpolitik should not be combined 
with excessive moralism; otherwise it comes too close to moral 
cynicism". 63
US sanctions had important effects on Polish-American relations: 
the export of agricultural products to the country was banned, civil
aviation traffic to the US was disallowed, fishing rights for the 
Polish fishing fleet were withdrawn, and more importantly, the credits 
and all commercial ties between the two countries were suspended. 
Additional sanctions were introduced later and amounted to an 
effective blocking of the debt rescheduling negotiations with the 
Paris Club countries, the PRL's entry to the IMF and the World Bank. 
Finally the US government imposed the suspension of all scientific and 
technical co-operation.
One may identify six main objectives which the US administration 
sought to achieve by imposing sanctions on the PRL: 1) as an
expression of Western sympathy and support for the Polish people; 2) 
putting into deeds the tough US anti-communist rhetoric which had 
preceded the imposition of martial law; 3) as a way of defusing the
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mounting domestic pressures which were urging the Reagan
administration to act in protest of the repression in the PRL; 4) to 
try and convince the Polish authorities that the US would not conduct 
normal relations with a government actively involved in repression; 5) 
to prevent the permanence of martial law in the country and dispel the 
belief that a return to totalitarism was the only answer to the
country's economic problems; 6) to discourage the Soviet Union from 
supporting a hard-line communist regime which would negate much of the 
emancipation the Polish nation had gained over the years.70 Three main 
conditions would remove the sanctions: an end to martial law, the
freeing of all political prisoners and the resumption of a dialogue
between the Polish government, the Church and Solidarity.
Although President Reagan appeared resolute to 'punish* the Polish 
junta, the weeks which followed the imposition of martial law revealed 
serious uncertainties in the US policy towards the Polish crisis. 
Three reasons affected the American response:
a) Washington seemed to have difficulties in analysing the crisis 
(it was reported that the US ambassador in Warsaw, Frank Meehan, 
thought the situation in Poland to be so unexceptional that he had 
left the Polish capital on home leave just before martial law was 
imposed; 7'
b) there were hesitations on the nature of sanctions to be 
implemented;
c) major uncertainties existed as to the effect the crisis might 
have on the NATO alliance. The American administration had not 
bargained for the split which developed among the Western allies as a 
result.
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These doubts were also the reflection of an on-going debate in the 
corridors of the White House, between those advocating restraint and 
caution and those in favour of hard hitting measures against the 
Jaruzelski regime. In the end it would appear that the latter gained 
the upper hand with Alexander Haig proposing to "optimize the 
pressure". In his memoirs, the US Secretary of State wrote that "plans 
for dealing with an internal suppression were however very much less 
satisfactory" than those which concerned the possibility of a Soviet 
invasion:
We had known for many months what we could do in case of 
direct Soviet intervention; but there was no certain plan of 
action in the more ambiguous case of internal crackdown. 72
Eventually Reagan took the step to send a letter both to Jaruzelski 
and Leonid Brezhnev asking the Polish General to free all prisoners 
and the re-establishment of civil liberties, and warning his Soviet 
counterpart that unless repression stopped in the PRL, the US would 
have no choice but to extend economic and political sanctions against 
the Soviet Union as well. With the Polish authorities giving no signs 
that the state of war would soon be lifted, the US also decided to 
impose economic sanctions on the USSR, attributing to it a major share 
of the blame for the imposition of martial law by having exerted 
extraordinary pressure on the Polish Party leadership. Aeroflot 
flights to the US were suspended, the export licensing system for high 
technology items was tightened, the Soviet Purchasing Commission in 
New York was closed, negotiations on a long-term grain agreement were 
postponed while negotiations concerning a new maritime agreement were 
suspended; finally certain bi-lateral co-operation agreements 
namely, those on energy, space, science and technology - were allowed 
to lapse. This did not bring unanimity among the ranks of the United 
States' allies. Unlike some previous major international crises, for
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instance, the Cuban crisis in 1962 or the repeated confrontation over 
Berlin, which all tended to have a unifying effect on the Western 
alliance, the Polish crisis had a completely opposite effect. This was 
amply illustrated in the gradual deterioration of relations between 
the US and its allies which followed the unilateral American
declaration of December 23, 1981. Divergences reached a peak in June
1982, when the US administration, recognizing the ineffectiveness of 
its restrictions on American exports to impede the construction of the 
natural gas pipeline between the Soviet Union and Western Europe, 
extended export restrictions to European firms producing pipeline
equipment with American licences and to foreign subsidiaries of 
American companies. This move inflamed Western European governments 
and even triggered countei— measures from France, Italy and Great 
Britain. The Western European countries were further unconvinced by 
the American arguments which tried to differentiate between the 
exportation of grain (at the time, the US was encouraging the Soviet 
Union to increase its purchase of American grain) and the importation 
of natural gas. For the European Community, the Reagan administration
"was calling upon others to make sacrifices that it was not prepared
to make itself". 73
The Soviet reaction was unequivocal. For the Kremlin, the American 
attitude towards the Polish events was showing all the characteristics 
of blatant interference into the domestic affairs of a communist ally- 
state and as such was totally unacceptable. In a Pravda article re­
printed in one of the only two national Polish newspapers still 
allowed to be published at the beginning of martial law7*1, the Soviet
writer, Bolshakov wrote that,
The White House and the Department of State were immediately 
in favour for the "return of the necessary conditions" for 
the continuation of "the Polish experiment", in other words, 
the unrestrained continuation of the counterrevolution. It
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is not a secret that the events in Poland are not just of a 
political nature for the US, but are also part of a 
strategic interest. . . . Ideological pressure on Poland was 
achieved through the promotion of a "controlled crisis 
management", as well as through material aid to opposition 
groups, under the supervision of the US and other NATO 
countries' special services. . . . The White House and the 
Department of State, breaking every principle of 
international law, and doing its best to dictate to the 
Polish government how to solve its internal problems, is 
trying to put pressure on Poland. And this is called "non­
interference"! No, it was and still is a clear and active 
policy of interference. Its goal is obvious: the destruction 
of socialism in Poland and the tearing of this country from 
the socialist community.76
The Polish authorities' reaction to the international community's 
outcry was at first rather cautious. While denouncing the sanctions, 
Polish official statements seem to have reflected the concern that any 
further deterioration in the nature of relations between the PRL and 
non-communist countries would have very detrimental effects for the 
country in the long run. In what seemed to be an accommodating 
gesture, Warsaw lifted censorship regulations on foreign 
correspondents, restored some telephone links and gave telex lines 
back to a number of Western embassies. 76 In the first few weeks after 
the American decision to impose sanctions on Poland, one finds many 
official Polish declarations which appear to support this. While the 
overall nature and tone of these articles clearly reflected the 
authorities' anti-American mood, the hints that Polish-US relations 
should not be unduly affected by the Polish domestic situation were 
unmistakable. In a meeting with foreign journalists, the Brigade 
General, Tadeusz Szacilo, answering questions on what effects the US
sanctions were having on Poland, said that,
American economic sanctions against Poland, which were 
announced by President Reagan, are a double-edged weapon. On 
the one hand they admittedly worsen our economic 
difficulties, but on the other, they compel us to seek other 
solutions. In this perspective, these restrictions are 
another way of destroying the Polish economy. . . . Reagan 
announced the implementation of sanctions against us, but it 
is not known at the moment if they will be implemented. It
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se eras to me that Reagan's performance here will not remain 
as one of the classic example of contemporary diplomacy. The 
President of the USA uses human rights principles in a 
selective manner; we have seen this in the case for instance 
of, Salvador, Turkey or Ireland. His noises have only one 
direction for "export". Polish-American relations were 
formed on the base of mutual sympathy between our nations 
and I hope that despite everything-, they will improve in the 
future. 77 (My italics)
As the passages in italics would seem to indicate, there still was, at 
this stage, hopes that the American sanctions would not be either 
implemented or at least would not affect key sectors of the Polish 
economy. The Jaruzelski regime appeared very conscious about the 
damaging potentialities which such sanctions might have on the already 
disastrous state of the national economy, an economy desperately 
needing new Western loans and credits. During the 1970s, the Polish 
economy had been oriented towards the use of international markets in 
order to develop domestic growth. Even if the results were not 
entirely satisfactory, foreign trade became a factor in itself which 
made it difficult, if not impossible, to keep to oneself or limit 
exchange solely with the socialist countries. 7e Because of this, the
prospect that Polish foreign economic orientation might have to be re­
directed to the East (the reference to "other solutions"), was perhaps
not very attractive to the Polish leadership. Even if this was the
only available option, any such aid would prove almost certainly 
insufficient and probably ephemeral. In any case there seemed to have 
been a clear appreciation that any aid from either the Soviet Union or 
the other Soviet Bloc allies would be far from sufficient to solve the 
Polish crisis. As Olechowski, the Deputy Foreign Minister pointed out, 
"It is improbable that the socialist states can, in the light of their 
present balance of payment situation, come to our help in a sufficient 
way to support the production level and the standard of living of the
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population". 73 The current state of the Soviet economy supported this 
view. The imposition of a state of war came at a time when the Soviet 
Union's hard currency reserves had been declining sharply and while 
the initial 'fraternal aid' helped to alleviate some of the hardships 
of the winter months, this was only a short-term assistance programme. 
Further, a deterioration of Poland's status on the international scene 
would render more difficult the task of legitimating the regime both 
abroad and at home. As the Polish Foreign Minister. Jozef Czyrek 
argued,
The chief task of Polish foreign policy at the moment is to 
ensure the existence of the most favourable external 
conditions, both political and economic, in our efforts to 
overcome the Crisis in Poland by our own means. Of special 
importance here is . . . the inviolable Polish-Soviet alliance 
and Poland's all-round co-operation with the USSR. It is
important to reconstruct and to consolidate our place and 
our role as a durable link in the political and defensive 
alliance with the Warsaw Treaty states and develop our
active partnership in the economic co-operation between 
socialist states, both at the bi-lateral and multi-lateral 
levels, under the auspices of COMECON. ... For our foreign 
policy at the present, we must bear in mind and avail 
ourselves of the conditions both internally and externally. 
Taking into our hands the terribly complicated effort of 
stabilizing and normalizing the domestic situation will not 
weaken our action in our relations abroad. We will act, 
keeping in mind, the continuation and unfolding of our 
traditional policy for dialogue, the easing of international 
tensions and the co-operation with all peoples, particularly 
in Europe, with whom we acted and are acting for the 
preservation of peace in Europe.00
On December 30, the PRL's Deputy Prime Minister, Mieczysiaw 
Rakowski, made a surprise two-day visit to Bonn where he had talks 
with the West German leaders. Nothing concrete came out of this visit 
if only that the Vice-Premier emphasized that there could be no return 
to the period before August I960 just as there could be no return to
the period of anarchy before December 13, 1981. 0,1 Yet, the subsequent
West German attitude towards the PRL may have had something to do with 
this brief encounter. On the whole, the West German management of the
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Polish crisis was essentially dedicated to downplaying it. Even if the 
German Bundestag was the first Western parliament to condemn the 
imposition of a state of war in the PRL and while Rakowski was told 
that the West German government expected the speedy lifting of martial 
law, the release of all prisoners and the resumption of the regime's 
dialogue with the Church and Solidarity, Bonn also spelled out that it 
would continue to adhere to the principle that the PRL must solve its 
problems by itself and without interference from abroad. The Schmidt 
Government had never been enthusiastic about Solidarity and in the 
aftermath of the imposition of martial law, it was careful not to 
ruffle Soviet sensitivities by initially denying any Soviet 
responsibility for the Jaruzelski coup. In a move to stave off new 
domestic unrest that might trigger a Soviet intervention after all, 
Bonn helped to launch a massive food campaign for Poland, instructing 
the West German post office not to charge any postage for food parcels 
sent to the Polish state. West Germany equally dashed American hopes 
on sanctions when Chancellor Schmidt, speaking in Florida where he was 
on holiday, said that "we would find it very difficult to apply 
sanctions ourselves against Poland". He even added that he thought 
that "sanctions, economically speaking, are not really of great 
effect".02 Overall this opinion was also shared by the banking world. 
As roughly 50% of the PRL's hard currency debt was made up of private 
bank loans, the eventuality of having to write off these very loans 
must have caused great anxiety to the banks concerned. For this 
reason, it is not unreasonable to presume that the military take-over 
must have been a relief for many of them as it was seemingly putting 
an end to a situation which the banking world must have perceived as 
hardly conducive to a speedy repayment of the loans. As the head of 
Citibank's international division explained, "Who knows which
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political system works? The only thing we care about is: can they pay 
their bills"?03
On January 4, 1982, the European Community's Foreign Ministers met
in Brussels to discuss the Polish situation and consider a collective
response to the events there as well as air out their degree of
support for Reagan's call for sanctions against the Soviet Union. The
meeting aimed primarily on reconciling their own differences over how 
to react to convince the Polish military government that it will 
inevitably face European reprisals if it did not relax its crackdown 
on Solidarity. In the final communique a five point programme was 
presented:
a) a solemn warning was issued to the Warsaw Treaty Organization 
against any intervention in Poland;
b) a call was made for "close and positive consultations" with the 
US and other Western governments to avoid "any step which would
compromise" President Reagan's sanctions against the USSR;
c) a pledge to secure condemnation of the Polish crackdowns as a 
grave violation of the Helsinki Final Act at the forthcoming
Conference On Security and Co-operation In Europe, to be held in
Madrid on February 9;
d) a pledge to secure at the UN "denunciations of human rights 
violations and accompanying acts of violence":
e) to implement moves to suspend credits, economic assistance and 
cut price food sales to Poland. In addition, the European Community 
will consider reducing the volume of its imports from the Soviet
Union. e4
An attempt to dispatch Mr. Leo Tinderaans, the Belgian Foreign
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Minister, as an emissary both to Warsaw and Moscow, was opposed and 
finally blocked by France and Greece. In all, the Western response was 
rather low-key and showed many signs of disunity among the members of 
the Western Alliance. Contrary to the Reagan administration, the West 
Europeans did not believe that economic sanctions could produce 
tangible results. More significantly, the prospect of the PRL 
defaulting on its foreign loans and thereby upsetting the 
international banking system, would have meant that the Europeans 
stood to lose a lot more than the Americans in this matter. Another 
aspect of this reticence to act was based upon the fear that Socialist 
Poland would be drawn even further into the grip of its eastward 
neighbour. Only the NATO meeting of January 11, 1982 seemed to have
unified the Western Alliance stand on the Polish crisis with the 
issuing of a strongly worded communique in which, for the first time, 
the NATO countries agreed to suspend negotiations with the Polish 
government on the rescheduling of the official debt owed to Western 
governments in 1982. The communique urged the PRL's authorities to end 
the state of war, release those arrested and restore immediately a 
dialogue with the Church and Solidarity. At the same time, it strongly 
criticized the role of the Soviet Union in the Polish crisis and 
hinted that the future of economic and commercial relations between 
the USSR and the NATO members countries would have to be re­
examined. &B Even so, individual countries' responses varied. On 
February 5, 1982, Britain became the first European nation to join the
US sanctions. On the 22nd, Belgium followed suit and announced that it 
would suspend Polish debt-rescheduling talks, suspend scientific and 
technical accords, and carefully review Polish applications for trade 
visas. Japan, a day later, imposed limited sanctions against Poland 
and the Soviet Union. Canada too, on February 24, 1982, imposed a
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number of economic sanctions against Poland, which included suspension 
of new commercial credits for goods other than food and the delay of 
Polish debt rescheduling negotiations. In France, the Reagan 
administration's abrupt call for economic sanctions without prior 
consultation with the NATO allies had triggered profound criticisms of 
the American line and further contributed to the French doubts as to 
the effectiveness of the sanctions. While the French assured the 
Americans that they would not undermine their sanctions, at the end of 
January 1982, Paris signed a major contract with Moscow for a share in 
the construction of the Siberian gas pipeline. In Bonn, the Bundestag 
rejected a resolution calling for economic sanctions and although the 
West German government later decided to withhold direct economic aid 
to the PRL and suspend negotiations with the Soviet Union on further 
scientific, technological and shipping agreements, the overall 
reaction was that of caution. An outright Soviet Pact intervention 
might have made things clearer in the minds of Western politicians. 
Yet the question still remains whether the NATO countries would have 
been able to react in any other way. The West's potential for 
influencing the course of events in the PRL, or anywhere else in the 
Socialist Bloc, has always been constrained by the fact East Central 
Europe represents a fundamental security interest for the Soviet 
Union. As such, economic or political leverage attempts by the West 
are always sure of encountering fierce and determined Soviet 
resistance and thus be in a majority of cases ineffective. It is 
therefore doubtful that the Western nations could have acted 
differently from their response to the 1956 and 1968 crises in Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia. What more could they have done for Poland in 1981?
The Western response to the imposition of martial law triggered a
sharp riposte from the PRL's authorities. In an article entitled "Our
open policy", it was written that,
Not only us, but also an objective observer, can read this 
pressure as an attempt to destabilize Socialist Poland and 
prepare the ground for creating "a Polish crisis" of an
international dimension. This is contrary to the lessons of
the past, of Europe's need and necessity to preserve a
climate of moderation in East-West relations. . . . Poland has
not changed and will not change its place on the world's 
political map, nor will it alter its stand on international 
problems. We still want to pursue an open foreign policy as 
established by Polish traditions. We do not want to lock 
ourselves inside four walls, to isolate ourselves from the
international community. ... Settled and friendly relations
in Europe are necessary for all states.QS
The reference to the Madrid Conference particularly incensed the 
authorities who described such attempts as gross interference in 
Polish domestic affairs. "The Polish delegation goes to Madrid with 
the intention, neither to discuss the internal affairs of other 
countries, nor the domestic affairs of Poland", said a commentary in 
Trybuna Ludu (January 9). The head of the PRL delegation, Deputy 
Foreign Minister, Jozef Wiejacz warned that his country would withdraw 
from the conference should any attempt be made to discuss the
country's internal situation. It was around this time that a first 
allusion was being made by the authorities of a linkage between the 
events in the PRL and European peace and security: "the introduction
of a state of war has not changed Poland's foreign policy. It 
threatens nobody. On the contrary, the risk has been averted of 
dismantling the Polish state, which could have been of serious 
consequences for the stability in Europe•" (My italics). e7 Up till now 
the regime's justification for the imposition of a state of war had 
suggested that it had forestalled the eventuality of a Soviet Pact 
intervention, even if this was never implicitly stated. It would 
appear that the emphasis was now changing to stress that the possible 
effect of any such developments would have affected directly the
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situation in Europe. This had the advantage, from a propagandist point 
of view, of shifting the onus onto the West to recognize the European 
context in which the Polish developments were unravelling and shifting 
the attention away from it being merely a situation concerning one 
country. In the months that ensued, a great deal of effort on the part 
of the PRL's authorities went into propagating this argument forward. 
Yet, it seemed to have had little effect on Western policies.
By this time Jaruzelski was facing three major problems. The main 
one was economic: how to put an end to the economic collapse and
improve the overall situation, however slightly. The second problem 
was political: how to replace the military authorities with a more
conventional form of rule where the Party would be seen as having 
regained its 'leading role'. The third and last one was to find a way 
of convincing the disillusioned Poles to co-operate with the regime in 
both tasks. Threatened by the restrictions imposed on the PRL by the 
West, the national economy was made to suffer accrued difficulties and 
any schemes to improve the situation heavily compromised. However it 
must be stressed that by this time, the PRL*s economy needed more than 
just a new influx of foreign credits. While the absence of such 
economic aid from the West did create general problems for the central 
planners, the roots of the crisis lay elsewhere. Even if Western 
credits had been forthcoming, a solution to the catastrophic situation 
was still a long way ahead. As Jerzy Urban, the government's spokesman 
said in 1962, answering questions from foreign journalists on the 
effects of the Western sanctions on Polish society, wladza si§ zawsze 
wyiywi (we. - the ruling establishment - shall always eat well"), 
admirably summarizing, however cynically, the authorities' position on 
the restrictions imposed by the West.®0
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A recurrent theme began appearing in Polish commentaries at this 
time. Countering American justifications that the sanctions would be 
directed at the regime, it was repeated ad nauseam that the Polish 
people would be the first to experience the hardships caused by the 
sanctions. This reflected mainly the leadership's realization that 
unless something could be done to improve the lot of ordinary Poles, 
it would become very difficult to proceed with a successful 
'normalization' of the country. And the longer this would be the case, 
the harder it would become for Jaruzelski to impose his rule over the 
Polish society. As the reported continuation of incidents throughout 
the country showed, the military were still struggling in their task 
of 'normalizing' the situation. Another crucial factor was the Soviet 
Union. The longer the crisis in Poland, the less support would 
Jaruzelski be able to expect from his eastward neighbour. For the 
Kremlin, despite all the positive aspects the imposition of martial 
law had reaped for the Soviet bloc, it had also affected its relations 
with the United States and revived the spectre of the Cold War (the 
more so with the continuing war in Afghanistan). More importantly, it 
had raised fundamental questions about the nature of communist power 
and the future of the Soviet Union's largest ally in the Warsaw Pact. 
After all, this was the first time a country within the Soviet sphere 
of influence had a military government at its head. Ideologically too, 
the PRL was far from presenting a cohesive picture: the state of the
Polish Communist Party was causing great concern to the Kremlin 
leaders. The prospect of the PRL becoming an economic burden as 
Western aid was halted or diverted cannot have been seen by the 
Kremlin leaders as a very satisfactory outcome and certainly not on a 
long-term basis. The announcement of a Soviet long-term credit of 
2.700 million roubles to cover the PRL's trade deficit with the Soviet
-119-
Union in the past year was made on January 6, but this was a long way 
from solving the Polish economic crisis.
The Polish-Soviet joint communique at the end of Foreign Minister 
Czyrek' s visit to Moscow on January 10 1982, clearly expressed the
identity of views of the regimes on the subject of Western sanctions:
The Foreign Ministers strongly denounced the latest steps 
taken by the US administration against the Polish People1s 
Republic and the Soviet Union. Both sides view those 
activities as an attempt to hamper the normalization of the 
situation in Poland and its emergence from the crisis and to 
subvert the socialist foundations of People's Poland, and 
also as an attempt to turn Poland into a seat of tension in 
Europe. ... The Soviet Union and Poland strongly reject the 
statement of the Brussels' meeting of the Foreign Ministers 
of the NATO countries of January 11, 1962, as an attempt at
grossly interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign 
state, the Polish People's Republic. Qs*
Again, at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which 
took place in Madrid on February 9, the head of the PRL delegation, 
Jozef Wieczak, made a passionate intervention in which he described 
the Western reactions to the imposition of martial law as the result 
of a "psychological-political war" against Poland. While he warned his 
audience that any attempt to use the current situation in the PRL as a 
pretext for global strategic goals was doomed to failure, he also made 
a parallel between continuing sanctions and the duration of martial 
law. Expressing the desire for its speedy removal, he complained that 
the authors of the "brutal campaign" against Poland (he singled out in 
particular the United States), were doing everything to impede this 
process and that any form of dialogue was made impossible because of 
that policy. What is perhaps most interesting here, is the 
reappearance of a theme which, throughout the crisis, was constantly 
used by the authorities in order to try and defuse the adverse 
international reaction to the Polish developments; again and again, 
the PRL's domestic situation was presented against the background of
European security and identified as a crucial factor in the 
preservation of stability on the continent. By drawing a link between 
European stability and the PRL's internal situation, a strong
connection was being made between the domestic and external factors 
directly influencing the nature of the PRL's policy-making. As Vice-
Foreign Minister Wieczak pointed out,
We will do everything in our power to ensure that the Polish 
crisis is not used against the easing of tensions and 
European stability. Poland will not become a pretext to 
return to the Cold War.30
This close identification between Polish national interests and 
European stability was heavily stressed by Warsaw. Two main
considerations were thus shaping the Polish authorities' stand on this 
question:
a) The worse the international situation, the more likely the 
pressure from the Soviet Union to speed up the 'normalization process' 
in socialist Poland. Already facing the prospect of having to turn 
eastward for assistance in the wake of Western economic sanctions, 
Jaruzelski had to try to persuade the Kremlin leaders that he was in 
control of the situation and that the PRL should not become an 
untimely burden for the Soviet Union, either economically or
politically. The longer the crisis, the more likely that Moscow would 
soon voice its doubts as to the value of the Jaruzelski leadership. 
While the imposition of a state of war must have been seen by the
Soviet Union as a successful operation, it was still too early to say 
that 'socialist normality' had returned to the PRL. In that sense, the 
police/military rdgime still had to prove itself as instrumental in 
bringing back stability in one of the main links binding the socialist 
bloc together. The quicker this could be done, the greater the margin 
of manoeuvre for the generals. And this highlighted another aspect of
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Polish 'normalization* policies namely, that the imposition of a state 
of war did provide Jaruzelski with some measure of leverage vis-A-vis 
Moscow; he had proved his ability to stop the 'counterrevolution' and 
now needed all the available support from Moscow to carry out the next 
phase of consolidation to ensure Polish stability within the Soviet 
bloc. The Party was in disarray and it was in his interest to persuade 
the Kremlin leaders that no-one else could succeed in carrying out 
this task.
b) At home, the situation was still uncertain. The primary tasks of 
the regime, after the suppression of 'open opposition', was to re­
assert the PZPR as the leading political force in the country. 
Obviously, martial law was helpful in this respect: the partial
militarization of the state and party apparatus enabled the 
authorities to press on with purges within the Party31 and reinforce 
central command over the economy. A clear allusion to the beneficial 
aspects of martial law as providing the right conditions for a 
complete reorganization of the party was given by Politburo member, W. 
Mokrzyszczak in an interview to ReczszpospolitaS2. Yet, it was not 
surprising that such measures as the practice.of signing a pledge of 
loyalty to the regime and the whole 'verification process' hardly 
made the authorities more popular in the eyes of the population. What 
was needed was the quick implementation of a series of socio- 
economical measures destined to persuade the nation that the 'road to 
anarchy' had ended and that the regime was now determined to put the 
nation back onto 'a new right track'. There was to be no return to the 
errors of the past. . . . One of the priorities was the imperative to 
reactivate an almost moribund economy and especially find a solution 
to the external debt problem. This would involve active participation
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on the international scene and required above all an adequate external 
climate (hence the recurring calls for a stable international 
environment). Economic aid from the Soviet Union and the rest of the 
socialist bloc allies, however, would not be enough to pull the Polish 
ally out of its current situation. While it is true that the Soviet 
Union was in a position to cover most of the PRL's indispensable 
requirements in industrial raw materials, the curtailment of 
sophisticated industrial inputs and spare parts from the West would 
seriously affect Polish ability to produce competitive and profitable 
exports, the prerequisites for servicing the country's foreign debt 
and the financing of its current and future requirements. Without a 
doubt this is to remain a major problem for the PRL as it nears the 
end of the century. The daunting prospect of being unable to update 
its industrial infrastructure and stem the inevitable disintegration 
of the existing machinery will have catastrophic results on the 
national economy and on the PRL's position in a world where, 
increasingly, new technologies and forms of production are determining 
the viability and stature of nations. Notwithstanding the limited aid 
the COMECON countries might give the PRL, the Polish industrial sector 
still required essential spare parts to maintain machinary purchased 
in the West during the 1970s and additional parts and equipment to 
complete the large numbers of semi-finished industrial development 
projects launched at the time. To this day stands in the middle of 
Warsaw, in front of the Central railway Station, a huge unoccupied and 
slowly deteriorating skyscraper, a monument, among others, to the 
false expectations engendered during and by the Gierek administration.
Western support was therefore vital for the PRL. This is why, 
despite all its propagandists rhetoric, the Jaruzelski regime was
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still seeking assistance from the West. And only in conditions 
conducive to relations of a friendlier nature could this be achieved. 
Hence the concern for a more suitable international climate. Further, 
any success in having the new Polish regime accepted on the 
international scene was also perceived as a way for the authorities of 
gaining greater acceptance for their policies inside Poland. It was 
thus faced with a dilemma: while there existed real political
incentives to seek a stabilization of the Polish economy through 
greater reliance on the COMECON countries, at the same time, there 
were also powerful economic constraints on this option.33
The correlation between the domestic and the foreign dimensions was 
made explicit in Jaruzelski's speech at the Vllth KC Plenum, the first 
one since the imposition of the state of war. It is worth quoting here 
extensive extracts as they clearly illustrate the points made earlier 
on. After opening his address with a sharp attack on Reagan's "anti-
Polish" campaign, he went on to say that,
Poland is being treated as an instrument, as one of pressure 
levers operated against the Soviet Union and the socialist 
community. ... Poland is no small country. Its demographic 
and industrial potential, geographic position and military 
importance are valued very highly in Europe and the world.
But at the same time our country has become, for a short 
period of time, a weakened link in the socialist system. ...
The process of dismantling the socialist community link by 
link, the rolling back of European history by a whole epoch 
was to have begun with Poland. We have thwarted that 
intention. The state of war in our country has become in 
effect an anti-war state Lstanem antywojennymJ; it has 
removed and at least considerably reduced for the present 
moment the threat of confrontation. .. . Perhaps history one 
day will state that just as World War II began over Poland,
World War III did not begin in Poland. ... We took the 
decision to introduce the state of martial law solemnly, on 
our own responsibility, motivated by the interests of the 
nation and the socialist state. Nobody dictated that 
decision to us. ... We have always stated clearly and 
unambigously that counterrevolution will not pass. We have 
kept our word.
Counterrevolution has not passed. Hopes of turning back 
events in Poland are a dangerous illusion and a dangerous 
blunder. One cannot turn back the course of history. The 
spring will belong neither to us nor to you Ca reference to
-124-
the Solidarity slogan which was popular at the time: "The
winter is yours, the spring will be ours] There will be 
quite simply a Poland which is socialist. ... We must stand 
firmly on our feet and be a worthy participant in the 
international economic life, which includes being a worthy 
partner for Western countries. We are proud of our European 
heritage, of Poland's contribution over many centuries to 
the culture and civilization of our continent and of 
struggle for freedom and progress to other nations. We do 
not fence ourselves off from Europe and the world. We want 
to maintain ties. ... Martial law is not an objective in 
itself. We regard it as a stage in the regaining of an 
equilibrium, in the overcoming of the toughest threshold of 
the crisis.9<d (My Italics)
Seven years later, Jaruzelski would declare that the imposition of 
a state of war had "saved Solidarity". Without it, the General
argued, the movement would have completely ceased to exist. In the 
months that followed the December 13 proclamation, he was of course 
unaware that in a few years' time, his representatives would be 
sitting at the same table as those who had been interned, persecuted 
and tried throughout the martial law period and after. At the time, 
his immediate objectives were to restore a semblance of stability, re­
build the Party, eliminate the 'opposition' and persuade the outside 
world to let socialist Poland regain its place on the international
arena. The years that followed showed him how hard these tasks would
be.
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working with a counterrevolutionary aim for the overthrow of the 
socialist system, I declare that I resign from this union". A copy 
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Rex regnat, sed non goubernat.
Jan Zamoyski (1542-1605)
CHAPTER 4 
CONSOLIDATION OF POWER.
Written some four centuries earlier, the remark that in Poland, 
"the king reigns but does not govern", has an analogous meaning for
the PRL in 1982. Though are obvious historical differences, the fact
remains that by taking the decision to impose a state of war, General 
Jaruzelski was now reigning over a militarized society; but his 
ability to govern the chaotic situation still prevailing in the 
country was being seriously impaired by the absence of a coherent 
policy designed to put the country back on its feet. And of course, 
Jaruzelski may have been the country's ruler, but no one doubted that 
even if Polish tanks were ensuring that order was prevailing, Moscow's 
directives kept on arriving in the Polish capital, keeping the new 
Polish leadership under constant observation. The General's main 
concern appeared limited to strengthening his own position and slowly 
re-introduce some, but not all, elements of the status quo ante. In a 
paradoxical way (if one listened to the arguments put forward by the 
authorities to justify it), the very existence of the state of war was 
detrimental to any plans for achieving this objective. Thus the
question was raised, almost immediately, as the state of war was 
implemented, when would it be 'safe' again to lift it. At the same
time, the duration of martial law was providing the Generals with an 
ideal okazja zrobienia porzgdku - an ideal opportunity to put the 
Polish house in order. Also, there was a pressing need to re-assure 
the PRL's allies that the trust impaired upon Jaruzelski and his team
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had been well-founded.
4. 1 The * Fraternal* Context.
It is significant to note how long it took for the state of war to 
be formally endorsed by the PRL's parliament. More than a month after 
the December 13 declaration, the Sejm finally 'approved' the decision 
on 25 January 1982. This belated 'ratification' was by itself in fact 
nothing more than a propaganda exercise, the purpose of which was, to 
say the least, unclear for the majority of Poles. What was clear 
however, was that force and not law was the real source behind the 
imposition of martial law. 1 In any case it changed nothing. With 
'domestic normalization' under way, it was time for the Jaruzelski 
regime to turn its attention to its socialist allies and return to 
less ambiguous relations with them after the tumultuous events of the 
past few months. The PRL's public relations machine had to explain the 
concrete, present and future implications of the military take-over
and reassure the socialist community that the situation was now at 
last under control.
Overall there had been unanimous consensus among the PRL's five WTO 
allies that the imposition of a state of war had been necessary and
later that it had been a successful bid to restore 'socialist
normality'. With various degrees of enthusiasm for Jaruzelski's 
decision (Romania was noticeably less effusive than the rest of the 
bloc), all the active bloc . members of the region emphasized the
necessity of martial law and insisted that the General's actions had 
quickly created the required conditions for a restoration of order and 
peace in the PRL. Even the most extreme actions on part of the 
repressive Polish authorities were praised and described as 
encouraging signs that the Polish situation was returning to normal.
The larger the number of arrests of various 'counter-revolutionaries, 
the more numerous the commentaries (especially Czech and East German) 
insisting that the situation was 'easing'.2 None of the PRL's Warsaw 
Pact allies displayed any of the uncertainties which had characterized 
the Western reaction. With increasing Western European resistance to 
American pressures for sanctions against the PRL and the Soviet Union, 
the WTO member states made the most of the apparent lack of unity in 
the Western camp. They attacked bitterly the sanctions as an 
unwarranted effort to interfere in the internal matters of the PRL, 
supporting their views by the argument that the decision to implement 
the state of war had been a sovereign one, made by the Polish 
leadership. The Soviet Union had responded to the declaration of a 
state of war in the PRL surprisingly quickly. Radio Moscow announced 
the formation of WRON and the imposition of martial law at 0900, 
Moscow Time, only one hour after General Jaruzelski had broadcast his 
proclamation. An hour later, Radio Moscow carried the first lengthy 
excerpts from Jaruzelski*s speech, giving details of the measures 
taken and repeated them four times later in the morning. A full text 
of the speech was broadcast later in the day. In the evening a first 
reference to the actual situation in the PRL and the effects of the 
new measures on the country claimed that with the introduction of 
martial law in Warsaw, Gdahsk and the majority of other regions of the 
country, a calm atmosphere had been on the whole maintained.3 The 
certain fact that the Kremlin knew about the decision to impose a 
state of war in the PRL did not mean that the Soviet leaders were 
entirely confident in the success of the operation. Caught in an 
earlier dilemma of reconciling their wish for stability and conformity 
and having to chose between a military intervention and a reliance on 
the Polish communists' own efforts to stabilize the internal
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situation, they had appeared indecisive over the possibility of 
finding a political solution to the crisis (ie. the least costly 
alternative). The first Soviet authoritative commentary on the
declaration of a state of war was a TASS statement on Radio Moscow on 
Monday December 14, 1981. ■* It was a carefully worded expression of the
official Soviet position on what had taken place in the PRL. It
denoted a certain reserve, dictated probably by uncertainty about how 
successful the Polish authorities* action would prove to be in the 
long-run. In the weeks that followed, three main themes appeared in 
Soviet commentaries. First of all, it was stated that the situation in 
the PRL was returning to normal as a direct result of imposition of 
the state of war and the Polish authorities^ success in foiling the 
counterrevolution. Secondly, the US was severely criticized for
interfering in the PRL's internal affairs and American assertions that 
Moscow had been behind the measures taken in the PRL turned to 
ridicule. Thirdly, the US was portrayed as receiving little support 
from its allies in its attempts to impose sanctions on the PRL. On the 
whole, the picture presented was that of a socialist Poland regaining 
a semblance of normality in the face of the desperate efforts by the
American nation to reactivate the counterrevolution:
Driven into a fury by the failure of its plans to overthrow 
... the socialist structure in Poland and restore capitalism 
in that country, the US administration is making convulsive 
attempts to hinder the normalization of the situation in 
Poland and prevent the Polish people from extracting itself 
from the crisis caused by the conspiracy of the 
counterrevolution.0
As the successful implementation of the state of war in the PRL became 
more obvious, the Kremlin then shifted its attention to two main 
areas. The first one concerned the implementation of measures to 
counter the effects of the Polish events on the international arena 
and their repercussions on the Soviet Union. With the announcement
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that the US would also be applying sanctions against the USSR, Moscow 
began accusing the Reagan administration of being in violation of the 
Helsinki Agreements, thereby trying to heighten world tension and 
destroy the fabric of East-West dbtente. The second area concerned the 
internal developments in the PRL. The big concern now was to ensure 
that the PZPR regained its leading position. In the light of the 
Western sanctions, also appeared the first signs that Moscow was 
determined to use the occasion to reinforce the unity of the socialist 
bloc. A lengthy article appeared in Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta describing 
the causes behind the Polish economic crisis.0 It is worth here 
summarizing it as it represented a veiled warning to the countries of 
Eastern Europe that they should concentrate on developing their trade 
ties with the Soviet Union rather than with the West. It also 
foreshadowed the PRL's eastern re-orientation which was to take place 
shortly. In the article, the economic commentator, B. Rachkov, 
identified six main causes for the crisis in the PRL: a) the
foundations of the crisis were laid in the early 1970s by the ill- 
considered actions of the previous Polish leadership who overestimated 
the country's export capabilities and underestimated the difficulties 
of trading with capitalist countries in order to resolve domestic 
economic problems; b) the mid-1970s economic crisis in the West raised 
the price of goods being imported by the PRL and affected the level of 
Polish exports; c) the leaders of Solidarity undermined the efforts by 
the Polish authorities to improve the foreign trade situation by 
strikes which severely damaged Polish exports; d) deliberate 
discriminatory measures in the West further made the situation worse 
in those sectors of the Polish industry dependent on supplies from the 
West; e) imperialist circles exploited the technological and financial 
Polish dependence on the West and strengthened the local
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counterrevolution; f) from the summer of 1981, the leaders of 
Solidarity embarked on a direct blockade of exports of certain goods 
in order to leave the Polish economy wide open to the expansion of 
capitalist corporations. At the same time, a slanderous campaign 
against the PRL's ties with the socialist countries was conducted and 
the counterrevolution tried to convince everyone that the cure for the
country's economic problems could be found only in the West. Overall
the article made it clear that a serious re-thinking of the socialist 
bloc's relations with the West would have to be discussed in the near 
future. Meanwhile, the Soviet leaders waited for the report from 
General Jaruzelski on the evolution of the situation in the PRL.
Three days after the Sejm's ratification of the state of war, on 
March 1, 1982, a Polish Party-state delegation, headed by Jaruzelski,
arrived in Moscow. The fact that it took place some three months after 
the December proclamation showed that Jaruzelski had not felt 
confident enough before to meet his Soviet counterparts. This was the 
first of a series of official visits paid by the Polish leadership to 
re-establish 'fraternal' relations with the socialist community's 
countries in the aftermath of the imposition of a state of war. As 
Raymond Aron once wrote, "£h politique, on peut choisir ses ennemis, 
on ne peut pas choisir ses allies?'. Naturally the Soviet Union was the
first stop, just as it had been, over 11 years ago when Gierek had
journeyed to the Soviet capital after his assumption of power. Despite 
the 'friendly atmosphere' in which the Polish delegation was received, 
the meeting revealed in part the continuing doubts of the Soviet 
leadership towards the process of the 'Polish normalization'. In his 
speech, the Soviet CPSU First Secretary emphasized the urgent need to 
restore the leading role of the Polish Communist Party and noted that
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"things [were] not easy for Poland [today]". "The waves of anarchy,
chaos and terror will not roll away at once", he added. 7 The Soviet 
side was identical almost to a man to the one which had followed the 
Polish crisis throughout its developments, a sort of informal task 
force on the Polish events. With the exception of Chernenko, this was 
the identical team of seven Soviet leaders which represented the CPSU 
at the Moscow summit of Warsaw Pact leaders during which the PRL was 
discussed in December 1980, and which met with the Kania-led PZPR 
delegation in Moscow on March 4, 1981. Facing this highly experienced
'crisis cabinet* the PRL delegation seemed weak in all respects, the
more so since of all those comprising it, only Jaruzelski seemed to
have had any kind of influence in the Kremlin. The Polish Foreign 
Minister, Jbzef Czyrek, who had been in Moscow in mid-January, did not 
seem at the time to be held in high respect by the Kremlin, a fact 
confirmed later with his replacement in July by Stefan Olszowski, a 
reputed 'hard-liner'. e In fact General Jaruzelski represented perhaps 
the only form of real authority to which the Kremlin leaders could 
address themselves to, a fact highlighting the current state of the 
PZPR who was yet to re-assess its 'predominant role'. In the joint
communique issued at the end of the meeting, the two sides confirmed
their ' unanimity of views and their identical understanding of the 
current and forthcoming tasks'. Three fundamental points were
stressed:
a) Poland would continue to be a socialist state whose economic and
political system remained based upon the principles of Marxism-
Leninism;
b) friendship and alliance with the Soviet Union was, is and will 
be the cornerstone of Polish foreign policy;
-136-
c) Poland remained a durable link in the socialist community as a 
member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance.9
In the PRL the Party media hailed the meeting as "one of the most 
important international event of recent times"10, a statement echoed 
in the Soviet press11 and an indication of how significant the 
encounter had been for the Polish leadership. A large part of the 
discussion had inevitably dealt on the current domestic situation in 
Poland and through this first joint Polish-Soviet assessment of the 
'normalization' process, both sides recognized the necessity to 
maintain a state of war as long as internal stability had not been 
achieved. Further, although this was not mentioned, the rigours 
imposed by the police/military authorities provided a suitable 
environment for the rejuvenation of the PZPR, a sine qua non before 
the return to a type of civilian rule. While there were obvious 
domestic reasons for maintaining the state of war, foreign policy 
considerations also played an important part for its duration. A 
certain degree of uncertainty surrounded Soviet policy at the time and 
this was grounded primarily in the anticipated death of Leonid 
Brezhnev. The failing health of the Soviet leader and the 
uncertainties concerning his successor were paralysing the scope of 
decision-making by the PRL ruling blite. In a climate of apparent 
instability in the Kremlin, the Warsaw leaders, though their policies 
generally kept in line with the requirements expected by a member of 
the Warsaw Pact, were certainly less tied by Soviet directives than in 
the past. In any case, as far as the domestic situation was concerned, 
both Warsaw and Moscow had the same goal: stability. Lifting the
state of war before any succession question had been resolved would
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have been too premature a move for the Polish leadership to consider, 
especially as they could not be assured that a relaxation of their 
control over society would not trigger an immediate response from the 
population, even if a non-violent one. A second chance to 'put the
house in order*, the Polish-way, might not then be so easily allowed
by the Kremlin, the more so if Brezhnev's replacement proved to be 
less conciliatory towards the PRL's leadership. It is interesting to 
note here the identity of purpose of both the Solidarity union and the 
authorities, who both sought, partly for different reasons, to avoid 
an armed intervention by the Warsaw Pact armed forces.
Yet "Soviet military, political and economic power, though a 
necessary condition of the continuation of the Eastern European 
systems in their present form, is not a sufficient condition".12 The 
regimes themselves are confronted by problems which they have to cope 
with on their own. With the continuation of the state of war the PRL 
leadership was faced with a series of dilemmas. On the domestic side, 
it impeded the process of 'national reconciliation' since it was 
difficult to gain the necessary popular support for the badly-needed 
economic reforms put forward by the Polish authorities. At the same
time any socio-economic successes were perceived by the authorities as 
likely to be successful only if the internal situation became and 
remained 'stable', a condition seemingly unattainable without the use 
of repressive means. On the external side, while the continuation of 
martial law was part and parcel of the authorities' campaign to
convince their socialist allies that 'socialist normality' was 
returning in the PRL, it also antagonised further any possibilities to 
resume normal economic and diplomatic relations with the West. 
Although a solution to the socio-political crisis had to be found,
this also required, by association, a solution to the economic crisis 
as well. Thus Western economic support was important as one 
determinant which would assist the Polish authorities, besieged by a 
myriad of economic problems, in regaining domestic and international 
recognition. The longer the state of war lasted, the more difficult
would be the process of 'normalization' both at home and abroad. This
dilemma once again highlighted a crucial tenet of Polish policy-making 
namely, that of the balancing of Eastern and Western oriented 
objectives. In this context it should be noted that the Polish 
Catholic Church was also opposed to any Western economic sanctions. 
The logic behind this position was the realization that they simply 
did not help to solve the Polish crisis. On the contrary, the 
sanctions, by complicating matters and forcing the PRL's authorities 
further into the arms of Moscow, presented a threat to the well-being 
of Poles without however, harming the regime itself. Therefore the 
very aim of such sanctions, as perceived by the West and aiming at 
putting the PRL's authorities under pressure, could not be fulfilled.
That the PRL leadership was eager to present itself in a favourable 
light in the eyes of Moscow was further demonstrated during the 37th 
anniversary celebrations of the Polish-Soviet Treaty on Friendship, 
Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, which took place in Warsaw on
April 20. This occasion received extensive media coverage although 
few, if any at all, took notice of this event. The day before, a
Soviet delegation from the CPSU's department for organizational party 
work had started a visit of the PRL, presumably to assist in the task 
of re-shaping the PZPR's organizational structure. On April 14, the 
WTO Chief-of-Staff, Viktor Kulikov, met once again with Jaruzelski 
while that same week, Soviet East-German and Polish forces were held
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the 'Friendship-82' military manoeuvres in North-West Poland.
On April 23, the 8th KC Plenum passed a resolution expressing the 
Party's hope that co-operation with, and the international aid of, the 
USSR and the other socialist bloc countries would be instrumental in 
bringing the PRL out of the current crisis. Undoubtedly, during this 
period Warsaw's foreign policy orientations were primarily directed 
towards the East and the extensive bout of travelling in Eastern- 
Central Europe by the PRL's representatives throughout the first half 
of 1982, clearly reflected this. On March 29, Jaruzelski visited the 
GDR, on April 5, he was in Prague, on the 21st, in Hungary, on May 20, 
in Bulgaria and on the 4th June, in Romania. 13 However, and despite 
the economic reasons which justified a Polish eastward realignment, 
the primary function of Jaruzelski's Ostpolitik must be seen as 
highlighting the pursuit of a political objective by the Polish 
authorities. The main aim here was to reassure the socialist bloc 
countries that the situation in the PRL was now under control and 
presented no more danger for the stability of the socialist alliance. 
At the same time, the Polish regime was at pains to show that further 
'normalization' still required massive aid from the socialist 
community in order to ensure its success (whether it really believed 
that it would be forthcoming is a matter for speculation). While 
politically, for the Socialist bloc, the situation in the country was 
returning back to normal, despite the fact that many uncertainties 
still remained, the catastrophic economic situation of the country 
still gave great cause of concern to the PRL*s allies (incidentally, 
although the whole bloc was experiencing severe economic problems, 
only in the PRL was the situation being called an economic crisis). It 
meant above all that the longer the duration of the economic crisis,
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the heavier the burden of helping socialist Poland would be, a 
prospect hardly appealing to the COMECON countries, themselves facing 
major economic problems of their own. Thus, the PRL's foreign economic 
objectives, while inevitably eastward-oriented, were in many ways 
hampered by the fact that greater economic integration under the aegis 
of COMECON could not fulfil all their requirements. This was partly 
because of a lack-of determination on the part of the PRL's allies and 
partly, most importantly, because of the unavailability of the long­
term required assistance necessary to pull the PRL out of the crisis. 
In a confidential assessment of the situation in the country, on 
November 16, senior party activists made this clear when they 
concluded that:
Many industries are paralysed because of the lack of 
imported materials, machinery and spare parts. We cannot 
rely on the fraternal nations to help us out of our present 
exchange difficulties with the West: the Soviet Union has
already done what it could and the Hungarians, Czechs, 
Germans and in particular the Romanians, are suffering 
similar difficulties.
Only the capitalist countries were potentially able to help although 
it was then doubtful whether they had such plans in the immediate 
f uture.
Characteristic of the beginning of the martial law period, and 
especially throughout December, was the degree of official self­
justification regarding the imposition of the state of war. This of 
course was not new but it took on a new form by the end of 1982. In 
many respects there seemed to have been a concern from the 
authorities' point of view, to explain and praise not only the basis 
for the decision to militarize society, but also to stress the 
positive effects of such a measure. Such an explanation would be given 
a subtler content as the months and years passed. This concern was
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naturally determined by the geo-political circumstances in which the 
PRL had to evolve and therefore it came as no surprise that the 
Jaruzelski regime made every effort to convince its eastern neighbour 
that the internal situation was now almost back to normal, a fact it 
saw supported by the recent low-key demonstrations of November 1982 
(although there were important demonstrations throughout the country 
at the time).
The rise of Solidarity had provoked feelings of considerable alarm 
among the Soviet leaders. One of their most immediate apprehension 
concerned the way in which the Soviet population - and in particular 
the border regions with the PRL - would react to the Polish example. 
In the end, those fears proved unfounded as the Polish crisis did not 
affect relations between the leadership and the Soviet public at 
large. However, at the same time, the Polish events did affect, to 
various degrees, Soviet perceptions on the nature and form of 
orthodox Marxist-leninist principles. That Solidarity represented the 
Polish working class fighting for rights which the authorities, the 
Party, failed to respond to, while at the same time still ruling on 
the principle that they represented the working class, showed that 
something had to change. Although one still had to wait a few years 
before the beginning of real changes taking place in the Soviet Union, 
it was clear that in many ways, the Polish events helped to shape the 
"contours of the Soviet reform debate". ls Jaruzelski's address to the 
Polish Nation was entirely re-printed in both Pravda and Izvestia'G. 
At this stage, the PRL's foreign policy orientation was virtually 
restricted to the Soviet bloc only, since Western reactions to 
the recent developments in the country precluded any immediate 
improvements in relations. One should also remember that it was now
nearly a month since Andropov, the new CPSU General Secretary was at 
the helm of the Soviet Union, following the death of his predecessor 
Leonid Brezhnev on November 10. Although the transition appeared to 
have been smooth, it was inevitable that the first few weeks of 
Andropov's reign would deal primarily with concerns internal to the 
Soviet Union. This gave the PRL's authorities an opportunity to use 
some initiative and present the new Soviet leader with faits 
accomplis. In particular, the announcement of Walesa's release (a day 
after Brezhnev's death and a day before the CPSU Central Committee 
elected Yuri Andropov), as well as his subsequent arrival in Gdartsk 
the same day that the PRL's delegation was attending the late General 
Secretary's funeral (November 14), all appeared too well planned to 
have been a mere coincidence. Soviet priorities at the time were 
elsewhere and this gave Jaruzelski the chance to be slightly bolder in 
his decision-making. This of course did not mean that the Kremlin was 
oblivious of the situation in the PRL. In the period 13 December 1981 
to December 1982, over 50 meetings took place between Soviet and 
Polish delegations, half of which were on economic questions. At the
end of November, on the 29th, Jan Glbwczyk, deputy Politburo member,
travelled to Moscow where he met Central Committee member, M. 
Zimianin, to discuss ideological co-operation between the two 
countries. On December 20, a PRL party-state delegation led by 
Jaruzelski, went to Moscow to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the 
Soviet Union. During his meeting with Andropov, the General informed 
the Soviet leader on the activity of the PZPR and the government in 
dealing with the economic and political 'stabilization' of the PRL and
thanked the USSR for its fraternal aid. In November 1982, Jaruzelski,
in an interview for the Guardian, had described the Soviet Union as 
"Poland's bulwark both on account of ideological and political reasons
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as well as for reasons of state". He also pointed out that
The essential tenets of Socialist ideology were and remain 
constant. What however is subjected to continuous changes, 
improvements and corrections is their practical
implementation. This is how we in Poland perceive the 
reforms now under way. 17
With hindsight, this sounded very much like a pioneering declaration 
of perestroi'ka, the Polish way, and some three years before the advent 
of Gorbachev (in his book Gorbachev wrote: "It is in the sphere of
Socialism and not outside it, that we look for answers. ... Those who 
hope that we will leave the socialist road will be deeply
disappointed. Every element of the programme of perestroi'ka ... is 
based entirely upon the idea that we need more socialism, more
democracy". 1G). The state of war in the PRL had given the regime an 
opportunity to start afresh, meaning returning to a situation
resembling the status quo ante. Yet, the regime was conscious that 
there could be no return to the situation which had contributed to the 
rise of the Solidarity movement and hence it was faced with two main 
options: either return to the Stalinist model and hold the country
with an iron fist, or develop an 'enlightened model of Socialism* 
where it would appear to be responsive to the demands of the people. 
The second option soon became policy and in the ensuing months, the 
regime used every opportunity to try and convince the Polish people 
that the ‘time of rebirth' (.czas odrodzenia) or 'renewal* iodnowa) had 
come. This then explains partly the insistence with which the 
leadership repeatedly referred back to the necessity for the 
declaration of the state of war in December 1961. In fact, to this 
day, some 7 years after the event, there are still regular references 
to the causes and reasons for the December 13 decision, especially in 
Jaruzelski's speeches, a fact which a psycho-analyst might well 
interpret as an extreme form of a guilt complex. To convince the
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public that the authorities were set on a new path, there had to be a 
justification for the conditions which enabled them to rule. After 
all, the same rulers had imposed a state of war upon the country and 
now they were trying to govern.
A couple of days before Jaruzelski's expected announcement that the 
state of war would soon be lifted (in the event it was only
suspended), General Jozef Baryla identified three main characteristics
embodied in the implementation of the state of war:
The clear essence of the state of war in Poland is expressed 
in the fact that it was an act of defence of the socialist 
state, defence of the achievements of the revolution against 
a counterrevolutionary threat, and was made in the interest 
of the working class and working people. This is its first 
important characteristic. The second particular 
characteristic of the state of war in Poland is the fact
that it was conducted in the whole majesty of the law, in 
accordance with the PRL's constitution, on the strength of 
the decision of the constitutional organs of the state. ...
It was a legal act vital for the defence of the state. ... 
Finally the third particular characteristic of our state of 
war, is that the decision to implement it was undertaken in 
the most broadly conceived interest of the nation and the 
Polish reason of state - with the principles in mind that 
our own problems will be solved by our own hands. It is hard 
to overate this fact.
Concluding he added,
The state of war is perhaps sometimes hard to bear, but for 
the country - it is salutary, it closes the gates to the 
forces of dismantlement, and opens it to others: common
wisdom, worthwhile work for people, a disciplined society, 
respected law and people's pride.19
It may have been salutary for the ruling establishment, but this was
certainly not what the majority of Poles thought as far as their own
fate was concerned. Their hopes, raised during the Solidarity era had 
now been replaced by a sense of resignation and the acceptance that 
there was little that could be done in the present situation in order 
to return to those '500 days' of near democracy. The country was being 
pacified, yet all the same, it was still a long way from being
' normalized' .
4.2 Domestic ' porz§dek*.
Some five months after the imposition of a state of war, it was 
clear that the 'War' had not sapped the morale and determination of 
the Solidarity supporters. Indeed one can say that the apotheosis of 
their activities took place in the summer of 1982. With the 
militarization of Polish society and the suspension of labour unions, 
Solidarity was forced underground. The leaders who had evaded the 
authorities on the night of December 12-13, strove to rebuild the 
union and preserve its continuity. The Solidarity underground emerged 
in an ad hoc fashion and its means and scope of action were inevitably 
restricted by the circumstances. The tactics which were now used were 
based primarily upon the assumption that the authorities would be 
damaged and discredited by various forms of boycotts, work stoppages 
and other similar actions, leading them eventually to accept the 
necessity to renew a dialogue with the ' true* representatives of 
society. The first trial of strength took place on May Day. Alongside 
the official parades, and throughout the country, peaceful crowds of 
people gathered to voice their support for Solidarity, ostensibly 
dispelling any doubts that opposition to the militarization of society 
had been crushed. Two days later, the first violent confrontation 
since the December coup took place. 10 000 people gathered in Warsaw's 
Castle square demanding the release of Lech Walesa and unfurling 
banners bearing the Solidarnosd logo. The peaceful meeting turned into 
a riot only after the ZOMOs began charging the crowd. The scene was 
repeated throughout the PRL and gave a clear indication of the degree 
of unpopularity for the authorities and underlined the still massive 
support for the suspended trade union. It was also indicative of the
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ability and willingness on the part of the regime to use force in 
order to intimidate the population. The next day, night curfews were 
re-introduced in several provinces and towns which had been affected 
by popular unrest. All the signs were pointing to the authorities' 
intransigence in seeking any kind of compromise with the Polish 
population. While Jaruzelski seemed to have made some effort towards 
proving his good will to the West, by adopting some positive measures 
after April 26, the population's determination, little disposed 
towards 'a national reconciliation', forced him to use the only 
available means at his disposal, namely force. May 3, 1982, was marked
by several demonstrations in all major cities and the re-imposition of 
the night curfew in several provinces affected by popular unrest. On 
this occasion General Czeslaw Kiszczak, the Interior Minister 
(MSW),commented that "public order was restored and this will be the 
case whenever anyone attempts to organize in Poland street 
disturbances or any other hostile excesses". 20 Throughout the summer, 
numerous demonstrations continued to occur, followed by increasing 
repression against the leaders of the opposition and their followers. 
On August 31, nationwide demonstrations took place to commemorate the
second anniversary of the Gdarisk Agreements, the most extensive since
the imposition of a state of war. The next day, WRON met and issued a 
communique forcing the WKOs to take appropriate and decisive steps to 
ensure peace and security.-1 On September 16, 1962, Kiszczak once
again, called for greater and more effective measures to improve order
and security in the country.-2- The Sejm was also put to good use: 
since December 1981, the Sejm passed over 50 major bills, more than 
the number passed in normal times during an entire fou:— year 
parliamentary term. -3 The main purpose of this flood of new 
legislation was to prepare the grounds for the aftermath of the state
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of war. It was on October 25, 1982, that a first attempt was made by
the authorities to transfer extraordinary martial law legislation into 
the permanent PRL legislation. The October 25 Law on Procedure with 
Regard to Work Shirkers exposed the aims of the regime in an 
unequalled way and made its declarations for greater democratization 
in the era of odnowa sound hollow. What in effect it was signalling, 
was the persistent and determined policy guiding the authorities 
namely, to reinforce the legal means of repression not only to control 
society more effectively but also to prepare the grounds for. an 
eventual lifting of the state of war.
On October 8, the Sejm declared a new trade union legislation, 
effectively terminating the legal existence of all labour 
organizations. During the period August 1980 - December 1981,
alongside the independent and self-managing Solidarity union, there 
had also existed also some 81 ' autonomous' unions - the remaining
official trade unions - and 24 branch unions. In replacement, plans 
were drawn to create new workers unions whose obedience to the Party 
and the state authorities would be legally secured (see below). They 
were to become active on January 1, 1983. As became clear later on,
the trade unions issue was to become "a key ingredient in Jaruzelski's 
attempts to demonstrate his regime's continuity with the violently 
foreshortened Solidarity e r a " . T h e  planned Papal visit for the 
Summer was cancelled and a virulent campaign against ex-members of KOR 
was initiated on September 2. The authorities made it also clear 
that they categorically rejected any possibility of negotiations with 
the Solidarity leadership under which the trade union could resume its 
activities openly.
The summer of 1982 had indeed been a 'hot summer' for the PRL and
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had demonstrated the still volatile atmosphere prevailing throughout 
the country. At the same time the extent of internal disturbances 
changed little to the overall situation. The social disturbances and 
the existence of the Solidarity underground failed to alter the course 
of events. However it did succeed in complicating the authorities' 
task by raising the political cost of their repressive policies. In 
turn this was demonstrating, both home and abroad, that the PRL* s 
leaders lacked the legitimacy they were so keen to achieve through the 
process of 'normalization*. The Solidarity era had revealed, as never 
before, the extent of the ideological bankruptcy of the Polish 
Communist Party. The imposition of a state of war did nothing to 
reverse this fact, on the contrary. As the months under military rule 
unfolded, it was clear to everyone that society had been 'de­
ideologized', and that more than rhetoric would be needed by the 
ruling establishment to muster any kind of support. This truth in turn 
emphasized the fact that any solution to current problems would imply 
a reinforcing of the authoritarian and bureaucratic apparatus, leaving 
ideological considerations to the 'dustbins of history'. In Leszek 
Kolakowski's words, this was "a new curiosity - a Communism without 
i d e o l o g y " . I n  such conditions, plans for 'normalization' would not 
only be harder to fulfil but also, it would remain an open question 
whether the authorities would be actually able to return the country 
to real 'socialist normality'.
Yet, despite the continuing unrest, the military rulers were never 
really threatened. This is something which Jaruzelski must have 
stressed to Brezhnev when he met the Soviet leader at the annual 
Crimean meeting of the heads of the socialist bloc countries on August 
16, 1962.27 Naturally the two leaders expressed "their complete unity
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of views". At the same time, Jaruzelski’s short trip (he left on the 
17th) indicated the degree of concern to the Polish leader that the 
situation was only precariously stabilized. A day before the second 
anniversary of the Gdarisk Agreements, General Jaruzelski, speaking at 
an officers' promotion ceremony in Poznah, said that only "strength
and stability were capable of bringing about a reform":
When there is weakness, and restless conflicts, it will 
fail. Today whoever acts against the interest of the state, 
is pulling Poland backwards, is breaking the process of 
change Lprzemian], ... In order to get out of the crisis, we 
still need above, all calm and tranquillity. Its defence is 
the duty of the state of war. 29
He pleaded that there be, on August 31, no "blood-stained (splamione 
krwig) excesses and illegal demonstrations", warning that even if the 
state of war was not to the liking of some, it was unfortunately a 
necessity which no-one would be allowed to upset.29 In vain, for the 
next day erupted widespread public unrest throughout the country. 34 
Voivods and 68 cities were affected. The authorities response was 
unequivocal: numerous arrests were carried out, and the WKOs were 
ordered to take appropriate and decisive steps to ensure peace and 
security. Over 5000 individuals were questioned and nearly 200 
interned.30 On September 12, a WR0N meeting called onto the Sejm to 
speed the bill on procedures against adults who avoid work or 
schooling and increase penalties in the law on speculation and in 
parts of the criminal code concerning bribery. 31 (this incidentally 
was running counter to WRON*s self-stated role in society, namely as a 
mere policy-inspiring body). It was also around this time that 
hundreds of internees, who had been held without charges in 
penitentiaries and internment camps and others who were simply under 
constant surveillance, were conscripted into the army and sent 
to "special military centres". By January 1963, some 6 000 male
conscripts were to be found in 22 such camps.32 Shortly afterwards 
the State Tribunal was inaugurated, followed the next day by the 
institutionalization of the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth 
(PRON). Founded on July 20, 1982 and adopted into the PRL's
Constitution a year later, PRON became an important element in the 
policy of 'socialist renewal' patronized by the state following the 
elimination of Solidarity and other organizations not controlled by 
the PZPR. In effect the new organization was just as little an 
authentic representation of society as a whole as had been the 
National Unity Front (FJN) which had existed since the end of the 
Second World War (nearly all other East European countries had had a 
similar organization). The PRON initiative "was an attempt by the 
political leadership to extend the basis for its own existence of rule 
in society and to prop up the moral justification for the proclamation 
of martial law".33 As such, from the very beginning of its existence 
it incurred the danger of discrediting itself in the same way as the 
FJN. The Sejm session of September 16, 1982, had heard an unequivocal
speech on order and security given by General Czeslaw Kiszczak. 
Denouncing the recent disturbances he warned "Poland's enemies", at
home and abroad that:
No provocation, no enemy activity will push us away from the 
road on which we entered in order to save our socialist
state, strengthen its independence and sovereignty, to 
implement the process of revival Codnowa], reform and
democratization, so that Poland can be reborn again iaby
odrodzid Polskf
The General's speech also referred, though briefly, to the use made by 
'adventurists' of churches and other religious places for their anti- 
state activities, a reference containing an indirect attack on the
Church as a whole for its role in the current disturbances. And he 
added the, by now, almost inevitable reference to 'foreign circles',
identifying the "real centre for the strategic control of all 
opposition in Poland as somewhere far from [the country's] borders".
As if to confirm the growing confidence of the Party leadership, 
the Sejm session of October 8-9, passed a new trade union legislation, 
thereby putting an end to the legal life of the suspended autonomous 
unions. The new Trade Union Act disbanded Solidarity, Rural 
Solidarity, the Polish Teacher's Union and two other union 
organizations. In their place, a framework was advanced for the 
establishment of a new labour movement, the expected new transmission- 
belt between the rulers and the ruled, which later came to be known as 
the All-Polish Confederation of Trade Unions (OPZZ).3S The trade union 
issue very well illustrated the wider dilemmas and paradoxes of the 
post-martial law period.3e The formation of the OPZZ was ardently 
attacked by a strong and vocal minority, including the most active 
Solidarity supporters, who refused to support the new structures and 
criticized those who did, calling them collaborators or opportunists. 
On the other hand, many Poles, though sceptical, about the new 
official unions (after all its leader, Alfred Mioaowicz, was a 
Politburo member. . . ), believed that they could provide the only real 
opportunity to defend the interests of the workers. Finally a broad 
middle group refused to identify itself with either position, 
preferring to wait and see or simply distance themselves from public 
affairs altogether. Because of this roughly equal tri-partite division 
of Polish society on this issue, both the regime and the 'opposition' 
were unable to muster enough support to carry out their programmes, 
assuming of course that either side actually had a real programme of 
its own. In his closing speech at the October 9 session of the Sejm, 
General Jaruzelski made no mention of a possible date at which the
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state of war would be lifted, hinting in a small sentence only that it 
might be soon.37 Meanwhile, the West looked on.
4. 3 Nothing New on the Western Front.
The Polish official attitude towards the West after it had 
initiated economic sanctions against the PRL was unsurprisingly 
bitter. Inevitably, for political reasons, the regime condemned the 
Western stand and blamed the economic sanctions as an attempt to 
hinder the 'normalization* process. Of course there were also economic 
reasons behind Warsaw's attacks on "Western interference" in its 
internal affairs. Without capitalist aid, nothing much would come out 
of the 'Polish renewal' exhorted by Jaruzelski and his aides. Again 
the foreign-domestic link appeared in all its importance. The Western 
governments were imposing sanctions on the PRL as a direct result of 
the internal policies pursued by Warsaw. Jaruzelski's concern touched 
above all internal matters, but tackling them inevitably involved a 
close look at foreign policy considerations. On the one hand, he had 
to convince his socialist allies that his policies were well-founded 
and conducive to a return to the status quo ante, and on the other, he 
had to persuade the West that the quicker it accepted the situation in 
the PRL, the better it would be for all sides, including the Polish 
population. Further, he was also aware that in order to succeed in his 
internal policies, outside help would be vital. Without it, the whole 
process might not only take longer but also have good chances of being 
simply another interlude before the next explosion of society's 
discontent.
Apart from the innumerable articles published in the official 
press strongly attacking the Western sanctions, the authorities also 
organized conferences aimed at proving the 'foreign interferences' in
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the PRL's internal affairs. In particular, on January 28, a meeting 
was held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where specific charges of 
espionage were levelled against several Americans, including personnel 
from the US Embassy in Warsaw.33 Yet, between the sharp attacks on 
Western states, accusing them of unwarranted interference in the PRL's 
domestic affairs, the Polish authorities always left the door open for 
the resumption of normal diplomatic and economic relations with the
West, particularly in the economic field. This reflected a sober 
realization that the PRL needed the West, more than it needed the
East. In fact it would appear that the Western sanctions took the
Jaruzelski leadership unprepared. It certainly could have guessed that 
the imposition of martial law would be hardly greeted with joy by the 
West, yet it seemed to have underestimated the possible level of the 
restrictions which were implemented. The regime repeatedly expressed 
this concern in all major speeches and in numerous articles in the 
press during this period. A good example of this can be seen in Jdzef 
Czyrek's speech at the Sejm on March 25, 1962.39 In many ways, this
foreign policy expose was revealing because it set the PRL's policy 
making for the next decade. The subsequent changes of Foreign Affairs 
Ministers in the following years (three in all) changed little to-the 
formulation of the PRL* s external objectives. This does not mean of 
course that it was possible to identify radical new tenets of the 
PRL's foreign policy other than those which traditionally have 
directed it. Rather it explained and confirmed the duality in the 
practice of the regime's policy-making namely, the constant 
relationship between domestic and foreign affairs. It also pointed out 
another crucial aspect of this policy-making in that it emphasized the 
intrinsic relation between political and economic objectives, a factor 
particularly important in all Soviet-type political systems and
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especially for the PRL in the 1980s (even if this link is not always 
accepted by the ruling establishment - see below). Czyrek's opening
line stated that,
Poland1s principal requirement is peace, internal peace. 
General comprehension of this truth forms an absolute 
imperative in the national education of contemporary 
generations of Poles and an indispensable condition of 
proper understanding of Poland's raison d'etat. 40
In other words, the stabler the internal situation, the safer the
nation is, because of its geo-political situation in Europe. Hence the
importance of a suitable domestic climate as a prerequisite for the 
conduct of foreign policy objectives. This line of argument revealed a 
two-pronged objective in that it sought to justify the repressive 
handling of the internal situation'11 and at the same time, to 
criticize the Western stand on the PRL. This point was stressed even
more when the PRL* s Foreign Minister went on to say,
Foreign policy is the function of the internal policy of the 
country, its national and class interest. Today this is more 
obvious than ever, to extricate the country from a difficult 
socio-economic crisis, and remove its cause and overcome its 
effects - this is, at the same time, a fight to reconstruct 
and strengthen the international position and role of
Poland. . . . (My italics)*2
The first part of the speech naturally emphasized the Polish-Soviet 
alliance ("the cornerstone of Polish foreign policy") and praised the
recent Jaruzelski-Brezhnev meeting in March which confirmed the,
historical, strategic dimension of the Polish-Soviet
alliance embodied in the statement that existence of a 
strong, independent, socialist Poland lies in the interest 
of the Soviet Union, just as the might and and international 
authority of the USSR lies in the interest of People's 
Poland. *3
Having stated the customary and praiseworthy reference to the Soviet 
Union, the Polish Foreign Minister began tackling the current 
situation with regard to the West. He called it a "dangerous 
tendency" to link the international political situation with the
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sphere of economic relations, thereby reflecting the regime's dual 
approach to foreign policy: there should be political relations on the 
one hand and economic on the other, with as little interference on one 
other. This of course echoed the Lenin interpretation of peaceful co­
existence as the principle guiding relations between the capitalist 
and socialist systems. For the PRL, in the wake of a military take­
over, and facing an abysmal economic situation, it was natural to 
stress the dichotomy between the political and economic fields. Since 
economic recovery was a priority for the Jaruzelski team, only this 
aspect of Polish-Western relations should remain topical even if, both 
at home and abroad, 'political recovery' remained a key issue. To this 
end Czyrek proposed the establishment of 'economic confidence-
building' measures:
A new aspect is thereby given to the problem of the security 
of economic relations. We believe it desirable to frame and 
adopt appropriate economic confidence-building measures. In 
advancing this idea we are not guided by narrow self- 
interest. We appeal to the governments of the CSCE states to 
shield economic co-operation from the adverse effects of the 
deterioration in political relations, to refrain from 
introducing new barriers to its development and to work 
towards the creation of an atmosphere of confidence and 
certainty in economic relations.
On December 20, 1983, the PRL tabled at ' the UN General Assembly a
resolution to this effect entitled, "The Building of Confidence in
International Economic Resolution'.44 Czyrek further added,
We do not wish to augment our foreign debt. We do not wish 
to live at the expense of others, We only wish to secure 
through international co-operation the possibility of 
utilizing the full resources of our economy and to restore 
our capacity for partnerlike, stable co-operation with other 
countries. The Western countries are making the lifting of 
restrictions contingent on the fulfilment by Poland of 
certain political conditions. This is inadmissible in the 
light of international law and the provisions of the CSCE 
Final Act. It is also out of the question! ... We are 
confident that a sense of realism will prevail. Poland has 
all the makings of being an attractive partner in 
international co-operation. It stands to reason that this 
potential can only be realized by a strong law-abiding and 
stable state. A state that is weak and torn by
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contradictions cannot be a reliable partner either in 
dialogue of economic collaboration. We hope that our foreign 
partners understand this. We are ready to go on developing 
bilateral relations with the capitalist states and in 
particular with the European states with which Poland is 
linked by long-standing traditions of good co-operation.*3
What is interesting in Czyrek's speech is the absence of any crude or 
violent attack on Western countries. While he criticizes any attempts 
to interfere in internal Polish matters, his audience, in which 
presumably he also included Western observers, heard an overall non­
belligerent account of the PRL's relations with the West, the stress 
being made on past trading traditions. The impression was that the 
Foreign Minister was careful not to convey a too negative image in his 
appreciation of the current political-economic stand taken by the 
West. This contrasted heavily with the current Soviet analysis of the 
situation. Nevertheless, as later events would confirm, this policy 
would soon be altered in response to the continuing hostility
expressed by most Western states, and in particular by the Reagan 
administration. A protest, issued by the PRL's authorities in response 
to the American President's statement on June 13, 1982, vehemently
attacked the United States' blatant interference into the PRL's 
internal affairs, repeating what was to become the leit-motiv of the 
regime's slogans directed at the Western countries involved in any
sanctions against the PRL. *s However, the Polish regime did seem to 
react and try to defuse the situation, always of course keeping in 
line with the PRL's obligations as a member of the socialist
community.
In lifting some of the martial law restrictions on April 28, 1982,
Jaruzelski was primarily intent on influencing Western public opinion 
against the staunch US government line on economic sanctions. Equally, 
in view of the forthcoming unofficial, but traditional May 3
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celebrations*7, the authorities were also attempting to prevent large 
scale anti-rdgime demonstrations by making a show of good will. The 
WRON meeting on April 28 lifted the overnight curfew throughout the 
country, allowed certain organizations to hold public meetings and 
extended travel possibilities (as we saw, these measures lasted only a 
short time). At the same time, it announced the release of 800
internees (among them many common law criminals), and the conditional 
freeing of another 200.40 Yet these timid moves had little effect on 
the US administration which kept a staunch critical stand throughout. 
On May 13, 1982, in retaliation for the expulsion of two American
embassy officers, Washington expelled two Polish embassy officials and 
proceeded to impose a ban travel under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie 
scheme by participants in a US-Polish programme of scientific co­
operation.
The one direct effect of the new trade union bill passed on October 
9, 1982, was to deteriorate further US-PRL relations, with the
American government removing the country's Most Favoured Nation status 
(MFN). This contributed even more to the PRL's poor international 
standing and was bitterly attacked by the regime. Yet it did not stop 
the authorities in crushing a strike on October 12, in Gdahsk, in 
protest of the dissolution of the Solidarity union, and the 
militarization the shipyards. Evidently the internal situation still 
necessitated the use of force and Jaruzelski was in no mood to 
compromise, even if this entailed incurring more economic retribution 
on the part of the West. It should be noted here that by this time, 
the Western sanctions, in all fairness, had outlived their original 
goals. The regime had not been coerced in liberalizing its hold over
society; martial law was still in force and there was no evidence that
it would be lifted overnight. In such a situation then, it was 
doubtful whether further sanctions against the PRL would have had any 
effects on the Polish ruling establishment. As it was more a gesture 
in response to domestic developments, and a natural reaction to the 
frustration of seeing the PRL's regime's apparent indifference to 
calls to re-establish the independent unions, the removal of the PRL's 
MFN status by the USA was, all the same, ineffective in altering the 
authorities' stand. It simply added a new type of economic sanction 
against the Jaruzelski regime and- while economically, this may have 
had some effect, politically it proved a waste of time. It raised 
however, in the long-term, a new problem for the Reagan 
administration, namely when to decide to lift the sanctions. "In other 
words, what kind of political liberalism in Poland would be accepted 
by the West as a prerequisite for the lifting of sanctions, despite 
the weak economic mechanisms and financial mess by which the country 
is still characterised?". 40 Indeed, Western sanctions would be used at 
a later stage, by the Polish authorities, to justify their own 
inability to reform the system and point an accusing finger at the 
West, especially the US, as the main cause for continuing Polish 
domestic economic problems.
This does not mean that the regime accepted this new sanction 
without a barrage of remonstrances towards the Reagan administration. 
On the contrary, it started a persistent but ineffective campaign on 
the international arena to try and have the decision condemned and 
presumably reversed. Apart from the loss of economic advantages that 
such a status did give the PRL, the political consequences were also 
relevant. The more the PRL lost its credibility now, the harder it 
would be in the future to renew a dialogue with the West. Since the
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latter was essential for the economic future of the country, any delay 
in the 'normalization' of international relations would create vast 
problems, or at least delay the implementation of any possible 
internal solution. It therefore explained the PRL'S authorities' 
concern with stabilizing the situation within the country and convince 
both the West and the East that the internal conditions were becoming 
'normal' once again. At the same time, this objective had to be 
pursued relentlessly, not only for external consumption, but also for 
internal purposes. The process of odnowa meant above all the 
reassertion of the Party in society, the elimination of any opposition 
and the rebuilding of a stable domestic environment. These were the 
top priorities and although they, by themselves, superseded at the 
time any other considerations such as the reactivation of a Polish 
Westpolitik, they were also perceived as the long-term means for the 
rebuilding of a more assertive foreign policy.
In the first interview granted by General Jaruzelski to a Western 
reporter since the imposition of a state of war, the PRL's leader 
metaphorically described the regime's current economic tasks as the 
"replacing [of] the engine driving the ship of Poland's economy" an 
operation which "is taking place amidst reefs and shallows". Satisfied 
that the state of emergency had "saved the the country from a 
dangerous internal confrontation, had contained anarchy and restored 
law and order", noting that the "period of [the] party's weakness 
[was] clearly passing", the General condemned the Western attitudes 
and actions against the PRL but made it clear that the PRL was 
" vitally interested in maintaining and developing economic relations 
with non-socialist countries". He even gave a warning: "The countries 
that give evidence of their understanding of the Polish difficulties
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and efforts will be well engraved on our memory. We shall give them 
preference to relations with them in the future".30 While it was not 
very clear what this sort of comment sought to achieve, especially in 
the PRL's current international situation, it denoted another change 
of tactic. After associating European security to the PRL's raison 
d'etat, the regime was now trying to show how damaging sanctions were, 
not only to the PRL but also to its former non-socialist diplomatic 
and economic partners. One has to say that this failed to be 
convincing. The aim remained unchanged however: to detract the
international community from meddling in the PRL‘s internal problems 
and focus its attention on external economic matters.
Speaking at the Sejm on October 26, the PRL*s Procurator General, 
Francizsek Rusek, expressed the regime's determination to enforce its 
power and authority over the Polish society. Stressing the fact that 
"a return to law-abidingness, law and order were two of the principles 
required by the raison d‘dtat", he forcefully declared that there
could be no return to the pre-December 13 situation:
Law-abidingness is one of the fundamental principles of the 
Polish People's Republic's political system as a socialist 
state. It is one of the primordial elements in accordance
with and in every respect to, the development of the state.
... In order to implement this principle in practice, it is 
needed, to a very considerable degree, to shape the socio­
political atmosphere within the country, the state of
discipline in the society, the respect for the law and 
relations towards the state authorities' organs. Alongside 
this, it is also vital to undertake all action which will 
secure the application of law-abiding and state principles.
Also, these principles must be constantly levered at various 
acts of anti-socialist forces in the country and from
foreign centres of diversion.31
On October 27, 1982, the 10th KC Plenum of the PZPR took place. It
heard a very gloomy economic report by Manfred Gorywoda. Commenting on 
the problems facing the PRL's economy in the forthcoming three years, 
he stated that "today it is not a question of whether we can surmount
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the crisis but how quickly we can accomplish this task".32 General
Jaruzelski's speech at the Plenum identified some of the causes lying 
behind the difficulties ahead and produced a strongly worded
commentary of the situation:
Socialist Poland is finding itself in the fire of a
particularly sharp attack from the imperialist camp. ... 
Poland is not the state of Texas. Poland cannot be shut in 
like Indians in reserves, it will always be open to the 
world. 33
The thrust of his speech emphasized that the length of the state of 
war would depend entirely upon the internal situation and its 
evolution. External diversion and an anti-socialist underground were 
setting back the hopes for a 'national reconciliation' and impeding 
the recovery of the economy, he added. All such anti-socialist
activities were bringing about only unrest, making it harder to come
to a national understanding and slowing down the process of odnowa. 
Despite the slacking enthusiasm of the population in continuing its 
waves of protest and the organizational difficulties facing 
Solidarity's Underground Interim Co-ordinating Commission (TKK, formed 
on April 22, 1S82), an eight hour nationwide strike had been planned
for November 10, 1982.34 The same day when Jaruzelski and Glemp had
finally agreed on fixing a date for the Pope's visit (November 6), it 
was also announced that Lech Walesa would shortly be freed. His 
liberation on the 11th33 had been accompanied by rumours spread by the 
regime, attempting to create the false impression that Solidarity's 
Chairman had decided to give up the struggle and had even struck a 
bargain with the authorities.33 This attempt to drive a wedge between 
the charismatic leader and his aides who had fought out the 'War' in 
the underground, misfired. However, and perhaps because of these 
rumours, the November strike had a low turn-out and failed to be the 
massive mobilization exercise some had thought it would be. This
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raust have brought satisfaction to the regime whose professed 
objective of eliminating support for Solidarity seemed to be having 
some success. In this context, it is interesting to note the 
authorities's policy of using symbolic motives to press their case 
both at home and abroad. Throughout 1982, official exhortations
repeatedly emphasized Polish independence, sovereignty, the unity of 
the nation and the country's social and cultural identity. Patriotism 
was equally encouraged and much was said about the historic continuity 
of the present armed forces with the traditions and achievements of 
their predecessors. The authorities used 'soft' propaganda techniques 
consisting of attempts to persuade the population that the interests 
of the Jaruzelski regime were identical with Polish national interests 
and raison d'etat. This explains the repetitive use of emotion-laden 
national symbols as the means to have the status quo accepted by the
nation.37 For the first time in 33 years, the guard of honour at the
tomb of the unknown soldier wore the Rogatywka, the traditional four- 
cornered hat, dear to all Polish patriots.se The theme of Polish
nationalism was repeatedly used by the authorities. Poland under 
Jaruzelski saw the (officially-sponsored) return to some of the idea 
of the endecja, a right-wing radical ideology whose inspirator, Roman 
Dmowski, had initiated in 1893 with the National League. It was no
mere coincidence that the authorities in the 1980s attempted to revive 
the ideas of a movement which under Dmowski, and in contrast with his 
great rival Pilsudski, had always looked eastwards and had held a
pragmatic russian-orientated vision of Poland's future.... These
themes were repeatedly used and in some respect have coloured (this 
was their aims) the perceptions of observers both inside and outside 
the country. What is more, this use of old fundamental values
cherished by a number of Poles, especially among the older
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generations, was being echoed in Church's statements, giving the
regime an added support from a most unlikely source. This in fact 
contributed to popular feelings that the Church was being too
compromising with the authorities. A good example of this
'psychological tactic' was the frontpage warnings which regularity 
appeared in the official media at times when social unrest was about 
to break out: Jaruzelski's call for calm on August 31 for instance and 
this un-signed commentary in Rzeczpospolita asking to whom the planned 
strike (November 10) was important ("... to those who want that Poland 
should never come out of the crisis. They call for strikes because 
they want the situation to become worse").39 Despite the extreme 
reservation with which the official media is looked upon by Poles, 
such calls inevitably carried with them some measure of truth and as 
such may have contributed to forging the impression among outsiders 
that the PRL's leadership did have, in a patriotic way, the interests 
of the country in mind .
After the accepted unsuccessfulness of the November 10
demonstrations, 'oppositional activity' gradually diminished, at 
least in comparison with the previous 10 months. This assessment was 
echoed in a meeting of senior Party activists and military commanders 
in Warsaw to confidentially discuss the situation in the country. 
Noting the poor turn-out for the planned demonstrations, they 
congratulated themselves for the authorities' success in controlling 
regional opposition centres. They also discussed the positive effect 
of Jaruzelski's meeting with Archbishop Glemp, and Walesa's release 
which brought about the desired effect of placating the nation and 
receiving a favourable Western reaction: "Walesa's release will be
used to compromise him in the eyes of public opinion as an element in
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the destruction of the mythology and symbolism of Solidarity. The 
appropriate services of General Kiszczak are already working 'on it". 
Also mentioned were the currently used techniques to win popular 
support, ie. a large-scale campaign of winning over popular Catholic 
personalities to the PRON, a "series of smiles" organized by the 
authorities (Rakowski's meeting with the actors), a certain degree of 
criticism allowed on economic and social subjects in a number of
selected publications ("Outright oppositional articles by Kisiel 
[Stefan Kisielewski] will appear in Tygodnzk Powszechny, All such 
moves are under strict control and their intention is to create an
impression of growing tolerance and normalization in public life").GO
Thus, it is fairly accurate to speak of the last weeks of 1982 as a
mopping-up period for the police and military authorities. The extreme 
brutality in the dissolution of the actors' association, the dismissal 
of several editors-in-chief, and the anti-Walesa campaign which took 
place at the time, clearly showed that the regime was determined to 
impose its will upon society and accept nothing short of a 
capitulation. On November 23, the TGOs were returned to some 42 
parishes and in 3 towns where they remained until December 1.C1
By the beginning of December, signs appeared that the state of war 
would soon be lifted. On the 8th, the Warsaw KOK concluded that all 
the aims of the state of war had been fulfilled and that the situation 
had improved in every sector during the past y e a r . I n  his address to 
the miners at Jastrz^bie on December 3, Jaruzelski praised the miners' 
performances and their contribution to the PRL's economy. He told them 
that "now it is possible to work without the terror tactics of 
strikes" and. that "it [was] now safe on the streets of Polish cities". 
He added, although it must have been hard for his listeners to share 
let alone understand his optimism that,
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A year above we said that it was bad and that perhaps it 
might become worse. Today we cannot say yet that all is 
fine. But it is already better.
So much "better", that less than two weeks later, the General, in an 
address to the nation on the eve of the first anniversary of the 
introduction of the state of war, announced its suspension by the end 
of 1982. Though he stressed that the road to "complete normalization" 
must be trodden on step by step, he looked back upon the past year and 
declaimed that while it had been a test, "we have passed [it]". 
However, "a decisive and more effective struggle with social evil is 
awaiting us. New legal instruments will make it possible to combat in 
a more severe manner crimes that threaten the lives, health, property 
of citizens", e*
For the regime, the important was "to win or not loose".es Defeat 
was simply not an envisageable option for Jaruzelski. The state of war 
was hardly a victory, but at the same time it wasn't a complete set­
back for the ruling establishment. At least, from the authorities' 
point of view, the 'anarchy' of the 1980s had been put to an end. Of 
course, the Polish Communist Party was in an urgent need of an uplift, 
but its eventual restoration as the ‘leading force' in the PRL was 
compromised from the start. Too many myths had been destroyed in 
recent years for the Polish rulers to use out-dated ideological 
arguments to convince the blas£ and tired Polish population that the 
' errors of the past had not been caused by Socialism, but by an 
insufficient amount of it'. For the time being, force remained the 
only argument that could be used effectively by the authorities.
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Dla Polakdw moina czasem co£ 
dobrego zrobid, ale z Polakami 
nigdy.
Aleksander Wielopolski (1803-1877)
(For Poles, one can sometimes do 
something, with Poles never.)
CHAPTER 5
A STATE OF WAR SUSPENDED.
Four years after the December 13, 1981 proclamation, Wladislaw
Loranc (who became Minister for Religious Affairs in 1988), summed up 
in an article some of the successes which had resulted from the 
imposition of a state of war. Among others he particularly praised the
'moral victory' won by the Party:
The imposition of martial law in December 1981 gave the lie 
to three political propositions which had been widespread 
within the Solidarity movement and constituted the political 
programme of its leaders. ... These three fundamental dogmas 
- the political and moral‘disintegration of the Party and 
the state administration, the enormous influence of 
Solidarity's professional staff, and society's readiness to 
jeopardize the national interest - were destroyed with the 
imposition of martial law, both by the way it was imposed
and by the way society reacted to it. 1 '
Ignoring the third 'dogma' as blatantly inaccurate and unfounded, it 
was clear that after a year of military rule, the first two 
propositions were clearly well off the mark. Although the suspension 
of the state of war showed that Jaruzelski's 'normalization' was 
scoring some success the fact that, in December 1982, it was suspended 
and not lifted, testified to the uncertainties still troubling the 
leadership. If Jaruzelski had thought that he was doing the Polish 
nation a favour by imposing his iron rule over the country, he was 
soon made aware that this decision had been made against the will of
the population. Marquis Wielopolski's observation (whose deep concern
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for his country was generally admitted while Jaruzelski's isn't), once 
again seemed to hold some truth. The Polish General knew that the 
coming years would require much dexterity and stubbornness on his part 
to gain the co-operation of a disillusioned and stunned majority.
5. 1 The External Environment: Eastern and Western Inputs.
The state of war was formally suspended on December 31, 1982. The
decree, while giving the Council of State the right to suspend some 
elements of martial law, actually incorporated many sections of it 
into legal statutes. The result was that almost all of the 
restrictions imposed one year earlier became now codified into the 
PRL's legal statutes. Perhaps even more important, all legal bills and 
rules enacted during the state of war remained in force. At the same 
time many internees, who had been released in the accompanying 
amnesty, found that they were still subject to a range of new 
repressive measures, among others, their dismissal from the jobs they 
had held before the imposition of the state of war.2 Add to this the 
fact that all major industries remained militarized and it was clear 
that the situation at the beginning of 1983 was bleak. Despite the 
authorities' claims that they had succeeded in 'normalizing' the 
country, the nature of this achievement presented all the signs that a 
lot more needed to be done to put the 'Polish house' in order.
The decision to suspend the rigours of the state of war after more 
than 12 months changed little to the overall situation in the PRL. 
While the authorities were at pains to convince the outside world that 
'normality' had finally returned to the country, the domestic 
situation was still far from presenting all the signs of 'socialist 
normalization'. Throughout 1983 the political leadership, stubbornly 
but somewhat unsuccessfully, attempted to muster public acceptance for
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its policies. It tried to return to a set of relations between the 
authorities and the public where the role and function of the former
would become viable again and where society's position would be once
again characterized by compliance and submissiveness. However, this
goal was not an easy one. The Party was still weak and the
institutions it tried to foster, in particular the new unions, were 
hardly convincing or appealing to the majority of Poles. Over the past 
five months, the PZPR was the subject of an in-depth re-assessment of 
its mobilizing capabilities and a campaign to 'reform' it internally. 
Using the environment created by the state of war, the Party ranks 
were being reviewed in a sweeping campaign to boost its morale and
effectiveness, not to mention its numbers. However the task was
proceeding at a slow pace. The exodus of Party members since 1980 (800 
000 lost members according to an official assessment3) had
considerably weakened the PZPR's organizational capabilities. Indeed 
the whole process of 'normalization' was hampered by the acute lack of 
confidence and popularity of the population for the Jaruzelski regime. 
The authorities were well aware of this fact and they endeavoured to 
alter this situation by reinforcing the state's institutional power 
and prerogatives. It did not bridge the gap between the ruling 
establishment and society at large but it did strengthen the means
with which the rdgime could enforce its will upon an exhausted and 
increasingly disillusioned population. That the state of war had only 
been suspended and not lifted as had been hoped, demonstrated amply 
the fact that the 'conditions were not yet right' for the leadership 
to be confident enough to do away with some of the instruments of 
control and repression offered by the imposition of a state of war. 
Yet by now, the tone and content of most major political speeches were 
expressing a new confidence which had not been so obvious in previous
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months. The main emphasis was made on the successful thwarting and 
elimination of 'anarcho-syndicalist adventurism'. In his report to the
Sejm in March, General Kiszczak said that,
Today, 15 months since the crucial decision of 13 December 
1981, we can say, with full authority, that the process of 
the disintegration of the state has been arrested, that the 
anarchy paralysing the national economy has been overcome, 
that the way is now open to a painstaking and long-suffering 
solution to the crisis.+
However the authorities were faced with the following dilemma: in
order to defend the system, they had to resort to continued security 
precautions but this was having inevitably an adverse effect upon the 
economy. While in some cases the militarization of some key 
industries, coal for instance, had had some positive effects, this 
nonetheless was a short-term solution to a long-term problem. In order 
to stabilize and improve the situation, economic improvements were 
necessary. But they could only have some chances of success if there 
was a relaxation of security controls. Trying to extricate themselves 
from this vicious circle would be a major concern of the authorities 
in the forthcoming months. It should also be noted that the costs of 
the imposition of martial law had themselves been an added burden to 
an already poor state of the economy. Whatever profits remained from 
the Gierek era were used up in the operation and further contributed 
to deplete the meagre reserves possessed by the Polish authorities. It 
should also be noted that there were indirect costs resulting from the 
imposition of a state of war. In particular, one is reminded of the 
1982 floods which affected the banks of the river Vistula. The damages 
were increased ten-fold for the inhabitants of Plock because of the 
communication blackout still existing there, which effectively 
prevented early warnings to the area as well as calls for rapid 
intervention.
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The decision to suspend the state of war was an ambiguous one. By 
removing some of the restrictions imposed on the Polish society, the 
regime was hoping to have the support of part of the population and 
the recognition by the international community that the situation was 
evolving in a positive way. It hoped thereby to exact, both abroad and 
at home, some measure of goodwill in order to improve the process of 
external and internal 'normalization*. Yet, at the same time, the 
trials of Solidarity members and the institutionalization of 
repressive means into the legislation had the effect of nullifying 
this apparent relaxation of control on the part of the authorities. In 
many ways, Warsaw's policy-making was characterized by the fact that 
it satisfied no-one. While this may have been the only possible policy 
from the regime's point of view, it was hard not to assess it
negatively. Even Soviet commentators seemed unhappy about developments 
in the PRL. In reply to a Western journalist's doubts, a Soviet 
counterpart remarked that, "at home (ie. in the USSR), on the level of 
impulsions and emotions, Jaruzelski's policy is making a lot of people 
unhappy, but on the political level, we have no other choice than 
support him fully".6 Obviously the Kremlin still looked on with some 
uncertainty and a lot more would have to be done by Warsaw to convince 
the Soviet leaders that 'there was no other way'. In May 1983,
Kommunist, printed a translation of an article in Nowe Drogi, which 
had appeared in the PRL a couple of months earlier. It highlighted the
extent to which 'normalization' was still incomplete:
Although the introduction of martial law and the decisive 
steps taken by WRON, the state authorities and the security
agencies, eliminated the threat of civil war, broke the back
of the opposition and severely constrained its activities, 
the rightist forces still represent a threat today, and it 
would be hazardous to entertain a casual optimism or faith 
in rapid success. Not all the preconditions that permitted 
the rightists forces to become active in the mid-70s and 
especially in 1980-81 have been removed. °
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Obviously, the threat to socialism in the PRL was still present in the 
minds of both of the Soviet and the Polish leaderships, and as the 
following comments in the same article seem to indicate, not everyone
was supporting Jaruzelski's policies:
Only a deliberately guided, controlled and wisely programmed 
process can bring about a return to normality. ... Since
martial law was introduced in december 1981, preconditions
have been created for speeding up the process of restoring 
the position of socialism, including its position in the
public mind. Yet it sometimes seem that these processes are
moving too slowly. 7
In the first months of 1983, the Polish authorities waged a harsh 
campaign against Western journalists posted in the PRL. On January 12, 
1983, the American news agency UPI's correspondent, Ruth Gruber, was 
expelled and the activities of the agency suspended (February 3). Five
days earlier, the BBC's correspondent, Kevin Ruane was told he could
not renew his visa. The same fate was shared by the Austrian
correspondent who was not allowed back in the country. The authorities 
presumably did not want the West to report the continuing repressive 
measures against Solidarity members and were determined to restrict 
any journalistic account which could have shown .that the situation in 
the country was still a cause of concern for the regime. In fact this
attitude did not restrict itself to journalists only. On March 3, the
International Labour Organization voted by a large majority to ask the 
PRL's government to allow an ILO representative to be present at the 
trials of Solidarity members and draw a report on the internal
situation in the country. On May 12, ILO also ordered an investigation 
into charges that workers' rights were being violated and set up an 
investigation commission to assess the violation of trade union law in 
the PRL. This was strongly attacked by the Polish authorities who 
decided to suspend co-operation with the organization as a retaliation
for what they saw as "interference in the country's internal
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matters". 0
This concern to convey to the outside world the impression that the 
situation in the PRL was now normal was clearly becoming a primary 
objective of the leadership's Western foreign policy orientation. In 
the circumstances there was little else it could do in this area, yet 
this policy - if successful - had potential domestic repercussions. 
Any formal Western recognition of the present regime would be a badly- 
needed contribution to the process of legitimization facing the 
authorities, in their attempts to bridge the gap between rulers and 
ruled. As such, the 'normalization' of relations with Western 
countries was crucial to Warsaw. By obtaining international 
legitimization, the regime would find it easier to legitimize itself 
in the eyes of the Polish people. However, in a catch-22 fashion, 
international acceptance of the Jaruzelski's regime would not be 
forthcoming as long as it was obvious that society still rejected the 
ruling establishment. On February 11, 1983, the Central Committee
International Commission met to discuss problems affecting the PRL's 
diplomacy. Wiejacz, the Foreign Affairs Vice-Minister, said that it 
was important to strengthen the external security of the state and 
ensure that it returned to its former international position. He also 
called for the support of Polish economic interests abroad, the 
presentation of a better image of the country and the development of 
co-operation with Polonia, the Polish Diaspora living in the West. 9 Of 
course this did not prevent the authorities from engaging in actions 
seemingly detrimental to such an objective, but then this was 
inevitable in the light of the geo-political position of the country. 
Once again the main argument used by the regime to justify the 
imposition of martial law and the need to return to a state of normal
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relations with Western states was the identification of the PRL's 
national security with that of the whole of the European continent. In 
a speech to the Sejm, Stefan Olszowski, the new Foreign Minister, made 
this clear:
A sense of responsibility has guided the actions of the 
Polish authorities in tackling our internal problems. The 
sovereign decisions taken in the supreme interest of the 
Polish state and nation have always also borne in mind the 
needs of stabilization of the international situation and 
the maintainance of security in Europe. . . . Just as the 
removal of basic elements of a structure can bring about the 
collapse of the whole building, so an undermining of the 
foundations supporting the edifice of peace in Europe would 
have incalculable consequences. Guarding our own house and 
eliminating the hazards to it, we can also bear in mind the 
great significance of this for the safety of the whole of 
Europe. 10
It is interesting to compare for a moment the main difference between 
this speech and that of Olszowski's predecessor, J6zef Czyrek, almost
a year ago, when he had addressed the Sejm on the same theme of
foreign policy (See p. 153 above). In March 1982, the main emphasis 
had been made concerning the internal situation: "Poland's main
requirement is peace, internal peace". 'Internal normalization' was
the highest of priorities at the time. A year later, this was no
longer the case, although of course it still remained a main objective 
of the authorities. 'Internal peace' had been achieved and the PRL's 
domestic problems could no longer be used as an excuse to implement 
restrictive measures against the PRL. International relations had to
take this into account:
Today we repeat: the policy of sanctions, pressure and
interference in our internal affairs is a dead end and 
doomed to complete failure. In any case, the suspension of 
the state of war and the important decisions which followed 
have removed the pretext for this policy that were advanced 
as the preconditions for correct relations. Its continued
pursuit can only mean one thing: a wish to obstruct the
normalization of our internal situation and hopes of
exploiting the so-called "Polish question" for the
exacerbation of international tensions.11
-176-
Although concern was being expressed at the unchanged Western 
attitudes towards the PRL, the Polish authorities also set themselves 
specific foreign policy tasks for the coming year. At the politburo 
meeting of January 25, three main tasks were called for: the
strengthening of ties with socialist countries, the pursuit of an 
active European policy on disarmament and peace and the building up of 
active economic and political relations with developing countries. 12 
While the first two sets of. policies had always represented, to 
various degrees, the PRL*s traditional foreign policy orientations, 
the last task, itself also not new, stood out, however, from the 
others in the present context. It was clear that in the wake of the 
Western sanctions, and in the light of the country's need of raw 
materials, the PRL would attempt to obtain what it needed somewhere 
else. In April, Stefan Olszowski travelled to the African continent 
and visited Nigeria, Benin and Angola. The PRL's main interest in its 
approach to less developed and developing countries has always been 
economic, as a way to improve its balance of payments (even if this 
has reaped meagre results as commodities exchange has been the rule 
rather than the exception). But it has equally tended to be pragmatic 
in that it has sought relations with such countries that would provide 
tangible, near— term benefits for itself. 13 The call for a 
strengthening of relations with developing countries was perhaps 
unsurprising in the light of the current deterioration of relations 
with developed Western countries. However the net material benefits 
expected,if any, were destined to be an insignificant contribution to 
the solving of the PRL's economic crisis. It was more likely to be an 
attempt to reinvigorate a flaccid foreign policy and demonstrate that 
the PRL could not be isolated on the international arena.
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All the same, the authorities were not successful in preventing the 
outside world from adopting a pessimistic attitude towards the 
situation in the country. As far as the 'opposition* was concerned, 
1983 marked the return to a more active involvement in the country's 
political life. Though shaken, underground 'opposition* began to take 
on a more determined stand, partly as a result of its re-organization 
as a more unified body. Bronislaw Misztal explained this new phase in 
oppositional activity as the normal conclusion of yet another cycle in 
Polish collective behaviour, his so-called ' Apathy-Participation- 
Apathy' model. In the preliminary stage (June 1976-1980), Polish 
society had behaved as a dissatisfied mass, discovering suffering and 
oppression. In the precipitation stage (August 1980-November 1980), 
society began acting as a crowd. This was followed by the popular 
stage (December 1980-March 1981), where an excited crowd/society 
formally organized itself as a movement. In the disorientation stage 
(March 1981-August 1981), a clear polarization of policies appeared, 
aggravating conflicts between the movement and the political system. 
From September 1981 to December 1981, the destabilization stage gave 
rise to more excitement, fatigue and growing apathy. The state of war, 
the truncation stage (December 1981-May 1983), introduced despair, 
broken hopes and apathy. Finally, the reconstruction stage (May 1983- 
1986), saw the rebirth of beliefs and prudent participation.1*
On January 22, 1983, TKK issued a statement calling for a programme
of resistance including non-co-operation with the regime, economic 
struggle, a fight for an independent social consciousness and the 
preparation for a general strike.Solidarity's Co-ordinating Office 
abroad, chaired by Jerzy Milewski, presented on March 17, a 600 page 
document concerning the state of human rights in the PRL to the heads
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of delegations to the Madrid CSCE, pointing out the violations of 
international law entailed by the imposition of a state of war in the 
PRL. According to the report, "the introduction of a state of war in 
Poland violated the following rules of international law: a) Art. 4 §1 
of the international Covenant on Civil and Political rights because no 
exceptional public danger threatened the existence of the nation, 
while only such circumstances can justify the imposition of the state 
of war as an emergency; b) Art. 1 §b of the ILO Convention No. 105 
which states that forced labour may not be used for economic purposes; 
c) ILO conventions Nos. 87 & 98 which guarantee freedom of trade union 
activities; d) Art. 9 §1 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political rights which was violated by the introduction of indefinite 
internment on the basis of administrative decision. 16 The verdict was 
obvious. Meanwhile in the PRL, all was far from being peaceful. On 
February 13, 1983, Police used tear gas and batons to break up a
peaceful demonstration in Warsaw commemorating the 14th month since 
the imposition of a state of war. A month later similar demonstrations 
occurred again in Gdarisk, Warsaw, Wroclaw and Kalisz. The Government 
spokesman, Jerzy Urban said, during a press conference on February 8, 
that the complete lifting of the state of war was still not possible 
as conflicts had not yet died out. He also pointed out that external 
circumstances did not create the right conditions either. In an 
interview with the London Times, he argued that it was high time for 
the West to call off sanctions against the PRL. "Western sanctions 
against Poland have so little to do with what is going on here", he 
said. "The dialogue with the Church had never been interrupted", he 
continued, and "how could there be an agreement with Solidarity since 
it no longer existed?"17
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Speaking at the PRON's 1st Congress on May 7, General Jaruzelski, 
in an attempt to define his view of 'national conciliation' spelled 
out that it was not important "who is to reach agreement with whom,
but on what matter and for what purpose":
Fundamental for national conciliation must be and will 
always remain: First: the ensurance of Poland's external
security, the integrity of her frontiers and of her
territory. Second: the insurance of calm, internal harmony
and the settlement of social controversies without conflict. 
Third: the insurance of real conditions for the improvement
of the material and cultural life of the nation, for the
advancement of Polish civilization. These matters are 
inseparable, they are unattainable in a state of internal
division, without international guarantees ensured by the 
alliance with the Soviet Union and membership of the 
defensive coalition of Warsaw Treaty states, without the 
leading role of the Party and a strong, democratic,
socialist state. 10
Again we can notice the intertwined relationship between domestic 
and foreign policy-goals made in the General's speech. Internal 
conciliation, a domestic goal, became determined by the continued 
pursuit of a close relationship with the socialist bloc, a foreign 
policy sine qua non. The successful attainment of domestic objectives, 
namely internal 'peace' in turn represented a crucial determinant for 
the pursuit of potentially beneficial foreign policy goals, here, the 
resumption of normal relations with the West, themselves crucial for 
the improvement of the country's situation.
In this respect the forthcoming Papal visit took on an important 
significance for the Polish authorities' bid to be accepted on the 
international arena. Though the state of war had been suspended, the 
Pope would be visiting his homeland still formally under martial law. 
The fact that the authorities did not go as far as lifting completely 
martial law before the Pope's visit reflected two main concerns. In 
the first place, they obviously thought that it would be too early a 
move, as long as the 'internal normalization' of the country was not
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fully implemented. On the other hand, it also reflected their desire 
not to appear to be bowing to external pressure as far as internal 
policy-making was concerned. By having the Pope visit the PRL still 
under military rule, Warsaw was seeking to show that all 
discriminatory measures undertaken by the West had failed to alter the 
regime's independence in the handling of its domestic affairs. At the 
same time, it gave Jaruzelski a sense of accrued credibility vis-A-vis 
non-communist countries: if the Pope could now visit the PRL, after
his planned visit in 1982 had been cancelled, then it meant that the 
situation there was improving. However, as we will see, this wishful 
thinking on the part of the Polish authorities failed to materialize.
A week after the PRON Congress, Politburo member, J6zef Czyrek, 
addressing Central Committee propagandists - known as Lektorzy -, said 
that the Party and Government's stand on the Papal visit remained 
unchanged and that it was seen as important for the further 
normalization of life in the PRL.19 Yet the authorities appeared 
somewhat uncertain of the potential effects the visit might have. 
Characteristic of the weeks preceding John Paul II's pilgrimage, was 
the obvious state-sponsored campaign to over-dramatize the 'risks' 
entailed by it. The MSW deputy Minister, Straszewski appeared on 
television, explaining the reasons behind the stringent security 
arrangements for the visit, as a prevention against the possibility of 
an assassination attempt by foreign centres.20 On May 26, General 
Kiszczak accused 'opponents abroad' of trying to shatter the unity of 
the WTO, explaining that "hostile forces were aiming at disturbing 
Church-state relations, helping the political underground and 
inspiring anti-socialist forces to set up terrorist groups".21 These 
were just a couple of innumerable alarmist propaganda statements aimed
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at creating a climate of paranoia among the population and capitalize 
on the entire nation's hopes that the visit would take place as 
planned. It should be noted that this was becoming a critical period 
for the authorities. Nothing illustrated this better than the signs of 
leadership uncertainty which emerged from the 12th KC Plenum which 
took place on May 31. Czyrek's report attacked opportunists and 
revisionists and warned against factional and demagogic attempts to
prevent the consolidation of the Polish Communist party.22
The Party needs to concentrate its forces, and not disperse 
them. In accordance with the position of the 9th Congress, 
we will oppose and decisively combat views and opportunist- 
revisionist behaviour and dogmatic sectarianism as well as 
fractionist and demagogic phenomena. 23
The plenum occurred after a delay (it had been scheduled for the 
beginning of the month) and Jaruzelski's speech was only released on 
Friday, June 3, an unusual three days after the meeting, fuelling 
speculation that some disagreement had occurred. It was also learned 
that all major ideological decisions would be postponed until after 
the Papal visit had occurred. Significantly, it was at this plenum 
that Professor Hieronim Kubiak gave his report concerning the causes 
and circumstances of recurring crisis in Communist Poland. The 157- 
page study had been conducted by a special Party Commission appointed 
at the Extraordinary 9th Congress on September 2, 1981, to inquire in
these matters. The main conclusion of the report which is relevant 
here was that while a deteriorating international climate in the mid- 
70s had undoubtedly contributed in exacerbating tensions within the 
country, it was wrong to ascribe the sources of social conflicts in 
the PRL to the international situation alone. Equally wrong was to 
blame them exclusively on the activities of the political opposition 
which, while normally aggravating crisis situations, is unable to 
provoke them. Instead, "it was the incorrect policy of the Party
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leadership and of the government, not external circumstances, which 
led to the transformation of a difficult situation into a grave 
crisis'*.2* The 12th KC Plenum was assigned the task of publishing the 
report in a special issue of Nowe Drogi, the PZPR main theoretical 
journal. However this was never done: it seems that even a watered-
down version of the report could not be publicized. A couple of months 
earlier the same journal had published an article entitled, "External 
circumstances for the overcoming of the crisis in Poland".26 In it, 
the author identified several reasons why the PRL was being used by 
the West as an element in the deterioration of East-West relations: a) 
to encourage the socio-political-economic crisis and alter the PRL's 
domestic and foreign policies; b) by affecting one socialist country, 
the crisis might also undermine the rest of the bloc; c) the PRL's 
traditional place in Europe; d) the fact that the 1980s had witnessed 
a confrontation between the capitalist and socialist camps; e) the 
fact that the Polish crisis became a good excuse for the US to 
confront the Soviet Union and affect the correlation of forces in
r
Europe and the world between East and West. Continuing, the author 
remarked that the PRL had found itself in the middle of the 
ideological confrontation between the East and the West and that 
therefore its foreign policy must aim at removing the effects of the 
country's international isolation. The 'normalization' of the PRL's 
relations with capitalist countries would therefore depend in 
particular, on the progress of the internal stabilization of the 
socio-political situation. Thus, the link between the PRL's foreign 
and domestic policy-making remained as strong as ever. The fact that 
now the ruling establishment was beginning to accept this reality, 
augured some changes in the leadership's perceptions of how to conduct
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its foreign relations with the capitalist countries.
5.2 The Second Papal Visit.
A visit by the Pope to Poland is itself a major event. That he
should be a Pole himself increases ten-fold the significance of such a 
visit. In the summer of 1983, the fact that it should be his second 
visit to his native country brought back memories of his first
pilgrimage, four years previously. All these factors combined with the 
reality of still existing martial law rigours, was to make the second 
Papal visit to the PRL a momentous event in the life of the Polish 
nation. Gone were the days when Pope Gregory XIV had formally 
condemned the 1830 uprising, siding with Tsar Nicolas II and
Metternich in asking the Poles to submit to Russia's authority,
arguing that the Tsar would then show all his goodness (the infamous 
Brevis Cum primum). 26 The contrast with the 1980s could not have been 
greater. Now the Pope was on Poland's side and epitomized the highest 
moral authority for the major part of the population. Unsurprisingly 
then, his summer 1983 pastoral visit became the psychological 
highlight of the year.
Since the beginning of the year, Church-state relations had been 
tensed and unproductive with the regime taking little heed of the 
repeated Church statements for a national dialogue, including the 
banned Solidarity union. In a statement issued on January 30, 1983,
the Polish episcopate asked the government to declare an amnesty for 
those still interned and commit itself to other initiatives aiming at 
re-establishing full social justice to facilitate the return of 
forgiveness and national unity. The 190th episcopate Conference 
reiterated its call for social justice leading to a national accord 
and said that workers should have the right to organize themselves in
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trade unions which defend their true interests. The statement also 
deplored the foreign press attacks on the Pope, a disguised reference 
to recent articles in the Soviet press.27 Notwithstanding obvious 
differences between the authorities and the Church, there was little 
doubt that this second Papal visit was seen as very significant for
the ruling establishment, the Church and the public at large. They all
recognized the value of the Pope's visit, although for different
reasons. For the population, it would be a breath of fresh hope in the 
creeping atmosphere of marasm and moral disenchantment. For the 
Church, it would be an occasion to confirm once more its predominant 
role in the Polish society and erase, in the joys aroused by the 
visit, some of the criticisms which it had received in recent times. 
Since the 6tate of war had been imposed, the Church had been split 
with some of its leaders supporting the primate's wish to keep talking 
with the authorities while others, including some energetic parish 
priests, urged the Church to adopt a firmer attitude in defence of
workers' rights. For the regime it would provide a well-needed boost 
to an otherwise damaged prestige and reputation at home as well as 
abroad. Although the visit was not happily looked upon by the Soviet 
Union and the rest of the socialist bloc (for example, eight days 
before the Papal visit, the Czech authorities placed a temporary ban 
on all transit through its territory to the PRL until the end of the
month, except for urgent family reasons and for business20), it
nonetheless would offer the Polish regime a useful contribution to the 
process of 'normalization'. At the same time it might pave the way for
greater chances of settling some of the PRL's current debt problems. 29
For Warsaw, there was also the hope that by allowing the Pope to visit 
his homeland a second time, it would enable the authorities to muster 
some support from the Church hierarchy in restoring stability and
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calm. In the words of the head of the Office for Religious
Denominations, Adam Lopatka,
The experience of the last few years has taught us that co­
operation between the state and the Church may be fruitful 
in removing damaging emotions and tension within the 
society, the appeasement of social conflicts and their 
negative effects, and the elimination of extensive areas of 
social indifference. This kind of co-operation may favour a 
way out of the economic, social and moral crisis in which 
Poland finds itself. 30
The Polish Catholic Church stressed the pastoral purpose of the visit 
and hoped that it would be a motivating factor for the authorities to 
lift the state of war: "The expected pilgrimage of the Holy Father
today becomes a pilgrimage of national hope. In the spirit of this 
hope, one ought to expect the lifting of the state of war, the 
restoration of civil liberties in full, the release of prisoners 
sentenced in connection with the introduction on the state of war, the 
consignment to oblivion of deeds defined by the law in connection with 
martial law as violations of the legal order, and the restoration to 
their places of work of persons dismissed as a result of their 
convictions"31 The regime, while itself also concerned to stress the 
pastoral character of the visit, adopted a more circumscribed attitude 
and refrained from linking the visit with any process of 
liberalization. In an interview with the Hungarian Party daily, 
Ndpszabdsdg, when asked what he thought of the Church's attitude to
the PRL's present political problems, General Jaruzelski replied:
At the most dramatic moments the Catholic Church lived up to 
its reputation as a responsible patriotic force. It has an 
important social position because of the great numbers of 
believers. While observing the constitutional separation of 
the Church from the state, the people's power treats the 
Catholic Church with great seriousness meeting it half way 
in its requirements for carrying out the pastoral mission.
Pope John Paul II's visit to Poland will be an important 
event. We hope that the Joint responsibility of the 
government and the episcopate to create fitting conditions 
for the visit and also the course and primarily the results 
of the visits will be an important touchstone of our mutual 
relations. ... The present state of relations between the
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state and the Church is overall good, although I admit that 
there is still room for improvement. It is in the common 
interest and primarily in the people* s interest, not to 
permit tension and conflicts. We believe that the leadership 
of the Church in Poland is pursuing the same goal, but it is 
difficult to pass over in silence the fact that part of the 
clergy is engaged in activity which has nothing in common 
with religion. And so one can say that the problem is 
largely one of collusion and contradiction between some 
representatives of the hierarchy and the vehement and 
politicizing part of the clergy, on the one hand, and the 
irreversible reality of the 20th century, on the other.32
The reality of Poland in 1983 was that under a political system
advocating Marxism-Leninism as the state religion, the bulk of the 
population was seeing in the Polish Catholic Church its only hope, a 
situation the ruling establishment was only too aware of. For society 
at large, the prospect of another papal visit was becoming a crucial 
issue. Although it would be too much to presume that it expected a 
renewal of the 1979 atmosphere and its subsequent developments, a
majority of Poles anticipated that it would re-invigorate the spirit 
at the origin of the Solidarity movement. But this time the situation 
was markedly different from 1979 and few harboured illusions that John 
Paul II* s visit would trigger off a repeat of the 1980 events. As
Bujak, the Solidarity leader still at large, put it, "it may be that,
as a result of Papal visits every sixth dictator in the world 
announces democratic elections, but I don't think that our dictator 
will do so".33 Unwilling to be coaxed into allowing the Pope to visit 
his homeland without setting out clear conditions for the visit, the 
authorities repeatedly stressed that the domestic situation should be 
such as to allow the Papal pilgrimage. A year earlier these had been 
lacking and had resulted in the cancellation of the visit. Now, with 
the situation almost under control, the prospects were better. From 
Warsaw's point of view, the visit was significant as it would 
represent the first official visit of a head of state (in this case
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the Vatican* s) since the proclamation of a state of war. It would also 
reinforce the arguments that the situation in the country was now back 
to normal, a factor which might influence a change in Western 
perceptions towards the PRL. And at home it would cast the regime in a 
more favourable light if it allowed the visit to take place. In
Polityka, Adam Lopatka, summed up the state's view and hopes:
What will the state gain? In the first place a certain 
desire of a large part of its citizens, to greet John Paul 
II in Poland, will be fulfilled. Secondly in the 
contemporary world there are political forces which try to 
undermine the treaties of Yalta and Postdam. As you know, 
the programme of the Papal visit includes a visit to Wroclaw 
and St Anne's Mount, places which Poland has regained as a 
result of these treaties. A visit and the acceptance of 
hospitality from the Church and Polish Catholics in just 
these towns means that the Pope upholds the treaty of 
Postdam. Finally, as a result of John Paul II's visit there 
will be a certain widening of the breach in the blockade 
which is being applied by the US and certain NATO countries, 
the visit of the head of the Vatican state and the Church
will make it much more difficult to continue this unfriendly
policy, a*
However, despite the gains which the authorities hoped to reap from 
the visit, they also were well aware of the potential pitfalls.
Firstly, there was the question of the Soviet Union. The May hard-line 
article reprinted in Kommunist from Nowe Drogi (see above), was a 
tough warning to General Jaruzelski, and it indicated that Moscow was 
still concerned with the situation in the PRL. Another article in 
Izvestia pointed out that "the stabilization process has a good many 
opponents. These are battered, but as yet not decisively defeated as 
forces that only a year ago prepared a counterrevolutionary coup". 3E 
There were fears that after the effects the first Papal visit had had 
on the socio-political life of the PRL, a new visit might trigger
renewed unrest. A second perceived danger hinged upon the. fact that, 
while it was clear that the regime was intent on using the Papal visit 
to bolster its credibility, any events which might disturb the
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occasion, either before or during, would have to be dealt with
summarily, using if necessary force and violence. Should the situation 
deteriorate prior to the visit and require its cancellation, this
would have become a major embarrassment for the Jaruzelski regime. 
Disturbances during the visit, under extensive foreign media coverage, 
would also be a setback for the PRL leadership. At it was, underground
Solidarity leaders said, in a statement dated March 23, 1983, that
they would not organize any demonstrations during the Pope's visit.36 
This did not stop them from issuing a call to demonstrate on May 1, 
prior to the papal visit. By doing so, it put the authorities in an 
awkward position. Should the authorities decide to act ruthlessly
against the planned action they would reveal their repressive nature. 
If they let it happen, they would in a way recognize the existence of 
a movement which they had argued existed no longer. An article in 
Rzeczpospolita accused the underground call for confrontation (sic) on 
May day as "tantamount to proof that the opposition is bent on 
destructing internal peace". It went on saying that "obviously its 
leaders are well aware that, considering the mood of the, majority of 
society and the firmness of the authorities as well, they will not 
emerge winners; but it is not victory they have in mind. This time 
their aim is only for world opinion to demand from the Vatican to 
reconsider the purposefulness of the Pope's visit".37 In the event, 
the May Day demonstrations showed that the underground had recovered a 
little from its November 1982 setback. But the regime did not stand 
idle. Troubles broke out between the security forces and Solidarity 
supporters, tear-gas and water cannons were used and numerous arrests 
followed. On May 3, the Police broke into the Polish Primate's Aid 
Committee headquarters and maltreated several voluntary workers. In 
itself this event really showed how committed the authorities were in
-189-
their professed aim of improving Church-state relations. The height of 
the repression was symbolized by the death of a high-school student, 
Grzegosz Przemyk after a night in Police custody on May 14 (his
funeral was attended by over 15 000 mourners).
John Paul II's visit to his native country lived up to its 
expectations. Throughout the pilgrimage, The Pope was careful to 
emphasize the conciliatory nature of his visit. While there was little 
in his homilies from which the authorities could rightfully benefit as 
far as their credibility and own perceived legitimacy were concerned, 
the Pope's meetings with Party and state officials, representatives of 
the PRON organization and the pro-r6gime catholic organizations were 
emphasized by the media as a sign of convergence of opinions and 
priorities between the Church and the state. Undoubtedly, the visit 
bolstered the regime's standing, at least in the opinion of its
leaders. An eight page assessment of the Papal visit was made by the 
propaganda department of the Central Committee to be distributed 
internally. Reproduced in parts by an underground newspaper, it
commented that the visit had been a "political necessity":
To refuse it would have involved immense political losses 
... We assume that the visit will break down the Western 
diplomatic blockade. There will be fierce battles for the 
interpretation of the visit, both at home and abroad. A
struggle for people's attitudes and consciences will begin.
Our propaganda should be allusive and intelligent.
Summing up, it could be said that the visit was, for us, a
success in the state-political field, and a setback in the
moral field. We have learned a lot about the views and
feelings of society. We have gained new experience on ways 
of dealing with the Church. The visit will change little in 
the short-term, but it may have its long-term effects, if we 
fail to neutralize its negative effects.30
The state tried to capitalize on the fact that it had been a jointly 
organized visit between the Church and the authorities and that it 
signified the collusion of the two institutions in the search for a
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'national conciliation'. If one of the regime's aims had been to make 
some progress in the process of the normalization of relations between 
the PRL and the Vatican, it proved unsuccessful. Nonetheless the 
Politburo did accept a report by the joint Church-state commission, 
expressing mutual satisfaction with the course of the visit on July 1. 
It should be noted that despite the presence of some 14- Soviet 
journalists accredited to cover the Papal visit only three brief 
reports appeared in the Soviet press, denoting the low interest the 
Soviet propaganda was ostensively showing for the visit.39 Soviet 
Television deliberately distorted its commentary of the Papal visit by 
making it appear as if John Paul II was only meeting a few old women 
when in fact millions were present wherever he went. The Soviet 
viewers were thus given the impression that the visit was of little 
interest. After the Pope had left the PRL, the news broke out of the 
existence of plans whereby the Polish Church would seek to obtain 
foreign aid for the benefit of individual farmers, in the form of a 
fund to be administered by the Church authorities. On September 14, 
1982, Cardinal Glemp had already outlined these in some details in a 
letter to General Jaruzelski. Of course, problems for the setting of 
this Agricultural Aid Fund immediately arose. The regime was aware 
that should such a fund be created and successfully managed by the 
Church, it would lead to an increase in the Church's prestige - both 
in the PRL and abroad - and thereby contribute to undermine the 
authorities' virtual monopoly on foreign trade and hard-currency
dealings. It might also raise eyebrows in Moscow as well as among the 
PZPR's hardliners. It also feared that the Fund would turn even more 
Poles towards the Church and tie some of the beneficiaries
institutionally with the Church. It was evident that the Polish
authorities, engaged in the process of re-establishing themselves as
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an all-pervasive body, would ensure that such projects as the Fund 
would be controlled by them as tightly as possible. Equally, it was 
also clear that the Church would do everything to acquire as much 
freedom of manoeuvre in terms of control and management of the 
Fund. Thus, despite the authorities' assurances that Church-state 
relations were improving, it remained the case that between the two, 
contacts were still fraught with suspicion and a lack of sincere will 
to co-operate.
With the end of the Pope's visit, the stage was now set for the 
lifting of the state of war. On July 8, 1983, PRON*s Executive
Committee called for a lifting of the remaining restrictions, a call 
duly 'approved' by the Politburo. Yet available evidence seems to show 
that the actual decision was not finalized until July 19, when WRON 
met, almost certainly to give the go-ahead for the formal lifting of 
the state of war on the occasion of the July 22 State celebrations. 
Uncertainty concerning the decision was illustrated by the report of 
the Japanese News Agency which quoted an un-named Party source as 
saying that martial law would not be lifted on National Day as it 
would have a negative effect on coal production as soon as the mining 
industry was de-militarized. 40 The July 5 unprecedented meeting of the 
Politburo, the Sejm Presidium and the State Council to discuss the 
"actual socio-political situation in the country and the tasks 
resulting from it", was almost certainly a coded reference to a 
discussion on the finalization of the preparations concerning the 
ending of the state of war. It is most probable that in the current 
climate, the authorities were quite keen on using such an occasion to 
prove their good intentions. On July 6, on the occasion of 
Jaruzelski's birthday, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet awarded the
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Order of Lenin to the Polish First Secretary. Accompanying the award 
was a letter where the General was referred to as "an outstanding 
party and government leader of People's Poland, an eminent figure in 
the international communist and workers' movement and a staunch 
supporter of the inviolable friendship of the Polish People's Republic 
with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist 
commonwealth".*1 The tone and phraseology used would seem to have 
indicated that the Soviet Union despite all the misgivings it may have 
had originally, was now becoming a lot more supportive of Jaruzelski's 
policies. Plans to lift the state of war must have been submitted to 
the Kremlin leaders for their approval, on the occasion of a Moscow 
conference of Communist leaders which took place on June 28, 1983.
With the imminent lifting of the state of war, the Sejm went into a 
flurry of legislative activity. As a result of three sessions on July 
14, July 20-21 and July 28, a wide range of new legislative measures 
and constitutional amendments were implemented. They extended the 
penal code, strengthened censorship regulations, restricted further 
the right to demonstrate and carry out protest activities and 
bolstered the administrative powers of the state concerning national 
security. Among other things, it was now an offence to belong to a 
banned organization. In particular one should note the following: Art.
3. §2/3 replaced the Front of National Unity with PRON; art. 4 which
until now contained a general statement of the aims of the PRL was now 
expanded to include a second paragraph that stressed "the class nature 
of the state"; art. 15 §3, was expanded by the introduction of the 
sentence that the state "guarantees the permanence of private farms"; 
art. 33, two new paragraphs empowering the Sejm or the State Council 
to declare a state of war in cases of internal zagrolenie.
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(emergency). The amendments also distinguished between the two kinds 
of threats to the nation, internal and external, and provided for the 
introduction of a state of emergency in the case of the former.*2 
When, in its July 22 communique, the PRL*s parliament formally 
announced the end of the state of war after some seventeen months of 
existence, it also declared an amnesty for many internees. All women 
under the age of 21 and those serving terms of less than three years 
would be freed within the next month, and men with sentences of over 
three years would have their term cut by half. For those still 
remaining in hiding, safe conduct was offered in exchange for 
surrendering themselves to the authorities by October 31, 1983,
confessing to their deeds and pledging to "discontinue their criminal 
activities aimed against the state's interests".4S However the amnesty 
did not affect the so-called "eleven" KOR and Solidarity leaders still 
emprisoned44, as well as tens of other Solidarity activists. 
Commenting on the July decision, Zbigniew Bujak wrote that "by lifting 
martial law and by acknowledging the situation as 'normalized', while
the underground exists, the authorities signalled their reconciliation 
to the fact of our existence. We have thus become a permanent element 
of the political reality in Poland". 4Cr
Both the Papal visit and the formal lifting of the state of war 
were significant events for the PRL. But did they really alter 
anything? The Church saw its prestige grow even further by
successfully and efficiently organizing John Paul's visit. Since 
December 1981, one had observed its overall spectacular political
promotion. The nation as a whole perceived it as the sole authority
and the only social structure able to act in the open. From the point 
of view of the authorities, the Church represented not only a powerful
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opponent but also a potential ally for its policies of 'national 
conciliation'. For the people, the brutal end of a dream, as 
incarnated by Solidarity, had now created a curious situation: 
society, while persisting in its attitude of refusal towards the 
authorities' line and fidelity to the ideals of the now banned union,
was unable to translate this attitude into a language of specific
actions. The great majority rejected the idea of a massive underground
movement and the continuation of 'all or nothing strikes'. Lifting the
curtain of martial law revealed a pacified stage but still there was
no sign of a return to what might be described as a normal situation.
A cartoon which appeared in an underground publication in mid-1983, 
showed a set of huge, sturdy wooden doors, guarded by a heavily-armed 
and mean-looking soldier. The caption read: The process of
democratization will take place behind closed doors". It aptly
conveyed the state of the PRL as the state of war was finally lifted 
and also forecasted a pessimistic outlook for the months ahead.
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Je leur pardonne de ne pas avoir 
la mdme opinion que moi; je ne 
leur pardonne pas la leur.
Charles-Maurice Talleyrand.1
(I forgive people for not having 
the same opinion as me; I do not 
forgive them for theirs.)
CHAPTER 6 
* NORMALIZATION*
The decision to impose a state of war reflected the ruling 
establishment's determination to put its own house in order. If the 
primary goal was to restore socialist 'normality' and gradually return 
to the political status quo ante, it was obvious that too many things 
had changed since August 1980 to allow for a real return to the pre- 
martial law established order. It would be an error to see in the 
imposition of a state of war more "than an illusionary impression of 
the past's having been recaptured by the present".2 As Brzezinski 
aptly observed, that "past [may] turn out to be rather different, 
maybe not quite as profoundly different as the challenges had desired 
but certainly unlike what might have been expected if the challenge 
had never arisen". 3 Therefore 'normalization' would imply more than a 
mere cosmetic change of leadership, still basing its policies on an 
outdated set of Stalinist principles. If, on the one hand, we accept 
that the term 'normalization' refers on the whole to "the process 
whereby an authoritarian state re-asserts itself with the aim of 
suppressing the aspiration of society which had emerged during a 
period of weakened party control"*, then Jaruzelski's bid to normalize 
the internal situation in the PRL had been on the whole successful. 
Yet, it was obvious that 18 months of martial law had failed to solve
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all problems. If, on the other hand, "normalization in state socialist 
country occurs when people believe that the will to change things is
lacking"6, then the Jaruzelski regime was still a long way from
achieving this aim. Domestically, tension still dominated relations
between the authorities and the people. Despite an understandable 
weariness from the society at large, the will from the 'opposition' to 
re-organise itself remained ever-present. Although at the time it was 
still too early to predict the late 1980s radical changes in relations 
between the ruling establishment and the population, it was clear, 
even then, that unless some degree of compromise was found, the
country's future augured very bleak indeed. As Lech Wal§sa put it,
To illustrate the situation, I compare Poland to a chess­
board. We play chess and our opponents - draughts. Both
sides are convinced that they are winning. In fact nobody 
can until we decide on one game. No matter how different our 
views might be, we have to follow the same direction. It is 
the direction towards whatever is in the interest of our 
homeland. 6
More than ever before, the Polish authorities faced the gruesome task 
of attempting to bridge the enormous gap between the rulers and the 
ruled. In this respect, 'normalization' was doomed to fail. Confidence 
in the authorities' ability to improve the overall situation was as 
low as it could be. Although Jaruzelski was aware that he had to build 
the basis for a 'national conciliation* if some progress in domestic 
reforms Were to surface, he was at the same time unwilling to share 
this task with an ' opposition' he had only recently stifled.
Although the term 'normalization' primarily referred to the
domestic environment, it also had external ramifications. With the 
imposition of martial law, the PRL had to face a near— complete rupture 
of normal relations with non-communist countries. Just as
domestically, there was a desire to return to the political status quo
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ante, externally there was a pressing need to resume normal diplomatic 
and economic relations with the capitalist countries. In many ways the 
two concerns were intertwined: 'normalization at home' would
facilitate 'external normalization'. At the same time, normal (i. e, 
pre-December 1981) external relations would greatly enhance the 
chances of reaching a compromise on the domestic scene. This is why, 
in the case of the PRL, the term 'normalization' should be seen as 
applying to both the domestic and the external environment. At the 
beginning of 1984, the PRL remained isolated internationally, 
something which further confirmed and emphasized at home the lack of 
legitimacy of the rdgime. For Warsaw, domestic and external 
normalization was therefore essential. The problem was how to achieve 
it and what form it would take.
6. 1 Western Sanctions: The Continuing Battle.
With the formal lifting of the state of war in July 1983, the 
regime was signalling, both at home and abroad, that it felt confident 
enough now to steer the country back onto the path of ' socialist 
normality' without the use of the repressive instruments provided by 
martial law. If it was meant to be a gesture of good will, it failed 
to be convincing. By attempting to suppress society's aspirations for 
greater socio-political autonomy and seeking the successful re­
integration of the 61ite around the predetermined ideology imported 
from the Soviet Union, the Jaruzelski regime was showing little 
apparent desire to liberalize the Polish society. Since the imposition 
of a state of war, the authorities had used every opportunity to 
introduce new legislative acts destined to reinforce their power over 
Polish society. When the return to civilian rule was formally 
announced, these additions to the Polish Law statutes remained in
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force and formed the legal basis for the post-martial law repressive 
measures. In other words, cosmetically, it had become useful for the 
regime to formally remove the symbol of repression encapsulated in the 
existence of a state of war; at the same time, having successfully 
legalized the means to enforce its control over the nation, the regime 
pursued its 'normalizing* objectives unhindered. It is doubtful 
however, that this strategy fooled anyone either at home or abroad. 
John Paul II's visit a month earlier had failed to give the regime the 
aura of credibility it had sought and the lifting of the state of war 
had all the characteristics of a non-event. It is interesting to note 
that the authorities had seen the visit as a test to gauge the 
population's behaviour.7 Seemingly satisfied by it, the next step was 
to lift martial law. In itself, this changed very little; The majority 
of the population was still distrustful of the Jaruzelski regime while 
most Western countries preferred to make conditional their restrained 
satisfaction upon subsequent developments in the PRL. In August 1983, 
two US Congress delegations returned from their visit to Warsaw and 
concluded that it was still too premature to lift the American 
economic sanctions. More effort should be made by the Polish 
authorities to relax their restrictions on human rights before normal 
relations could be restored between the two countries.® It was only a 
year later that the first signs of a thaw in PRL-West relations took 
place. Meanwhile, the Polish authorities remained isolated on the 
international scene and faced an un-co-operative and highly 
distrustful population.
In its relations with the West, the Polish authorities used every 
opportunity to attack the policy of sanctions imposed against the PRL. 
'Normalization' had to take place both domestically and on the
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international arena. Speaking at the United Nations General Assembly, 
Jablohski sharply accused the USA of continuing its 'anti-Polish 
activities'. While America remained the regime's bdte noire, Jablohski 
criticized the entire Western bloc for failing to adopt a more 
conciliatory attitude towards the PRL. He forcefully attempted to 
convince his audience that "normalization and stability" were now 
pervading the country. The main gist of his speech, apart from 
bitterly attacking 'imperialist forces', was to call for a dialogue, 
both political and economic. But he stressed that the PRL's internal 
situation was not to be "internationalized". His idea of Poland was of 
"an independent socialist state within secure borders and free from 
European armed conflicts". This was the 'essence of the Polish raison
d'dtat', he added.
A secure and strong Poland, stable and internally unified, 
is in the interest of peace and co-operation for the whole 
of Europe and the World. Its reason of state is part of the 
European reason of state.9
This reflected the continuity in the duality of purposes expressed in 
nearly all official statements concerning the West. While strongly 
attacking all external attempts to influence the domestic situation in 
the country, the Polish regime also attempted to divorce the internal 
issue from the external one. It repeatedly stressed that the conduct 
of foreign relations could not be conditional on domestic 
developments, and that an improvement in contacts with Western 
countries should not be dictated by Western perceptions of the 
regime's domestic policies. International relations should emphasize 
the 'objective character* shaping co-operation between states. 
However, this type of declamation could only disguise the authorities' 
own realization that the two issues of improved external relations and 
internal 'liberalization' were in fact linked. All major speeches
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which immediately followed the lifting of martial law were primarily 
directed at a foreign audience and had one particular thing in common: 
they constantly reiterated that the PRL's domestic situation was now 
normal and therefore the internal situation could not be used as an 
argument for delaying the resumption of contacts between the the PRL 
and its former diplomatic and economic partners. Nevertheless, and
whether it liked it or not, the Jaruzelski rdgime had to accept that 
its actions on the domestic level had significant effects on the
external one. The reason why this was so significant for the PRL can 
be partly explained by the dependence on the West which it had grown 
accustomed to during the Gierek years. The most virulent exposes 
against 'Western interference' could not hide the fact that Western 
economic help remained vital for the implementation of far-reaching 
reforms. Practically, the whole policy of 'renewal' was based upon 
this reality. Any domestic successes, vital in themselves for the 
regime, depended enormously upon external factors, and in particular 
upon the resumption of normal economic and diplomatic relations with 
the West. In a memorandum addressed to the US administration, the
Polish government repeated that the state of war had been imposed out 
of dire necessity but had now been lifted since it was no longer 
needed. Yet, the note continued, the Reagan administration showed no 
signs of ending its discriminating actions against the PRL. This meant 
therefore that "the US [was] doing all it can to jeopardize and impede 
all efforts of the Polish nation to come out of the crisis". 10 But if 
the Reagan administration seemed intransigent, the Polish authorities 
too showed clear signs that they were not prepared to accept blindly 
the terms offered to them by the West. On November 16, 1983, talks in
Paris between the PRL and sixteen Western governments on the 
rescheduling of the Polish debt were disbanded early in view of
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unacceptable demands by the Polish representatives. It should be said 
that even if the domestic situation in the PRL had been stable, it
would still have remained doubtful whether the Polish government could 
have been able to service even the interest on the debt principal. One 
is therefore drawn to the tentative conclusion that despite all the
calls for a 'normalization' of relations between the PRL and Western 
countries, General Jaruzelski did not welcome it wholeheartedly. 
Indeed, continuing domestic problems could be used to delay the 
resumption of normal contacts with the West, thereby pushing back 
further the date when the debt accounts would have to be settled. Of 
course, as a long-term strategy this had its drawbacks. But as a 
short-term one, it had the advantage of putting aside the need to 
service the debt, as well as appeasing Soviet concern that over- 
dependence on Western capitals would not once again be the key to the 
PRL's socialist development.
By 1983, the theme which dominated official statements was that all 
economic and diplomatic sanctions against the PRL were affecting the 
whole nation and not just the ruling 61ite. Furthermore, the 
authorities maintained, there could be no possible solution to the
disastrous economic situation as long as those restrictions remained. 
Naturally this theme provided the authorities with a perfect excuse 
for failing to implement radical economic reforms. By focusing the 
root of all problems on the West, they could hide their own failings 
and identify a scapegoat for the PRL's internal problems. Already in 
Lenin's Russia, this line had been regularly used to justify domestic 
difficulties and has been repeatedly employed by all communist regimes 
ever since. This argument remained constant, even when it became
obvious that Western sanctions could not be blamed anymore for the
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continuing Polish economic crisis. Indeed, as a project study 
undertaken for the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the 
Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies seemed to show, the 
consequences of the Polish crisis were actually felt more by the West 
than by CMEA countries. The PRL stopped servicing her hard currency 
debt and asked for rescheduling, reduced her imports from the West to
less than half of the imports in 1976, and faced with severe supply
constraints, reduced exports to the West more severely than to CMEA 
countries (for example, because of the decline in coal output the 
PRL's total coal exports were 26 mn. tons less: 18 mn less for the
West and 8 mn less for the East). 11 Thus, however paradoxical it may 
have seemed, the Western sanctions were in fact partly helping the 
Polish government by delaying the repayment of the PRL's enormous
debt. In general, sanctions can not only help leaders to present
themselves as effective defenders of the country and its people
against external enemies, but can also provide them with a useful
explanation for any economic difficulties or setbacks which arise,
whether or not there is a real connection between the two: "it is
often difficult to distinguish between or to identify sources of
economic difficulty but always convenient to blame them on outside 
agencies". 12 In the case of the PRL, this line of argument would be 
increasingly used by the authorities as economic reforms faltered and 
as Western sanctions remained. In this sense, it provided Jaruzelski 
with a propaganda weapon both against the West and the Polish 
'opposition'. Of course, this type of explanation could only give
Warsaw a short-term reprieve in handling the difficult internal
situation and would soon outlive its utility if serious reforms were 
to be sincerely implemented. But it gave the Polish authorities a
breathing space during which they could hope to gain substantial
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advantages for the future.
By the end of the year, Walesa himself, called for an end to 
Western sanctions because "what Poland needs now is not losses of 
millions of dollars but aid of thousands of millions". He also 
pointed out that the Polish government had been persistently using 
them as an excuse for the imposition of repeated and drastic 
decreases in the standards of living of Polish workers and the Polish 
society. 13 It was dawning upon the West that the economic sanctions 
against the PRL had outlived their usefulness and it was generally 
accepted that the aim had been primarily political. On November 2, 
the United States decided to take limited steps to ease some of its 
restrictions on the PRL: it joined other Western nations in
negotiating a rescheduling of part of the Polish debt and allowed 
Polish officials to enter into discussion with private American 
companies concerning potential fishing agreements. But it kept its 
veto on the PRL's admission to the IMF and refused to reconsider its 
MFN status. This was enough for the Polish authorities to continue 
its sharp attacks against the Reagan administration, especially in 
the light of the end of EEC economic sanctions against the Soviet 
Union on December 23, 1983. An article in the Polish underground
press summed up the situation:
The American sanctions provide an excellent propaganda 
excuse while their economic effects are fairly limited. The 
trade with the West is hampered not so much by the removal 
of reduced import tariffs as by the fact that we are unable 
to offer much to the demanding Western markets. It is true 
that LOT planes cannot land in the US and that Polish 
fishermen have no access to US fisheries. But because of 
large distances the major part of the hauls were anyway sold 
straight away to foreign buyers and never reached our 
market. The gist of the sanctions was the refusal to grant 
further credits, including the purchase of raw materials and 
intermediate products needed by our industry. In short, 
however paradoxically, the end of financial contacts imposed 
by the USA was quite convenient to the Polish government: it 
meant that talks on the rescheduling of Polish debts would 
be postponed. By the same token there was no need to repay
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the subsequent instalments. Did the West know that? It did, 
but the sanctions were the only way to demonstrate its 
disapproval of the Polish authorities and the events after 
13 December 1981.
Nothing illustrated better the PRL government* s exasperation at the 
continued American sanctions then its reaction to the award of the 
Nobel Peace Prize to Lech Walesa. On October 11, the Norwegian 
Ambassador in Warsaw was told officially that the award was an 
interference in Poland's internal affairs and would have serious 
consequences for relations between the two countries. This was the 
first official protest against a Nobel Peace Prize winner since 
Hitler objected in 1936 to the award made to Carl von Ossietzky, a 
German pacifist. The Government's spokesman described this as 
"another monkey trick by Ronald Reagan, made in Oslo this time. ... 
It confirmed the thesis of the Polish government about foreign 
inspiration for the divisions and conflicts in present day Poland". 1S
6. 2 Nineteen Eighty Four.
Some 24 months after the imposition of a state of war, the Polish 
domestic situation was still uncertain and little had changed on the 
international front. In 1984, however, domestic and foreign affairs 
would prove significant for the PRL: a) domestically, two events in
particular stood out: the People's Council elections in June and the
murder of Father Jerzy Popieluszko in October; b> externally, the PRL 
scored several successes in the foreign policy field, especially with 
regard to the West. In the East, Soviet policy was feeling the 
effects of successive leadership changes, Brezhnev's successor 
Andropov dying and being replaced by Konstantin Chernenko. In itself 
this was having an indirect effect on policy-making in the PRL. In 
spite of the PRL's continual 'friendship' with the USSR, but most
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certainly because of uncertainties in the Kremlin at the time, Polish 
policy-making found a greater margin of independent activity, both 
domestically and externally. 1984 marked the timid resumption of 
normal relations between socialist Poland and its former Western 
diplomatic and economic partners. In October 1984, the first NATO 
state visit since the imposition of martial law took place and 
although it was still too early to speak of a total 'normalization' 
in the foreign field, it was clear that slowly the PRL was emerging 
from its self-inflicted isolation.
Domestically, the state of the PZPR remained the main 
preoccupation for the Jaruzelski regime. Its return to active life 
depended essentially upon the success of 'normalization' in three 
main areas: 1) to purchase the compliance of those workers with the
strongest industrial force - above all the coal miners; 2) to create 
groups and new unions which could lay claim to be speaking for the 
'working class'; 3) to ban intellectual associations that could form 
a platform of opposition. However helpful the imposition of martial 
law had been for laying the basis for such a strategy, the internal 
situation was still uncertain; it still remained unclear that the 
authorities would succeed in these tasks. Though living in 
clandestinity, the Polish 'opposition' continued its work of opposing 
the regime's policies through the dissemination of a large 
underground press.,G Though beset by obvious organizational problems, 
it remained an active force whose influence could not be dismissed. 
Following the Polish historical tradition, underground Solidarity was 
the Twentieth Century version of the 'struggles for national 
liberation'. Despite repeated efforts by the authorities, its impact 
on society was indisputable and was constantly reminding the
-207-
Jaruzelski regime that a 'national accord' would be unrealistic in 
excluding Walesa and his supporters. On January 26, 1984, the Sejm
set up an extraordinary commission to work out a bill extending the 
current parliamentary term of office. In effect this meant a 
deferment of general elections. It was also, therefore, an indication 
that the authorities were conscious of their inability to stage- 
manage parliamentary elections to their own satisfaction. On February 
13, the Sejm formally extended its term of. office until the end of 
the year with its final session taking place on July 31, 1985, after 
65 months of unbroken tenure. This had been the longest parliamentary 
session in the PRL. With the election of new deputies approaching, 
the next move on the political board was to hold People's Councils 
elections (Rada Narodowa). People's councils are "the local organs of 
power and the fundamental organs of community self-government of the 
town and country working people in communes, towns, districts of 
larger cities and voivodships" (PRL Constitution, Art. 43 §1.) The 
successful stage-managing of these elections would give a boost to 
the authorities' aims of restoring the PZPR to the fore of Polish 
political life.
In preparation for the People's Councils elections, the PZPR 
ideological machine was set in motion. On March 16, a 3-day National 
Conference of PZPR Delegates took place. Usually Party congresses are 
held every five years but sometimes an interim Party conference is 
held to 'discuss' pressing current problems and boost Party members' 
flagging enthusiasm. It evaluated the implementation of the 9th 
Extraordinary Congress and prepared the election of participants to 
the next Congress. It also assessed the state of the Party's 
membership and organizational unity. Since October 1983, 30% of
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factory, municipal and voivodeship committees had been changed. 30% 
of POP first secretaries had been replaced and a total of 7900 
members expelled.17 The Conference adopted a resolution entitled 0 co 
walczymy, dok§d zmierzamy (what are we fighting for, where are we 
heading), laying the basic principles behind the policy of odnowa 
which so far had remained confined to slogans.1® 39 years earlier in 
1943, the first manifesto of the Polish Worker's Party (PPR) had used 
practically the same title (0 co walczymy) to head a programme 
stressing the twin goals of national independence and social 
revolution. In 1984, the fight was taking place inside the Party and 
the introspection it was subjecting itself to, revealed only too 
clearly how hollow were its claims to be the leading force in the PRL 
(if you do not know where you are going, it is hard to to lead...). 
In his closing speech General Jaruzelski made it clear that the Party
had to play a leading role in post martial law Poland:
We took the responsibility that never again could there -be a 
return either to the pre-August deformation [ deformacjil, 
nor to the pre-December anarchy, and the threat to 
socialism. On this basis we approved the renewal of 
socialism, the line of understanding, battle and socialist 
reform. The guarantee for the realization of this policy can 
only be the Party - the same, but not quite the same. Such a 
Party we are becoming. From this road we cannot digress.19
He presented eight targets to the Party: to overcome the economic
crisis; to fully rebuild the ties between the Party and the 'working 
class'; to strengthen the socialist state; to continue the 
introduction of socialist reforms; to consolidate the policy of 
national accord; to mount an ideological offensive in the younger 
generation; to achieve tangible progress in science, education and 
culture and finally, to consolidate the PRL's place within the 
socialist community.20 In spite of the ritual propagandist tone of 
the conference, it was clear from the delegates' own speeches that
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the PZPR was engaging in a thorough re-appraisal of itself as a party 
and on the solidity of its base. Though the conference confirmed that 
the Party line had not changed since the 9th PZPR Congress, it was 
obvious that it had been held for the purpose of closing rank6. The 
National Conference of PZPR delegates provided a platform for a first 
public assessment since the lifting of the state of war of the new 
orientation faced by the Party in its battle to regain its 
credibility. Of course, anti-socialist forces and especially the 
intellectuals in the 'opposition' were criticized, but also the 
uncertainties of the leadership, local parochialism and excessive 
bureaucracy within the Party. Emphasized throughout was the poor 
frame of mind of administrative cadres and the growing weakness of 
the youth and the workers in playing an active role in the affairs of 
the Party. Little was said about how the odnowa would be conducted, 
but the general mood was indicative enough of the continuing marasm 
affecting the PZPR. The resolution adopted at the end of the 16th KC 
plenum2', on June 3, called for the enhancement of the political role 
of the working class and its influence on the activity of the state. 
By underlining the necessary socialist character of trade unions and 
their recognition of the leading role of the PZPR, the Central 
Committee was clearly stating that it had no intention of considering 
the participation of Solidarity in the process of renewal. 22 Under 
such conditions it was hard to imagine that 'normalization' would 
proceed smoothly.
The fears and concerns expressed at the Conference of PZPR 
delegates were amply justified from the Party's point of view by the 
results of the local elections which took place on June 17, 1984.
Although preparations for the successful outcome of the elections
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were made23, including a co-ordinated secret services offensive which
started on March 5 and ran well into May - presumably to intimidate
the electorate and prevent any coup d‘eclat by the underground 
opposition -, a low turn-out on the day dispelled Jaruzelski's claims 
that the Polish ' renewal' was answering the aspirations of the Polish 
society. Despite the fact that more candidates' names appeared then 
there were seats to be filled, this semblance of democratic choice was 
nullified by the fact that even if all candidates were not PZPR
members, they had been first 'approved' by the Party. All the Party
candidates put forward were listed first on the ballots, and the sole 
practical use of the voting booth was to voice one's disagreement with 
the order on the list. Officially, the authorities claimed that the 
elections were boycotted by some 20% of eligible voters (40% according 
to the opposition). By claiming a near 75% turn-out (when one compares 
with the March 1980 elections when there was then a 98.87% turn-out), 
the authorities were acknowledging that at least some 6 million people 
had failed to vote, even more if one uses the 'opposition's' own 
figures. Alone this low turn-out was a revelation when one has been 
accustomed to the usual 95% or more participation in all Eastern 
Central European countries' election results. The first three days of 
May had seen demonstrations erupting in all industrial centres where 
Solidarity was influential. In Gdartsk, Lech Walesa managed to enter 
the official First of May parade and salute the tribune with a V-sign. 
Some 684 arrests were reported throughout the country. In such an 
uncertain climate, it was no wonder that the authorities failed to 
attain the support they had wanted. Rulers-ruled relations had further 
been exasperated at the beginning of the year with the start of the 
so-called ‘war of the crosses'. The conflict erupted when the head of 
the agricultural school at Mietne (Siedlce), under government
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instruction, ordered crosses to be removed from seven lecture halls, 
sparking protests by students and their supporters. The authorities' 
decision to ban crucifixes from the classrooms provoked a strong 
reaction from the Polish episcopate who demanded the return of crosses 
in all public places and the respect for Catholic rights. The whole 
affair was a matter of principle on both sides. The Church refused any 
compromise on this issue while the authorities appeared determined to 
tighten its political control over the activities of the Roman 
Catholic clergy. The fact that the regime had taken this decision 
indicated that it felt strong enough now to engage a head-on conflict 
with the Church. With the 'opposition' seemingly under control, the 
process of 'normalization' was now turning its attention to the next 
'opponent'. Although Jaruzelski needed the support of the Church, the 
latter's uncompromising stand on certain issues continued to represent 
a direct challenge to the Party and therefore, failing its outright 
elimination, it had to be constrained. The overall result of such a 
policy alienated further the regime from the society. Moreover, it 
fuelled a negative publicity for a government who was hoping to appear 
'reform-minded' in its policies. When Jaruzelski said that "we are 
pursuing a line of struggle and accord. Struggle with those who damage 
socialist Poland. Accord with all who, despite traumas, bitterness and 
vacillation, want to work honestly for their country. It is to them 
that we stretch out our hand, we will not be lacking in patience", it 
was difficult not to find a hollow ring to his declaration.24 The 
picture from the outside continued to remain bleak and in such 
circumstances it was difficult to imagine a rapid improvement in 
relations with the West. 'Internal normalization' was delaying its 
external counterpart. By the end of the year, a new event was to have 
significant repercussions for both. Indeed, in many ways, it became a
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turning point in the history of the PRL.
6. 3 The Death of a Priest.
"Too great is the sacrifice of blood, of tears, of humiliation, 
offered at the feet of Christ, that it should return from Him as a 
gift of real liberty, justice and love, that it should bring about the 
resurrection of the Motherland". 2G In his 'Masses for the Homeland', 
Father Popieluszko constantly reminded his listeners to the need for 
human and national dignity, for alienable human rights, for the 
courage to conquer fear and hatred with love.2G Often his sermons 
would deal with the notion of sacrifice and it was clear that this was 
a prospect he had reconciled himself with. His death at the hands of 
three officials of the PRL's security forces, on October 19, 1984,
tragically confirmed his premonitions.27 This was not the first time 
that a priest had been murdered in the PRL.2Q Yet in this particular 
case, the search for the culprits and their subsequent trial in Toruri 
were conducted in a blaze of publicity, in itself a rare, if not 
unique, occurrence in a Soviet-type system (such trials have of course 
existed before, but they never never received the kind of publicity 
and openness this one did). The most immediate reason for the actual 
trial taking place at all was the escape of Father Popieluszko's 
driver. Had he too vanished, it is very likely that the crime would 
have gone un-reported and the priest* s disappearance added merely to 
the list of 'mysterious and unexplained' cases. In the event, the 
authorities displayed a remarkable openess considering that the whole 
case was implicating the secret services. At the same time, it was 
obvious from the very start that, while the exact circumstances behind 
the murder remained unexplained, the government did everything it 
could to exploit the situation to its own advantage.
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The authorities embarked very rapidly upon a campaign to convince 
the Polish population that it was an isolated incident, not an example 
of 'socialist legality* or normal security forces practices. They did 
almost everything to show that Father Popieluszko's murder had been a 
deliberate attempt to discredit the authorities. This attitude had its 
roots in both domestic and international considerations. At home, it 
was clear that the priest's murder could fuel renewed unrest and 
jeopardize the meagre results of 'normalisation'. Father Popieluszko's 
funeral was the occasion of probably the greatest public gathering 
(some half a million people) since December 1981, with the exception 
of the Pope's visit. It was therefore essential that the Jaruzelski 
regime distance itself as much as possible from any association with 
those involved. Hence the repeated statements, even before a single 
arrest had been made, that the abduction was aimed primarily at the 
government and its policies. At a press conference, the Government's
spokesman said that,
Regardless of who committed this act, it was intended to 
strike a blow at the positive processes taking place in 
Poland. For example, it was meant to cast a shadow over the 
normalisation of relations with some Western countries. It 
is an act directed against the process of renewal and is
presumably aimed at Church-state relations. 29
The PRON leadership issued a statement which voiced the opinion that 
the abduction had been intended to give the impression that "instead 
of entering into the dialogue they have proposed, the authorities were 
aiming to liquidate their political opposition". 30 Internationally it 
was essential for Warsaw to convey the impression that this 'act of 
provocation' had been aimed at Jaruzelski himself. Judging from the 
Western reports at the time, this was partly successful. It should be
pointed out that the notion that the whole affair had been a
provocation aimed at the government was originally launched by the
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government itself, anxious to portray the incident as an isolated
event and at odds with the normal standards of legality observed by
the security apparatus. To obtain reliable information on this is
almost impossible, but one should also mention the real possibility 
that the murder and the trial that followed, may have been the
reflection of a probable fight between the Party and the SB. In
communist states there have always been two powers, the Party and the 
institutions in charge of repression, information-gathering, and all 
the activities related to the task of controlling society. Conflicts 
between the two may at times occur, and more often than not, the Party
emerges the victor. In the PRL, the repressive apparatus may have
caused Jaruzelski some trouble in the carrying out of the General's 
'normalizing' directives (it is thought, for instance, that the
Popieluszko 'affair' had been, among other things, the result of the 
personal tension existing between Miroslaw Milewski, the head of the 
Central Committee department in charge of law and order matters, and 
General Kiszczak, the Interior Minister). By staging the Popieluszko's 
affair, the SB could effectively be compromised and thus give 
Jaruzelski the advantage it needed to dominate it. In the event, the 
'conspiracy theory* soon became a real possibility. When, on November 
11, Milewski was effectively suspended from his influential position, 
while Jaruzelski took personal control over the Interior Ministry31, 
the road seemed open for a thorough purge of the MSW. This then seemed 
to support the thesis that Father Popieluszko*s murder may have been 
planned without the General*s knowledge (Milewski 'resigned* from all 
his public functions on May 14). Instead, since such an operation 
could not conceivably have been enacted without high-level orders, it 
was showing that even among the ruling establishment the General was 
encountering difficulties in pursuing his policy of 'national accord'
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- something the official propaganda was at pains to show. That 
Milewski was also reputedly one of the most senior hard line Marxists 
in the Politburo helped to boost the 'liberal' or 'moderate' image of 
the First secretary. At the time there was a real possibility that 
sanctions would soon be lifted, thereby finally 'normalizing' 
relations with the West. As such, the case of the murdered priest 
threatened to impede progress in this context. As an anonymous
contributor wrote,
The crime was aimed against its victim and also against the 
clergy, against Solidarity and against all social opposition 
- not against the generals. Nevertheless, what it meant to 
Jaruzelski was the destruction of all effects, poor as they 
may be, of all his efforts towards "normalization". The 
image of law-abiding and competent government which was so 
laboriously created, especially for the sake of 
international credibility, was shaken.32
Shaken but not irremediably damaged. Judging from the number of 
Western high-level visits in the aftermath of Father Popieluszko*s 
abduction and the subsequent discovery of his body, PRL-West relations 
remained largely unaffected by the event. Three days after the 
abduction, the Greek Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou was in the 
PRL on an official visit. A week later still, the Finnish Foreign 
Minister followed. Finally on November 3, Malcolm Rifkind, the 
Minister of State at the British Foreign Office was in Warsaw (see 
below). Jaruzelski's decision to hold the trial of three members of 
the security forces was still a perfect way of showing the world and 
the Polish population that the blame for Father Popieluszko's murder 
should not be placed at his door. By showing that it had only been an 
isolated event and not part of a systematic pattern of violence, a 
trial could have a very beneficial public relations impact. In an 
unusual way, the 17th KC plenary session endorsed a resolution 
condemning the Popieluszko*s murder33 and the next day General
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Kiszczak who was personally in charge of the investigation, announced 
the arrest of the kidnappers.
When the trial of Piotrowski, Chmielewski and P§kala began in Toruri 
on December 27, 1984 it became clear very soon that the authorities
had also decided to use it as a forum for criticizing those priests 
who, like Popieluszko, were considered too political. Some eight days 
later, the victim himself became accused of his own murder. This was a 
prelude to a series of concerted attack on the Church in general and 
on other ' extremist priests' in particular. In his closing speech, the
Public Prosecutor, Leszek Pietrasiriski, noted that,
While our state has always purged and continues scrupulously 
to purge the ranks of its employees, eliminating all those 
who infringe the law in whatever aspect it may be, the 
Church authorities do not act in the same way. . . . Citizen 
and priest [Father Popieluszko] was involved in extremist 
acts contrary to our laws and the rules governing his work.
He was the victim of the accused who, like him, thought they 
could hold up to ridicule the law and who, like Father 
Popieluszko, considered that their office protected the 
law. 3-4
It is not an exaggeration to say that the ' honey-moon' between the 
Polish authorities and the episcopate came to an end with the Toruri 
trial. The beginning of 1985 heralded a state offensive against the 
Church. On January 26, Rzeczpospolita published an interview with Adam 
Lopatka, the Minister of Religious Affairs, where he condemned the 
Church's tolerance towards the "fighting clergy" which prones "anti-
state activities in Poland". He added that,
I make no secret of the fact that some of the clergymen are 
political zealots and show no respect for the principles 
defined by our constitution and the state's interests, we 
disapprove of this and are concerned by it. ... We shall 
make every effort to eliminate such phenomena for the sake 
of the state and, above all, for the sake of our people. 3S
In February, the Party daily addressed a severe warning to the Church 
by saying that the authorities' patience had its limits and that so-
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called extremist priests would be sanctioned if they did not put an 
end to their political activities against socialism.36 The attacks
persisted and even intensified after the verdict in the Toruri trial 
had been given (February 7). On February 2, the Polish episcopate 
issued a statement against the "tendentious reporting by the mass 
media on the Toruri trial.37 But the authorities' onslaught continued 
unabated. Guidelines were issued to all the voivodships departments 
for religious affairs by director Aleksander Wolowicz, one of 
Lopatka's aides, stipulating that, a) the departments should emphasize 
the contrast between the policies of Pope John Paul II and that of
Primate Glemp; b) those priests who enjoy official favour should be 
set against those whom the authorities dislike; c) the building of
churches ought to be blocked or at least delayed, even when permission 
had originally been given; d) the turn-over and circulation of the 
Catholic press should be decreased and new publications not 
permitted. 30 That a real offensive was being waged against the Polish 
church was further illustrated by an article in Trybuna Ludu, where, 
for the first time, the Pope himself was being accused of supporting 
Solidarity.39 John Paul II was also later accused of following a 
policy aimed at opposing the PRL to the socialist bloc in order to
make it a "state-buttress of Christianity against communism from the 
East".*10
The 'Popieluszko affair' had created an unfortunate situation for 
the Jaruzelski clan. If one accepts that the decision to assassinate a 
member of the clergy had been taken without the General's knowledge 
(though a provocation to compromise the SB cannot be excluded), then 
it is easy to see why. Just when Warsaw was making progress in the 
conduct of its foreign affairs, with the visits of the Greek Premier,
-218-
the Foreign Ministers of Finland and Austria, the murder was focussing 
world opinion on the negative side of the PRL's internal life. All 
Polish efforts to convey to the outside world the picture of a 'back 
to normal' country could well be seriously damaged if the Polish 
leadership was in any way identified with the event. In this sense 
then, it could prepare the ground for the General's replacement by 
ostensibly showing his inability to rule. That General Kiszczak, made 
a personal appearance on Polish Television to announce the arrests of 
father Popieluszko*s murderers, was a revealing testimony to the 
gravity of the situation as far as the ruling establishment was
concerned. Later in the year, a remarkable event happened in the
annals of Polish law: the PRL Secret Services were formally condemned
to pay damages and interests to two Solidarity activists who had been 
maltreated during internment. ** This was a symbolic event for it 
seemed to mark a new stage in the relations between the population and
the ruling establishment. But, it did not become a real precedent.
Rather, it was the exception to the rule, which proved that the
regime was still a long way from tolerating society's involvement and 
control of its repressive organs.
Ever since the suspension of martial law, the chief difficulty for 
the West had been to decide how direct a link there should be between 
the easing of Western's remaining sanctions against the Jaruzelski's 
government, and that government's handling of its explosive people.
The murder of a priest, should it be proven that it was conducted with 
the support of the authorities, could further delay the resumption of 
normal external relations. It was then crucial that Jaruzelski should 
show that he had little to do with the whole affair. It must be said
that in this he was helped by Western governments. They too, in a
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sense, had little to gain from a situation where internal tensions 
would once again be set alight. Despite condemnation by the 
international community (the European Parliament passed a resolution 
to this effect on November 15, 1984), restraint was shown in assessing 
the impact of the event. Tacit acceptance that this would not unduly 
damage the rapprochement between the PRL and the West could only give 
Jaruzelski the satisfaction that he had successfully weathered a 
potential crisis. However, it remained unclear why precisely when a 
thaw in PRL-Western relations was in the making, the authorities 
should choose this moment to wage a bitter campaign against the Polish 
Catholic Church. It may have been a result of the power struggle 
within the Party hierarchy and Jaruzelski's determination to settle 
the thorny issue of the Church's influence. By accepting to renew 
normal relations with the PRL, the West was in effect de facto 
sanctioning the 'legitimacy' of the Jaruzelski regime and therefore 
giving it the possibility to settle internal matters without too much 
external interference.
6. 4 External Normalization?
Internationally, little had changed for the PRL since the 
imposition of martial law. To succeed in normalizing its external 
relations with the West, the Polish regime was determined to break out 
of the isolation in which the country had found itself after December 
1981. In this, the use of new slogans was very revealing. At the 
beginning of the year, the official media tried to make convincing the 
idea that increased production and better standards of living were 
peaceful instruments on the road to 'national conciliation'. 
Similarly, the basis for normal relations with foreign governments had 
to be based upon peaceful principles of mutual co-operation.*2 Peace,
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at home and abroad, the slogans claimed, was the only solution to a 
situation that was too similar to the Cold War era and all of its 
implications. A headline in May read: "A joint aim unites us:
Prosperity - in Poland; Peace - in the World". At the time, the main 
issue in East-West relations concerned the stationing of American 
Pershing missiles in Western Europe. Against this background, one may 
assume that the PRL*s interest in pursuing an active 'peace policy' in 
its foreign policy had two major aims. Firstly it was obviously 
following the lead of the Soviet Union and supporting its declared 
intention to stop the missiles from being permanently stationed in 
Europe. Secondly, the pursuit of a disarmament policy in Europe, was
one conducive to a climate of renewed ddtente, And here the PRL could 
hope to profit from this enormously. Even Cardinal Glemp seemed to be 
supporting this policy when he said, in a homily, that "the
perspective of a new year may wake in us a feeling of oppression, as
we hear the news that certain European countries of old Christian 
culture are harbouring death-carrying rockets". The outstanding 
economic problems still facing the country were unchanged: wages were 
increasing faster than production; too many investment projects had 
been started with the result that they were putting too much stress on 
factories having to supply the materials (especially housing); a low 
product-quality ratio; a chronic shortage of imported materials and 
components; an un-controllable foreign debt. In such conditions, any 
improvement in relations with the Western creditors could have far- 
reaching effects on the national economy. Yet, the removal of 
sanctions and an improvement of economic relations with the West might 
not have much effect in the long-term. Of course new credits from the 
West would certainly add vigour to the production process, but the end 
of sanctions would also accelerate a rescheduling agreement with the
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Western creditor governments. In effect this would mean that Warsaw 
would have to pay a much larger amount of hard currencies to the West 
in order to service its huge debt. New credits could thus be 
channelled into repaying debts rather than giving fresh life to the 
country. But even if the short-term prospects resulting from an 
improvement of PRL-Western relations could bring about some economic 
successes, the political implications of such a rapprochement 
represented then, a greater attraction for the Polish authorities. In 
a situation where visible economic improvements could only be 
envisaged in the long-term, the quickest way for the regime to regain 
some kind of prestige and thereby credibility, was to make some 
progress in the political field. And here one can explain the main 
motivation, and at the same time goal, of the Jaruzelski team. In his 
speech to the diplomatic corps at the Wilanbw Castle, Premier
Jabloriski stated that,
We would like to stress in particular the fact that we 
behaved in this manner (i.e. by imposing a state of war) not 
only from our own interest, but also for the whole of 
Europe, in the interest of peace, valued by all nations of 
the world. ... A year ago, in January 1983, when the state 
of war was already suspended, I could say with satisfaction 
that Poland was once more a country where order reigned, in 
the process of consolidating internal peace, and at the same 
time a reliable partner in international relations. ... An 
important element in the economic development of each 
country is co-operation and trade exchange with foreign 
countries. This always has been of great significance and 
particularly at times when a country is struggling with 
great efforts in the midst of a crisis. ... Poland was and 
remains an open country without barriers and restraints, 
prepared for co-operation with everyone; but co-operation 
with partners possessing equal rights and to their mutual 
advantage. **
By 1984, it was becoming apparent to the Polish authorities that an 
easing of Western economic sanctions against Poland would require a 
reassessment of Polish foreign policy. December 1982 saw the first 
signs of a thaw in East-West relations with the lifting of EEC
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sanctions against the Soviet Union. By January 1984, the US had 
started easing its stand against the PRL, with President Reagan* s 
decision to allow Polish chartered flights to land on US soil and lift 
the ban on Polish use of US territorial waters. It seemed that 
everyone, the West, the Polish regime and the 'opposition* were for 
once agreeing that the continuation of restrictive measures against 
the country had by now outlived their usefulness. Walesa's plea to 
President Reagan that economic sanctions should be abandoned (December 
5, 1983) clearly illustrated this. But if sanctions were soon to be
completely lifted, the problem remained as to the form in which future 
relations between the PRL and the West would develop. For the West, 
the main problem was to find a satisfactory way of dealing with the 
Polish external debt. More than two years after the imposition of 
martial law, it was clear to Western governments and bankers that the 
Jaruzelski regime was now stable enough to be considered as a durable 
partner, whether they liked or not. For the PRL, the foreseeable 
improvement of relations with the West had to be tackled in such a way 
as to ensure political and economical benefits. A relatively calm 
domestic situation was conducive to the pursuit of external goals. At 
the same time, the knowledge that the Western stand on economic
sanctions was weakening, gave Warsaw an opportunity to adopt a more 
confident attitude in its relations with the West. Despite the 
dramatic state of the Polish economy, it was obvious that the internal
situation was more or less under control. It was then only a matter of
time until the West would have to reconsider its own position vis-A- 
vis the PRL. This would thus explain the vigorous and seemingly self- 
assured Polish attitude in the foreign affairs field at the beginning 
of 1984. However, this apparent will to regain credibility on the 
international arena was marred by the deterioration of US-USSR
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relations. Since the Afghanistan invasion by Soviet forces in 1979, 
relations between the two super-powers were at their lowest point 
since the beginning of the detente years. It was not surprising then, 
that the Soviet Union took the decision to boycott the Olympic games
due to start in the summer of 1984 in Los Angeles. Inevitably, the
Kremlin 'asked' its allies to join in. On May 17, the PRL formally
withdrew from the Games following a two-hour discussion of the Polish 
Olympic Games Committee. Earlier, a delegation of Polish Party
officials made a special journey to Moscow in order to soften the 
Soviet demand for Warsaw Pact unanimity on the issue of the Olympic 
boycott. *G Just as in 1982 when the Football World Cup diverted the 
attention of many Poles from their everyday problems, the prospect of 
the country's participation at the Olympic Games could have diverted 
some of the nation's energy into following the performances of the 
Polish athletes. In this light, it was understandable that the 
authorities were hoping to change the Soviet stand on the boycott. 
This illustrated once again the traditional dilemma faced by Polish 
leaders between furthering their own interests and at the same time 
having to comply to the Kremlin's own current priorities. It also 
served to explain the regime's attitude towards the West, especially 
towards the USA. Indeed, Soviet-American differences could provide 
Warsaw with an opportunity of playing a role in East-West relations. 
But for the moment, this possibility appeared remote.
In his speech to the Sejm, Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowski, 
emphasized that "unfriendly behaviour towards Poland in the form of 
sanctions and other restrictions or aggressive anti-Polish propaganda 
[was] incompatible with the cultivation of normal relations between
sovereign states". But he left the door open when he added that,
It is the government's intention to maintain partner-like,
mutually beneficial relations with the developed capitalist
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countries. The state of our relations with this group of
countries varies according to the approach adopted by each 
of them towards Poland and their observance of the generally 
accepted rules of international law, particularly their 
compliance with the principle of non-interference in 
internal affairs.46
It is significant to note the use by the Polish regime of the 
sanctions factor as one of the determinants behind the continuing 
crisis. After the poor policy of the 1970s and the '1980 anarchy', the
Western sanctions, and in particular the American ones, were used to
justify the failure to improve the Polish internal situation.47 Of 
course, by 1984, it was obvious that whatever effects the Western 
sanctions originally had, they simply could no longer be used by the 
Polish leaders as a credible explanation for their inability to solve 
the crisis. While publicly still using this justification for both
domestic and external purposes40, the authorities were already looking 
ahead and preparing the ground for the resumption of normal relations 
with the capitalist countries. In this respect the visit by the UN 
Secretary General, P6rez de Cuellar to the PRL on February 18, 1984
was significant. It gave the Polish authorities the first occasion
since 1982 to demonstrate their 'international credibility' in the 
eyes of the capitalist countries. According to a commentary in the
official press49, three political conclusions could be drawn from the
visit. Firstly it "underlined the fact that the large contribution of 
socialist Poland in matters of peace and international co-operation 
[could] not cancel the effects of a slanderous Reagan-style campaign". 
The UN General Secretary's visit was not going to change Western
positions and attitudes overnight. Secondly, it showed that "Poland's 
presence and activity [was] needed by Europe and the World, 
particularly in the contemporary climate of a growth of international 
tension and armaments". Although this may have been wishful thinking
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by the commentator, it was true that the Polish question remained high 
on the East-West agenda and that a solution to the crisis was in the 
interest of all. Thirdly, the visit had a domestic content. Though it 
was not published, part of the talks between de Cuellar and Jaruzelski 
touched the issue concerning A. Wesolowska, a UN employee sentenced by 
the Polish authorities in March 1980 for spying. In exchange for UN 
mediation between the Polish state and the '11' interned KOR and 
Solidarity activists, Warsaw promised to release her. However the deal 
was rejected. What was striking here, was the authorities' willingness 
to allow a third party - ie. an international organization - to deal 
with an internal matter. Admittedly, it was doubtful from the
beginning that the interned would accept a deal as long as their own
requests were ignored (the holding of a trial). Nevertheless, UN 
mediation, if successful, could both settle a thorny domestic matter 
and boost the regime's image abroad. In the event, it served only to 
highlight the growing realization by the authorities that the issue of 
human rights in the PRL could give them an additional lever in 
negotiations with the West: as long as political prisoners, and
especially those with international renown, remained imprisoned, a 
speedy return to external normalization was unlikely. However, their 
release at opportune times might bring about some results. It should 
be noted, however, that the tactical use of the issue of human rights
had its own limitations. De Cuellar's speech appeared censored in the
official press and the passage in question illustrated well enough 
that the authorities were not prepared to go too far. A four page 
commentary in Rzeczpospolita on the UN General Secretary's visit made
no mention of the following:
...less life-threatening, but nonetheless tragic, is the
fact that important human rights - civil and political,
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economic and social, religious and trade union - continue to 
be ignored.so
Again, when the ILO Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Poland 
published its 144-page report, confirming that the regime was 
violating labour union rights as laid down in the ILO Convention of 
which the PRL is a signatory, the Polish authorities reacted angrily 
and boycotted the 70th ILO Conference in June 1984. Later, on November 
19, the PRL formally submitted its intention to resign from the 
organization in response to the ILO's acceptance of the report. 
Against a background of vain economic sanctions, the issue of 
political prisoners in the PRL was one of the last cards held by the 
West in delaying formal resumption of diplomatic and economic 
contacts. The Jaruzelski team was well aware of this and it proceeded 
to adopt measures intended to eliminate this problem. On July 13, 
under the terms of the amnesty, the '11' were freed. Nine days later 
the Sejm proclaimed a full amnesty. To give a semblance of democratic 
participation by the Polish society, the decision was preceded by a 
PRON resolution asking for a general amnesty on July 16, 1984. Over 31
000 petty criminals were released from prisons together with 630 
people (out of 652) arrested or sentenced for "offences of a political 
nature".61 The next day, EEC's Foreign Ministers issued a statement 
welcoming the amnesty, hoping that further measures would help to 
promote national reconciliation and a programme of reforms. On August 
3, the Reagan administration removed restrictions on scientific and 
cultural contacts with the PRL and authorized the resumption of 
regular Polish airline flights to the US.62 It also agreed not to 
block negotiations on the PRL's membership of the IMF but made this 
conditional upon the fact that political prisoners released are not 
re-arrested. It seems that the Pope's appeal to the the US President
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"for an immediate unconditional lifting of Western sanctions and an 
end to the ban on Polish membership of the IMF" in May63*, may have had 
had an influence on American policy towards the PRL. The US decision 
was followed by Japan's confirmation that it too had lifted some 
sanctions against the PRL. A Polish-Austrian inter-governmental mixed 
commission for economic co-operation met in Vienna on August 24. This 
was the first meeting of its kind at such a high level attended by 
the Polish side with representatives of a Western government for 
several years. On the whole, the July 22, 1984 amnesty triggered, as
far as the PRL was concerned, a positive reaction in the West (even if 
some sanctions still remained). Domestically, even the Polish church 
voiced its approval by commenting that "the latest amnesty for 
political prisoners is seen as a step in the right direction".64 
Moreover, it epitomized the continual linkage of domestic and foreign 
policy. Its effects were doubly satisfying: internally it sought to
put into practice the regime's professed determination to facilitate a 
'national accord' and thereby remove some of the opposition's claims 
against it; externally, it succeeded in improving the PRL's image by 
removing (temporarily) one of the most durable objections expressed by 
the West towards the Jaruzelski regime. In one decision, the goals of 
both 'domestic and external normalization' could be furthered.
One should be careful, however, not to ascribe here too much good 
will on the part of the authorities. It was obvious that certain 
limits could not and would not be transgressed. Although the 
authorities' stand on specific internal matters could, to some degree, 
be discussed in an international context, it was clear that this 
'gesture' was very limited. In its foreign policy, the regime's 
priority lay in the resumption of normal diplomatic and economic
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relations with the West in order to lessen the extent of the economic 
crisis. It clung to the idea that economic reforms could be 
implemented successfully without political changes, a position which 
was strongly and continually criticized both by the Polish 
'opposition' and the West. With this in mind, it is understandable 
that General Jaruzelski would remain intransigent as far as domestic 
matters were concerned. Yet, he was giving himself room for manoeuvre 
by calling for renewed normal relations with the West. Although the 
period since the imposition of a state of war had seen a definite 
Eastern re-alignment of the PRL's foreign policy, the authorities 
never expressed the desire to break its relations with the West. This 
was indicative of the fact that socialist Poland, not only needed 
Western partnership, but also sought to play a role in East-West 
relations. Continued isolation could have no positive effects - on the
contrary. Thus, while remaining firm in specific areas, it was
undoubtedly in the PRL's interests to 'normalize' its foreign policy 
and convince the outside world (the Soviet Union included) that a 
return to pre-martial law relations and an intensification of co­
operation between the PRL and capitalist countries could only be
beneficial to all concerned. As was shown, the main preoccupation of
the ruling establishment since December 1981 could be summarized in 
the following question: how to divorce economic matters from the
political context? The fact that the two are intrinsically related to 
one other, made the task a difficult one. The Polish UN initiative for 
International Economic Confidence Building Measures (first enunciated 
on December 20, 1983) was a step in this direction. The main professed 
goal of this initiative was to protect economic relations from growing 
tensions in international political relations. It showed the PRL's
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concern to avoid a repetition of the kind of economic sanctions it had 
been experienced for nearly three years now.
With the political amnesty of July 1984, the Polish authorities had 
hoped that the road was now open to complete the •normalization' of 
relations between the PRL and the West. It did trigger a favourable 
change of attitude with Western governments but it failed to be 
entirely satisfactory to the Polish regime. In particular, the 
American position, by falling to remove all remaining sanctions, was 
the subject of sharp attacks by the Polish media. An article in 
Trybuna Ludu on September 20, cast a gloomy picture on Polish-American 
relations. It described them as "being worse than in the early 50s" 
and summed up US 'interference' along four parameters: political,
economic, propagandistic and subversive. In December 1983, the 
Polish authorities had stressed that all US restrictions should be 
lifted, and that they were prepared to engage into a dialogue with the 
Reagan administration and fully normalize relations between the two 
countries.5S With the formal US conditional intention to reconsider 
its objection to the PRL's IMF membership, the Polish government 
expressed its disappointment that this was still not enough to 
constitute a return to normal relations. On August 13, 1984, the US
Charg6 d'Affaires in Warsaw, John Davies (ambassadorial relations had 
still not be resumed after the last US Ambassador Francis Meehan had 
left Warsaw in January 1982), was handed a memorandum from the Polish
government in which it was written that,
Only the resignation from a policy of interference in 
internal matters and propagandist aggression, a return to 
normal conditions of trade and joint economic and financial 
co-operation in all areas and applying measures for the 
elimination of the damages caused by a policy of 
restrictions, can lead to a normalization of Polish-American 
relations. The Polish government does not see any other 
way.ss
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On the occasion of the celebrations commemorating 40 years of the 
PRL* s foreign policy, the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee met in
Wroclaw and heard Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowski summing up the 
external activities of the state since the Second World War. Alongside 
the traditional praises for the Soviet-PRL alliance, and the usual 
attacks against any revanchist claims to alter existing borders, 
Olszowski said that "the present anti-communist policy of
confrontation, directed by the USA and aggressive NATO forces" must 
end in failure just a6 had failed "the imperialist policy of the Cold
War in the 1950s". He added that,
In conditions of international tension, American policy - 
and also other NATO states - towards Poland is the function 
of an imperialist policy of confrontation in the relations
of allied socialist states. They endeavour to use Poland as
an instrument of global contest with Socialism. Our 
difficult situation is being used in order to further
aggravate the atmosphere in Europe and in the world.
If the beginning of the year had showed little improvement in PRL-
Western relations, the October month heralded the return to the 
'external normalization' so much hoped by the Jaruzelski regime. After 
33 months of an absence of contacts with Western governments, the PRL 
authorities greeted with satisfaction the resumption of high-level 
talks with Western representatives. 1984 was a land-mark in this
respect (see Appendix), although one has to wait until 1987 to see a 
real progress in the PRL's foreign contacts with the non-communist 
world.
On October 16, 1984, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Leopold Gratz,
arrived in Warsaw for a three day-visit. A few days later, on the
22nd, the first official visit by a NATO country leader since 1982 
took place. On this occasion the Greek Prime Minister, Andreas 
Papandreou, behaved in a discordant manner towards his Western allies
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by praising General Jaruzelski and voicing perhaps an unwarranted 
optimism towards the internal situation in the PRL. It was known for 
some time that Greece, ever since its entry into the Common Market, 
had often been critical of EEC's policies - both internal to the 
European Community and on foreign policy issues -, and the Greek Prime 
Minister's enthusiastic comments during his visit only served to 
emphasize, as far as the Polish authorities were concerned, the 
growing disunity among members of the Western alliance towards the 
PRL. Indeed, this disunity which had emerged after US calls for an 
European boycott of joint participation in the building of the Soviet 
gas pipeline, may be identified as one of the causes which enabled the 
PRL regime to break out of its former isolation. In a situation where 
economic sanctions were beginning to become a problem not only for the 
PRL but also for Western governmental and financial institutions, a 
solution had to be found to solve the deadlock. It is therefore not 
surprising that individual Western countries, apart from aiming to 
salvage their economic investment in the PRL, also had in mind to make 
diplomatic use of the 'Polish question' against the wider background 
of East-West relations. On October 29, the Finnish Foreign Minister, 
P. Vaeyrynen, payed an official visit to the PRL. He soon was followed 
by the British Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Malcolm 
Rifkind, on November 3. The letter's visit was important, not so much 
for its contents, but mainly because of its form. The British guest 
angered repeatedly his Polish hosts by behaving in a manner which they 
considered as totally inappropriate. The government's spokesman 
accused him of "treating Poland as a colony".00 In a gesture which set 
a precedent for all subsequent Western visits to the PRL, the British 
Minister met with members of the 'opposition' and payed his respects 
to Father Popieluszko's grave, in the yard of St. Stanislaw Kostka
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church, a place considered by most Poles as a sanctuary both against 
state repression - 'the one really free place in the PRL', and, in the 
religious sense,09 of opposition to the authorities. Both acts were 
directly challenging the credibility and legitimacy of the Polish
authorities since they were ostensibly pointing out to the existence
of other valid Polish interlocutors for the West apart from the
regime. A couple months later, the government spokesman was to 
announce the authorities' decision to fix a code of conduct for all 
Western official delegations. By it, the Polish government firmly 
invited its foreign guests to abstain from meeting, even on a private 
basis, representatives of the ' opposition*: "Poland has only one
representation, not several, and this principle should be respected by 
our guests. If any of our Western partners feels the need to 
compensate its relations with the Polish authorities through 
unfriendly gestures towards them, it would be well advised to wait for 
this need to disappear".60 If the Polish regime had hoped that 
domestic matters be disassociated from external ones in its relations 
with the West, it was proved wrong. The PRL's 'public representation' 
machine seemed somehow oblivious of the fact that by cancelling or 
postponing foreign visits, the regime was hardly publicizing a 
positive picture of itself in the West. The Western diplomats' 
insistence in paying their respects to Popieluszko's grave was a clear 
sign to the authorities that the governments they represented attached 
great importance to the Solidarity-Church-state dialogue. Official 
attempts, therefore, to publicize progress in the 'national
reconciliation' process were very ineffective in Warsaw's handling of 
foreign diplomats' visits. Despite this, in the ensuing months, the 
regime endeavoured to do everything to counter what it saw as 
ostensive signs of Western interference in Polish domestic affairs,
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arguing that the 'normalization' of relations with Western countries
had to be freed from such attempts:
It cannot be expected that all future visits by Western 
diplomats will be absolutely free from attempts to interfere 
with the internal affairs of our country. However, the 
efforts to counteract such attempts are certain to foster a 
genuine normalization of relations with the West.61
Despite the appearance of the first signs that an improvement in 
PRL-West relations was in the making, the process of 'external 
normalization' was not unfolding smoothly. On November 21, the planned 
visit by the West German Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, was 
postponed as a result of what the West German Government described as 
"unacceptable conditions" imposed by the Polish authorities. Warsaw 
had refused to grant a visa to a West German journalist, objected to 
the laying of a wreath at the grave of a German soldier killed in 
World War II, and had publicly admonished the Foreign Minister for 
visiting Popieluszko's tomb.62 The postponement of the visit followed 
a campaign against West German 'revanchism' which had filled the pages 
of the official Polish media throughout the Autumn of 1984.63 Despite 
this setback, both sides seemed eager to resume normal relations. One 
had to wait until March 1985 for the West German Minister to finally 
visit the Polish capital, on his way to Sofia from Helsinki. The 
brevity of his visit did not hide the fact that both countries had key 
interests to discuss. For West Germany, good relations with the PRL 
were necessary in order to try and resolve the contentious question of 
the emigration of Poles with a German origin from the so-called 
'Western territories'. For Warsaw, West Germany could be used as a 
bridge head for convincing the West to come forward with new hard 
currency credits. With a total foreign debt of some $bn 28, Bonn was 
the principal creditor country with Sbn 4, 5. Willingness on both sides 
to normalize their relations was given added significance with the
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visit of the West German Finance Minister, Martin Bangemann on March 
21, 1985. During the two-day official visit, a meeting of the Joint
Economic Polish-West German Commission took place, the first one since 
1979. Speaking at a press conference, Bangemann said that the FRG was 
prepared to offer the PRL new credits, provided Warsaw officially 
signed the agreement rescheduling its debts to Western governments. He 
also called on Other creditors to follow with offers of new credits 
and promises to support the Polish application to rejoin IMF. Whereas 
there seemed to have been an improvement in PRL-FRG relations, the war 
of words continued between the two countries throughout 1985. That 
year had marked the 40th anniversary of the return of the 'Western and 
Northern territories to the PRL’. For Warsaw, any hints that for the 
West Germans the question of the PRL's western borders was still open, 
always triggered strong attacks against the Bonn government.
US-PRL relations saw an improvement at the end of 1984. On December 
17, Washington announced that it was withdrawing its objection to the 
Polish membership to the IMF. The Reagan administration considered 
that the Polish government had carried out its commitment on a general 
amnesty. This signalled the end of a conflict which had opposed the 
two countries since December 1981 and the beginning of a thaw in their 
relations. In many ways it was a victory for Jaruzelski. After
repeatedly accusing the US administration of interfering in Polish
domestic affairs and waging an anti-Polish campaign, Warsaw had the 
satisfaction of seeing its major adversary compelled to make the first 
move. Real benefits from IMF membership would not be helpful to the
PRL for at least a year and therefore the US decision had more the
character of a psychological success for the Polish authorities than a 
material one. For a year now, the Polish official line had been that
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the PRL was prepared to resume normal relations with capitalist 
countries "on the basis of partnership, reciprocal advantage and non­
discrimination", but only when all current restrictions had been 
lifted. In adopting this stand the Polish authorities were effectively 
placing the onus of improving relations between the West and the PRL, 
on the capitalist countries. One of the latest expression of this 
position had been presented at the UN forum by the PRL Foreign 
Minister, Stefan Olszowski on August 28 when,he had described to the 
General Assembly, the extent of anti-Polish "propagandist aggression". 
In a speech given on the occasion of Miner's Day (December 3), General
Jaruzelski had said that,
Poland is recovering her international position and wishes 
to improve relations with America (as well as other 
countries). ... Poland is too significant a country to be 
marginalized. Poland desires an improvement of relations 
with the US but not at any price; the US is famous for being 
the last to recognize historical realities. The French 
government is so enthralled by its new love of Washington 
that it has forgotten several hundred years of friendship 
with Poland. Poland is invariably for a normalization of 
relations with West Germany but these relations are 
complicated. 6A
A week earlier, in front of some 122 editors, columnists and 
journalists from 22 countries attending an East-West conference60, he 
had repeated that "Poland was not, is not and will not be the outcast 
(wyrzutek) of the international society".66
A month after the 'express' visit by the West German Foreign 
Minister, it was Britain's turn to send a high-level representative 
and thereby fuel the process of the PRL*s 'external normalization*. On 
April 11, 1985, Geoffrey Howe, the Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs arrived in Warsaw, on the last leg of an European 
tour. His visit had three main purposes. In the first place it was 
aimed at improving East-West relations in general and specifically to
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achieve some progress on arms control. Secondly, it sought to stress 
the importance of human rights and respect for the provisions of the 
Helsinki Final Act. Finally, it was an occasion to discuss bi-lateral 
issues, including the freeing of credit loans and the accreditation of 
British journalists. The mere fact that these items were officially 
accepted by the Polish authorities reflected how anxious they were for
the visit to take place. As a Polish commentator noted,
The British Foreign Minister is not the first Western 
politician visiting Warsaw since Washington's attempt to 
isolate Poland from contacts with the West, but he is the 
first Cabinet member of a large Western power, the closest 
ally of the US, to come to Poland on an official visit. 
Considering this, it is impossible to speak about Poland's 
isolation. 67
Throughout and shortly after the visit, the Polish official media was 
at pains to stress the significance of the resumption of Polish- 
British relations. Even if no specific agreements were signed, the 
visit "initiated the beginning of a vast programme for Britain's East 
European Policy", it "closed the initial stage of Poland's move away 
from its political and economic isolation",60 it confirmed the fact 
that "relations with Poland continue to occupy an important place in 
the British version of 'Eastern policy'"69 and it showed that "Poland 
cannot be ignored by anyone wishing to pursue an effective Eastern 
policy, and that [it] is emerging from the isolation imposed on it by 
the West". 70 During the visit, Geoffrey Howe met not only with 
Jaruzelski but also with Cardinal Glemp and Solidarity activists. He 
followed Malcolm Rifkind's example and paid a visit to Father 
Popieluszko's grave.
'External normalization' seemed to gather some speed with this 
latest round of Western ministerial visits to the PRL. Slowly the dark 
curtain of international isolation was being raised. Still, it was too
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early yet to talk about a full resumption of normal relations between 
the PRL and the West. The fact remained that Warsaw was giving away 
very little of anything and at the same time asking a lot of 
everything. Jaruzelski* s Western approach still lacked many of the 
ingredients needed for it be fruitful. Consequently, he was drawn to 
look to the East.
6.5 Re-orientation to the East.
In an interview, some four months after the lifting of the state of 
war, the Foreign Trade Minister, Tadeusz Nestorowicz, drew attention 
to the fact that in the light of the US sanctions and vetos, his 
ministry had reached certain conclusions, supporting "the geographical 
re-orientation of the PRL's foreign trade".71 Virtual isolation from 
the non-communist world called for a 're-orientation' of the PRL's 
foreign economic policy. Even if the PRL's isolation was not total in 
the sense that it was the subject of diplomatic and economic sanctions 
only from developed Western countries, the fact was that their lack of 
willingness to resume such contacts were in effect contributing to 
lowering the PRL's international status. This gave the PRL very little 
room for manoeuvre on the international scene. Inevitably, the East 
would have to become the primary objective for a bid to break out of 
international isolation. By trying to develop an Ostpolitik, the 
Polish regime was attempting to regain the status of an active country 
in foreign affairs and build the foundations for the resumption of 
normal relations with the West. In this, it sought the support of the 
Soviet Union. It should be however stressed that this 're-orientation' 
did not imply a fundamental change in the PRL's foreign and economic 
policies since it would have implied that the orientation was 
different before. Rather it was meant to intensify co-operation with
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the PRL* s socialist allies and reduce the country's over-dependence on 
Western financial sources. As the Planning Commission Deputy Chairman,
Stanislaw Dlugosz put it,
It would be more accurate to speak of a qualitative and 
quantitative boost to processes of economic co-operation 
with CMEA countries, which mirrors the progress being made 
toward an integration of their national economies.72
Also important was the fact that, in itself, 'external normalization' 
was a process which was also directed at the Kremlin and not only at 
the West. By intensifying contacts with its socialist allies, Warsaw 
was also trying to show that it remained a faithful and reliable 
partner. 1983 had been a busy year for Polish-Soviet relations. On 
August 1, the head of the CPSU CC International Department, L. 
Zamyatin, had led a Party delegation to Warsaw where the discussions 
hadfocused on ideological co-operation, propaganda and information 
between the two communist parties.73 Viktor Kulikov, the WTO commander 
in chief visited Warsaw on September 14. In October, Jerzy Majka, head 
of a PZPR CC Information Department delegation arrived in Moscow for 
talks on ideological questions. It appeared that with the PZPR 13th KC 
Plenum on 'The Ideological Activity of the Party' (the first one in 
twenty years solely devoted to ideology) due to take place on October 
14, both Warsaw and Moscow had been determined to present a facade of 
ideological continuity and mutual support. Despite the 'success' of 
the first stage of 'normalization', the PRL still represented a 
certain degree of deviation from the accepted model. The military 
factor in Party-state organizations was still very active. This 
anomaly had to be rectified and broad lines defined to re-invigorate 
the presence and activity of the PZPR. In the event, the 13th Plenum 
provided no answers. The main thrust of all the speeches centred on 
the need For political and institutional continuity combined with an
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equally strong defensive reaction against any and all attempts, real 
or imaginary, to undermine the viability of the existing system.74 
Some twenty days later, the head of the KGB, Viktor Chebrikov, was in 
Warsaw75, a few days after the 14th PZPR KC Plenum had introduced new 
faces among the Party leadership. One cannot avoid suggesting the 
hypothesis that such a visit had had the objective of giving council 
to the most pro-Soviet elements of the Polish Communist Party, 
starting with the Police apparatus. On the whole, it was clear that 
the Kremlin continued to give its support to General Jaruzelski. 
Inevitably such support implied a re-assessment of the trade between 
the two countries. Since 1981, Polish foreign trade balance with CMEA 
countries, and especially the Soviet Union, had remained heavily in 
the red. It was thus understandable that efforts would be made to 
correct this situation. Martial law, Western sanctions and the need to 
ensure that the PRL was back on the path of socialist normality 
provided an ideal opportunity to solve this debt problem. On November 
28, 1983, a Soviet Party and State delegation, led by Deputy Premier
and Chairman of the Planning Committee, Nikolai Baibakov, visited the 
PRL. Agreements were signed touching Polish participation to the 
construction of a pipeline between Kobryn and Brze6d.743 A fortnight 
later it was the turn of a Supreme Soviet delegation, led by Vitali 
Ruben, the Chairman of Soviet Nationalities, the delegation stayed in 
the PRL for a whole week during which Ruben met Jaruzelski. Later 
still, on December 13, Jaruzelski met Yuri Marchuk, Soviet Deputy 
Premier and Chairman of the Soviet State Science and Technology 
Committee, heading a delegation of Soviet academics and industrial 
leaders. A discussion ensued on the expansion of co-operation in 
science and technology between the two countries. On the occasion of 
the 40th anniversary of the PRL's army, Pravda praised the latter*s
-240-
role, by saying that "in the delicate and complex situation tit had] 
shown patriotism and a a profound internationalism, an attitude 
without compromise in the fight against counter-revolutionary and 
enemy ideology"; It also had presented "a high morality".77 
Interviewed by Soviet television on October 12, 1983, General
Jaruzelski thanked the Soviet Union for its "solidarity and trust" and 
called the Polish-USSR alliance "the cornerstone of the class and 
national interests of the PRL". Emphasizing that "the strongholds of 
countei— revolution had been destroyed", he warned that their "parasite 
activities", at home and abroad, still hoped to use Poland's problems
to weaken its place in the Socialist bloc.
Poland is being punished because she is socialist and a 
friend of the Soviet Union, and particularly because she 
saved herself from the conflicts of a fratricidal war. She 
has avoided a civil war which could have destabilized the 
whole of Europe. Political boycott, economic restrictions 
and propaganda aggression are used against us but this too, 
we bear it. Nothing will come out of imperialist plans 
against Poland. We do not want to be, and will not be a pawn 
on the international scene.70
Perhaps best underlining the current nature of Polish-Soviet relations 
was Jaruzelski*s official visit to the USSR on February 4, 1984. It
was the second one since the imposition of a state of war and followed 
the nomination of the new CPSU First Secretary, Konstantin Chernenko. 
Soviet support for the General was underscored by the presentation of 
the Order of Lenin (for his birthday, a few months earlier). Just over
two years after the General had imposed his iron fist on the PRL, the
Soviet leaders could be satisfied with the progress of 
'normalization*. They may still have had some reservation, but on the 
whole they had to be pleased: "The frenzied attempts of reactionary
forces to reverse the course of history have failed"75 The main result
of the visit was the signing of a Long-Term Programme of Economic and
Scientific-Technical Co-operation between the two countries up to the
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year 2000. By calling for an intensification of co-operation and 
closer integration within the CMEA, the agreement's primary goal was
aimed at reducing the two countries' over-dependence on the West. It
specified 219 areas of co-operation. The scientific and technological 
programme was to cover 85 research problems involving the co-operation 
of 95 Polish and 180 Soviet institutes.ap Yet, the agreement also 
symbolised Moscow's new strategy towards impoverished Poland. In order 
to assure deliveries of Soviet raw energy materials, the quantity of 
which are not usually predetermined, the PRL would have to invest both 
in Soviet mining and pipelines and direct its most modern industries, 
including micro-electronics, robotics, mining machinery and machine 
and ship-building capabilities, towards the specific needs of the 
Soviet economy. This declared intention of co-operation was however 
less productive than claimed. Indeed, a quick glance at the level of 
foreign trade between the two countries since the imposition of 
martial law indicates that the volume of trade between the PRL and the
USSR has in fact decreased noticeably:
Comparative Table of Polish Imports-exports For 1981 and 1987 
With Selected Countries.01
(in Percentage of total trade).
Imports Exports
1981 1987 1981 1987
Austria 2. 5 3, 9 i, a 3, 2
France 4,8 2,5 2,7 2, 4
Yugoslavia 2,4 3, a 2, 1 2, 9
FRG 7,3 11, 5 9, a 10, a
Switzerland 1, 4 3, 9 1, a 2, 2
Great Britain 3, 3 3, 7 3, 7 4, 4
Italy 2,0 2, 9 2,9 2, 9
USSR 34, 4 27, 5 26, 1 24. 8
China 0, 6 3,2 0, 4 3, 4
India 0, 6 1, 4 0,4 0, 6
Japan 1. 1 1.2 0, 7 0, 8
Brazil 4, 0 2, 1 1, 1 1.2
USA 6, 1 1.3 3, 1 2,8
Australia 0, 7 1.2 0, 1 0, 1
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With the italics denoting the greatest observed long-term changes in 
trade volume over the period, it can be seen that PRL-USSR foreign 
trade showed a marked decrease in volume, disproving the claims that 
Warsaw's Eastern re-orientation was reaping benefits for the country.
A month after the signing of the co-operation programme between the 
PRL and the Soviet Union, the Chairman of the Soviet Committee for 
Foreign Economic Relations, Riabov, was in Warsaw. Three days later, a 
high-level CMEA meeting took place in Moscow (June 12-14, 1984). It
was attended by Jaruzelski who was met at the airport by Mikhail 
Gorbachev, perhaps the very first official contacts between the two 
men. If there were any doubts that Jaruzelski's policies had 
supporters in the Kremlin, then the occasion of the 40th anniversary 
of the PRL (July 22, 1984) dispelled them. A high-level Soviet Party-
state delegation, led by Nikolai Tikhonov, attended the celebrations.
r
It was exclusively composed of Central Committee members (Ligachev, 
Sliunkov, Aristov, Golubiev, Savicki). Both Tikhonov and Ligachev gave 
speeches to Polish workers at Warsaw and Katowice factories, in which 
they both praised Polish-Soviet relations, emphasizing that "our 
security and strength lies in a long-lasting and united alliance" and 
that "40 years of Poland is also the story of our friendship".®2 
General Jaruzelski was praised for his "realism" and although little 
else was said about him, the overall impression was that (it is 
tempting to say by now, inevitably) the Soviet Union was fully 
backing the Polish regime.
The PRL 'Eastern re-orientation' was to be expected in the light of 
the Western economic and diplomatic sanctions. However, despite the 
May 1984 Polish-Soviet agreements and the usual slogans of friendship 
and co-operation, relations between the two countries showed no real
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signs of profound changes. If economically, some adjustments were 
made, primarily in order to settle a deficient Polish trade balance 
with the USSR, they represented a fraction of what was really needed 
to pull the PRL out of its continuing crisis. Politically, as long as 
the internal situation remained calm, the Kremlin leaders, beset by 
succession problems, could only have been satisfied that the 
Jaruzelski regime had managed to 'pacify' Polish society. Deviation of 
the Marxist-Leninist norm embodied in the institutional militarization 
of the Party and Government seemed to have had positive effects after 
all. In the absence of a more orthodox alternative, Jaruzelski would 
still have to be trusted.
'Normalization' has thus been process taking place both on the 
domestic and foreign level alternating between economic and political 
interests and between the socialist bloc and the West. Although, in 
the beginning, a Polish re-alignment to the East had been the only 
available option for an internationally isolated PRL, it became clear 
very quickly that Warsaw had also continued to attach great importance 
to the resumption of normal relations with the West. Despite a slow 
start, 'political normalization', both at home and abroad, appeared 
successful. However, 'economic normalization' was still a long way 
from being attained, constantly raising the possibility of wiping out 
the gains obtained in the political sphere.
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Drodzy radzieccy iowarzysze i 
przyjaciele, nigdy dot§d nie 
bylismy sobie tak bliscy. . . 1
Wojciech Jaruzelski
(Dear Soviet comrades and 
friends, we have never been so 
close to each other...)
CHAPTER 7 
THE PRL SINCE GORBACHEV.
On March 11, 1985, Mikhail Sergei Gorbachev was elected First
Secretary of the CPSU. At the age of 56, he was one of the youngest 
Party leaders to head the Soviet Union and his ascension to power, as 
later events confirmed, marked the end of an epoch dominated by the 
dinosaurs of Soviet politics. His immediate priorities were to
strengthen his own position and remove the remains of the old Brezhnev
generation still anchored in the state and Party apparatus. The new 
Soviet leadership, by professing to conduct radical domestic changes 
seemed to demonstrate a desire to break away from 'the remnants of the 
Stalinist epoch', both in the economic and political spheres. From the 
beginning he demonstrated a radical change of style from his
predecessors and as he progressively strengthened his position, all 
the signs pointed to some far— reaching changes ahead, not only in the 
Soviet Union, but also by implication East Central Europe as well. 
From 1975 to 1985, the apparent overall stability of the Soviet Bloc, 
Moscow's involvement in other concerns and the enfeeblement of the 
Soviet leadership, all contributed to a lack of coherent and active 
Soviet Policy toward its East Central European allies. With the
arrival of Gorbachev, this seeming passivity soon gave way to a 
greater involvement in the affairs of the Socialist Bloc by the Soviet
Union. The emergence of a new leadership in the Kremlin was greeted 
with some restraint, both in the East and in the West, the latter 
having learned its lesson since Andropov. It was clear that it would 
be better to 'wait and see* before assessing the real significance of 
the Gorbachev phenomenon. For the PRL, the new Soviet leader was still 
an unknown factor and had little effect on the country's internal and 
international situation. Geo-political priorities remained unchanged 
and as long as the internal situation remained stable, the 
Jaruzelski's regime had no reason to see in Gorbachev, either a threat 
or a positive development (though of course the former was always more 
likely). Yet, as later events showed, the Gorbachev era would have a 
sizable impact not only on the nature of East-West relations, but also 
on the domestic policy-making of the socialist bloc countries. As 
Vladimir Kusin remarked, Gorbachev had set the signposts for Eastern 
Central Europe "in a way that [combined] firmness with a good amount 
of understanding. He [seemed] to have recognized that there [were] 
limits that he himself [could not] overstep, as well as problems that 
his lesser allies had to cope with in their own way".2 The 
implications of the Soviet perestroika were inevitably touching upon 
the nature of the relations between the Soviet Union and its European 
allies. The policies of the new man in the Kremlin were thus bound to 
affect the decision-making processes within the socialist bloc. And 
the PRL was no exception.
7. 1 Polish-Soviet Relations.
The Gorbachev phenomenon did not fail to attract the attention of 
the majority of Poles. Opinions about the new Soviet First Secretary 
varied and although the majority seemed at first sceptical about the 
merits of perestroika and glasnost, everyone agreed that a new era was
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in the making. In a poll conducted in 1987 by CBOS (the government ' s 
opinion polling centre), 40,2% of respondents thought that Soviet 
reforms were considerable and that they was a good chance of producing 
considerable changes. 53,9 % thought that the Soviet reforms'
influence on the international situation would be beneficial and 48,6% 
that East-West relations would benefit from them . Only 38,4 % thought 
they would have a beneficial effect in Poland while 20,3% failed to 
see any effect.3 Officially, support for Gorbachev was unrestrained 
but it could not hide the fact that all developments east of the 
Vistula had a sense of ddjd vQ. The economic reforms, the reforms in 
the local CPSU elections, the liberation of political prisoners, all 
these signs of the so-called perestroika had seen light in the PRL as 
early as the small 1956 revolution. The Polish leadership has made a 
lot of the 'convergence' between the Polish and Soviet reforms but at 
the same time it has avoided posing as the precursor to the Soviet 
changes. As Jaruzelski pointed out during the 10th PZPR Congress and 
later, Polish and Soviet communists were at different stages in 
building socialism, each developing under different conditions. 
However, needless to say that the PRL remained an unconditional ally 
of its big Eastern brother. As far as the Polish 'opposition' was 
concerned, many of its leaders continue to doubt Gorbachev's will to 
make some progress, especially in the field of human rights, without 
endangering the very foundations of his power. Others have argued that 
the Soviet leader need the support of the intelligentsia to enliven an 
inert Party and that therefore his reforms can only be limited. 
Finally there are those who simply do not believe that anything 
Gorbachev can do will bring about long lasting changes. The Church has 
tended to abstain from making any overt comments on the events in the 
Soviet Union, but may have been more involved than is thought, as for
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instance, in the noticeable thaw between the Kremlin and the Vatican. 
The invitation to Cardinal Glemp to attend an International Forum for 
a World without Arms in Moscow, in January 1987, (he refused but sent 
two delegates) seemed to indicate that the Polish Church might have a 
role to play as some liberalization of religious freedoms in the 
Soviet Union become more certain.
Since the lifting of the state of emergency, two dominant themes 
had dominated the PRL's foreign policy statements. In the first place 
there was an almost never-ending glorification of the USSR and 
repeated expressions of gratitude for Soviet help. Secondly, there 
were stubborn and, at times, irrational attacks on the Reagan 
administration, implying that Washington alone was the source of 
tension in the world and the principal cause of political and economic 
troubles in the PRL. With the advent of the restrictive measures 
promulgated by the West, the Polish regime was no longer so inclined 
to balance its involvement with the East with independent ties with 
the West, especially the US. Although, for obvious reasons, relations 
with the West could not be fully ignored, the Polish disappointment 
which followed the slow and cautious Western responses to 
'normalization', restricted Warsaw's policy-making choices. Very soon 
the Polish government concluded’that it had nothing to lose by anti- 
American campaigns and the subsequent deterioration in relations 
between the two countries. Yet, and despite the so-called Polish re­
orientation to the East, the Polish rdgime repeatedly indicated that 
it had no intention of severing all contacts with the West. This task 
was by no means an easy one. Since the imposition of the state of war 
the country had become more than ever identified with the Soviet Union 
and it had thereby lost much of its previous international prestige. A
mere resumption of normal diplomatic and economic contacts with the 
West was still not sufficient enough to restore the PRL's image on the 
international arena. This concern surfaced many times and was 
particularly clear in the context of Polish-Soviet relations. Although 
all pointed to a definite re-alignment to the East - part of 
Jaruzelski*s policy of regaining its place within the socialist 
community - it appeared that Warsaw was concerned that its 
international position be not solely identified in terms of Soviet 
interests. Ardently supporting every new Gorbachev initiatives, 
especially in the disarmament field, the Polish authorities did, at 
the same time, all they could to boost their country's standing both 
in Europe and in the world. With the emergence of a second ddtente and 
helped by the success of Gorbachev's very effective seduction campaign 
in the West, this process was greatly facilitated. But it was not one 
without difficulties. Against a background of American intransigence, 
Warsaw sought to convince the lesser states of the Western camp of the 
futility of the various sanctions applied to the PRL. However, despite 
their differences and apparent lack of unity, Western governments 
showed little inclination to resume normal relations with the Polish 
regime. Partly because of this, an active Polish policy, following the 
Soviet lead, was initiated outside Europe, culminating with 
Jaruzelski's visit to China in September 1986. Even so, it seemed that 
this policy of normalizing external relations was not a hurried one. 
Above all, for Warsaw, domestic interests were predominant. This did 
not stop the Polish authorities from linking their foreign and 
domestic interests together, and use the resulting interrelationship 
as the foundation of their 'normalization* policies. The domestic- 
foreign dichotomy was never as clear as in the years following the
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imposition of a state of war in December 1981.
While the British Foreign Minister, Geoffrey Howe was in the PRL, 
his Polish hosts also greeted, on an official visit, the Soviet 
Minister of Defence, Marshal Sergei Sokolov (April 9-13, 1985). The
visit which "took place in a friendly atmosphere, land] touched upon 
the present international situation and the further development of 
Polish-Soviet co-operation", was also the prelude to the forthcoming 
meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries, to be held in 
Warsaw. On its agenda was the signing of a protocol extending the 
validity of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual 
Assistance, originally signed in Warsaw on May 14, 1955. This first
meeting of the member countries of the Warsaw Pact in the Polish 
capital since May 1980 represented an obvious praise for General 
Jaruzelski*s policies. The presence of Gorbachev, for whom this was 
the first trip abroad in his capacity of CPSU First Secretary, was 
also the first visit to the PRL by a Soviet Party leader since 
Brezhnev's attendance of the Treaty's 25th anniversary in May 1980. 
Amid enormous and omnipresent security arrangements, contrasting with 
the discreet security presence in 1980*, the various East Central 
European leaders arrived on April 24 in the Polish capital. A day 
later, the Soviet leader was greeted at the airport by General 
Jaruzelski. The renewal ceremony produced no surprise. On the other 
hand, more significant was the implicit announcement by the Polish 
authorities that only part of the Soviet delegation had left the 
Polish capital at the end of the meeting. During his extended stay, 
Gorbachev met with General Jaruzelski, the first such high-level 
discussion in the PRL between Soviet and Polish officials for nearly 5 
years. The communique issued at the end of the meeting stressed "the
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Soviet Union's invariable solidarity with the PZPR, for surmounting 
completely the consequences of the crisis, for the stabilization and 
the strengthening of Socialism".3 The fact that no mention was made of 
Jaruzelski's efforts and achievements indicated that in the eyes of 
Moscow, the road to full 'normalization' in the PRL was still
incomplete. On May 14, 1985, the Soviet Union and the PRL signed
a new protocol on border traffic between the two countries, intended 
to simplify the procedure for crossing the border by residents of 
border regions.3 This was the first official relaxation of the border 
controls which had been imposed in the wake of the Polish events in 
the early 1980s. That the new Gorbachev leadership was anxious to 
ensure that the situation in the PRL was stable and ideologically 
secure, was further illustrated by the visit of the CPSU Central 
Control Committee Chairman, Mikhai’l Solomentsev. Although the visit
was described "part of regular contacts between the PZPR and the
CPSU"', it was obvious that the Kremlin wanted to ensure that the
Polish Communist Party was taking all necessary steps to reinvigorate 
itself and develop constructive strategies for the future. Without a 
doubt, and more than ever in the current period of changes taking 
place in the USSR, stabilization in Poland remained for the Kremlin 
the key to the status quo in the Soviet European empire. But the 
imposition of martial law, and the fact that the Poles had been 
intimidated in doing the 'dirty work' for them, made the Soviet 
leaders have to accept the fact that they would have less control over 
the process of normalization in socialist Poland than had been the
case in Hungary or Czechoslovakia. This of course did not mean that 
Jaruzelski would have a completely free hand, only a greater margin of 
manoeuvre that otherwise might have been the case. Not being totally
in control has never been something the Kremlin leaders have accepted
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lightly. It was for this reason that the Jaruzelski card, despite all
the profits it had reaped, was still to some extent, an uncertain one
in the long-term. Later, in June, the 40th session of the CMEA
countries took place in the Polish capital. In a speech delivered at 
the closure of the meeting, Nikolai Tikhonov reaffirmed Soviet support
for Jaruzelski's policies by saying that,
[in] visiting Warsaw, we feel a deep satisfaction at the
progress achieved by the working people of Poland - led by 
the Polish United Workers Party - in building a new society
and overcoming the difficulties encountered by their country
as a result of the hostile activities of anti-socialist and 
anti-Polish forces.2
The final communique underlined the economic priorities for the Bloc 
countries and gave a first insight in Gorbachev's policy towards his 
East Central European allies.° It set out the general trend toward 
military-economic integration put forward by the new Kremlin 
leadership. Five interlocking goals were spelled out: There had to be 
a closer co-ordination of the national 5-year plans so as to fit 
production programmes; special long-term co-operative agreements were 
concluded such as the extracting and transport of Soviet natural gas; 
there was an elaboration of a joint plan of action for scientific and 
technical work; there were calls for a continued high concentration of 
trade within the bloc with special emphasis on the delivery of quality 
goods and consumer durables from East Central Europe to the Soviet 
Union; finally guidelines were issued for the limitation of trade and
economic links with the West.3
On May 28 the Italian Premier, Benito Craxi, met General Jaruzelski
during a short stop over in the Polish capital on his way to Moscow.
In a message he delivered to the Polish leader, he expressed his wish
to see greater contacts between the two countries but he linked this
possibility to greater tolerance from the Polish authorities towards
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the 'opposition': "a lack of tolerance can cause great damages to the 
image of Poland and even provoke serious repercussions on the 
international level". 10 It was also learned that during this meeting, 
Jaruzelski informed his interlocutor that the Polish ambassador in 
Brussels would shortly present the EEC with an informative note from 
COMECON concerning relations between the two economic communities.11 
This was the first such report of this type written by COMECON. It 
seemed to confirm the opinion that the PRL was regaining greater 
status within the socialist bloc and that Moscow, by allowing it to 
submit this message, wanted to prove that it now firmly supported the 
Jaruzelski regime. This support developed notably before the October 
Sejm elections, with the Soviet Press taking a positive view of 
developments in the PRL and Joining ranks with Polish communists in 
blaming all difficulties on Western interference in the country's 
internal affairs. 12
Characteristic of PRL-USSR relations at the time was the flurry of 
economic contacts between the two countries. On September 6, 1985, a
Polish delegation led by Deputy Premier Zbigniew Szalajda, head of the 
Council of Ministers' Committee for Science and Technology paid a one 
day visit to Moscow. The purpose of the visit was to expand scientific 
and technical co-operation for a forthcoming long-term Polish-Soviet 
programme on scientific-technical progress. That same month, on the 
28th, a PRL Agricultural and Food Ministry delegation led by Stanislaw 
Zieba, was in Moscow to review the progress made in implementing a 
long term Polish-Soviet co-operation deal in agriculture and food 
industry. 13 On October 7 the Polish and Soviet Vice Premiers and 
Planning Commission Chairmen signed a protocol on the co-ordination of 
the socio-economic plan of both countries for 1986-1990. It was also
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agreed to defer the repayment of some 5 mn. roubles owed by the PRL to 
the USSR. This was the first stage in the implementation of the long­
term co-operation programme signed in 1984. As Premier Zbigniew
Messner later assessed it,
[The] co-operation and the durable bonds between the Polish 
economy and the Soviet economic potential guarantee the 
former a rapid and stable development and a considerable 
reduction of technological dependence on the capitalist 
countries. They testify to the advanced stage reached in the 
re-orientation of the Polish economy towards co-operation 
with Socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union. This 
is a strategic move for Poland.14
The new Polish Foreign Minister, Marian Orzechowski1c paid his first 
visit abroad to the Soviet Union, where he met his Soviet counterpart. 
Soviet support was again stressed with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze 
pledging that "the Soviet Union will support and help Polish 
communists and all working people in their struggle to overcome the 
results of the crisis". 13 Warsaw's undoubted submission to Moscow, 
especially in foreign policy and economic areas, was rewarded with the 
PRL's quick return as the Soviet Union's first major ally. After 
attending the CPSU 27th Congress (25-27/2/1986), where he had been 
treated with special respect and attention by Mikhail Gorbachev, 
Jaruzelski stopped in Wilno, on his way back to the PRL, to meet 
Lithuanian Communist Party officials. This visit to Lithuania, the 
first by a PZPR leader, was remarkable in that it had a controversial 
and highly emotional connotation. The Lithuanian capital was a 
highly-charged symbol of Polish nationalistic expression. Until 1939, 
it had been a Polish city and was the birth place of many Poles who 
had distinguished themselves against Russian domination. It also 
evoked memories of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth which had had, 
for some four hundred years contained Turkish and Russian expansion to 
the West. It had also been Pilsudski's coveted objective after the
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1920 Soviet debacle following the 'Miracle of the Vistula', and a 
crucial city in his plans for a Lithuanian-Ukraine-Poland federation. 
Its forceful separation from the Polish state at the end of World War 
II and its inclusion in the Soviet Republic of Lithuania is still 
regarded by many Poles as one of the major infamies of the Yalta 
Agreements. The fact that Jaruzelski was allowed to make such a visit 
testified to the high degree of confidence by the Soviet leaders for 
the General. By visiting Wilno, Jaruzelski hoped he might be 
favourably viewed by many Poles, even those most staunchly opposed to 
him. One of the undoubted aims of the visit was precisely to use the 
emotional significance of the city for the Polish nation, in order to 
create a picture of a patriotic leader deeply concerned about the fate 
of those Poles living in the Soviet Union. By doing so, it also sought 
to present Jaruzelski as a man capable of extracting concessions from 
the Soviet leadership, even in such sensitive issues related to the 
annexation of Polish territory by the USSR during the Second World 
War. The Polish authorities' manipulation of national symbols as means 
to divert the population's interest from pressing domestic problems 
was once again being used to the full. Yet, talking to Poles, it would 
appear that this tactic was only convincing for the very ones who were 
trying to implement it and that the majority of the population, well 
aware of this, hardly responded to it at all.
Less than a month after the CPSU 27th Congress, the Soviet Foreign 
Minister, Shevardnadze, was in the PRL on an official visit. The 
speech he delivered on this occasion took the form of a public Soviet 
confirmation of support for Jaruzelski's policies, and its strongest
expression to date:
Today we are gratified to hear that the time of unrest is 
over, that the situation is stabilizing, that first 
successes have been achieved - all due to the wisdom, 
resolve and energy of your nation and of the party led by
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Comrade Wojciech Jaruzelski. 17
This unequivocal appraisal of Warsaw's policies meant the ' return' of 
the PRL to its pre-1981 position within the socialist bloc. It 
confirmed its 'unshakeable alliance with the Soviet Union' and opened 
the stage for greater Polish initiatives on the foreign policy front. 
The most spectacular example of this was the official visit made by 
Jaruzelski to the People's Republic of China (PRC) in September 1986. 
Originally, he had intended to visit only Mongolia and North Korea but 
three weeks before his departure, the PRC was added to his itinerary. 
Contacts between the two countries had been revived in 1985 with the 
visit of Deputy Premier Obodowski, the first such high-ranking visit 
to the PRC since 1957 when the then Prime Minister, Cyrankiewicz had 
been in the Chinese capital. In May 1985, the PRC Deputy Premier, Li 
Peng, had signed in Warsaw a trade agreement between the two countries 
for 1986-1990. The appearance of PRC diplomats in Eastern Europe was
something new and it reflected a timid Chinese effort to improve
relations with Eastern Central Europe. In the case of the PRL, the 
opportunity to participate in this process and reap at the same time 
economic but also, more importantly, political gains on the 
international scene was promptly taken up. Jaruzelski was the first 
East European leader apart from Nicolae Ceaucescu (1985) to visit the 
PRC for nearly 30 years and he preceded a planned visit by Erich
Honecker in October. Apart from the visit's economic results for the 
PRL,e, it had allowed the Polish authorities to play an intermediary 
role in the resumption of Soviet-PRC relations. In July 1986, Mikhail 
Gorbachev1 s speech in Vladivostok had stressed Moscow* s desire and 
willingness to improve relations between the two countries and had
been the first step in the Soviet Union's new Far East 'peace
offensive'. "I would like to re-affirm: the Soviet Union is prepared
- at any time and at any level - to discuss with China questions of 
... measures for creating an atmosphere of good-neighbourliness", the 
First Secretary had stressed. 13 With the Kremlin leadership eager to 
make some headway in this direction, it was only a matter a time for 
its East Central European allies to follow suit. The fact that the PRL 
succeeded in being one of the first two members of the Soviet Bloc to 
make an official,visit to Peking in recent years emphasized the trust 
which Jaruzelski enjoyed in Moscow. Presumably, the PRC leadership 
also had supported the choice of the PRL as the de facto 
representative of the Soviet bloc. It was significant that a few 
months after the Polish visit, the Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping, in 
the wake of internal turmoil shaking the PRC at the time, had advised 
that the country should follow the Polish example by using 
'dictatorial' means to handle political opposition: "They adopted
martial law and controlled the situation; that clearly shows that if 
we don't use dictatorial methods, it won't do. ... We must not only 
talk about dictatorial methods but also practise them".20 The Chinese 
were probably the most constant admirers of General Jaruzelski*s 
methods. In June 1987, when Chinese Premier, Zhao Ziyang visited the 
PRL on his first leg of an Eastern European tour, he praised in no
uncertain terms the 'normalization' policies of the Polish regime:
We are particularly delighted and impressed by the fact that 
during recent years the Party and the Polish government, 
together with people from different groups of Polish 
society, in a joint effort and relying on their own wisdom, 
bravery and power, took firm steps to reverse and then 
stabilize the situation, thus enabling the nation to return 
to the proper road of development. 21
It was clear that the Polish leader's visit was seen as a first 
attempt to warm up relations between the PRC and its Soviet neighbour 
and its diplomatic significance should not be underrated. As far as
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the PRL was concerned, it undoubtedly contributed greatly in re­
affirming the country's stand as the Kremlin's closest ally. Indeed, 
from then on, it appeared that the PRL had been chosen, admittedly in 
a limited capacity, to play the role of a broker for some of Moscow's 
delicate international initiatives. With the posting of Stefan 
Kwiatkowski, the first Polish diplomat in Tel Aviv since 1967,
relations between Israel and the PRL seemed to take on a new 
character. The PRL was now the first East Central European Country 
apart from Romania to have a permanent representative in the Israeli 
capital. On October 16, 1965, Israeli TV reported that an exchange of
representatives with the PRL was expected to take place shortly.22 The 
two-day Sejm meeting on foreign policy (31/1-1/2/1986) discussed 
relations with Israel. And on October 16, 1987 Kwiatkowski was in Tel
Aviv. Although it was stressed that this was not a formal
ambassadorial post, the mere fact that there was now a permanent 
Polish representative in Israel seemed to indicate the opening of a 
new channel of communication between the two countries, and
consequently also with the Soviet Union. In itself this was no great 
event, but it did point to a certain degree of foreign policy
initiative from Warsaw. What is more, it showed that the PRL had 
regained in toto its place as the number two of the socialist bloc.
Prior to the 10th PZPR Congress in July 1986, The Jaruzelski regime 
had followed the developments in the Soviet Union in what could be 
best described as a passive way. The Kremlin's support for the 
General's policies was equally somewhat reserved, even if all the 
signs pointed that Gorbachev appraisal of his Polish neighbour were on 
the whole positive. Until the 27th CPSU Congress, in February 1986, 
Polish issues remained to a large extent outside the Soviet Union's
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sphere of concern, busy as it was with the magnitude of its own 
problems. With the confirmation of the predominant Gorbachev line, and 
the strengthening of the Soviet First Secretary's position, the USSR's 
European allies began to show greater signs of acceptance, and even in 
some case enthusiasm, for the changes taking place in the Soviet 
Union. Aware that Gorbachev now seemed a durable and stable 
phenomenon, Eastern Central European ruling establishments slowly 
started to adapt their behaviour on the 'new Soviet model*. With the 
closure of the Polish Congress, a symbolic apotheosis of Jaruzelski's 
'normalizing' policies, the PRL wholeheartedly became one of
Gorbachev's most ardent supporters. Mieczyslaw Rakowski expressed this
clearly when he said that,
Anything that happens in the Soviet Union, directly or 
indirectly, concerns People's Poland. The PZPR and its
ideological and political allies welcome with great 
satisfaction, and fully support, the changes taking place in 
the Soviet Union and the firm will to continue the policy of 
perestroika and glasnost. We perceive a recognition of the
values and weaknesses of socialism that runs close to our
own in the reformist moves of the CPSU leadership. 23
At the same time, there were repeated indications that the Polish
leadership was keen on identifying domestic changes in the Soviet 
Union with the PRL's own internal developments. To quote Rakowski
again,
It can be said without exaggeration that every success of 
the Soviet Party in pursuit of its present policy is also 
our success and a confirmation of the correctness of the 
road upon which we embarked at the 9th Extraordinary PZPR 
Congress in July 1981. . . . Our achievements in the
democratization of the socio-political system are a tangible 
contribution to the consolidation of the policy line of
which Mikhai'l Gorbachev is the leading figure.2*
As one Soviet journalist commented, "present day Poland lives a rich 
and eventful life. The spirit of revival is felt in every sphere".23 
PRL-Soviet relations took on a new turn on April 21, 1987, with a
Declaration on Polish-Soviet Co-operation in Ideology, Science and
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Culture. General Jaruzelski, making his sixth official visit to the 
Soviet Union since the imposition of martial law, was greeted by 
Gorbachev as "a great friend of the Soviet Union and Poland's 
outstanding leader". After the Soviet leader's attendance of the 10th 
PZPR Congress, this new meeting between the two leaders finally 
consecrated Jaruzelski's position as the number two of the socialist 
bloc. While several long-term co-operation agreements in cultural, 
ideological and scientific research were signed, by far the most 
significant event of the visit, in view of its important historical 
connotation, was the undertaking by both sides to re-examine relations 
between the two countries and eliminate the so-called 'white blanks'
in their joint history. The joint declaration read that,
The PZPR and the CPSU give great importance to joint studies 
on the history of relations between our countries, parties 
and nations. There should be no "white blanks" in this 
history. The centuries-old ties between the nations of 
Poland and Russia require a thorough examination. 2e
Those controversial historical episodes - among others, the Katyn 
massacre and the fate of Poles deported to the Soviet Union in 1939, 
the secret clause of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact - have always been 
the source of the Poles' great animosity towards their Eastern 
neighbour. There was also the question of the total liquidation by 
Stalin of the Polish Communist Party (KPP) in 1938 and the execution 
of some 5 000 of its activists. The Polish authorities were never 
able, and more accurately never could, convince the Polish population 
that such events had been either perpetuated by Nazi Germany or had 
been in the higher interest of the nation. For over 4-0 years they 
attempted to ignore what all knew about, making a farce of the 
'fraternal alliance' binding the PRL and the USSR and confirming in 
the minds of the population the image of a Polish puppet-state, 
subservient to the Kremlin's whims and interests. That the two leaders
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publicly announced the need for this re-examination was in itself a 
surprise for everyone. Of course, traditional Polish pessimism wanted 
more than a mere declaration of intent. A first meeting of officially 
appointed Polish and Soviet historians opened in Moscow on May 18, 
1987 and to this day (1989), talks are still going on, with little 
concrete results so far. The decision to examine the "white blanks" in 
Polish-Soviet relations re-kindled a burning issue.27 Gorbachev 
himself raised it while in the PRL in 1988, during a meeting with 
representatives of the Polish intelligentsia.2® At the beginning of 
1989, the Polish media began publishing numerous articles on the Katyn 
massacre after the publication of British Foreign Office records; 
concerning the results of the Polish Red Cross investigation in this 
matter. Most surprisingly, these records were first published in the 
PRON weekly, Odrodzenie ("Revival"), after a Polish researcher had 
patiently gathered them.23 Re-opening such issues and all their 
implications seemed a bold move on the part of the Polish and Soviet ‘ 
authorities. For Warsaw, using the glasnost climate and raising the 
expectations of millions of Poles had a direct internal effect. It was 
yet another calculated step to further the process of 'national 
conciliation'. By 1987, because of very policies implied by 
'normalization', Jaruzelski was left with very little to give to those 
who opposed him. The 'carrots' he could use to sweeten this process 
had been almost all handed out. The domestic situation being far from 
satisfactory, the Polish ruling establishment was eager to make its 
decisions more palatable by ‘ liberalizing' some of its views 
concerning previously taboo subjects. By doing this, not only were 
they keeping in line with the changes taking place in the Soviet Union 
- calling for greater openness - , but they were also hoping to divert 
the Polish public's attention away from pressing current problems to
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more emotional issues, concerning the past. It is likely that General 
Jaruzelski used his meetings with Gorbachev to convince the latter 
that unless some controlled degree of liberalization in various 
spheres was permitted, Polish 'normalization' would fail, thus once 
again raising the spectre of another highly destabilizing period for 
the socialist bloc. With the new 'Gorbachevian' mood and the 
accompanying domestic problems it was creating, this was the last 
thing the Kremlin wanted. Therefore the apparent new character of 
relations between the PRL and the Soviet Union was answering Warsaw's 
desire to become recognized as an actor in its own right on the 
international scene and at the same time provide the means, through 
greater room of manoeuvre in the field of foreign policy, for getting 
greater internal support for its policies. As Orzechowski, the Polish
Foreign Minister, summed it up,
The circumstances behind the fact that perestroi’ka and our 
own "socialist renewal" have coincided, provide a first-rate 
occasion for us to enhance our opportunities in 
international politics. This accordance and this convergence 
hold important consequences for us. 30
Although he repeated the so-often heard need for the Soviet Union to 
have a "strong Poland, a Poland which is stable and which speaks out 
in its own strong voice on the international forum", he also added 
that,
The Soviet perestroi’ka, as well as our own "socialist 
renewal" have made it necessary for Polish-Soviet relations, 
for concepts such as friendship, alliance and co-operation, 
to be given a new meaning, for they have adjusted to modern 
times, and have been cleared of unnecessary ornamentation,
their formality or ceremoniousness. Today, perhaps more than 
ever before, we clearly understand how much Poland and the 
USSR need each other.31
That the PRL was now firmly supporting Gorbachev remained
unquestioned. At the same time, it seemed that opportunities were
emerging for the Polish state to be more assertive in its domestic and
foreign policy-making. Though both the Soviet the Polish leaderships 
had problems of their own, they were also both aware that it was in 
the interests of all to see the outcome of their own reforms. "Our two 
countries are at different stages of building socialism and are 
building it under different conditions. However the Polish policy of 
"socialist renewal" and reform closely converges with the Soviet 
strategy of restructuring and acceleration", emphasized Jaruzelski. 32
On February 28, 1987, Mikhai‘1 Gorbachev made a statement on the
elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe, a step that opened the 
road for the signing by the two superpowers of the December 1987 INF 
treaty in Washington. Since the advent of 'Gorbachevism', Soviet 
foreign policy had launched an unprecedented 'peace offensive'. This 
was the result of Soviet domestic needs to direct efforts towards the 
implementation of deep economic reforms. Gorbachev overall aims were 
to cut military spending, create an efficient bureaucracy by stream­
lining it, improve the state of East-West relations and thus obtain 
money and credits (especially from Western Europe) needed for his 
'restructuring policies'. An obvious route for the attainment of those 
objectives passed through a series of arms-control agreements, 
starting with the INF Treaty. In this respect, aid and support from 
its Eastern Central European allies was all the more useful. Not only 
could it serve the purpose of reinforcing the unity of the socialist 
bloc, but it also added other voices supporting the 'socialist peace 
policy' , thereby increasing the weight of the argument. Three months 
after the February statement, Jaruzelski himself proposed a Polish 
plan to Decrease Armaments and Increase Confidence in Europe. Speaking 
at the 2nd Congress of the 0PZ2 (May 8), the General outlined a four- 
points scheme for reducing nuclear and conventional armaments in
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Central Europe. The 'Jaruzelski Plan', as it came to be known, called 
for a gradual withdrawal of mutually agreed operational and tactical 
kinds of nuclear weapons as well as various types of conventional
weapons, especially those that could be used in a surprise attack; an 
evolution in the nature of military doctrines that could be 
reciprocally assessed as being strictly defensive; and finally a 
continued search for and agreement to new security and confidence-
building measures. 33 This Polish 'initiative' was received in the West 
as indifferently as the 1957 Rapacki Plan to establish a nuclear-free 
zone in Europe or the 1964 Gomulka Plan envisaging a freeze of nuclear 
armaments. Indeed, it looked more as an attempt by the Polish leader 
to have his name inscribed in the annals of disarmament initiatives 
and give his country a semblance of having an active peace policy. The 
May 29, 1987 meeting of the WTO Political Consultative Committee made 
no mention of the plan in its final resolution. 3A
7.2 External-internal linkages.
A bare week after the Warsaw Pact meeting in April 1985, important
demonstrations took place throughout the PRL. Some 10 000 people took
part in a peaceful march in Warsaw. In Gdartsk, serious troubles 
opposed an estimated 3 000 Solidarity supporters with the anti-riot 
forces.33 Jacek Kurort, the founder of KOR was arrested. While 
'internal normalization' was still proving to be causing problems to 
the authorities, 'external normalization', despite the resumption of 
contacts with the West, was also the subject of disappointment by the 
Polish regime. After the May 1 demonstrations, two US diplomats were 
thrown out of the country for allegedly "having taken part in an 
illegal demonstration", the authorities describing their participation 
as "a flagrant violation of diplomatic status and international norms
-267-
and customs".36 This prompted a protest by Washington and the 
subsequent expulsion of four Polish diplomats from the US. The Polish 
media also carried severe criticisms of Reagan's decision to lay a 
wreath in a cemetery where Waffen-SS soldiers had been buried, at 
Bitburg in West Germany. It looked as if every occasion was good to 
attack the US administration and thereby show its apparent lack of 
goodwill in resuming normal relations with the PRL. On May 6, Warsaw 
decided to suspend some of the air facilities granted to the US 
embassy. The planned visit by the Belgian Foreign Minister, Leo 
Tindemans, was cancelled after the Polish authorities had turned down 
his request to meet members of Solidarity and lay flowers at Father 
Popieluszko's grave. Polish-French relations were further aggravated 
by the strong Polish protests against the showing of the film Shoa in 
French cinemas, accusing it to give an outrageous portrait of apparent 
Polish contribution to the Jewish holocaust. On May 17, the Government 
spokesman made public a letter by 28 Nobel Prize winners protesting 
against the forthcoming trial of Adam Michnik, Bogdan Lirt and 
Wlasdilaw Frasyniuk, who had been arrested on February 13 and accused 
of leading an illegal organization. The trial which ensued became the 
main subject of conversation throughout the spring. It revealed, as if 
it still needed to be confirmed, the authorities' unrelentless 
intention to muzzle the opposition. In this respect the Gdahsk trial 
heralded a new stage in the process of 'internal normalization'. 
Tensions between the authorities and the Church, which had risen in 
the wake of the Popieluszko's murder, persisted. The unprecedented 
opening of the trial, on June 3 before the district court in 
J^drzejdw37, of two young priests (Marek Labuda and Andrzej 
Wulczynski), accused of supporting students in their attempts to 
oppose the decision to remove crucifixes from classrooms, clearly
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illustrated that the traditional conflict over the Church and the 
state's respective influence on society had not rescinded. Despite all 
the calls for 'national conciliation', the regime was once again 
showing that it was determined to curtail any opposition, in whatever 
form, to its policies of 'normalization'. There were now some 200 
political prisoners after only 20 had remained imprisoned in the wake 
of the previous Summer's amnesty. Less spectacular but perhaps more 
significant in the long-term, were the legislative measures which 
aimed at further strengthening central power. In his speech to the 
Sejm On The Present State of Security and Public Order (May 10), 
General Kiszczak accused "special services and subversive centres" of 
waging a war against the PRL and equated opponents to the regime to
Western spy agents:
Attempts are made to expand the scope of infiltration into 
Poland's socio-political life, as well as the economic and 
defence potential. Signals multiply about the growing number 
of Western special services' attempts to recruit spies among 
Polish citizens travelling to the West. Provocations, 
blackmail and other pressures are employed for this purpose.
The intelligence and subversive centres in the West 
prepare instructions and scenarios addressed to [Poland's] 
internal enemy. 30
The Sejm passed on this occasion a new law on Special Criminal 
Liability, making criminal law still more repressive.39 The adoption 
of these new legal measures significantly enhanced the authorities' 
capacity for repression in a wide range of political and criminal 
cases. This new array of legislative acts showed that the policy of 
'internal normalization' had still not attained its goals. The 
effective elimination of all 'oppositional' activity remained one of 
the most important priorities of the ruling establishment. This was 
further confirmed by J6zef Czyrek's speech at the 19th KC Plenum (May 
13-14) t devoted to the Role and Tasks of the Intelligentsia in 
Socialist Poland,
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At the same time we tell with full firmness the ringleaders 
of destruction and anarchy, the counterrevolutionary 
adventurists hiding behind demagogic words the absence of 
any positive programme: there will be no agreement with the
enemies of socialism. The struggle will continue to the very 
end, to the total defeat of anti-socialist forces and 
slogans. AO
He also added that one of the practical tasks for the Polish 
intelligentsia was "to unmask the real objectives of the Reagan 
administration's anti-Polish policy as well as the rising revanchist 
tendencies in the FRG".41
The Gdartsk trial once again stressed the linkage between domestic 
and foreign policies. With the verdict being announced and the 
following harsh sentence passed upon Frasyniuk, Lirt and Michnik (3fc, 
2&, and 3 years in prison respectively), most Western governments 
voiced public dismay at the Polish authorities' stand for being so 
intransigent. A concrete effect of the sentence was the refusal by the 
Italian Prime Minister to meet the Polish Foreign Minister, Olszowski, 
who arrived in Italy on an official visit on June 20. Yet the Polish 
authorities relentlessly endeavoured to implement the various phases 
of 'internal normalization' and on June 22, all funds and assets 
seized from Solidarity and other unions were officially transferred to 
the new official unions, the OPZZ.
The Spring-Summer 1985 period marked a significant period for Party 
activities. Repeated interventions and discussions took place during 
this period to emphasize the need to renew the Party's internal life 
which, since the 9th Extraordinary Congress, had given the leaders 
ample cause for concern. After the successive purges implemented 
during and after the imposition of martial law, there was now an 
urgent need to make the PZPR effective again in its organizational 
activities and in the effectiveness of its political role in Polish
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society. On June 5, 1985, The Chairman of the KC Central Auditing
Commission said that Party's life was still marred by insufficient 
individual activity by rank-and-file members. He added that "there is 
a necessity to improve the effectiveness of the whole Party and its 
particular organizations, because if this effectiveness is missing,
this can check development and progress, and bring down the rate of 
achieving the socially accepted goals as well as those involving the 
Party's ranks' internal instructions and tasks".*2 A week later, the 
20th KC plenum convened to discuss the obvious failure of the Party to 
infuse life into its inert membership. Also on the agenda was the 
notable decrease in Party membership, down some 30% since the last 
Congress in 1981, and now standing at 2,112,000 members (3,150,000
previously). As general Jaruzelski stressed at the end of the plenum,
It is indispensable to step up the pulse of ideological
life, to consolidate Marxist-Leninist identity and unity of 
the Party. Every kind of demagogy, irrespective of its 
origin, every manifestation of both self-complacency and 
scaremongering are harmful. they affect the Party's 
cohesion, we shall care for it continuously, we shall defend 
it consistently.*3
It is interesting to note that during the plenum, General Jaruzelski 
referred explicitly to Gorbachev's 'new style'. In particular, he 
embraced two of the Soviet leader's main objectives namely, the fight 
against alcoholism and the denunciation of ineffective Party cadres. 
He said that "our Soviet comrades criticize openly and publicly by
calling by name, both heads of some administrative and economic links, 
including the central level, as well as individual members of party 
authorities". "In our country", he added, "we are still too kind, too 
soft in this respect".*4 He also encouraged Polish communists to
inspire themselves from the innovatory solutions in process in the 
Soviet Union. The Polish odnowa was finding its raison d‘dtre in the
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Soviet perestrol'ka.
On July 31 1985, the final session of the current Sejm took place. 
It had been the longest Sejm in the history of the PRL and during its 
65 months of existence managed to pass 203 laws as well as some 90 
acts defining programmes and directions of development in particular 
areas. On this occasion an amended version of the Trade Union Bill 
was passed, making the workplace trade unions representative of all 
workers instead of its members, thereby allowing only one trade union 
per enterprise. This was a further blow for all those hoping for trade 
union pluralism and was clearly demonstrating the authorities' 
determination to weaken and ultimately destroy the last remains of the 
Solidarity era. The July 25 Amendments to the 1982 Law on Higher 
Education were also a step in this direction. They increased the 
government's powers to dismiss, suspend and transfer university 
teachers as well as the power to suspend or expel students, and close < 
down institutions. University teachers would have to take an oath o f • 
pledging loyalty to the principles of a ' socialist university'. That 
the regime was now feeling more confident was further confirmed with 
the announcement that parliamentary elections would be held on October 
13, 1985, the first such elections since March 1980. The uncertainties
which had forced Jaruzelski to delay the opening of a new Sejm had by 
now seemingly been resolved. The TKK immediately called for a boycott 
of the elections, saying that "to participate [in them] would mean 
abandoning the social and national aspirations (of the Poles] and 
participating in the crimes of the state of war leadership"*®, to 
which the government spokesman answered back by saying that "a boycott 
is nothing but a turning of one's back on the only kind of Polish 
state which really has a chance to exist...... a demonstration of
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unwillingness to participate in state life in any form".*6 It was 
undeniable that the Jaruzelski regime viewed the elections as an 
important milestone, not only in the process of 'internal 
normalization', but also as far as foreign relations with the West 
were concerned. As the 21st KC plenum resolution stressed, "the 
success of the elections in Poland will be evidence of progressing 
socio-political stability; it will also consolidate our state and 
strengthen its international position".A7
One of the main pre-occupations of the authorities in the Autumn, 
was to ensure that the parliamentary elections to be held on October 
13, would be a success for their "normalization" policy. The 1985 
elections aimed at proving that the internal situation of the country 
was now well under control and that General Jaruzelski's policies were 
finally paying off. It wanted to boast both internally and externally
of a return to a 'normal' political life. As one commentator noted,
In other countries of the world, political normality is 
understood as a situation where, although various groups may 
express their discontent in a more or less energetic manner, 
the people and groups in power rule the state with the
support, or at least the consent of the majority of society.
I think that the elections have shown that we have reached 
this state of affairs. 43
All the pre-election campaign speeches stressed the importance of the
elections as another clear sign of the 'national accord' emerging from
the growing stability within the country. By staging the elections the 
regime was hoping to score points against two of its main opponents at 
the time namely, the Solidarity activists and the US. With a high 
turn-out, Jaruzelski could show both at home and abroad that his
policy line had gained the support of the majority of the population 
and that therefore all internal and external activities which 
countered the authorities' efforts were detrimental to the well-being
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of the nation. Although the very fact that the election date had been 
publicized demonstrated the authorities' confidence that they could 
ensure its success, the weeks preceding October 13, revealed that the 
regime was somewhat uncertain as to the final results. On September 
12, Solidarity and other autonomous branch and Union representatives 
called a boycott of the elections while the Church refrained from 
advising believers on how they should vote. As far as the procedure of 
the elections was concerned, the Polish electoral system established 
for the June 17, 1984 local peoples' elections and for the October 13,
1985 Sejm elections had revealed that the opportunity for a real 
contest was seriously impaired. Carefully selected candidates,
electors not able to have a candidate on the ballot if the authorities 
opposed him, officially preferred candidates given an almost 
unsurmountable advantage by being listed first on the ballot sheets, 
rather than have their names appear in alphabetic order, and the 
drawing out of a national list which included Jaruzelski and other top 
Party leaders, all of whom ran unopposed in order that national 
leaders would not be voted out of office*9; it was thus not surprising 
that the opposition called for the boycott. In an interview to the 
Party daily, the MSW Deputy Minister, General Wladyslaw Poioga, 
accused Solidarity underground and Western secret services of
preparing a campaign of provocative actions aimed at upsetting the 
outcome of the elections.60 Speaking on the tasks for ideological
activists and all party members in the election campaign to the Sejm,
Politburo member J6zef Czyrek said that,
the campaign preceding the election to the Sejm is of
particular political significance. Another stage in 
normalizing Poland's socio-political situation is being 
completed, and the campaign constitutes one more important 
step towards national agreement. ... At the same time we 
know that this agreement does not exclude the possibility of 
a struggle, above all against those forces which try to 
sabotage the process of socialist renewal, forces which are
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increasingly remote and increasingly opposed to the supreme 
interests of the nation and state. Sl
While there was a clear domestic goal in assuring the smooth running 
of the elections, Warsaw was also eager to use this occasion to
demonstrate what it saw as the ill-foundation of the continuing 
economic sanctions against the PRL. By staging successful elections, 
the Polish authorities would be able to back up their claims for 
credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of Western governments. The 
elections then provided Jaruzelski with a new tool by which to further 
the PRL's current foreign policy objectives. It aimed at proving that 
Western claims of repressed political freedoms in the country were
false and unfounded. In this they were helped indirectly by Cardinal 
Glemp's call for a lifting of the sanctions during his visit to
Washington, on September 20, 1985. In his press conference, the Polish
Primate said that he had always considered them as unjust since they 
had ruptured economic and scientific co-operation and inflicted 
dangers on the Polish people.Gs In his election campaign speech, 
General Jaruzelski clearly stressed the connection between the
elections and the PRL's standing on the international arena:
Our joint electoral voice will be yet another confirmation 
of our nation's will and determination to defend peace, to 
strengthen security and the inviolability of borders, to 
boost Poland's international position in the are of 
political, economic, scientific and cultural relations. We 
will do this to demonstrate once more to those who keep to 
their policy of boycott, restrictions and interference in 
our affairs that theirs is an irrevocably lost cause. No 
foreign government shall believe that here, in the land of 
the Vistula and the Oder, anything can be done without us, 
besides us, or against us. 63
Attending the 40th Anniversary session of the United Nations, on 
September 27, his first visit to the West since taking power, General 
Jaruzelski gave a lengthy interview to Michael Getler of the 
Washington Post. In it, he declared that a voter turn-out of 75 to 60
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percent in the Sejm elections would indicate a return to a 'high level 
of normality and stability in his country and might lead to a new 
amnesty for political prisoners: "The better the results of the
elections (the more it will show that] stability and normality have 
reached a high level and the better consideration [there] will be for 
announcing an amnesty".6* At the same time he warned the Reagan 
administration that its support of Solidarity and its calls for a 
boycott of the elections would seriously jeopardize the chances for an 
amnesty: "Encouraging people to boycott as the Voice of America and
the so-called Radio Free Europe do ... is aimed at limiting electoral 
participation and this will lower the index of stability [which may] 
not allow for the amnesty".
As it turned out the official results of the elections showed a 
78,6% turn-out66, a figure contested by Solidarity which recorded only 
a 66% turn-out of all eligible voters. Compared with the 1980 
elections which had recorded a 98,87% figure, the 1985 election 
results were indeed poorer. Yet, the authorities seemed to have been 
satisfied with the outcome. The Politburo Report on the PZPR activity 
during the Sejm campaign noted that by "going to the polls, the vast 
majority of Poles expressed its determination to participate in 
socialist Poland's future". It also "showed that the social base for 
national conciliation [was] widening and that the overwhelming 
majority of Polish society [was] backing this patriotic idea". se 
Regardless of the truth of this statement, it was clear that the 
authorities assessed the outcome in a positive manner and saw in it an 
opportunity to carry on their policies unchanged. Speaking at the 22nd 
KC Plenum, General Jaruzelski expressed this confidence by claiming 
that "the elections results should give us the energy to solve the
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problems that are still piling before us". "We are stronger now", he 
added, "we can therefore afford to be more determined and decisive in 
overcoming our weaknesses, in opposing everything that holds or pulls 
us back, and in preventing the dirt we sweep out of our house from 
returning through the back door". 57 Jaruzelski also stressed the
"important external dimension" of the elections:
The elections results have promoted the consolidation of 
Poland's international position and its international 
prestige. They gave satisfaction to our infallible and time- 
tested allies in neighbouring countries and to our friends 
in more distant lands. 60
In effect, the elections' results produced a 'normalized' 
parliament.ss The 460 deputies were all selected by PRON and not a 
single deputy who had dared vote against important governmental
decisions during the last parliamentary session was re-elected. It 
also provided an opportunity to undertake extensive governmental
changes. In a move that seemed to mark a timid return to 'civilian' 
rule, General Jaruzelski resigned from his post of Prime Minister, to 
be replaced by Zbigniew Messner, an economist expert and technocrat. 
Jaruzelski's new post as head of state (replacing the aging Henryk 
Jabloriski), an honorific position, would enable the General to meet 
all heads of state without any infringement to the diplomatic protocol 
and spend more time for the preparation of the 10th PZPR Congress, due 
to take place in June 1986. However, it changed little to his position 
within the PRL. In view of his First Secretaryship of the Party and 
his presidency of KOK, his authority over the affairs of the country
remained indisputable. That he remained fully in control was further
evidenced by the mini-high-ranking purges within the Party apparatus 
which took place at the time and which continued up to the 10th PZPR 
Congress. In March 1983, Mieczyslaw Moczar, the head of the Supreme 
Chamber of Control (NIK), had been one of the first of Jaruzelski's
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potential enemies to be removed. During the 22nd KC Plenum on November 
11, 1985, Stefan Olszowski was replaced by Marian Orzechowski.
Olszowski's demise was soon followed by the replacement of the Polish 
Ambassador in Moscow, Kociolek, on January 4, 1986. After Milewski,
both Olszowski and Kociolek were reputed to have belonged to the so- 
called hard-liners within the PZPR and often at odds against
Jaruzelski's policies. Their 'retirement' was interpreted as an 
expression of the General's wish to smooth out Party differences in 
the wake of the forthcoming Congress.60 The first sitting of the Sejm 
(6/11/1985) saw the replacement of five Vice-Premiers and 13 cabinet 
Ministers. The 'normalization' of the PRL's internal life was 
continuing unrelentingly.
On the external front, the US still remained the main target of 
Polish phillipics. It seemed to the Polish authorities, that nothing
it did was pleasing the Reagan administration. Jan Rem (or the
government's spokesman) summed up in his own way the essence of the US
doctrine towards the PRL:
It is the conviction that it is possible to rule Poland from 
Washington, that the US should mould Poland into a shape
that corresponds to the American vision of what political 
and economic relations should look like. It is believed that 
Poland can still be used as a lever to crack open the whole 
socialist bloc from within. ... It is not only Washington's 
policy towards Poland which is characterized by being 
completely divorced from reality. The same is true of the 
political evolution of America's friends inside Poland.61
It is striking to note once again how the Polish authorities were 
identifying their internal and external enemies as motivated by the 
one and same objective. Indeed, this identification was part of a co­
ordinated campaign to discredit both the 'opposition' in the PRL and 
the regime's greatest opponent abroad, the USA. As interpreted by the 
ruling establishment, domestic problems had their origins outside
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Polish borders, while foreign interference in the PRL's internal 
affairs was being promoted and encouraged inside the country. Again 
the foreign-domestic link appears, this time used by the authorities 
as a major component of its propaganda machine.
7. 3 The Polish Economy since Martial Law.
In a nutshell, the 1970s Polish policy of attracting Western 
investments had been based upon the naive assumption that all the
credits and loans thus incurred would be re-payed as soon as the PRL
would begin to flood the international market with its goods. What in
fact happened was that the Polish economy, as a result of the
investment boom, was developed and modernized in total isolation from 
the domestic capacity of the Polish economy to provide the necessary 
outputs for an export drive, essential if a viable economic balance 
was to be preserved. The legacy of this policy was now affecting the 
Jaruzelski rdgime's ability to extricate the country out of the 
economic crisis and was seriously impeding the 'normalization* 
process.
On December 13, 1981, a state of war had been proclaimed over the
whole of the PRL. As we saw, it had all the appearances of being 
introduced predominantly for political reasons. However, the fact 
remained that economic issues, having played a crucial role in the 
1980 explosion, could not be disregarded as peripheral to the decision 
to impose a state of war over the PRL. In fact, it cannot be doubted 
that in seeking to destroy Solidarity, General Jaruzelski, not only 
had hoped to eliminate political opposition to his policies, but also 
to create^ the right conditions for re-establishing normal socialist 
economic order. Indeed, both political and economic reasons dictated 
the decision to militarize the whole country.
On January 1, 1982, it was announced that a major economic reform
would be implemented with the aims of restructuring the economic 
mechanisms, the principles underlying the Polish economy and the whole 
organizational set-up. Before the imposition of martial law, the 
reform had been planned officially to start in 1983. The key initial 
document, Kierunki reformy gospodarczeje2, had been completed in June 
1981, was approved by the Party Congress in July 1981 and served as 
the basis for the new law on the state enterprises and self-management 
adopted in September 1981. The decision to begin the process of 
implementing the economic reform a year ahead of schedule was taken 
for two main reasons: In the first place, martial law enabled the
authorities to drastically increase prices and set up of the right 
conditions to implement economic decentralization. On January 1, 1982
new wholesale prices were introduced, followed in February by another 
steep increase in retail pricing. Secondly, the political elite wanted 
to be seen as reformers and thereby gain wider acceptance among the 
Polish population. However, the proposed reforms were not sufficiently 
far-reaching. They completely ignored the central problem of the 
Polish hard-currency debt to the West and "the extent to which the 
Polish economy had become an open economy during the restructuring and 
modernization drive of the early 1970s".63 Three major principles 
underlined the reforms: a) enterprises were to become independent,
self-financed and self-managed, the so-called 3-S principle 
iSamodzlelnodd, Samofinansowanie, Samorzqdnodd). Independence meant 
that the enterprise's choice of production was no longer to be 
constrained by a centrally imposed directive plan, b) greater price 
flexibility and increased financial discipline would be obtained 
through competition, anti-monopoly laws, freedom to import and 
conservative credit policy. Even bankruptcies would be allowed, c)
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although central planning would still be maintained, it would be much 
less detailed. The new policy slogan would be: competition as much as 
feasible, direct intervention as little as possible.6*
The immediate economic objective of the military government had 
been to restore some semblance of order to the economy. Yet, it soon 
became clear that the economic reform was producing very little 
concrete results apart from empty words. With the abandonment of the 
1982 Plan, the Polish economy gained many attributes of a war economy 
with highly centralized planning as its main feature. Even by 
themselves, the measures introduced by WRON had little in common with 
the sweeping principles of the reform. The 3 year plan (1983-1985) had 
three main priorities: a stress on saving materials and energy, an
export drive to the West, and the attainment of equilibrium on the 
domestic market. In order to fulfil these aims, operational programmes 
were introduced. They were essentially the embodiment of central 
planing as applied to an enclave of the economy. In 1982, their use 
was extensive with 14- operational programmes covering around 50% of
all industrial production. 66 By 1983, they had been reduced to six:
a) Transport Equipment;
b) Industrial supplies for agriculture;
c) Medicine and sanitary products;
d) Clothing for young people;
e) Footwear;
f) Safety Gear.
That same year, the authorities introduced government contracts 
(zaadwiena rz§dowe) which were a variation on the operational 
programmes, the main differences being that, where firms were drafted 
into the former, participation in the latter was voluntary. This move 
turned out to be popular with firms because the authorities guaranteed 
them supplies of scarce materials and foreign exchange. In return co­
-281-
operating enterprises promised to fulfil orders for goods as specified 
by the government. Every ‘operational programme' was put under the 
command of a special commissioner. The responsibility of managers for 
their enterprises was reinforced. All forms of workers' participation 
was suspended. Key industries were 'militarized'. At the same time, 
the very conditions created by the state of war further determined 
that the PRL would hardly benefit from any so-called reforms. In an 
environment of administrative chaos, where inter-city travel, 
telephone services and other means of communication were restricted, 
the conditions necessary for rapid economic development were indeed 
very limited if not non-existent. Western economic sanctions only 
created new difficulties for the Polish authorities and this further 
impeded any chances that some real improvement would soon surface. The 
only success story concerned the coal mining industry. With its 
militarization, ie. , miners were subject to military discipline and 
could be court-marshalled for refusing to follow orders, coal output 
over the first five months of 1982, was some 16% higher than in the 
same period in 1981. This had the direct effect of eliminating coal 
shortages and provide a more even supply of electrical power. However, 
it failed to improve the situation of the economy as a whole. In the 
steelworks, output fell by 24% in the first five months of 1982. Motor 
car production was 33.5% lower in the January-May period than in the 
first five months of 1981. The production of television sets fell by 
34,2%, cotton fabric by 16,3% and footwear production by 15,8%.66 In 
sum, the state of war had failed to make any profound positive impact 
the economy. Though production targets were achieved, those related to 
improved effectiveness were not. The 3 year plan was a quantitative 
success but a qualitative disappointment. The excess of actual over 
planned investment highlighted this, with an increase in investment in
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1983 of 9.4% (the target for 1985 had been fixed at 5%), of 11.4% in
1984 and 6.4% in 1985 despite the call in the annual plan for a zero 
investment growth. G7
Nonetheless, and however bad the state of the Polish economy still 
was in 1982, the rate of economic decline was somewhat reduced and a 
hard currency trade surplus even achieved:
Polish Foreign Trade in Millions of $ US. SQ
Imports
Exports
Balance
trade with the West in 1982 went into a surplus of around $ 358 m. , 
the first time this had happened since 1971. Obviously, the austerity 
measures imposed by the authorities were having some positive effects 
on the level of imports. Of course, this improvement was inevitable in 
the he sense that it was doubtful in any case whether there was any 
money available anyway to purchase goods on western foreign markets. 
The outstanding problem facing the PRL remained its huge and growing 
external debt. By 1982, the Polish gross hard currency debt (ie. 
including arrears) stood at some $ 25 billion.
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
5668 4309 4451 4008 5077 5437
5772 5742 5890 6339 6137 6510
-96 + 1433 + 1439 + 1531 + 1060 + 1073
noted that from a def icit $ 750 m. in 1981, the PRL's
»s and Net Hard Currency Debt 1977-1986 (in $bn>.69
Gross (q ) Net
1977 14. 0 13. 5 a) including
1978 17. 8 17. 0 arrears
1979 22. 7 21. 5
1980 25. 1 24. 4
1981 25. 5 24. 7
1982 25. 2 24. 2
1983 26. 4 25. 3
1984 26. 8 25. 2
1985 29. 3 27. 6
1986 31.2 29. 6
(1987 33. 5. 31. 5) (beg. of year)
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Since then it has continued to rise steadily, reaching in 1987, the 
enormous sum of some $bn 33 and making the PRL the most indebted 
country in the Socialist bloc. The imposition of a state of war in 
December 1981, had ended all discussions between the Western creditors 
and the PRL. However, in view of the interests involved, governments- 
banks union on the question soon broke down, with Western banks 
speedily engaging in negotiations for the re-scheduling of the Polish 
debt. They had simply concluded that if they wanted the PRL to service 
its debt, then all concerned would have, soon or later, to discuss the 
modalities for doing so. By April 1982, Western banks were already 
actively seeking ways of settling with the Polish government the 1981 
maturities. Only 5% of the $ 2,3 bn principal due had to be paid, 
with the remaining 95 % being deferred after 1986. Since 1982, the 
Banks signed 6 major agreements with the PRL. In 1983, they agreed to 
defer further $ 1,1 bn. of the principal to 1986-92. In 1984, the
principal of money due over 1984-1987 ($ 1,5 bn.) was postponed until 
1988-1993. In 1986, an agreement was reached whereby 95% of $1,6 bn. 
due to be repaid in 1986-1987 was re-scheduled to 1990-1991.70 
Finally, on December 10, 1987, the PRL signed an agreement with the
Club de Paris, deferring the payment of $8,8 m. due in 1986-1988 for 
a period of ten years, with a five year grace period.
Overall, the Polish debt problem required actions by the 
authorities in two main areas. First it would be necessary to have 
intensive economic policy efforts domestically in order to gradually 
speed up the country's economic growth, especially in export 
production, as well as the attainment of better effects in the first 
field of efficiency and profitability, quality and usability of 
products. Unless there was an increase in economic efficiency, there
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seemed that little could be done to direct resources towards exports 
or to cut back on exports, short of course, of imposing intolerable 
hardships on the Polish society. Secondly, Warsaw was inevitably 
compelled to continue talks and negotiations with creditors, not only 
for the rescheduling of payments, but also to increase the 
participation of creditors in solving problems of the PRL's further 
economic development. This last objective became a major part of the 
PRL's foreign economic policy towards the West, and the most difficult 
in which to achieve any concrete results.
The recovery which seemed to have been achieved in 1983-84 was due 
to five overall factors. In the first place the preceding deep slump 
had furnished an opportunity for renewed growth as a strong fall in 
outputs 'suspended' some of the previous barriers for growth such as 
energy shortage and transportation under-capacity. Secondly, the 
working week was increased by some 20 7# in comparison with 1981. 
Thirdly, the excellent weather conditions had permitted a remarkable 
increase in crop yield after many years of stagnation and thus 
assigned more funds for the purchase of production materials needed by 
the industry. Fourthly, the cuts in imports of capital goods enabled 
some additional purchase of raw materials and components. Lastly, the 
creditor countries' own conduct helped the Polish government to delay 
the repayment of the Polish debt.71
he first stage ipierwszy etap) of the economic reform was 
quantitatively successful, but production targets relating to improved 
effectiveness were disappointing. As the following table shows, the 
poor quality of economic control in 1983-1985 was illustrated by the 
excess of actual over planned investment.
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The 3 year plan: Intentions and results. 7*
% growth planned % growth
National income
produced 0 1 15
distributed 8.5-10.1 14
Consumption 9-10 13
Investment 5 27
Industrial production 14-16 16
fuel & energy 8. 9 9. 1
metallurgy 16. 2 10. 7
engineering 22 23. 4
chemicals 20.4 17. 5
minerals 10. 2 8. 9
wood & paper 20. 5 19. 5
food industry 11. 2 14. 2
In 1987, with the slow progress made since 1982, the Messner 
government decided to launch the second stage (drugi etap) of the 
economic reform. r3 According to the project, this stage would consist 
in a) restoring equilibrium on the consumer market, procurement and 
capital markets; b) making the economic parameters more realistic; c) 
increasing the autonomy of enterprises and development of 'socialist 
enterprises'; d) strengthening of worker's self-management and local 
self-governments; e) free-flow of material and financial means between 
enterprises; f) consistent observance of the principle of self- 
financing, and g) further restructuring of the system of managing the 
economy, including institutional restructuring of the centre. Despite 
the clamours in which it was announced, the second stage of the 
economic reform did little to remove the traditional problems plaguing 
the Polish economy. Waste of labour, little innovation and the new low 
level of production continued to constrain the country's economic 
development. As labour supply increasingly fell, working time cuts and 
losses contributed further to the perennial lack of rationalization of 
labour policy in the industrial sector, causing among other things, 
high fluctuation in levels of work. Additional constraints such as the 
high and constantly rising foreign debt, the growing technological gap
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bet ween the PRL and developed countries, the rationing of goods and 
the thriving black market economy, severe ecological problems, all
made efforts by the Polish authorities to put the Polish economy back
on its feet, a daunting task. Without decreases in state subsidies 
and a substantial revision of the pricing system, hopes for an 
improvement in economic performance remained bleak. In the words of
the well-known Polish economist, Waldemar Kuczyrtski,
It is commonly admitted that the reform, after a powerful
drive in 1982, is dying out. The modifications have brought 
about a degeneration and created a mixed system where the 
defects of centralism and those of market economy are co­
existing - a kind of bastard state of affairs. If there is 
no new drive to create a real market, this attempt at reform 
will only be of interest to historians.74
7.4 Foreign Affairs.
On June 20, 1985, the Polish Foreign Minister arrived in Rome on an
official visit. The contents of his speech at the Italian Foreign 
Ministry indicated that the PRL was still pursuing a policy of 
rapprochement with the West despite the setbacks suffered recently in 
the wake of the Gdansk trial and the overall definitely cool response 
from the West to Polish efforts to resume normal relations. In his 
speech, Olszowski stressed the Polish government's vested interest in 
"assigning high priority to its relations with Italy". He went on to 
add that,
Whatever differences may exist in political systems or in 
current international obligations, we want Poland and Italy 
to co-operate as closely as possible in the international 
arena for matters of supreme importance for all mankind. ...
We want an intensification of bi-lateral trade and 
industrial co-operation as well as co-operation in science 
and technology. We think there are still considerable, yet 
unused, possibilities in this area.7S
He emphasized the main line of current PRL'S foreign policy 
orientation namely, to develop relations with all countries regardless 
of their political system. This of course was not something new, but
it had now become a pressing need. During his stay in Rome, Olszowski 
also held talks with the Pope, ostensibly showing the regime's desire 
to make some progress in the normalization of relations between the 
Vatican and Warsaw.
In an interview, the Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Jan Kinast, discussed the nature of the PRL's foreign 
policy and its slow recovery of its position within the international 
arena. Coming at a time when some progress in this field was being 
made, it was an interesting official point of view of the nature and 
development of the PRL's foreign policy in the mid-1980s. It is also 
significant in that he opened the interview by underlining the close 
link between the PRL's socio-political developments and external 
factors:
The conditions in which Poland's socio-economic problems are 
resolved are not only shaped by internal factors, although 
their role is of course predominant. But such matters as the 
political and economic situation in Europe and worldwide, 
the state of East-West relations and Poland's contacts with 
other countries also carry significance.7B
The internal-external link was further emphasized when Kinast defined 
one of the PRL's foreign policy tasks as "creating the best possible 
external conditions for overcoming difficulties, for attaining greater 
internal stability and for accelerating socio-economic development".
As far as foreign policy was concerned, General Jaruzelski*s visit 
to the UN headquarters in New York (September 26) was the highlight of 
Polish diplomatic activity in 1985. This was his first visit to a 
Western country since in power. Coming less than a month before the 
Sejm elections, it bore all the signs of a new diplomatic effort 
towards normalizing the PRL's relations with the Western World. During 
the visit, the General had the opportunity of meeting several foreign 
ministers and to discuss with them the current Polish domestic
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situation and its implications for accentuating the resumption of 
normal economic and political relations between the PRL and Western 
countries. He met with the UN General secretary, De Cuellar as well as 
with the Italian, West German and Austrian Foreign Ministers. Speaking 
in front of the General assembly, Jaruzelski urged the organization to 
prepare a special report on the anticipated effects of militarizing 
outer space, following in this the Soviet line. He also advanced two 
suggestions, one for creating a World Debt and Development Centre at a 
founding meeting in Cracow, and another for adopting the rule of the 
free flow of technology for the purpose of environmental protection. 
He praised the Polish government's success in stabilizing the Polish 
internal situation and called for 'realism' in the conduct of
relations with the PRL:
We have indeed gone through a difficult test, but political 
realism, a sense of responsibility for Poland's future, and 
a conviction that Poland's stability constitutes an 
important element for peace in Europe, prevailed in the end.
... the worst is behind us now. 77
While the main gist of his speech and later interviews to the US press 
denoted that he was most interested in conveying the impression that 
it was now high time that the US should alter its position on 
socialist Poland and that normal diplomatic relations be at last 
resumed, he also demonstrated a concern for a rapid improvement in 
economic relations. He expressed deep concern for "the deepening 
development gaps, a new upsurge of protectionism and discrimination, 
the political character of present international economic relations". 
In an interview to Time, the Polish leader said that the PRL was 
prepared for a full normalization of US-PRL relations but that this 
goodwill had to be paralleled by American return to political realism 
and the halt of practices which are hurting the Polish nation. On the 
subject of Solidarity, the General unequivocally declared that "this
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chapter had been closed"73, a strong Indication that he was satisfied 
with the effects of 'internal normalization' and that therefore 
progress could and should be made in normalizing relations between the 
West (the US in particular) and the PRL. At the time of his visit, an 
IMF team was in the PRL, attending one of a series of meetings winding 
up the preparatory stage of reviewing the PRL*s bid for re-admission 
to the Fund. The presence of the Polish leader at the UN seemed to 
have started anew the PRL's attempts to finally settle the thorny 
question of 'external normalization'. At the time, Polish anti- 
american propaganda once again opened fire on the Reagan 
administration mentioning not only the continuation of Polish attacks 
on the US but also a growing impatience at the slow pace at which 
Washington was reacting to the internal changes in the PRL. Out of the 
three conditions set by the US administration for the lifting of 
sanctions, the lifting of martial law and the release of all political 
prisoners, the resumption of a dialogue between the regime and 
Solidarity, and between the regime and the Church, only the first half 
of the first condition had been really met. On the other points, it 
was difficult to imagine that the US would be entirely satisfied. 
Further, one had to admit that while the lifting of martial law and 
the release of some political prisoners could be satisfied by discreet 
or public specific acts by the Polish regime, the resumption of a 
dialogue between the various Polish dramatis personae required a 
process and therefore time - a single act could not bring about long- 
lasting changes. On this point it was clear that Washington and Warsaw 
had very different views on the meaning of 'normalization'. The 
slowness of this process, admitting that it was taking place at all, 
was thus hampering PRL-US relations. At the same time, the Reagan 
administration was also concerned in finding a way of lifting the
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remaining sanctions without loosing face. Indeed, one of its main 
problems now was not whether or not to lift the sanctions, but when. 
In the spate of anti-american commentaries at the time, one article in 
particular should be mentioned here. Written by the government's 
spokesman, it summarized the main tenets of American policy towards 
the PRL over the last decade. Jan Rem argued that in the 1970s, US 
policy "was designed to bring about a situation in which the incumbent 
Polish government would become dependent on different ties with the 
West, especially on economic ones, and this would gradually curb its 
elbowroom. The Polish leaders at the time failed to foresee the 
adverse economic and political effects which might lead to Poland's 
excessive dependence on the West". In the 1980s, still according to 
Urban, the US administration shifted its attention to "those forces 
inside Poland who took up the struggle to bring about the fall of the 
socialist system in Poland". While stressing that the PRL could do 
little to improve relations with the US as long as the latter did not 
wish it, he made the point that there were ways of preparing for the
future 'normalization' of relations between the two countries:
The progress in internal political and economic 
stabilization in Poland will help a future normalization of 
relations with the US and a development of relations with 
American allies, and vice-versa, all internal troubles and 
conflicts would be interpreted by ruling circles in America 
as an argument for continuing the policy of making life 
difficult for Polish society.30
The government's spokesman was well aware that internal stability had 
a crucial role to play in affecting the nature of the PRL's relations 
with Western countries. This concern had been amply illustrated in the 
manner and form of many governmental decisions since the lifting of
the state of war. This is also why, for instance, the Polish
authorities had been so eager to show successful parliamentary
elections, hoping by this token to obtain some credit for their
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efforts of normalizing the domestic life of the country. They were 
part and parcel of the regime's attempts to regain an international 
credibility which had been so seriously damaged since December 1981.
After the results of the parliamentary elections on October 13, 
1985, a series of contacts with Western states was initiated. The 
tempo with which they were carried out seemed to demonstrate Warsaw1 s 
urgent desire to make some headway in this area. Whether the West* s 
willingness to resume some sort of dialogue could be explained by a 
positive assessment of the elections, or simply because of a 
psychological lassitude with the doubtful utility of continuing a 
policy of restrictions, remains an open question. Most probably, the 
perceived necessity to deal with some pressing economic problems, in 
particular the Polish foreign debt question, gave the impetus for a 
quantitative rise in contacts between the West and the PRL. In the 
political field however, diplomatic apathy remained. On November 7, 
ended in London the 12th session of the Polish-British Joint 
Commission for Economic, Industrial and Technological Co-operation. 
The Polish side expressed 'its readiness for a further growth of turn­
over but pointed out to the need to facilitate the access of some 
Polish goods to the British market and for the full normalization of 
financial and credit relations.31 A week later representatives of the 
two countries met again and held political consultations. On November 
17, the first meeting of the kind in four years between Japan and the 
PRL took place. It discussed the further development of trade and 
industrial co-operation between the two countries. November 22 saw the 
signing of a long-term programme between Austria and the PRL, aiming 
at expanding economic, industrial, scientific and technological co­
operation. Five days later, Dutch and Polish Foreign Ministries'
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representatives held political consultations in The Hague. Despite the 
constant calls for a re-orientation of the Polish economy towards 
COMECON countries, it was obvious that Warsaw was looking wherever it 
could outside the socialist bloc for the possibility of expanding its 
economic contacts. On August 29, a Polish bankers' delegation headed 
by the Finance Minister, Stanislaw Nieckarz, was in the PRC for a 6- 
day visit. Already in June, the resumption of parliamentary contacts 
between the two countries had taken place with the visit of a 
delegation from the Chinese National People's Congress. On October 5, 
the Morroccan Minister of Mining and Energy was in Warsaw where he met 
Jaruzelski. They discussed problems of economic co-operation. By 
Autumn 1985, some progress seemed to take place as far the PRL's 
external debt to Western countries was concerned. On October 24, 1985,
Bonn agreed to a programme for the rescheduling of the PRL's debt, an 
agreement formally signed on December 13, and delaying the repayment 
until 1991-1995. On November 19, the Paris Club representing 17 
Western countries, agreed to reschedule the Polish debt over a period 
of ten years.
The most surprising development as far as the PRL's foreign policy 
at the time was concerned, was the unexpected visit by General 
Jaruzelski to France on December 4, 1985, the. first meeting between
French and Polish heads of state since May 1980, when Valery Giscard 
d'Estaing had met Brezhnev in Warsaw. This was an unofficial visit, a 
short stay (une escale technique) between visiting Libya and Tunisia. 
It is probable that the Polish authorities had hoped to use the 
current favourable climate following the recent American-Soviet summit 
in Geneva in order to speed up the return of the PRL to the rank it 
wanted for itself in the international arena. It is worth noting that
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just as Gorbachev had chosen Paris as his first official visit to a 
Western capital, Jaruzelski chose President Mitterand as his first 
Western interlocutor. It is still unclear why President Mitterand 
thought it might be of some use to French-Polish relations and this 
uncertainty was clearly reflected by the amount of critical appraisal 
by the French media and political world. In the event, the Polish side 
was evidently pleased that it had taken place at all for it provided 
another opportunity to make some progress in the 'external 
normalization' of the PRL.®2 The visit touched "bilateral relations in 
the context of the situation in Europe and the world"®3 and appeared 
to have produced an informal agreement to develop and tighten the 
relations between the two countries, thus founding the basis for the 
resumption of a French-Polish dialogue.64 It was obvious that a 
meeting between the two leaders was by itself an event that could be 
seen as conducive to an improvement of relations between the two 
countries. But it remained unclear whether it actually served this 
aim. Certainly for Jaruzelski, it was an important first step in the 
process of improving his country's external relations with the West. 
Regardless of the concrete results of the talks, it offered the Polish 
leader a psychological platform of credibility from which to assail 
both the domestic and international communities and show all that 
'normalization' was not an empty word. For Mitterand, the purpose of 
the meeting was somewhat vaguer. When he made his first visit to 
Eastern Central Europe, on December 8, 1988 he chose Czechoslovakia
and not the PRL, thereby indicating that his relationship with the 
General was not as close as one could have surmised. As far as 
Warsaw was concerned, the international impact of the meeting was 
certainly beneficial. On December 7, 1985, The West German ex-
Chancellor, Willy Brandt, payed his first visit to the PRL since the
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signing of the Polish-West German Treaty of 1970. During his stay, he 
gave his approval for the return of the PRL on the international 
arena. His "Europe needs Poland" and "Peace in Europe needs a stable 
Poland" must have delighted his Polish hosts. He also expressed 
hostility for the remaining sanctions against the PRL by saying that 
"experience has shown that discriminatory method and economic 
isolation are practically never reasonable and on the whole are 
contrary to the hopes they are linked with".es
The Politburo report at the 23rd KC Plenum assessed positively the 
changing relations between the PRL and the West. Yet it was careful 
not be too overjoyed at the slow resumption of contacts with former
diplomatic and economic partners:
We appreciate the realistic approach of those Western states 
which have embarked on the path of normalization of 
relations with Poland. To those countries which have not yet 
abandoned the line of restrictions, we repeat: there can be 
no normalization on the basis of intervention in Poland's 
internal affairs.
With the announcement during the plenum that the PZPR Congress would 
be held in June 1986, the authorities' resolve to fully normalize the 
internal life of the country gathered new strength. Having weathered 
the storm, it was now high time to formalize the odnowa. Capitalizing 
on the dissensions within the 'capitalist camp' concerning the 
usefulness of continued sanctions and aware that the climate in East- 
West relations was conducive to improving contacts with the West, 
Warsaw continued to use every opportunity to pursue the 'external 
normalization' of the PRL. Shortly after the Jaruzelski-Mitterand 
meeting, the first meeting of the French-Polish Commission on Economic 
Co-operation took place in Warsaw on 8 January, 1986. The visiting 
French Deputy Foreign Minister, Jean Baylet, offered new credits worth 
some FF 170 million. Although the meeting had been arranged prior to
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the two countries' leaders' meeting and therefore may supposedly have 
had no connection with it, it is revealing that Baylet's visit was 
particularly discreet. There were officially practically no 
announcements that it had taken place, no reported meeting between the 
Deputy Minister and members of the opposition, and he made no 
statement concerning the situation in the PRL. What is surprising is 
that the Polish authorities seemed unwilling to use this visit for 
their own political purposes. This may have been the result of French 
insistence that this should be so. This did not mean that Warsaw was 
tempering its attempts to publicize its public relations campaign. On 
January 16, the Congress of Intellectuals For a Peaceful Future of the 
World opened in Warsaw. However, it was regarded as little more than a 
new attempt by the Polish authorities to secure a measure of 
international recognition and acceptance of their policy of 
international normalization and more than 400 invited personalities 
refused to take part. Diplomatically then, little progress had been 
achieved since 1982.
In the foreign economic sphere, it was still too early as well to 
speak of a radical improvement, though something was obviously 
changing. The Vienna talks between the PRL and a working group of 
Western commercial banks on January 28, showed that the problem of 
servicing the Polish debt was encountering notable difficulties. The
banks voiced on this occasion complaints that while there was some
apparent repayment of the capital debt, interests arrears were still 
not being repaid in full. Yet hunger for Western credits ensured that 
the PRL would remain as active as it could on the international arena.
On March 10, 1986, a Polish delegation headed by Deputy Premier
Zbigniew Szalajda, was in Bonn to discuss the development of co-
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operation between the two countries. Here again it was announced that 
West Germany had granted the PRL export loan guarantees of up to DM 
100 million ($ 45 mn), the first agreement of its kind since 1981. A 
month earlier, on February 11, the signs that a thaw was in the making 
between the PRL and the US surfaced with the meeting in Warsaw of 
Polish Foreign Trade Minister Andrzej Wdjcik, and the American Charge 
d'affaires to discuss the state of trade between the two countries. 
But nothing concrete came out these talks. In his speech to the Sejm, 
summing up the PRL's foreign activities in 1985, Foreign Minister 
Orzechowski unequivocally stated that " [the PRL's] political and 
economic relations with many capitalist countries [were] still 
precarious". He emphasized that the principal aim of the PRL's foreign 
policy was to "break out of isolation, to neutralize the repeated 
efforts to re-impose it and to obtain the lifting of restrictions". 
Blaming, as his predecessor had done, the West for the internal 
difficulties faced by his country, he added that "the overcoming of 
the difficulties will largely depend on the restoration of normal 
practices of financial co-operation and credits with the main creditor 
states in the West".07 While obviously, economic matters continued to 
be at the top of the Polish foreign affairs agenda politically,
foreign policy acquired a new meaning for the Polish authorities with 
respect to internal affairs: "foreign policy is both an impulse to and 
a broad platform for national conciliation", the Minister said. This
statement emphasized the clear connection the regime was making
between the two sides of its normalization policies. Praising the 
country's successful (sic) bid to "crumble the barrier erected to
separate it from part of Europe and the World", 1985, according to
Orzechowski, had confirmed another truth:
It confirmed the importance of the alliance and friendship
with the Soviet Union, Poland's dependence on the strength
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and cohesion of the socialist community of states and the 
direct interrelationship between the country1s domestic 
situation, its economic strength and the progress of 
national conciliation on the one hand, and its international 
position and role on the other.BG (My italics)
But if political closeness was viewed positively by the Polish 
leadership, geographical proximity to the Soviet Union on the other 
hand could have its drawbacks. Late April 1986, the worst nuclear 
power station accident ever recorded took place in Chernobyl, near 
Kiev. Apart from the ecological consequences it had for the PRL, it 
also contributed to lowering once again the level of economic 
interaction between the PRL and the West. On May 1, 1986, Sweden,
Norway and West Germany imposed restrictions on the import of food 
from East Central Europe. Austria followed on the 4th and on the 10th, 
11 out the 12 members of the European community imposed a ban on the 
imports of fresh food from Eastern Central Europe. Disputing the 
obvious health reasons behind this decision, the Polish government 
attacked it and claimed it to be of a continuation of Western's
interference in Polish domestic affairs:
What purpose is this decision meant to serve? The purpose is 
beyond doubt of a political nature. It is not just since 
yesterday that the policy of pretexts has been pursued 
towards Poland, and this is not the first case of putting 
stumbling blocs before the socialist countries and the 
economic co-operation between the East and the West.SQr
For obvious domestic reasons, the Polish authorities, unprepared as 
they were to face the eventuality of a nuclear disaster, were anxious 
to dispel mounting fears that the whole country had been contaminated 
by the nuclear cloud. Chernobyl not only showed the PRL's total lack 
of safety measures in the case of a nuclear accident, but it also cast 
a dark shadow on the government's own schemes to develop the country's 
reliance upon nuclear energy. By minimizing the extent of the fall-out 
over the PRL, Warsaw was undoubtedly hoping to avoid even greater
opposition to the £arnowiec nuclear station project. Also from an 
economic point of view, any reduction in the amount of trade with the 
West was detrimental to the national trade balance especially when it 
touched the export of Polish food, one of the few positive development 
in the PRL's foreign trade. As GUS reported, the PRL had earned $642 
million from food exports in 1981, $711 ran. in 1983, $829 ran. in 1984 
and $938 mn. in 1985.90 Despite the^ slow progress in the PRL's 
'external normalization", a minor success was scored when, after some 
years of intensive negotiations, socialist Poland was formally re­
admitted to the IMF on June 12, 1986. It was only a minor success
because mere re-admission to the IMF was insufficient to solve the 
outstanding economic problems faced by the country. Rather, it had 
greater political significance in that it contributed in consolidating 
the PRL's place in the international arena by reinforcing its leaders' 
credibility. It also showed that despite the country's 'Eastern re­
orientation', the need for Western credits and loans was still vital 
for the national economy. The economic benefits from re-admission to 
the IMF were dubious, at least in the short-term. A country which has 
pulled out, but wants to rejoin, must follow the same procedure as a 
country which has never belonged to the IMF. This rule had important 
consequences for the PRL. The size of a country's IMF quota (the so- 
called Special Drawing Rights) is significant because it predetermines 
the maximum amount of financial assistance the .IMF may arrange for 
member country. The fact that the PRL was granted a quota ($ 680 
million SDR), which was much smaller than the one it could have had if 
it had been an IMF member continuously, was in itself a serious 
setback. The PRL's IMF membership, though by itself an encouraging 
sign, was insufficient to solve all the current Polish economic
problems. 91
The arrival of Gorbachev certainly had a significant impact on the 
PRL, and especially upon its leaders. The lengthy exposes of the CPSU 
First secretary, declaring that Socialism had reached a crisis, 
inevitably affected all the East European ruling establishments. In 
the PRL, it primarily contributed to the restraint showed by 
Jaruzelski and his return to the rhetorics of reforms. It also paved 
the way for the gradual improvement in the PRL's relations with the 
Western capitalist countries. In the light of what was happening in 
the Soviet Union, Polish policy-making was forced to turn away from 
policies of open repression - contrary to the Gorbachev line - and 
engage into some sort of dialogue with the society at large, the so- 
called 'national conciliation' line. Thus, Jaruzelski was left with 
only two options: be remembered as the man who introduced a state of
war or as the man who gave the impulse to a new compromise between the 
state and the nation. Since the first option was something that he 
repeatedly seemed to want to forget, the second option inevitably drew 
him to seek a rapprochement with Solidarity, a force in the PRL 
without which little could realistically be done. This alone was bound 
to create some opposition within the PZPR for Jaruzelski's policies. 
The task, therefore was a difficult one for the General. In the end, 
he had to allow the resumption of a dialogue between the interests he 
represented and those which constantly threatened his perceived vision 
of stability of the social set-up in the PRL. His dilemma was crystal 
clear: how to develop the Polish brand of perestroi'ka and invite more 
liberalism in the political life of the country, without losing the 
reins of power.
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Pracujmy produktywnie, 
produkujmy reprodukcyjnie, 
konsumujmy produkcyjnie, 
a iym, czym bylismy, 
jeszcze bfdziemy.
Masymilian Jackowski 1870 
(Should we work productively, 
produce reproductively, consume 
product!vely, what we were, we 
would become again.)
CHAPTER 8 
SOCIALIST RENEWAL
To some extent, changes in communist countries resemble soccer. The 
manager, the coach, or the team may be removed or replaced by new 
faces, new principles of organization and strategic play may be tried 
out, but in the end, the game remains the same. Players come and go 
but the rules and aims stay unchanged. To use this analogy for the 
PRL, the board of directors, after a disastrous season, decided to 
change the organization of the club and change the team's coach. Very 
quickly, the Polish team somewhat improved its game and avoided being 
relegated to the bottom of the League table. Soon, it even began 
winning some matches, but on the whole its playing performance 
remained unsatisfactory. After another change of the club manager, a 
new style of play and 'revolutionary tactics' were introduced. Under 
the latter's enthusiasm, the 'polska team', through a series of close 
victories, regained its place in division one. Yet, World Cup 
qualification was still a long way ahead and a lot of effort still 
needed to be done to ensure Polish representation.
After the 'socialist normalization', 'socialist renewal' made its 
entry on the Polish stage. In line with changes in the Soviet Union, 
the PRL. approached the end of the century with unprecedented internal
-304-
developments. Yet their long-term effects are still in the balance and 
though one can now (1989) aptly speak of a new era in socialist 
Poland, many incertitudes linger on. Breaking out of its international 
isolation has not meant that the PRL has found it easier to deal with 
its debt problem. Similarly, the new character of Polish political 
life comprises many superficial changes which denote little changes in 
the authorities' attitude towards society. The traditional socio­
political set-up remains unaltered. The setting up of new state 
institutions (senate and president) and a 35% representation in the 
Sejm of a legalized opposition, do not yet represent the makings of a 
truly parliamentary democracy. Over the past seven years, after a 
period of internal pacification, the PRL has ceased to be the pariah 
of the international community. At the same time, the new status quo 
reached as 'normalization' ended, determined the shape of the new 
important internal changes taking place in the PRL. In 1985, Lech 
Walesa had accurately foreseen that "the legal period of Solidarity's 
existence, was a minor episode to be continued. Everything lies ahead 
of us. The great battle is still to come. It will be less spectacular, 
without fireworks, but a lot more interesting than what we have been 
trough". 1
8.1 The Same but Different...
The first Party Congress since the 1980-81 crisis took place in 
Warsaw on June 29-July 9, 1986. Its main emphasis was on the prospects
of 'socialist renewal' or the, strategy for the socio-economic "path 
into the 21st century".2 It was a very different Congress from the 9th 
Extraordinary Congress of 1981. At the beginning of 1980 the party had 
had over 3 million members and candidate-members; by 1986, more than 1 
million had been expelled or had resigned. Between the congresses, the
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Party had admitted some 160 000 new members and at the time of the 
10th Congress the ranks of the PZPR totalled 2, 125, 762 members. 3 In 
the event, the congress produced little of any real interest for the 
nation. Its main resolution, "On Increasing Management Efficiency and 
Improving the Standard of living, on Enhancing Socialist Democracy, on 
Consolidating Poland's International Position"4 was a bland statement 
trying to create the impression that the Party was particularly 
concerned with improving the nation's standards of living, especially 
the desperate housing shortage. The four main goals formulated at the 
Congress called for the achievement of a gradual improvement of living 
conditions of the working people and their families, for a 
strengthening and consolidation of the abilities of the national 
economy for an effective and balanced development, for the further 
development of socialist democracy as the foundation for the 
strengthening of the state and the rallying of all patriotic forces in 
the country around the supreme interests of the Polish nation. Finally 
it called for a strengthening of the PRL's international position and 
authority, especially through the consolidation and expansion of all­
round ties with the socialist community and the active participation 
in the international movement for the defence of peace in Europe and 
in the world. The Congress' declaration " On Security and Co-operation 
in Europe"® was a mere reiteration of Moscow's current 'Peace 
policies' and offered no new propositions of any value. In his opening 
speech, General Jaruzelski made several major points. In the first 
place he praised the Party for having weathered the storm, "surviving 
a formidable ordeal, overcoming its defensiveness, its ideological 
confusion and its organizational weakness".6 He called for renewed 
efforts for the development of the PRL, to make up for lost time ("We 
must stride forward more boldly. Acceleration is a necessity at this
point of history"7 ) He repeated once again that the PRL's "interest is 
inextricably bound up with detente and with international dialogue",6 
that the PRL would not be dictated to and that its voice should be 
heard more loudly. He also called for a meeting of all socialist 
countries to chart their struggle for peace.9 On the whole the 
Congress allowed General Jaruzelski to reinforce his own position 
within the PZPR (the promotion of 3 generals to the Politburo10) and 
strengthen the hold of the Party over the country. In fact, the 
Congress revealed only too clearly the inherent paradox of the 
'normalization policies' of the Polish regime. Since 1982, there had 
existed an obvious contradiction between the political raison d'etre 
of normalization, ie. the establishment of state hegemony over society 
- and the principle of economic reform, namely the decentralization 
and market exchange. As one commentator stressed, "an obvious tension 
exists between an economic recovery programme based on 
decentralization and a political programme of 'normalization' aimed at 
the consolidation of power and hegemony over society".11
Perhaps the real highlight of the whole Congress was Gorbachev's 
address, the only Soviet Bloc leader to attend the gathering. 12 Even 
his presence seemed shrouded in unexplainable discretion, with hardly 
any mention of his arrival in and departure from the PRL, in great 
contrast with his earlier visit to the GDR. 13 His presence was, 
however, enough to confirm that in the eyes of the Kremlin, Jaruzelski 
had been and still was the 'man of the situation'. Despite earlier 
misgivings on the General's ability to quell the Polish turmoil, the 
praise with which Gorbachev described the 'normalizing work' achieved 
by his Polish counterpart was enough to underline Soviet satisfaction 
and confidence in the Polish leadership. In his address, the Soviet
leader appraised the Polish Communist Party in effusive terms, paying 
special tribute to General Jaruzelski's "energy, political 
perspicacity, foresight and skill in finding solutions to very complex 
problems, his unflinching defence of his nation's interests and of the 
cause of socialism". 1A He also added that "Soviet communists know that 
the cause of socialism in fraternal Poland is in reliable hands".1® 
This was by far the greatest expression of support the Polish leader 
had had since the imposition of martial law by any Soviet official. It 
indicated that the Polish authorities' policies of 'normalization' 
were fully sanctioned by the Kremlin: "Your Congress shows again that
the Polish United Workers' Party is the vanguard force capable of 
uniting Polish society and leading the country along the road of 
economic, social and cultural progress". 16 At the same time that he 
praised the Polish leadership, commending it on its ability to restore 
socialist normality through the imposition of martial law (and without 
Warsaw Pact forces intervention), Gorbachev also made it clear that 
the so-called Brezhnev 'limited sovereignty doctrine' was still in
force, at least in theory:
"I want to assure the Congress and all Polish people that we 
shall remain your friends in the future, in any weather. ...
To threaten the socialist system, to try to undermine it 
from the outside and wrench a country away from the 
Socialist Community means to encroach not only on the will 
of the people, but also on on the entire post-war 
arrangement, and, in the last analysis, on peace.17
Gorbachev's speech also contained a Soviet assessment of the Polish 
crisis, acknowledging its lessons for the communist movement. It 
stressed that the Polish crisis "was not a protest of workers against 
socialism. It was, above all, a manifestation of disagreement with the 
distortions of socialism in practice, distortions which painfully 
affected the working class".10 This disagreement, he went on to say, 
was used by "the adversaries of socialist Poland, inside and outside
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the country":
It is well known what was sought by those in the West who 
hypocritically describe themselves as friends of the Polish 
people. They are not in the least concerned about the 
destinies of the Polish nation. Their intention is to 
dismantle socialism, to liquidate socialist gains. Really, 
the worse it is in Poland, the better it is for them. T9
With the closure of the 10th PZPR Congress (which could be aptly be 
described as Jaruzelski's own Congress), the 63 year old General was 
confirmed as the indisputable leader and his policy of 'renewal' given 
a new boost. In the months that followed a new impetus was given to 
the attempts to re-build the PZPR into an efficient and confident 
organization. The 2nd KC Plenum of July 24, 1986 presided over a major
reshuffle in the Party leadership. In May 1987, the 4th PZPR KC Plenum 
On the Role of the Basic Party Organizations, called for renewed 
efforts to revitalize the basic party units (POPs) and harnessing the 
rank and file membership into more active involvement in the regime's 
economic and political normalization programme. It also installed a 
20% cut in the Party apparatus and a transfer of 10% of full-time 
Party political activists from the voivodship committees to the 
POPs. 20 But this apparent re-organizational activity did little to 
increase the Party's standing with the Polish population. Its effects 
were primarily aimed at consolidating Jaruzelski's position and stem 
once for all the wave of demoralization which had so much 
characterized the Party's activities over the last few years. 
Confident in the internal stability of the country, the General 
decided once again to use the 'political amnesty card', both for 
internal and external purposes. In his opening speech to the Congress, 
the Polish First Secretary had implicitly raised the possibility of an 
amnesty for political prisoners. The July 17 1986 Sejm session
announced a programme for the release of both political and criminal
-309-
prisoners in order to provide then "with a last chance of rejoining 
public life". It passed a bill intended on reprieving on humanitarian 
grounds persons convicted of offences against the state and public 
order if there were grounds for supposing that they would not repeat 
these offences for which they were originally arrested. 21 This partial 
and conditional amnesty seemed to have had the positive effect, in the 
foreign policy field, of triggering the first economic agreement 
between the Polish and American governments since 1982. On July 30, 
Washington and Warsaw agreed on the re-scheduling of government 
guaranteed debts owed to the US and initially due in 1982-84. The 
payment of some $m. 1700 would now be made over a period of 6 years
beginning in 1990.22 More spectacular still was the MSW's announcement 
of a surprise amnesty, this time unconditional, for all political 
prisoners on September 11, 1986, a measure directly affecting 225
persons including among others, Zbigniew Bujak, Wladyslaw Frasyniuk, 
and Leszek Molczuski. In an interview the Interior Minister, General 
Kiszczak, explained that the decision was taken because of "the 
progressive stabilization of the internal situation in Poland and 
especially the diminishing social response to attempts to carry out 
clandestine activity as well as other initiatives directed against the 
state and public order".23 This new amnesty was a surprise for 
everyone, especially for the 'opposition*. As Bronislaw Geremek 
commented,
The manner in which [the amnesty] was conducted shows that 
the authorities aimed at producing a kind of psychological 
shock. Presumably, apart from winning new credits from the 
West, the decision aimed at producing certain effects at 
home. As in the case of previous amnesties, one of the 
object was to weaken social resistance, to break the unity 
of the opposition movement and to convince "the silent 
majority" that normalization in the country has prevailed.24
Asked what he thought Western reactions to the amnesty would be like,
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General Kiszczak answered that "the attitude of numerous Western 
countries towards our present decision would be a specific test of 
their political realism and of their good will, of their real 
disposition to develop political and economic relations with Poland 
based on equal terms".25 This latest amnesty prompted Lech Walesa to 
write to President Reagan urging him "to take action that might help 
to improve the situation of the Polish people", expressing the hope 
"that if Polish society [was! given the chance to undertake positive 
actions in the field of the national economy, . .., Poland could count 
on foreign credits".26 On October 15, the Solidarity leader and nine 
intellectuals from various social groups, issued a statement 
concerning the current situation in the PRL and called for an end to 
the remaining US sanctions. They underlined the fact that Western 
economic assistance was indispensable if the PRL was to overcome its 
economic problems.27 There were already some signs that the American 
administration was considering a lifting of the remaining sanctions. 
After his return from a visit to the PRL, US Congressman, Stephen 
Solarz, voiced the opinion that the US should now drop its sanctions
against the Polish state.2Q However this process was to last a while
longer, the Reagan administration cautiously delaying its decision 
until it was satisfied that the latest amnesty was not followed by new 
arrests. This caution was naturally attacked by the Polish
authorities. In his speech to the Zielona G6ra PZPR Conference on
Report-back and Election, Jaruzelski made the following remarks:
Western propaganda presents our move as a result of external 
pressures. Is it that they have so few successes of their 
own that they want to take credit for what the Polish
authorities do and for that which results from the maturity 
of our nation? All our sovereign decisions which stabilize 
the situation in the PRL, whether someone likes them or not, 
stem from an evaluation of the internal situation and are 
dictated by the realities of the country. . . . Poland is not 
interested in special relations but in normal relations. And 
this normalization lies not only in bur interest but equally
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in the interest of our Western creditors. A withdrawal of 
restrictions and a development of economic relations is, 
objectively, one of the conditions for repaying the debt.-29
By the end of 1986, the Reagan administration seemed to have 
reconciled itself with the fact that a return to normal relations with 
the PRL was now needed. On the occasion of the Vienna CSCE Conference 
on November 5, 1986, the US and the PRL held their first meeting at
governmental levels since December 1981, when Rozanne Ridgeway, the US 
Secretary of State for Europe and Canada, met the Polish Vice-Foreign 
Minister, Jan Kinast. Later the US Department of State announced that
it was in the process of reviewing US policy towards the PRL in the
light of the recent amnesty. The road for a resumption of normal
diplomatic relations between the two countries was thus being re­
opened. Some ten days later, the Polish authorities announced that 
they had decided to delay by one year the PRL's planned withdrawal 
from the International Labour Organization. The decision to withdraw 
was to have taken place on November 17, two years after the PRL had 
voiced its disapproval of the ILO report on the violation of Trade 
Union rights in the country. The decision not to withdraw from the ILO 
was described as a "gesture of good will" from Warsaw in the hope that 
"this would be met in an appropriate manner" by the West. 30 
Eventually, a year later, the PRL decided to remain member of ILO
after "evidence that [the organization] had abandoned its previous 
policy of using the organization for anti-Polish campaigns and 
interference in the internal affairs of the sovereign state".31 Yet 
Warsaw itself showed apparently little resolve to do everything it 
could to improve relations with the US. On December 9, Senator Edward 
Kennedy was refused permission to visit the PRL on a private basis, 
the authorities' decision being based on account of the "heavy
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political programme" planned by the Senator. A couple of days earlier, 
the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Thomas Simmons had left 
the PRL after a five day visit. Obviously, official meetings were 
preferred by the Polish authorities to private trips.
Speaking at the Revived Polish Trade Unions Congress on November
27, 1986, General Jaruzelski appeared in an optimistic mood.
The attack on the socialist state continued on both the 
external and the internal front. They wanted to crush us by 
hunger and cold, by restrictions and boycott, they wanted to 
force us to our knees when pent-up emotions subsided, they 
reached for new methods. They spared no expense, no time on 
the air, no generous awards, no grotesque citations. We have 
survived. We have not bowed to pressure. 32
'Normalization' was slowly but surely returning to the country and 
Solidarity, at least for the time being, seemed a thing of the past. 
Relations with the capitalist countries were showing some signs of 
improvement and the PRL's place in the socialist bloc had regained its 
former position. Yet, the situation was still far from being normal. 
Indeed, as time went by, it became more and more obvious that the 
authorities' claims that (socialist) normality was once again reigning 
in the PRL were vastly exaggerated.
8.2 The New Status Quo.
1987 marked the return of the PRL on the international stage. 
Between Jaruzelski's official visit to Italy in January and George 
Bush's trip to the PRL in September, the Polish authorities were hosts 
to a number of important Western officials. This resumption of high- 
level contacts between the PRL and Western states was in part 
triggered by the lifting of US sanctions against Warsaw. It set the 
scene for a radical increase of diplomatic and economic links between 
the PRL and its former Western partners and put an end to its 
international isolation. This process of 'external normalization' had
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star t ed in 1984 but had encountered many difficulties. This had been 
due mainly to the various aspects of 'internal normalization'. The 
Polish authorities had failed to convince the West that their policy 
of odnowa was having positive effects on Polish society. Underground 
Solidarity, in spite of society's growing political apathy, still 
represented a force which, together with the Church, kept on fighting 
against the implications of Jaruzelski's 'normalization' policies. The 
repeated demonstrations of public discontent, the various arrests and 
persecution against Solidarity members, the apparent unwillingness by 
the authorities to improve their relations with both the Church and 
the 'opposition', received a lot of publicity in the West. After the 
' 500 days' , when world attention was focussed on the Polish 
developments, ,the martial and post martial law period continued to be 
followed attentively, even if in a somewhat resigned way, in Western 
capitals. However, with the rise of Mikhai’l Gorbachev, interest in 
Eastern Central Europe affairs shifted noticeably to the Soviet Union. 
In the wake of the new Soviet First Secretary's declarations and 
deeds, world opinion began to by-pass continuing Polish problems and 
became almost fascinated with developments in the Soviet Union. This 
new period of a second ddtente had the indirect effect of allowing 
Jaruzelski to pursue his 'normalization' policies partially outside 
the glare of Western inquisitiveness. Recurring problems emerged from 
time to time and though they kept on evoking once again the early 80s 
period, a certain lassitude with Polish events crept in. Gradual 
acceptance that the new Polish rbgirae had all the characteristics of 
being durable, and that further restrictive measures against the PRL 
seemed hopeless to change a situation where the ruling faction was 
becoming stronger all the time, promoted among Western governments the 
view that a policy of confrontation had ceased to be useful. The time
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was now ripe for abandoning a 'passive1 stand towards the PRL, 
(consisting in ignoring the Jaruzelski regime), and develop instead an 
'active' policy in relations with Warsaw, that is, the renewing of 
normal diplomatic and economic contacts and the opening a dialogue 
with the authorities to try to solve the debt problem. At the same 
time, the changes taking place in neighbouring Soviet Union were 
opening possibilities for a greater measure of East-West contacts, in 
which the PRL, in view of its importance in the socialist bloc, may 
come to play a significant role. Against this background, it was 
becoming clear that soon or later, the poor state of relations between 
the West and the PRL would have to change. With the lifting of the 
remaining US sanctions, a new chapter in PRL-West relations opened.
In an interview, Foreign Minister Marian Orzechowski, when asked 
about the PRL's foreign policy achievements in 1986, expressed his 
satisfaction at the progress made since the international blackout
following the imposition of a state of war:
We have achieved tangible results in our efforts to 
establish favourable co-operation with the West, to remove 
obstacles to trade and scientific and technical co­
operation, and to regulate our financial and credit 
relations. These factors have made a large contribution to 
eroding the policy of restrictions and normalizing economic 
co-operation with most of our Western partners. ... Realism 
is getting the upper hand. It arises from an understanding 
of the durable nature of the socio-political transformations 
under way in Poland. ... It seems as if Western Europe has 
come to realize once again that Poland is too important a 
partner to be subject to attempts to limit its equal-righted 
participation in the life of our continent.33
Concluding the interview, Orzechowski stressed the importance of 
internal developments in the PRL for the continuation of Warsaw's
'external normalization':
Our internal achievements are going to facilitate the 
elimination of whatever has been left from economic 
sanctions and will fully restore Poland to its previous 
international position, including its influence upon the
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fate of the world. 34
Jaruzelski's official visit to Italy on January 12, 1987, was the
first tangible sign that the period of the PRL's international 
isolation had finally come to an end. This was the General's first 
official trip to a Western state since 'the War' and as such was 
heralded as a "historic visit" by. all the Polish media. Its 
significance was boosted by the fact that the Pope himself received 
the Polish leader with whom he talked for over an hour. From the 
Polish authorities' point of view, this was a de facto acceptance by 
the Vatican that the policy of 'internal normalization' had succeeded. 
Throughout 1986, there had been growing rumours that the two sides 
were moving closer to an agreement for the resumption of full 
diplomatic relations. Shortly before the Polish visit, the Polish 
Minister for Religious affairs had hinted that "something may happen 
in the briefest of delays, if the Vatican expresses its interest to 
the existence of such relations".3s Part of the discussion between the 
Pope and Jaruzelski undoubtedly touched upon this question. For Warsaw 
the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Vatican had become a 
main goal of its policy towards the Polish Catholic Church. Yet 
progress was slow since it depended upon the authorities' will to give 
the Church full legal status, a demand which for years had remained 
unanswered. If successful, it was obvious that this diplomatic coup 
would greatly change Church-state relations in the PRL. At the same 
time, the Polish episcopate too had reservations about the 
implications of such a rapprochement between the Vatican and 
Jaruzelski's regime. The visit also provided an opportunity of 
emphasizing the PRL's regained prestige on the international scene. 
From a foreign policy standpoint, it . confirmed the resumption
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of normal contacts between the PRL and the West and opened the road to 
finding solutions concerning the Polish debt problem. As Jaruzelski
himself commented,
In the current complicated international situation we regard 
this visit and the contacts we have established here as a 
major element of European and East-West relations. It was 
with this idea in mind that we expressed our desire to make 
our relations with Italy something like a model. 36
Domestically, the encounter between the spiritual leader of the Polish 
nation, Pope John Paul II, and the head of socialist Poland, 
contributed to reinforce the General's stand with regards to 'national 
conciliation' . It was during his meeting with the Pope that General 
Jaruzelski formally invited the head of the Catholic Church to pay his 
third visit to his native country. The programme included a trip to 
Gdahsk, a city banned from the Pope's previous two visits, which by 
itself was an important and highly symbolic addition to the Pope's 
agenda for millions of Poles. Despite whatever reservations the 
population had towards Jaruzelski, this and the fact that the Pope had 
accepted to meet him, was bound to alter somehow its appreciation of 
the man and perhaps even make it forget for a while that he had 
instigated the imposition of a state of war upon the country.37
Upon his return to the PRL, Jaruzelski hosted Japan's Prime 
Minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone (January 15). Continuing a series of 
diplomatic 'firsts', this was the first ever visit by a Japanese head 
of government since the establishment of diplomatic relations between 
the- two countries 30 years earlier. This visit, apart from the 
diplomatic-political benefits for the Jaruzelski rdgime, had also an 
important economic connotation. The PRL was hoping to increase the 
volume of trade between the two countries as well as obtain further 
credits, so crucial for the PRL's economic reforms, at a time when the
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external debt stood at some $ 33 billion, $1,3 billion of which fell 
to Japanese creditors. Some five months later, General Jaruzelski
returned the visit by travelling to Tokyo on June 28, 1987. If he had
intended on following the footsteps of Jozef Pilsudski and seek
Japanese help to raise a legion - in his case new credits and loans - 
he waq^ as unsuccessful as his illustrious predecessor 82 years 
before.30 And he was certainly not greeted the way Walesa had been 
when he too paid a visit to Japan on May 10, 1981. Yet the visit was
obviously viewed as an important one by the Polish leadership. As
Jaruzelski himself noted,
We want the Japanese presence in Poland, along with all the 
technological and organizational consequences of that, to 
become a significant and permanent factor in Poland". ... I 
cannot speak for others, but I am sure that the economic 
effects of Polish-Japanese contacts will be watched closely 
in many countries, including socialist ones. 39
If he had a vision of a Japanese-run economy for the PRL, his trip
certainly dispelled this momentary mirage.
Of considerable significance for PRL-Western relations was the 
January 28, 1987, visit by US Deputy Secretary of State, John
Whitehead to the Polish capital. With the September 1986 amnesty, one 
of the last visible obstacles to an American withdrawal of its 
sanctions had disappeared. Though cautious not to act too soon upon 
the news that Polish political prisoners had been freed, the Reagan 
administration had waited for the new year to make some concrete moves 
in this direction. A presidential statement on December 12, 1986, had
expressed the hope "that the amnesty [would] be an important first 
step toward a meaningful dialogue between the Polish people and their 
government". In order to encourage this process, the US administration 
had "decided to enter into dialogue with the Polish government".40 
After the Vienna meeting between Orzechowski and Ridgeway in November
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1986, and Simmons' visit in Warsaw in December, this latest prise de 
contact between the US and PRL augured the high-level resumption of 
relations between the two countries. Being only a fact finding mission 
- as well as meeting Polish officials, Whitehead also staged a diner 
with Walesa and other leading members of the 'opposition' and held 
talks with Cardinal Glemp -, Whitehead’s visit produced no concrete 
agreements. It was only decided that both countries would increase in 
the near future their economic and political contacts. The Polish 
authorities were aware of the implications of the visit and ensured 
that Whitehead would be free to meet anyone he liked. He was allowed 
to meet Walesa and leading members of the opposition, pay his respects 
to Father Poieluszko's grave, without any official interference, when 
only not so long ago, the sole perspective of a meeting outside the 
planned agenda was enough for the authorities to cancel an official 
visit altogether (this had been the case with the Belgian, Irish, 
Spanish and Norwegian Foreign Ministers in 1985). More ways of 
repairing PRL-US relations would be discussed on the occasion of 
Politburo member Jdzef Czyrek's visit to the US in March 1987, as head 
of a Polish parliamentary delegation. Yet, the 'first steps' had been
made even if the official Polish line remained somewhat reserved:
Realism is surfacing in the US administration circles, as 
can be seen in the very fact of initiating dialogue. However 
we still await practical conclusion. Relations between 
Poland and the US are still abnormal.*1
The Polish authorities did not have to wait long. On February 19, 
1987, President Reagan announced the lifting of all remaining US 
sanctions against the PRL. After mentioning the fact that his 
administration had been in touch at the highest level with the Polish 
government, the Church and with Solidarity, Reagan said that the 
Polish authorities had taken steps which led him to believe that
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"Poland should be given a renewed opportunity to address its trade
obligations with the benefit of most favoured nation treatment". He 
also announced the lifting of the ban on the PRL* s eligibility for
official US credits and credit guarantees.42 'External normalization' 
had now entered a crucial stage. The most enduring and damaging 
obstacle to the PRL's return on the international scene had finally 
been removed.
But there was still a long way until the resumption of normal
contacts with the West would produce concrete results. In this sense 
one can speak of the PRL's success in ' the diplomatic-political 
normalization' with the capitalist countries; however, in the economic 
sphere, 'external normalization' had not yet been achieved. Apart from 
the huge burden on the national economy created by the external debt 
($ 33,5 billion at the beginning of 1987), the PRL was now confronted 
with the task of persuading Western governments and banks to invest 
once again in the country and provide for greater financial 
assistance. Without substantial Western aid, the whole package of
economic reforms envisaged by the authorities had little chance of
succeeding in improving the continuing dramatic situation. The GUS 
report on February 3, 1987, showed that the industrial production
level was still some 5% down on the 1979 figure.43 However, Western 
credits were now harder to obtain in view of a general reluctance by 
the West to repeat what had been in the end a loss-making venture in
the 1970s. Although the Polish government was undoubtedly pleased to
see the remaining US sanctions lifted and regarded this as an
important achievement for the PRL's foreign policy, contributing to "a 
definite and generally visible consolidation of Poland's position in 
Europe and the World",4* it was still unhappy about future prospects
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in PRL-West economic relations. As Orzechowski noted in his address to
the Sejm on the PRL's foreign policy,
The normalization of political relations with the West is 
unfortunately not accompanied by an equal pace of 
normalization of economic, credit and financial relations.
To us, a country's friendly readiness to pursue economic co­
operation is the basic indicator of its attitude towards
Poland and a sign of its will to genuinely normalize mutual 
relations.4S .
But of course, the successful 'normalization' of economic relations 
with the West did not entirely depend upon the latter's goodwill. 
Important structural changes in the PRL's foreign economic policy were 
also badly needed. This need was reflected in an open letter to 
Zbigniew Messner, the Polish Premier, which urged him to conduct deep 
and profound reforms in the running of the PRL's foreign trade.
Stating that "Poland finds itself at the bottom of European
statistics", the letter expressed the conviction that,
Previous efforts to stimulate Poland's foreign trade and 
external contacts have been insufficient.. This is 
particularly true with regards to the economic system
operating in foreign trade and the practical operation of 
central administration. ... We are convinced that the 
philosophy, organization and manner in which foreign trade 
is conducted need revision, that outdated views must be 
eliminated, inefficient methods abandoned and bureaucratic 
barriers and interference swept away. 46
With the lifting of US sanctions, the foreign policy front looked 
brighter. In the months that followed, the Polish authorities played 
hosts to a series of official visits by Western Foreign Ministers (see 
Appendix). Possibly the most significant one was that of Jean-Bernard 
Raimond, the French Foreign Minister, marking the resumption of 
Franco-Polish relations after 6 years of stagnation. The attitude of 
the Mitterand administration towards the Polish situation had been 
well encapsulated by the then French Foreign Minister, Cheysson, who 
had declared in the spring of 1981, "Good luck to the Polish people" 
and on December 13, 1981, "Of course we'll do nothing". Despite the
fact that France's position on the 'Polish question' was perhaps 
second to none except the Reagan administration, it remained true that 
apart from stopping credits to the PRL, its policy reflected great 
discretion and ultimately great passivity at the top. Nonetheless, 
contacts between Warsaw and Paris had, until then, been almost non­
existent and Jaruzelski's inopportune visit had done little to break 
the ice. Raimond's visit finally put an end to this state of affairs. 
On July 31, 1987, in Vienna, a rescheduling agreement of the Polish
debt was signed with 500 Western commercial banks. It concerned some $ 
8 bn. and was a small, but undoubtedly useful, new arrangement for 
Warsaw.
George Bush's visit to the PRL in September 1987 marked a new stage 
in PRL-US relations. He was the most important American personality to 
be in the PRL since President Carter's 1977 visit. Two seemingly 
contradictory purposes emerged from the Vice-President's trip. In the 
first place, it served the purpose of consecrating the resumption of 
normal relations between the two countries after a long period of 
stagnation and at times deep tensions. At the same time Bush wanted to 
express the American interest and support to the activities of the 
Polish 'opposition'. Prior to the visit, in July, the US Congress had 
voted a $ 1 million fund for the banned Solidarity union in the form 
of a supplementary appropriation bill for the 1987 fiscal year. Though 
Solidarity refused the money for its own use and proposed instead its 
allocation to an exclusively medical destination, the Polish 
authorities had angrily denounced the gift as yet another American 
attempt to subsidize anti-Polish state activities. 47 From the start it 
was obvious that the Vice-President's visit was not to be equated with 
American support for the Jaruzelski regime. In his speech upon landing
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in Warsaw, the Vice-President announced that the United States hoped 
to play a constructive role in the process of 'national conciliation' 
in the PRL. Without wishing to interfere in Polish internal affairs, 
he also expressed his determination to meet representatives of all 
tendencies in the Polish s o c i e t y . I n  a toast, Bush said that he 
would like to see [the Poles] "freer, more independent and more 
prosperous". He also added that, "everyone recognizes that these last 
few years have been difficult ones in Poland. We in America have 
watched and suffered with you. But we are confident that you will not 
merely survive the present difficulties but will prevail. You will 
never be alone". One had to bear in mind of course, that on October 
12, 1967 Bush announced his presidential candidature and that
therefore a lot of the euphoria of his Polish trip was inevitably 
linked with this fact. Even if at times, Bush appeared to be 
conducting a pre-election campaign tour which was directed at the 
American electorate, his presence and speeches seemed to re-assure the 
majority of the Polish population that he would be a welcomed 
successor to President Reagan. His appearance at St. Stanislaw Church 
and his use of Solidarity* s victory sign was endlessly commented by 
many Poles. Indeed, one could even hear later Polish voices claiming 
Bush to "our president". His appearance on Polish television 
(September 28) when he informed the viewers of the non-official part, 
of his visit was unsurprisingly applauded by the Polish nation. As far 
as PRL-US relations were concerned, Bush visit produced three concrete 
agreements and one conditional one. The US administration voiced its 
willingness to intervene in favour of the PRL with the members of the 
Club de Rome for the rescheduling of the country's debt. A co­
operation agreement was also signed touching scientific and technical 
matters. Thirdly, normal ambassadorial relations were re-established.
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On October 6, John R. Davies was formally accredited as the American 
Ambassador in Warsaw, while his Polish counterpart, Jan Kinast took up 
his functions in Washington on October 17. Lastly, Bush promised 
economic help for the PRL if progress was realized in the domain of 
freedom and pluralism in the PRL. In 1989, he seemed to fulfil this 
promise by urging the creation of a special economic aid package for 
the PRL, following the April agreements of the Polish Round Table
The Vice-President's was officially ending almost five years of 
tensed Polish-Araerican relations. While in practice, it was too early 
to notice any substantial improvements in PRL-US economic relations, 
Bush's trip served the grander Polish scheme of finally extracting the 
country out of its international isolation and for this reason was 
seen by Warsaw as highly beneficial. As a symbol - something communist 
regimes are always eager to use -, it was a step which opened the road 
to greater possibilities of at last making some progress on the 
domestic front. It was significant that the Polish Foreign Minister, 
Orzechowski, had linked the fate of detente with Polish-US relations: 
"In the long-run, there can be no ddtente in East-West relations 
without the normalization of relations between the USA and Poland".4® 
All the same, it was hard to explain Washington's changed attitude 
towards Warsaw outside the context of the new Soviet-American
dialogue. The 'normalization* of relations between the PRL and the US 
was therefore nothing more than one of a series of gestures to improve 
East-West relations. On the whole, for the PRL, internally and
externally, it short-tern effects meant very little.
8.3 The Third Papal Visit.
When, on June 8, 1987, John Paul II stepped off his plane at Ok§cie
airport, he was returning to a changed Poland. Four years had passed
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since his last visit. The state of war had been lifted and the country 
'pacified'. Yet it was still not 'normalized*. Unlike his previous 
pilgrimages, this time, the Polish nation did not expect any miracle 
from the Pope. It was enough that he came. Ep His first speech urged 
the Polish faithful to be hopeful, and not give way to despair and 
moral apathy:
I invite you into the community, to this community that has 
been shaped by Jesus for generations. He does not cease to 
restore sense to the man who is tired, lost, suffering and 
loosing hold of life's meaning. The Eucharist is the 
Sacrament of this great sense. It also helps to regain faith 
in the right ideals, the will to live - to hope.51
The preparations for the Pontiff's third pilgrimage to Poland had
contributed to a certain improvement in Church-state relations. Since 
the 'Popieluszko Affair', the ruling Polish establishment had
increasingly hardened its stand towards the activities of the Polish 
clergy. Severe warnings were repeatedly given to the Church urging it 
not to engage itself politically in favour of the opposition.®- From 
1985 onwards, the regime intensified its attacks against what it
called ' clericalism'. As Adam Lopatka, described it, "clericalism has 
nothing in common with the concern for the religious needs of
believers":
It is a flagrant violation of the Church-state separation 
principle, .... , it abuses the freedom of religion for
political activities, [and is] incompatible with socialist
Poland's raison d'£tat. ... All clericalism is harmful. 
Particularly perilous are such symptoms of clericalism which 
are in tune with the designs and actions of enemies of
socialist Poland's constitutional order, both those at home 
and abroad". E3
With the 2nd National Party Conference (November 27-28, 1985) devoted
to ideological and theoretical matters, the authorities had launched a 
new campaign of doctrinal attacks against the Church. Its main 
onslaught had touched the education sector. The Sejm law of July 1985 
on Higher Education had been the first step in a national purge of
senior officials from universities and other intellectual institutions 
of higher education. The 24th KC PZPR Plenum discussed problems in 
education and passed a resolution to strengthen administrative and 
ideological control of the central and local governmental agencies.s* 
At the 212th Episcopate Conference (12-13 March 1986), in Czestochowa, 
the Polish bishops discussed what they perceived as the latest 
governmental efforts to exert increased ideological and political 
pressure on the Church and to bring about the disintegration of the 
Catholic nation. They issued a statement highly critical of the 
government's internal policies. Among other things it noted that 
schools were again "unfortunately becoming, under the slogan of 
secularism, the ground for an intensification of atheist 
propaganda". cc That the authorities were conducting a new anti-church 
campaign was obvious. A month later, Jan Rem used a whole page in 
Trybuna Ludu to accuse the "extremist priests" of harming relations 
between the government and the Church, blaming 'clericalism' as a 
burden on relations between the two.SG However, this time, officials 
commentaries appeared more subtle in that they clearly aimed at 
splitting clerical ranks between 'extremists' and 'moderates', always 
careful to stress that only a fraction of the Polish clergy was 
engaging in anti-state activities. A crucial part of Jaruzelski's 
'internal normalization' policies had been to improve Church-state 
relations in the name of 'national conciliation'. Warsaw was also 
anxious to show that Western accusations that such a dialogue was non­
existent was groundless (the Church-state resumption of a dialogue had 
been one of the conditions set by the Reagan administration for the 
lifting of US sanctions). Yet all showed that the authorities' efforts 
to woo the Polish episcopate were largely unsuccessful. The 212th 
Episcopate Conference had drawn attention "to the fact that without
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full respect of human rights and the rights of social and professional 
groups, the economic problems which the homeland faces cannot be 
solved".®'7 The Glemp-Jaruzelski 1 summits' (there had been eight 
between December 1981 and December 1987) produced little concrete
results and it seemed that no progress would be made until the 
authorities showed a greater will to compromise. The absence of a 
positive dialogue was best illustrated with the episcopate's decision 
to renounce its three year-old project of aid to the private sector of 
the agriculture in view of the authorities' attitude. It issued a 
communique on September 3, 1986, stating that that a deadlock had been
reached on the future of the foundation. The government had been
unwilling to modify their insistence that the Foundation be 
subordinated to various ministries, a stand which, for the episcopate, 
would mean "a Diktat by the state administration, which would run 
counter to the assumptions of the foundation, particularly its 
autonomy".Although on July 1987, the Polish government decided to 
lift tax and custom charges on agricultural equipment imported by the 
Church, the long-term application of the aid programme remained
uncertain. 09 Despite the authorities' 'Christmas gift' in 1986, 
allowing the full retransmission of the Midnight Mass by the Pope on 
Polish television - the first time this was ever shown, Church-state 
relations remained on the whole stagnant.00 For the Polish Church, the 
future of a successful dialogue with the authorities required "the
setting up of such social and legal solutions which would not bring 
about any political discrimination and which would create lasting 
solutions to the problem of political prisoners". 01
Unsuccessful in their relations with the Church at home, the Polish 
authorities turned their attention towards the Vatican. At the
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beginning of 1987, there was considerable speculation that the Polish 
government was on the verge of establishing diplomatic relations with 
Vatican. Its old aim of undermining the influence of the Church 
through direct relations with the Vatican once again was surfacing. 
But little progress would be made as long as the Polish Catholic 
Church had not been given legal status. In 1983, the Church had 
proposed a bill ending the government's right to veto appointments of 
parish priests and the building of churches, and establishing the 
right to found Catholic schools and hospitals. Though the bill was 
accepted by governmental experts, it was rejected by the Party
leadership. The subject was revived only in 1987 after the Pope's 
'historic* meeting with Jaruzelski in Rome. In the months preceding 
the 3rd papal visit, successive meetings involving dignitaries from
the Vatican, the Polish government and the Polish Church hierarchy
took place, culminating with the week-long visit by Archbishop 
Silverstrini, the Vatican's special envoy, on April 21-28. Warsaw's 
interest in raising the topic of diplomatic relations was obvious, 
both for domestic and external reasons. This fact alone explains 
partly why it failed to be successful.
In May and June 1987, the Polish press published lengthy articles 
concerning the preparations for the papal visit. Fears were expressed 
not only for the safety of the Pontiff, but also for the peaceful 
outcome of the whole trip. Four days before the Pope's arrival, the 
Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs made a statement in which he 
announced that the ministry had received "reliable information that
attempts to disrupt the Papal visit may occur":
Extremists are planning to take advantage of the Pope's 
visit, not only for propaganda purposes, such as throwing
leaflets, making statements and launching appeals, but also
to disrupt public order by provoking riots in the streets.
. . . The actions aimed to disrupt the visit of John Paul II
to Poland are actually designed to prove to the West that
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Poland is an unstable country. Those who are planning the 
disturbances of the Papal visit are striking principally at 
the most vital interests of the Polish nation. 03
It was clear that despite its claims that* the PRL was now a ' stable 
and normalized* country, the rdgime was still mindful of the effects 
of a new papal visit. Just as in 1983, there were important gains to 
be won by it, especially on the international scene, but at the same
time, there always was the possibility that something may not go
according to plan. An editorial in the Party's theoretical monthly 
described the third papal visit as "occurring at an unusually 
important time for Poland, Europe and the world". "Nothing should 
stand in the way", it continued, "in order that this event brings 
about advantageous benefits to the question of Polish understanding 
and co-operation in the field of the economic reform and surmounting 
difficulties on the road to the country's development".03 The 
anxiousness on the part of the authorities to use this occasion to 
publicize the effects of 'normalization* was best illustrated by the 
government spokesman's comments in the aftermath of the visit.
According to him, the visit had brought about "the outbreak of a 6-day 
anti-Polish propaganda in the West".04 At a time when the PRL's 
external relations were finally recovering from a period of isolation, 
critical comments in the Western media were a cause of immense 
irritation on the part of the Polish authorities. The Pope's own
speeches during his visit must also have at times caused exasperation 
to the Polish regime. A few hours only after his arrival, the Pope 
told General Jaruzelski that "a lack of respect for the rights of man
constitutes a threat to peace":
It is immensely important for a society's future that 
individuals do not lose their sense of usefulness in their 
work, that they are not disappointed with their efforts. ...
This is of fundamental importance for the national economy.
The economy, like all work, exists for man and not vice-
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versa.es
On his second day, John Paul II called for academic freedoms in Poland 
in a speech at the Catholic University of Lublin and on the 10th, he 
reiterated the Church's support for farmers to have their own trade 
union. The next day he was in Szczecin and Gdahsk, where he praised 
the 1980 Agreements, implicitly stressing that he remained attached to 
the ideals of Solidarity. He also met Lech Walesa. This was his first 
visit to the Baltic coast as the Pope. His words could not have 
pleased the Party hierarchy, and despite the relative passivity on the 
part of the authorities, the important police deployment throughout 
the visit testified to a certain nervousness from the top. With the 
departure of the Pontiff, the ruling establishment heaved with relief 
that all had gone well, with minimum trouble. With the end of the 
visit, it was now time to return to 'the real problems', a concern 
which Jaruzelski himself somewhat ironically commented upon in his
farewell speech to the Pope:
Your Holiness will soon bid farewell to your motherland, and
you will take its picture with you in your heart, but you
cannot take away its problems. The nation remains here,
between the Bug and the Oder rivers. It must itself cope 
with challenges. The future of Poland, its actual position 
in Europe and in the World, will be determined by its 
internal cohesion and economic might, its civilizational,
scientific and cultural progress.00
Despite the Western 'anti-Polish propaganda', the visit was positively 
assessed by Warsaw. It had confirmed "the continual and irreversible 
character of internal stabilization" and the PRL's "normalization of 
its foreign relations".07 Just as the second Papal visit, the 
authorities had sought to use the Pope's pastoral trip for domestic 
and foreign purposes. In both cases, it was an opportunity to 
publicize the results of the country's "normalization" in a favourable 
way. But this, in itself, had its drawbacks. Despite all the efforts
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by the authorities to conduct a public relation campaign, it was clear 
that their smoke-screen was very light indeed. For the ruling 
establishment, the benefits per se reaped from the visit were almost 
null. As far as the Polish nation was concerned, the visit had 
provided it with a breath of fresh air by giving the Polish people the 
moral support it so much craved for. The editor of Tygodnik
Powszechny% Jerzy Turowicz, summed up this feeling:
John Paul II walked across Poland, stirred all Polish hearts 
and returned to the Vatican. Our social, economic and 
political situation is apparently the same as before, but 
perhaps this is not so? Something has changed, and not only 
inside. Poland, after this pilgrimage is different.60
In the spiritual sense, yes, but materially little progress had been 
made. A social accord was still a long way away; the external debt was 
expected to be over $ 36,250 million by the end of the year with the 
PRL repaying nearly $ 2 bn. in capital interest yearly.63 Church-state 
relations were still as stagnant as ever. Less than a week after the 
Pope had left the PRL, the 221st Polish Episcopate Conference issued a 
public statement announcing that the Church would expand its public 
activities in defence of human rights and the principle of public 
self-determination. 70 By presenting the main direction of the Church's 
activity in broad social rather than narrowly defined religious terms, 
this statement was of considerable political importance. Moreover, it 
struck directly at the Polish regime's social policies. With the 
Church taking a more determined stand, with the 'opposition' still 
active and influential, with the economic crisis showing no signs of 
easing up, Jaruzelski must have wondered if anything had really 
changed since 1983.
8.A Epilogue
Support for perestrol'ka is now a new political and moral 
yardstick. It makes it possible to tell genuine advocates of 
peace and social progress from more or less declared
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champions of reaction and confrontation.71
These words uttered in the Kremlin Congress hall by Jaruzelski to the
participants of the Great Socialist October Revolution 70th
Anniversary Celebrations, in November 1987, showed how much had 
changed since the fateful days of the General's decision to impose a 
state of war in the PRL. Unable to find a lasting solution to his 
country's deep problems and at loss in elaborating a rational and 
successful policy to extricate the PRL from its socio-political
apathy, the Polish leader had turned to his Eastern neighbour for 
ideological help. The Polish odnowa, was Warsaw's answer to the Soviet 
perestrol'ka (in fact it preceded it several years before when the 
concept was first U6ed by Stanislaw Kania at the 9th Extraordinary
PZPR Congress) but due to the particular situation in the PRL, it had 
so far failed to muster the masses. One has to remember that in the 
Marxist-Leninist vocabulary, any renewal means above all, the renewal 
of the Party and reform, any change which strengthens the Party 
apparatus. The 1980 events had laid the last nail in the coffin of the 
demystification of communist rule in the PRL, and if a 'national 
renewal' really was to appear, it would have to be without the Party 
and its fossilized structure. By fully supporting the changes taking 
place in the Soviet Union, the PRL was seeking to import the 
psychological factor of ' Gorbachevism' and draft it on the country. 
But Jaruzelski was no Gorbachev. And the PRL was not the Soviet Union. 
In a Polish article examining the changes taking place in the USSR, a
commentator remarked that the "balance-sheet [was] gloomy":
The only encouragement is the fact that the overwhelming 
anti-reformist camp ... is united primarily by the force of 
their opposition to changes. It has no programme (underlined 
in the text); to be more precise, it cannot admit that its 
only actual programme is the defence of the status quo ante 
in the name of their ruthless social egoism. This compels 
this camp to pretend that it cares for the revolutionary 
ideals of the past, for the purity of the idea, for the good
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memory of the predecessors, for the moral health of the 
contemporary people, etc. However, at the bottom of It all, 
one finds a more or less skilfully disguised greed of the 
man of property, threatened by the spectre of 
expropriation. 72
In many ways this evaluation also fitted the PRL. Six years after the 
Polish experiment in 'Bonapartism', after unsuccessful stages of
economic reforms, after the failure to rally the bulk of the 
population behind his policies, General Jaruzelski was showing all the 
traditional communist leaders' propensity to hold on to power and do 
little else.
At the same time, however, what was happening in the Soviet Union 
was increasingly putting pressure on the Polish ruling establishment 
to seek new ways of governing the country. The apparent Soviet
willingness to upset many of the orthodox principles which had until 
then regulated Soviet socio-political life, provided the Polish 
leadership with a ready-made theoretical framework from which to try 
to resolve the country's internal deadlock. In the purest of Marxist- 
Leninist tradition, it offered a convenient basis to launch a new era,
by explaining the past in terms of the present. Fundamental tenets of
ideology came increasingly under fire and this gave the opportunity 
to justify certain changes. Gorbachev had launched a campaign to re­
appraise Socialism and this process was finding a real justification 
in the PRL. Polish 'restructurization' coined new words, new phrases 
which changed little, but gave the semblance of a new era. Nothing 
illustrated this better than the Polish Foreign Minister's 
(Olechowski) use of the term "socialization of Polish foreign policy", 
which he explained as the "taking into account to a greater extent the 
opinions of various milieux and especially the coalition mode of 
exercising power...".73 Seven years after the Gdahsk Agreements, the
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Polish authorities began re-assessing the road covered since, 
concluding that the Solidarity events and the imposition of martial
law were all part of one and same process:
Today we know that the signing of the agreement did not end 
anything, but it began a process of basic changes - which 
are increasingly revolutionary - in social life. This 
process is taking place and we know that it is far from 
ended. The year 1981, together with martial law and the last 
four years marked successive stages of this process which 
consists of the elimination of a paternalistic organization 
' of society and the achievement of subjectivity and 
independence by citizens and social groups.74
The same article contended that "Socialism in the form in which the
state has .overwhelming control has exhausted all its developmental
possibilities". 70 Clearly something was changing, at least in form. In 
the PRL, the summer of 1987 saw the first signs that a cautious but
resolved destalinization process was burgeoning in the PRL, following
the Soviet example. In September 1987, an article entitled "Is this 
the end of a taboo?" discussed the new thinking (sic) about Stalinism, 
commenting that it was "marking a fundamental change and [made] more 
credible the desire for deep reform".70 Little by little, the changes 
taking place in the Soviet Union were filtering through into the PRL. 
The only problem was that in this respect, the Polish society was far 
more advanced than the Soviet one, when it came to introducing new 
types of so-called liberalization. Poles simply expected more. This 
was thus creating problems for the Jaruzelski regime for, while 
pressured to show that it was not only supporting Gorbachev policies, 
but also that it was actually implementing some far-reaching changes 
in the PRL, it had to be prudent not to relinquish its last levers of 
control over an increasingly dissatisfied society. Jaruzelski*s views 
at the time were best illustrated by the publication, in the Soviet 
journal Kommunist, of his comments on the "new horizons" ahead of 
Socialist Poland. They deserve to be quoted in full, as they
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succinctly summed up the ideals pursued by the Polish leadership:
Our Party has had dramatic experience of the effects of 
departing from the dialectic regularities of building 
socialism. The failure to perceive various dilemmas and 
contradictions, the conservative attitude, self-satisfaction 
and bureaucratism separating the Party and state leadership 
from 'real life', weakened the ties with the working class 
and the broad masses. We paid dearly for delaying the 
changes for which conditions had already been ripe and for 
stepping back from processes already embarked upon, for 
conservatism, for the petrification of the forms and 
corrosion of the mechanisms of development of the economy 
and democracy. ... Our Party has started the renewal within 
itself. While remaining the same Marxist-Leninist Party, it 
is gradually becoming a different one in terms of raising 
its ideological and moral requirements, conceived in a 
Leninist way. ... Efforts to consolidate the Party's 
position in the state and in public life involve a trend 
which can be conventionally referred to as socialist 
pluralism. It has nothing to do with the bourgeois concept 
of the so-called game of political forces; it also rejects 
antagonistic competition. It is based on consolidating the 
leading role of the Party and on expanding socialist 
democracy. 77
Despite the vagueness of the terra 'socialist democracy', it was clear
that the Polish authorities had no intention oh introducing reforms
that might undermine their power. On the contrary. Yet, their tactics
had to change .and adapt themselves to the new mood in the socialist
bloc. One way of "broadening socialist renewal" and "inject broader
democracy in the political life of the nation", was to hold a
referendum, the first one to take place in the PRL since 1948. In many
ways, the sole decision to turn to the population for its opinion was
an unprecedented move for a soviet-type system. But the novelty of
this decision went no further. In the case of a majority affirmative
vote, the government could then pretext the support of the population
for its policies. On December 29, 1987, the Polish electorate was
asked two questions: a) are you in favour of the full implementation
of the programme for the radical revival of the economy - as proposed
to the Sejm - in order to visibly improve the standard of living, even
if this involves living through a difficult two or three ye^rs of 
rapid change; b) do you favour a  democratization of political life, the strengthening o f. 
self''government, the broadening of civic Tights, and a  greater public participation in  
government ? 78
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In the case of a negative vote, little would change and it certainly 
would not cause the demission in toto of the ruling establishment. 
Indeed, by staging a referendum, the Polish regime was primarily 
intent on demonstrating its self-professed good-will of bringing the 
nation together. It must have been aware that abroad, such an example 
of 'public consultation' would have a major psychological effect on 
Western perceptions concerning the Polish odnowa. Such semblance of 
democratic means would nullify many of the criticisms to which the 
PRL was still being subjected to. In the end the outcome was 
predictable. A low turn-out (the official figures put it at 67,32 % of 
eligible voters) ensured that the 51 % affirmative vote required to 
make the reforms binding on the government was not attained. Non­
confidence in Jaruzelski*s policies was once again being demonstrated. 
This "new experience in socialist democracy"79 had ended up in a 
failure. But if the battle for people's minds was a lost cause, the 
Jaruzelski regime stubbornly clung on to ideological principles to 
justify their place within Polish society. Speaking at the 6th KC
Plenum on December 15, 1987, Jaruzelski stated that,
The analysis contained in the report on the sources and the 
development of social conflicts in the history of Poland 
proves that it was a shortage and not an excess of socialism 
that was behind the turmoils and breakdowns; not a surplus 
of democracy, but a deficit of it, not too much but 
inadequate authority of the state.eo
In this, the Polish First Secretary was merely paraphrasing his Soviet 
counterpart. Gorbachev's exhortations were being relayed in the PRL by 
an increasingly confident leadership. The new mood was contagious. 
Even if at home, the Polish 'socialist renewal' was still a rhetoric 
phrase to camouflage the continual stagnancy, the Polish ruling 
establishment increasingly relied on the changes taking place in the 
Soviet Union to further its own goals. Asked by a journalist what he
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thought of perestrol'ka and what it meant for his country, Foreign
Minister Orzechowski replied:
Do you really think that we are in competition with 
perestrol'ka? Let's stop being so complex-ridden. It's only 
natural that the position and policies of the Soviet union 
have a decisive meaning for the future of Europe and the 
World. We cannot aspire to such a role. But we need not and 
do not have any complexes on that score. We are making up 
fast for the lost years. It is a long time since Poland has 
seen such diplomatic activity. Never before have so many 
foreign diplomats and politicians visited Poland. ... The 
similar aims of Soviet perestrol'ka and Polish 'renewal* give 
Poland a unique chance to say more in the arena of 
international politics. The similarities in the thrust and 
tone of perestrol'ka and ' renewal' are of great importance to 
us. 01
But just as reforms in the Soviet Union were encountering many 
problems, the Polish odnoua was in great danger of remaining dead 
letter. A mini-crisis erupted in the Summer of 1988 among a
disillusioned and impatient workforce. The strikes which then took 
place were the result of grievances expressed by workers at the 
ineffectiveness of the government's policies. It was also showed that 
Solidarity was still alive and active, that the need to have the 
banned union re-legalized was firm and strong and that the policies of 
'normalization' had in this respect failed. The immediate result of
the summer disturbances was a thorough reshuffle in governmental ranks 
with the entire dismissal of the Messner cabinet in October. The 
ineffectiveness of the second stage of the economic reform and the
constant lowering of standards of living had provoked the new
generation of post-Solidarity workers into vividly expressing their 
dissatisfaction. Even if not comparable to the 1980s, this latest 
unrest called for radical new measures on the part of the authorities 
to avoid a new wave of unrest. This time, there could be no more hope 
that another 'Polish solution to a Polish problem' would be available. 
The new faces in the Mieczyslaw Rakowski government, and the apparent
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greater pool of ability and competence represented by many of the new 
ministers, raised hopes that at last something could be done to 
extricate the PRL from its tragic situation. And soon enough, appeared 
the first signs that the ruling establishment, after nearly seven 
years of uncompromising attitude, was finally prepared to accede to 
some of the propositions enunciated all this time by the underground 
1 opposition' :
Halt the police trends in the development of the state, free 
political prisoners, re-establish a meaning to national 
understanding - these are initial realistic imperatives and 
Polish thoughts about the future. Only the realization off 
these demands can unblock the society's situation, bring 
about initiatives, enable the concrete carrying out of 
economic and state reforms. 02
On November 30, 1988, Lech Walesa appeared on Polish television in a
tete-£-t£te with the leader of the official trade unions, Alfred 
Miodowicz. The Nobel Peace prize winner was slowly ending his exile as 
a 'private person' and though representing a social force which was 
still illegal, he made it clear to millions of viewers that without 
the participation of Solidarity, without a real dialogue being 
instaured between society and the ruling establishment, no progress 
would be made. Until then, the ruling establishment had stubbornly 
refused to consider the idea of trade union pluralism advocated by 
Solidarity. By portraying the union as bent on seeking confrontation 
and refusing any political solutions, the authorities were attempting 
to persuade would-be listeners that the era of Solidarity had come to 
an end. But the slogan Nle ma wolno£ci bez SolidarnoSci (there is no 
freedom without Solidarity) which came to be heard and repeated 
throughout the country, showed how wrong they were. By the end of the 
year, the PZPR was beginning to acknowledge the necessity for change. 
In a two part KC plenum, a new course of action was drafted. 
Apparently disagreement among the participants pervaded throughout,
-338-
wit h Jaruzelski even submitting his, and others, resignation to the 
KC. In the end, however, his line prevailed. In its final resolution, 
the 10th PZPR KC Plenum stated that "a continuation of socialism 
requires the thorough reform of the PZPR" and that the Party 
"recognizes the need to consider the plurality of interests and 
aspirations, and [the extension of] the coalition government to that 
part of the opposition which recognizes and acts within the limits of 
the constitutional order".03 In an unprecedented statement, the Party 
presented its position on political and trade union pluralism, 
declaring that "the KC believes it is necessary to devise a new 
formula for the shaping of political pluralism. ... The KC confirms 
the PZPR's readiness to hold a dialogue and to search for new forms of 
agreement with every constructive political force, provided that the 
latter - no matter what its political orientation and ideological 
inspirations are - observes the constitutional order of the country 
and recognizes the good and fine future of the people and the state as 
the greatest value".04 On February 6, 1989, took place the inaugural
meeting of the Round Table talks between the ruling Party, the allies 
and organizations linked with it, and Solidarity and representatives 
of those groups and professions represented in Lech wal^sa's Civic 
Committee. Ironically, the so-called 'constructive opposition', led by 
Walesa, sat at the table though it was still an illegal organization. 
Two months later, the April Agreements were signed, opening the way 
for the legalization of Solidarity, Rural Solidarity and the 
Independent Students' Union, as well as important constitutional 
changes in view of the forthcoming Sejm elections in June. An 
important new chapter in Poland's history seemed to have been written.
In Bronislaw Geremek's words,
The very idea of the round table may be regarded as
something imperfect, something which hides the shortcomings
-339-
of public life, an implant substituting for the lack of 
parliamentary practice. But even then it is an extraordinary 
proposal for other nations in this part of Europe. Besides, 
it may not be quite absurd to think that amid the 
contemporary crisis of institutionalized public life, this 
lame form of dialogue between the authorities and society, 
similarly to the 1980 Gdarisk Agreements, contains some 
universal message about the subjective rights of social 
groups, the nation and society. At any rate, something has 
started moving in Poland. This may be an opportunity. GS
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Pamiftajmy , ±e Polska wdrdd 
naroddw jest dui$ mysz§, nie 
malym sloniem.
(Remember that Poland, among 
nations, is a large mouse and 
not a small elephant.)
Tadeusz Kotarbiriski (1886-1981) 
CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION.
'Polish normalization' lasted nearly five years. It started with 
the imposition of a state of war in December 1981 and ended around the 
10th PZPR Congress in June 1986. Throughout this period, the Polish 
authorities had been determined to destroy the 'opposition',
consolidate the system and build up public support. Using the
conditions offered by the militarization of Polish society, the 
Jaruzelski's regime first proceeded to 'pacify' the country. During a 
period which lasted almost as long as the 'Solidarity era' (585 days), 
the Polish Army, aided by the repressive organs of the state, sought 
to restore some order and lay the foundations for the re-building of 
pre-1980 Socialist Poland. Apart from its domestic implications, 
martial law also had significant external consequences. The 'War' had 
been a 'triumph' for Soviet foreign policy. It had solved the Polish 
internal crisis, had had a sober effect on potential Eastern Central 
European unrest and had not jeopardized too much the Kremlin's
European diplomacy. "It was a tragic, though undeniable, tribute to 
the art of statecraft as developed and practised by the Kremlin". 1 For 
the first time, a major crisis originating in one of the socialist
bloc's countries, and whose potential effects were directly
threatening the stability of the entire Soviet European sphere of
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interest, was solved without the use of direct Soviet military 
intervention.
Despite its setbacks, Polish 'pacification* and then 
'normalization' were also a success for Jaruzelski and his ruling 
team. The general remained in power, seemingly strong enough to resist 
all potential threats to his position. Even the Soviet Union was 
forced to admit, after a while, that the Polish General had saved the 
day and that he represented the only capable force able to improve the 
situation in the 'Polish province'. Indeed, as, the years passed, 
Jaruzelski steadily reinforced his position, shedding his uniform for 
a civilian suit and becoming the uncontested leader at the head of the 
PZPR. His confidence, and a measure of his power, was revealed in 1989 
when, during the 10th KC plenum, he actually offered to resign as 
First Party Secretary.- Alongside the propulsion of a military man at 
the head of country, the instauration of a military/police state had 
also the immediate results of pacifying the country, providing its new 
leaders with the opportunity of consolidating their hold over society 
and restore socialist 'normality'. However, at least until 1985, this 
policy had very little concrete effects on improving state-society 
relations. Despite the official calls for a 'national reconciliation', 
the majority of Poles, either ignored the new leadership, or engaged 
in activities aimed at countering its policies. If a certain apathy at 
large had arisen in the months following the imposition of a state of 
war, very quickly, the movement which had been seriously weakened in 
December 1981, once again began gathering strength, making the 
authorities' task the more difficult. With the arrival of the new CPSU 
leader, Warsaw moved away from its overall passive attitude aimed at 
containing opposition to its policies and remaining in power, to a
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more active policy whose main psychological guidance it drew from 
Moscow. The new East-West climate facilitated this and was 
scrupulously used by the Polish regime to further its own interests. 
Since it differed little from the new Soviet thinking, it was allowed 
to develop into something which not even the ruling establishment 
could have foreseen in 1981. In all appearances, Gorbachev made no 
attempts to constrain the PRL's policy-making. However paradoxically, 
this 'freedom of action' had its own constraints for the Polish 
authorities. Left to decide on their own the appropriate course of 
action to take, the Polish authorities were soon faced with the 
dilemma of how to implement badly-needed reforms without losing their 
hold over society, two aspects of the internal policy-making which by 
definition seemed mutually exclusive.
Yet, Polish 'normalization' did not end at home. It was also 
taking place on the international scene. After successfully, though 
slowly, regaining the favours of the Kremlin, the PRL persistent 
foreign concern touched its relations with non-communist countries. 
The state of war had isolated the PRL and in spite of efforts by 
Warsaw to regain its lost international status, little concrete was 
achieved in the first years of 'normalization'. Only when the domestic 
situation seemed stable and the ruling establishment confident enough 
that it had finally restored 'socialist normality' to the country, did 
the first signs of a thaw between the PRL and the West appear. Yet, 
persistent Western insistence that a return to normal relations was 
dependent on internal developments arising from Jaruzelski*s policies, 
obliged the latter to pursue a line which after a while seemed to 
contradict the very aims of 'normalization*. The 'socialist renewal', 
intended primarily to rebuild a new Polish Communist Party, and
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restore its leading role in Polish society, faltered and forced the 
regime to accept the gradual return of Solidarity as a major socio­
political force in the country. After years during which the Polish 
authorities had strived to destroy the 'opposition', it dawned upon 
them that any solution to the stagnancy of the system passed through 
some compromise with those very forces they had sought to eliminate. 
In this they were also influenced by the changes taking place in the 
Soviet Union.
Thus, the internal changes in the PRL as it approached the end of 
the decade had been conditioned by external events to such an extent 
that it has been hard to separate the two sets of determinants over 
the last eight or so years. The present study showed how closely 
linked were the domestic and foreign policy-making of the PRL since 
1981, and how repeatedly each set of internal and external factors 
deeply affected one another. The imposition of martial law was a 
response to both domestic and foreign determinants. Despite Jerzy
Urban's claim that "the West with its own hands co-created the 
imperative of proclaiming martial law in Poland"3, it was clear that 
Moscow's security interests in the stability of the PRL had been the 
main determinant behind the December proclamation. The 'normalization' 
policies in turn were markedly affected by internal and external
events, while the 'socialist renewal' resulted from constraints 
emanating both abroad and at home. In 1981, a Polish analyst had 
written that "everything which takes place in Poland has its
international implications, exerts an influence on external relations,
on Poland's position in the socialist community, in Europe and in the 
world".A At the same time practically everything that takes place in 
the broader East-West context has its influence on PRL's internal
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developments. The period of 'normalization' provided a striking 
example of this link. After a period of isolation, the Polish regime 
painfully extracted itself from international ostracism. But this was 
not achieved without significant domestic changes, which directly or 
indirectly were the result of external pressures, originating both in 
the East and the West. These pressures or constraints for the Polish 
leadership influenced the latter in seeking a framework of policy­
making adequate both for domestic and foreign objectives. Had, for 
instance, Western insistence that a resumption of normal relations 
between Warsaw and Western capitals died out, it would have been very 
unlikely that Jaruzelski would have been compelled to go as far as he 
did in 1989. His 'normalization' policies were a mitigated success in 
that they preserved the political system, but failed to ensure its 
viability. Also, it it quite obvious that in the absence of Gorbachev, 
the General would have equally been hard pressed to undertake the kind 
of concessions to the aspirations of Polish society he did from 1988 
onwards. All this, of course, does not warrant the comment that he was 
the inspirator of changes taking place in the PRL. On the contrary, he 
was subjected to them, and only did his utmost best to keep in line 
with them, by trying to be in control as far he could. International 
pressures and domestic tensions cumulated in forcing him to adapt 
himself and the Party to the evolving environment. Captain of ah 
unruly crew and seconded by inefficient officers, he tried to steer 
the Polish ship though rough waters, holding on to a helm whose rudder 
was out of action. One is here reminded of the metaphor identifying 
the PRL to a 'ship of state ploughing hostile seas across the
unchartered ocean of the future':
On this line of thought, People's Poland must be seen as a 
war galley of the great fleet of Communism commanded above 
desks by a corps of overseers, propelled below by a press- 
ganged crew shackled to the bench; and rowed by to the tap
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of a martial drum. It sails due astern of the great Soviet 
flagship to which it is fastened by a heavy, spidery chain. 
Unfortunately, most of the Polish overseers are half-hearted 
in their job; the crew consists of former freemen, who still 
long for their liberty and who are sons of Themistocles, not 
Xerxes; and no one wants to listen to the drum. As a result, 
the Polish galley is slewing from side to side. The decks 
are already awash. Is she capsizes, she threatens to drag 
her neighbours with her to the bottom. So urgent action is 
needed. Either the overseers drive the convicts to row in 
unison, or the flagship will send a boarding party to help 
them. Better still, they could hand over the galley to the 
crew, and let them row as volunteers. Best of all, if the 
Soviet admiral would only agree to cut his losses, he could
axe the chain, and set 'the Poland' free.s
By 1989, the chain though in an advanced stage of rusting, was still
there.
The PRL's geo-political position in the centre of Europe, firmly 
anchored in the socialist bloc dominated by the Soviet Union, usually 
has meant that it has not been seen by many observers as a policy- 
generating state. Instead it has been viewed as a target of the policy 
of other states, and in particular, the Soviet Union. Since the end of 
the Second World War, the Polish People's Republic has remained in the 
so-called socialist community and as such, bearing in mind the
perceived hegemonic nature of the Kremlin leaders, has attracted
little attention from Western scholars. This can be partly explained 
by the general tendency of researchers to ignore the foreign policy of 
smaller and medium sized states and by the obvious fact that the PRL 
has been, both politically and military, in the Soviet shadow since 
1945. For all practical purposes, the PRL's foreign and domestic
policies were therefore, above all, a reflection of Soviet decision­
making and a mere implementation of the Kremlin's wishes and needs. It 
has thus been assumed that its policy-making was insignificant and 
warranted no detailed examination. However, this kind of reasoning 
cannot be sustained in the light of the internal and external
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determinants which have shaped Polish policy-making since 1945. These 
have had a significant impact on the PRL's successive leaderships' 
ability to develop, to various degrees, a Polish brand of policy­
making independent of Moscow. This does not, of course, mean that one 
can ignore the huge constraints imposed on the country in virtue 
of its place in the Soviet bloc. In this respect it would be 
naturally incorrect to speak of a truly independent and sovereign
Poland (the question whether any state in the present world can be 
truly sovereign is of course another matter beyond the scope of this 
study). Nevertheless this argument does not preclude the existence of 
a specific Polish policy-making and therefore its analysis. Naturally, 
the foreign policy of any given state is the subject of many
constraints, its geography, its economy, its political structure, 
culture and tradition (the domestic environment). Foreign policy 
action is also taken with reference to other bodies similarly acting 
on the international stage and is likewise affected by their action 
(the international environment of the decision-makers). Elements 
within environments interact with each other and this interaction 
takes place between environments as well. Its nature may vary, with 
one country clearly dominating another, but even then, both are
subject to influences originating from their respective domestic and 
foreign environments and as a result of their mutual relations. Thus, 
PRL-USSR relations are also a two-ways process, where, to various 
degrees and depending on the situation, both countries influence each 
other. In 1981, the events in the PRL, to a significant extent,
created various constraints and pressures on the Soviet Union 
decision-making. Likewise, developments in the USSR, and especially 
from 1985 onwards, had important consequences for Polish policy­
making. In both instances, definite domestic questions had their
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impact on both the domestic and foreign processes within both 
countries. As far as the PRL was concerned, the whole period following 
the imposition of a state of war demonstrated clearly the complicated 
process of interaction between Polish domestic and foreign policies. 
Indeed, it provides the political analyst with a revealing insight in 
the policy processes of a Soviet-type country. Though it may be 
tempting to see in the PRL a unique country in this respect, it is 
obvious that of study of this relation between foreign and domestic 
processes could prove very instructive for other East central European 
countries.
Poland's unique position in Central Europe, with its lack of 
effective natural boundaries, has meant that it has never been able to 
develop a secure political existence independent of either German or 
Russian and then Soviet influences. As a result, the nature of its 
policy-making has always been heavily determined by Polish perceptions 
of its neighbours. By the 19th century, both German and Russian powers 
dwarfed Poland and it became the letter's policy to try and play one 
against the other. Poland has traditionally harboured fears of German- 
Russian coalitions which, as the numerous partitions it had to endure 
throughout its history amply demonstrated, were not idle apprehensions 
but directly linked to the very survival of the nation. By the end of 
the Second World War Poland, now the Polish People's Republic, found 
itself completely under the influence and 'protection* of the Soviet 
Union. Until at least the death of Joseph Stalin, it presented all the 
characteristics of a 'Soviet puppet state'. With the rise of Krushchev 
and under the leadership of Wladuslaw Gomulka, it slowly developed its 
own brand of 'Polish socialism', gaining in the process the attribute 
of being an 'independent satellite' - a slightly exaggerated
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description but one with some truth attached to it nonetheless. 
Throughout its existence the PRL's conduct of foreign affairs has been 
closely associated with that of the Soviet Union. On practically all 
major international issues, the PRL has aligned itself on Soviet 
foreign policy, whether it was Indochina, the Middle-East, Cuba or 
Afghanistan. At the same time, it has taken advantage of opportunities 
to pursue its own interests, especially in Europe. The fact that these 
often paralleled Soviet own goals in the area does not mean that the 
PRL had therefore no objectives of its own or lacked any initiative in 
the foreign policy field. The PRL has sponsored measures aimed at 
reducing East-West tensions in Central Europe by arras limitations, 
ddtente and economic co-operation. In 1958, it put forward the so- 
called 'Rapacki Plan', calling for a nucleai— free zone in Central 
Europe. More recently, in May 1987, the 'Jaruzelski Plan' sought to 
decrease armaments and increase confidence in Europe between the two 
blocs. Arm limitations initiatives have continued to be a prime 
foreign policy objective for the PRL, both on account of foreign and 
domestic considerations. While Polish alignment on Soviet foreign 
policy has always been obvious, a study of the PRL's foreign policy­
making process should not however be confined only to an approach from 
a Soviet perspective. While it has a ring of truth to it, the argument 
that "Polish foreign policy is made in Moscow" is by far too 
restrictive of the PRL*s abilities to make and execute its own foreign 
policy objectives. Rather, there seems to be more sense to ask oneself 
what are the limitations and restrictions on Polish efforts to realize 
their own perceived interests.
One the most fundamental limitations on Polish policy-making stems 
from the Prymat Polityki Zewn$trznej and its characteristic importance
for Polish domestic affairs. In the twentieth century, more than ever, 
the PRL's domestic and foreign affairs are closely linked and this has 
meant that without a close look at both processes, a complete coherent 
picture of the situation in this country is hard to reach. Nothing 
illustrated this better than the period between December 1981 and 
December 1987. The decision to impose a state of war over the country 
was ostensibly a political act in response to a perceived internal 
deterioration of the situation. Jaruzelski*s coup was not an attempt 
to replace the communist system with a military junta, but on the 
contrary an act to preserve it. And it was not aimed against the broad 
framework of the Soviet system. It was confined to it. Yet, it also 
was the result of enormous external pressures on the Polish 
leadership. The 'Polish crisis' was not limited to Polish borders. Its 
ramifications went far beyond the Oder and the Bug and for this 
reason, its international significance formed an intrinsic element in 
explaining Jaruzelski's unprecedented coup d'dtat. Similarly, the 
developments ensuing from the militarization of Polish society, not 
only had enormous effects on the situation inside the country, but 
also on the conduct and state of Polish foreign policy. By sealing the 
country internally, the Polish leadership equally isolated itself from 
the international community. Despite the relatively low interest 
traditionally shown by Western/capitalist countries for events taking 
place behind the 'iron curtain', the imposition of a state of war in 
the PRL, spurred them to take decisive, though on the whole 
ineffective, measures in protest. Even it they were on the whole 
characterized by a lack of unity and an absence of real coherent 
policy-making, they were enough to turn the PRL into an international 
pariah. In the months and years which followed, the Jaruzelski team 
would struggle, not only with a chaotic and unruly domestic situation,
but also with the effects of losing its pre-1961 international status. 
Though Western sanctions effectively froze PRL-West relations and 
became linked to the evolution of the Polish internal developments, 
the state of war also had significant consequences on PRL-East 
relations. Despite the fact that the Polish 'normalization' was a 
satisfactory answer to Soviet security interests in Eastern Central 
Europe, it was only after a long period of time that the PRL returned 
to its number two place within the socialist community. Throughout 
martial law and after its lifting, the Kremlin leaders remained far 
from confident that the crisis had been weathered. In the short-term, 
the Polish Generals had efficiently contained the 'waves of anarchy' 
which had threatened to flood all over the bloc. But in the long-term, 
large questions marks still remained. It is partly because of this, 
that the Polish leadership, aside from its concern to resume normal 
relations with non-communist countries, was very careful to do 
everything to consolidate its standing in the eyes of Moscow and its 
allies. This meant, among other things, pursuing a domestic and 
foreign policy in line with that of the Soviet Union. Though these 
objectives were in no way different than from those which the PRL had 
always pursued, they took on a particular importance in the post- 
martial law period. "For Poland the most urgent thing to do was to 
recapture its position within the socialist community. Without this 
you cannot be reckoned with on the international arena", remarked the 
Polish Foreign Minister Orzechowski.G The urgency of this task form 
part of Warsaw's 'external normalization', on par with attempts to re­
shape a Polish Westpolitik heavily compromised with the imposition of 
a state of war. All the same, this process was a reaction to the 
events taking shape in the Soviet Union. It was not a worked out brand 
of Ostpolitik, or a new form of Polish policy-making towards its
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eastern ally. Indeed, the present situation and the degree of changes 
in the USSR seem to offer the Polish leadership an opportunity to 
develop such a policy, which in the long-run could have marked effects 
on the PRL's geo-political situation. 7
Notwithstanding the fact that a return to the status quo ante was 
unrealistic, Warsaw was still compelled to restore a semblance of 
'socialist normality', based upon force and repression. With the 
changes emerging in its eastern neighbour, it began adapting some of 
its policies to the 'new mood' introduced by Mikhai'l Gorbachev. In 
this, the 'reformist trends' affecting nearly the whole of the 
Socialist Bloc provided Jaruzelski with an ideal opportunity to shape 
Polish internal developments in accordance with the new ideology. 
Faced with continual domestic problems and in light of Western 
intransigence, Jaruzelski decided to play the 'Polish experiment 
card' . It must be of course stressed that he had very little else to 
do. The situation in the PRL after 1980 precluded any return to the 
forms of ruling which had existed hitherto. It is unquestionable that 
the short-lived Solidarity experience was the precursor and the 
originator of the radical changes which would take place less than a 
decade later. With it, the system had entered what Staniszkis called 
"the baroque phase of the system called 'really existing socialism".0 
By developing the Polish brand of 'socialist renewal', General 
Jaruzelski was in effect hoping to score successes both at home and 
abroad. Domestically, concessions would strengthen his position among 
the Polish population and further contribute to strengthening the 
process of 'normalization'. Externally, it would bring him closer to 
the Soviet line and be a persuasive argument in convincing the West 
that Poland under Jaruzelski was the forerunner of great changes in
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the Soviet bloc. However, all along, this new tactic was being impeded 
by the slow progress in the domestic situation. Besides, it very 
doubtful whether the Polish Generals were in fact reform-minded when 
they set out to militarize Polish society. With an enfeebled Party and 
a distrustful and unco-operative population, Warsaw's plans were 
seriously constrained. A dramatic economic state further limited the 
level of real changes taking place quickly, the more so when the 
ruling establishment systematically clung onto the idea that economic 
reforms were possible without political ones.
The years of 'normalization' then, were a process by which the 
Polish authorities strove to restore the primacy of the communist 
system and at the same time alter some of its precepts to render this 
'renewal' more palatable to the nation. Throughout though, it was 
obvious that the policies pursued by Jaruzelski would inevitably lead 
to some dramatic changes into the traditional political set-up. It is 
of course a matter of speculation whether the General was an advocate 
of the reforms from the very beginning. That something had to change 
was obvious, but whether the ruling establishment was eager to 
introduce far-reaching changes in the PRL is more disputable. The 
truth was that the enormous pressures put on the authorities, both 
domestically and externally, compelled the latter to seek some 
solution which would at last answer many of the grievances expressed 
by the Polish society. Unable to shake off the influence of both the 
Church and the large 'opposition', the Polish regime was slowly 
compelled to resort to entirely new approaches in its policy-making. 
Its aims remained the same - to stay in power - but its means differed 
greatly from past habits. In this, not only were internal events 
determinant but also many of the subsequent moves it made were the
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direct result of external developments. Without Gorbachev, it is 
doubtful whether the PRL leadership would have gone as far as it has 
in striking a 'social contract' with the Polish population in the way 
it did in April 1989. After a period of uncertainty resulting from the 
successive leadership changes in the Soviet Union, the Polish ruling 
establishment was confronted with a task for which, despite forty 
years of holding the reins of power, it was unprepared. For the first 
time, Warsaw seemed to have been given carte blanche to handle its 
internal problems. With the new mood and all its implications, the 
Soviet Union under Gorbachev was concerned above all with its own 
problems. Any signs of trouble in its European condominium would be a 
setback for Soviet policies and greatly jeopardize its domestic and 
international efforts to push on with profound reforms. Calm was the 
order of the day. The Kremlin simply required loyalty and stability 
from its allies. Thus, as long as these conditions were fulfilled, the 
East Central European leaders were in a sense free to implement 
policies in line with those expounded by the Kremlin. Since conditions 
varied throughout the Bloc, specific approaches had to be developed. 
In the case of the PRL, Jaruzelski was then compelled to formulate a 
new strategy of rule, given the apparent greater leeway of action 
offered to him by the CPSU First Secretary. In the absence of a 
coherent and decisive policy, with little signs that it knew what to 
do, the Polish regime was therefore at first unable to formulate an 
effective policy-making. Only by the end of 1988, as a result of 
domestic and foreign constraints, did it begin to make bold moves to 
improve the overall situation. Apart from the Soviet factor, the 
attitude of Western states towards Warsaw also made necessary the 
elaboration of a new strategy. Above all, Warsaw sought to woo back 
Western support. This was inevitably unproductive as long as the
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Polish domestic environment continued to exhibit the characteristics 
of a police state. Since Western perceptions and actions seemed 
greatly influenced by the degree in which the Polish authorities were 
conducting a dialogue with the Church and Solidarity, Jaruzelski was 
drawn inexorably in finding a compromise with the forces opposing him. 
When he finally took the decision to accept the realities of the new 
Polish socio-political set-up, and agree to a concrete and open 
dialogue with the various actors on the Polish stage, he was at last 
reacting not only to a domestic necessity, but also to international 
pressure.
Indeed, the whole 'normalization* process epitomized the complex 
relationship between domestic and foreign policy-making in the PRL. It 
was a process which took place on two levels: internally and
externally. At the same time, it was heavily determined by two sets of 
concerns: political and economic. And it was a process taking place 
against the background of East-West relations. Practically all the 
issues which were at hand during the period 1981-1987 took place 
within a framework where domestic and foreign interaction remained 
inseparable. One may try to represented in the following schematic 
way. Each arrow denotes the interaction between the various 
determinants influencing the overall Polish policy-making. Again, this 
simplistic diagram is obviously inadequate to explain in full the 
complex nature of the relation between all the components shown here. 
At the same time, it serves the purpose of making it clearer. The 
point of intersection in the middle of the diagram should be seen as 
showing the core of the foreign-domestic process.
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The two main tenets of 'normalization' touched directly upon the 
internal situation - the return to socialist normality - and the 
external one - the return of a pacified and stable PRL in the
socialist community and the resumption of normal relations with non­
communist countries. The various stages of this process, pacification,
national conciliation and socialist renewal were all elements of this 
domestic/foreign dichotomy characterizing the PRL's policy-making 
process. Again, as far as political and economic questions were
concerned, they had to evolve in both a domestic and foreign 
environment. The political developments within the country had a
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crucial significance for the attainment of economic support, in 
whatever form and from wherever. For the West, the sine qua non for a 
resumption of pre-1981 relations with Socialist Poland was the extent 
to which the Polish authorities were prepared to implement a dialogue 
between the various socio-political forces within the country. Only 
when some progress was made in this area (the various amnesties among 
other things), were Western governments willing to engage into some 
fruitful dialogue with Warsaw. Nothing illustrates this better than 
President Bush's 'new policy towards the PRL' in the wake of the Round 
Table Agreements in April 1989, stating publicly his resolve to take 
steps to help the economic and political liberalization of Socialist 
Poland. Yet, even then, this was a slow process. It really began 
unfolding as a result of the alteration in the superpowers' relations, 
and was part of the broader East-West context. Yet, its implications 
have had paradoxical consequences. Nowhere was it more striking than 
in Polish-Soviet relations. It is not an exaggeration to say that 
future events in the PRL will play an important role in determining 
the viability and duration of perestrol'ka in the Soviet Union. In many 
ways, the fate of those two countries have colluded. With the 'state 
of war card' having been played, the Polish authorities have been left 
with very little indeed to use as the ultimate means of ensuring their 
own survival and the continuity of the system. 'Normalization' £ la 
polonaise had confirmed John Paul II's comments shortly after December 
13, 1981, when he had remarked that rz$d ktdry uczeka sif do sily Jest
slaby (a government which uses force is weak). Relying on sticks, the 
Jaruzelski regime had underestimated the strength and vitality of a 
society determined to fight the hegemony of a political system alien 
to its national character. Though combining overall a.greater ability 
and shrewdness than their predecessors, the Polish authorities under
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Jaruzelski have been inevitably forced to give in in many areas. This 
has dramatically reduced their capital of 'carrots' to hand out at 
various times, and when needed. In the event of a new crisis arising, 
similar in intensity to the 1980-1981 era, the Polish problem would 
require this time, a non-Polish solution. But such a development would 
almost certainty torpedo the whole of Gorbachev's policy, both at home 
and abroad. Though, the Soviet First Secretary would be reticent to 
employ military force, he also would be forced to do so. After all, he 
was not elected to preside over the disintegration of the 'Soviet 
European Empire'. But, if driven to do so, the costs this time would 
be incalculable in terms of his policies, and would represent a major 
setback for East-West relations. In this sense then, one can easily 
conclude that the official propaganda's euphoric description of 
present Soviet-Polish relations is in fact warranted. What is 
happening in the PRL is of vital importance to the Soviet leaders. 
Although the socio-political evolution which has taken place in the 
PRL over a six-month period has been truly remarkable, the results of 
the Round Table Agreements will remain in the balance. Unless some 
dramatic and effective means of salvaging the Polish economy and 
improve living standards emerge, the possibility of another explosion 
will subsist. This danger will increase in direct proportion with the 
duration of a stagnant situation. In this respect, international 
relations once again are destined to have an important role to play. A 
lot will depend on Western motivation and determination in 'helping' 
the PRL solve some of its outstanding problems. Of course, without 
profound lasting changes in the PRL's socio-political life, no amount 
of aid from capitalist countries will have any real effect. Yet, even 
a reduction of Polish debt instalment repayments may be conducive to 
alleviating this financial burden on the Polish economy. In turn, this
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may allow more governmental funds to be injected in specific areas 
badly in need of capital. That the West has a role to play is 
undeniable. The question is, how. The Polish authorities are well
aware of the pitfalls of a policy of dependence on the West and it 
will do everything it can to avoid a repetition of Gierek's mistakes. 
On the other hand, they are also aware that for a 'restructurization' 
of the economy, there has to be accompanying steps in the political 
sphere, without which very little will be achieved. Their dilemma thus 
remains what it was in the years following the imposition of a state 
of war: how to stay in power and at the same time satisfy society's
aspirations, two apparently contradictory goals in a system where 
democratic means of ruling have been non-existent for over forty 
years.- A failure in either would have untold consequences, not only 
for the Polish nation, but also for the Soviet Union, for Europe and
for East-West relations. What is now happening in the PRL is thus of
fundamental importance. The fate of this country, situated in the 
heart of Europe, as it approaches the Twenty First Century should
remind us of a slogan popular in the 1830s: Polska jest skazana na
Wielko£d - Poland is condemned to be Great.
Chapter 9 Notes
1. Jan B. Weydenthal and Bruce Porter, The Polish Drama 1980-81, 
Toronto, Lexington Books, 1983, p. 139.
2. Rzeczpospolita, 19/1/1989.
3. Jerzy Urban, 'The interdependence of Polish home and foreign 
policy', Press release of the PRL's Embassy in London, Lecture 
given at the RIIA, Chatham House, 17 February 1987.
4. Janusz Symonides, ' problemy polityki zagranicznej na IX 
nadzwyczajnyra zjeidzie PZPR', Spraw Mifdzynarodowych, 1981 (8), p.
7.
5. Norman Davies, The Heart of Europe, Oxford, New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1987, pp. 43-44.
6. Zycie Warszawy, 9/1/1987.
7. Edmund J. 06manczyk in Tygodnik Powszechny, No. 23, 7/6/1987,
urges the need for such a new Polish policy towards the Soviet 
Union.
-361-
8. Jorge Luis Borges once wrote that Baroque is an example of style 
which exhausts its own possibilities and borders on becoming a 
caricature of itself. The final stage of any art is baroque when 
it reveals and destroys its own means of expression". Staniszkis 
Telos, Winter 1982/83, p. 87.
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APPENDIX A.
PZPR Plenums/Conferences/Congress, July 1981 - December 1987.
1st KC
2nd KC
18-19th July 1981 
11th August 1981
3rd KC 2/3rd Sept. 1981
4th KC 16/17th Oct. 1981
5th KC
6th KC
7th KC.
28th Oct. 1981
27/28th Nov. 1981
24/25th Feb. 1982
1st PZPR National
Ideological
Conference
8th KC.
9th KC.
10th KC.
11th KC (+NK ZSL) 
12th KC.
2/3rd April 1982 
22/23rd Ap. 1982
15/16th July 1982 
27/28th Oct. 1982
20/21st Jan. 1983 
31st May 1983
13th KC. 
14th KC.
15th KC.
14/15th Oct. 1983 
18/19th Nov. 1983
18th Feb. 1984
[during 9th Congress.] Elected 
members of Politburo and 
Secretariat
Discussion on the means to 
counteract the deteriorating 
socio-economic situation and 
Part activity after 9th 
Congress.
Party's tasks in shaping the 
position of workers' self­
management in socialist 
enterprises in conditions of 
the economic reform.
Political situation in the 
country. Appeal against 
strikes. Resignation of Kania. 
Jaruzelski elected 1st Party 
Secretary.
Current situation in country 
and main lines of party 
activity.
Party's tasks in weathering 
the crisis, New economic 
reforms.
Presentation of draft
declaration 'What are we 
fighting for, where are we 
heading'.
Discussed realization of 9th 
Congress resolution in the 
sphere of the crisis.
On youth.
Socio-economical development 
for 1983-1985.
Workers and peasants. 
Socio-political situation and 
the activity of the Party. 
Results of the KC Commission 
set up to explain reasons and 
course of social conflicts in 
the history of PRL.
Ideological activity of the 
Party.
Party action in ' the 
realization of socio-economic 
goals.
To work out the organizational 
and programmic assumptions for
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a national 
delegates.
conf erence of
2nd PZPR National
Delegates
Conference
16th KC.
17th KC.
16th KC.
19th KC.
20th KC.
21st KC.
22nd KC.
23rd KC.
24th KC.
25th KC.
26th KC
Xth PZPR Congress
2nd KC.
3rd KC.
4th KC.
5th KC.
16th March 1984 
2/3rd June 1984 
26/27th Oct. 1984
21/22nd Dec. 1984 
13/14th May 1985 
12/13th June 1985
3rd Aug. 1985 
5 & 11th Nov. 1985 
20/21st Dec. 1985
31 Jan/1 Feb 1986 
13/14th March 1986 
7th June 1986
29th June 1986 
24th July 1986
16th Dec. 1986
22nd May 1987 
8th Oct. 1987
The leading 
working class.
On the strengthening 
socialist state.
role of the
of the
Economic reform and the 
strengthening of the state.
The role and tasks of the 
intelligentsia.
Of the efficiency of the 
political andjorganizat ional 
activity of the Party.
Party tasks in the Sejm 
elections.
The PZPR contribution to the 
Sejm elections.
Tasks of the Party in the 
socio-economic development of 
the country / preparations for 
the X Congress.
National Education Problems./ 
Programme Project PZPR.
Thesis for the Xth Congress. / 
Cadre policy of the Party.
Draft discussion of Xth 
Congress.
Tasks of the Party in 
implementing the Xth Congress 
resolution.
The speeding up of the 
standards of quality in the 
economy / New ,stage of the 
reform.
On the role the basic Party 
organizations.
Second stage of economic 
reforms / Announcement of 
ref erendum.
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The Militarization of the PRL's Government in 1984: an overview.
M ilita ry  Council o f National Salvation (CRON):
Chairman; General Vojciech Jaruzelski
Mettbers: Lt General Florian Siwicki {Defence M in is try )
Lt General Tadeusz Tuczapski 
Lt General Eugeniusz Holczyk 
Adairal Ludwik Janczyszyn
Major General Czeslaw Kiszczak { In te r io r  M in istry)
Major 6eneral Tadeusz Hupalowski {Local economy, environment) 
Major General Czeslaw Piotrowski {M ining and Energy)
Major General Jbzef Baryla
Major General Uiodziaierz Oliwa (Country's M in is t r a t io n )
Major General Henryk Rapacewicz
Major General Jbzef Uzycki
Major General Tadeusz Kr^pski
Major General Longln tozovicki
6eneral Michal Janiszewski {C h ie f o f Cabinet O ffice)
General Jerzy Jarosz 
Colonel Tadeusz Makarewicz 
Colonel Tadeusz Garbacik 
Colonel Roaan Les (retired)
Lt Colonel Jerzy Klosifiski 
Lt Coauander Miroslaw Heraaszewski 
D irecto r 6eneral and Inspector in  Chief o f Government Control:
Brigadier Marian Ryba 
D irecto r General o f The Planning Commission attached to the Cabinet:
Major General Jan Zielibski 
Chairman o f Chief Control Office,
General Tadeusz Hupalowski 
D irecto r General o f the M in is try  Of Adm inistration:
Brigadier Edvard Drzaga 
Undersecretary o f State o f the M in is try  o f Communications:
Brigadier Leon Koiatkowski 
Undersecretary o f the M in is try  o f Education:
Major General Jan Czapla 
Deputy Defence M in isters (6 Major Generals):
Jbzef Baryla - Chief o f the Main P o lit ic a l Committee o f the Army, 
Eugeniusz Molczyk 
Zbigniew Nowak 
Mieczyslaw Qbieczybski 
Tadeusz Tuczapski 
Jbzef Urbanowicz 
M in is try  Of In te r io r  Undersecretaries o f States:
Major Generals Vladyslaw Ciastort and Vladyslaw Poioga 
Brigadiers Lucjan Cxubiski, Konrad Strazewicz and Stanislaw 
Zaczkowski
Commander-in-Chief o f the People's M i l i t ia :
Brigadier Jbzef Beia
Voivodships:
Major General Mieczyslaw Dgbicki (Warsaw)
Major General Roaan Paszkowski (Katowice)
Brigadier Mieczyslaw Cygan (Gdansk)
Other counties - Heads o f Governing Committees:
Colonels Ryszard Urlirtski (Elbljg); Kaziuierz Buczaa (Kalisz); 
Zdzislaw Mazurkiewicz (Koszalin); Alojzy Uojciechowski (Rado&); 
Janusz Kowalski (Siedlce); Boguslaw Jazwiec (Tarnobrzeg); Valerian 
Mikolajczyk (Zielona Gbra)
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APPENDIX C
Proclamation on the Introduction of Martial Law Issued 13 December
1981 by the Chairman of the Council of State of the Polish People's
Republic.
Guided by the need to ensure an increased degree of protection for 
the basic interests of the state and the citizens, in order to create 
conditions for the effective upholding of calm, harmony, and public 
order, and for the reinstatement of violated social discipline, and 
also bearing in mind the guaranteeing of possibilities for the 
efficient functioning of the authorities, the state administration, 
and the national economy, and acting on the basis of Article 33, 
paragraph of the Polish People's Republic's Constitution, the Council 
of State has introduced martial law.
In connection with this, during the period of time during martial 
law remains in force, the public is informed of the following:
1. The convening and holding of all kinds of gatherings, marches, 
and demonstrations is banned, as well as the organizing and conducting 
of public gatherings and artistic entertainment and sporting events, 
without obtaining prior consent from the appropriate regional office 
of state administration, with the exception of religious services and 
rituals, taking place on the premises of churches, chapels, or other 
places designated exclusively for these purposes.
2. The dissemination of all kinds of publications and information, 
by any means, is banned as is the public display of works of art and 
the use of all kinds of printing equipment without first obtaining the 
permission of the appropriate office.
3. The right of workers to organize and to hold strikes and protest 
actions is suspended.
4. Persons who are in public places are obliged to carry an 
identity document and in the case of school pupils of 13 years of age 
or more, their school identity card or a provisional identity card.
5. The duty has been introduced to obtain prior permission from the 
appropriate state administration body for a permanent sojourn in a 
border area and from the local Citizen's Militia for a temporary stay 
in such an area.
6. Tourism, as well as sailing and other sports is prohibited on 
both inland and coastal waters.
Moreover, for the duration of martial law, as far as the general 
duty to defend the Polish People's Republic is concerned, the 
following was decided:
1. Recruits recognized as fit for military service, as well as
people in the reserve, regardless of their service can be called up at 
any time by a decision of the Minister of National Defence.
2. Designated units of state administration and of the national
economy which carry out tasks of particular importance for the defence 
and security of the state have been militarized. This means that 
persons employed by these units are subject to special duties about
which these persons will be notified by the management of their
enterprises.
3. Persons assigned to serve in specified civil defence units can 
be put under the obligation to carry out active service in civil 
defence for such period of time as is required by their task.
4. Citizens can be required by the appropriate local bodies of
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state administration and bodies of military administration to make 
specific personal and financial contributions to the defence of the 
state.
For the duration of the state of martial law, insofar as the 
interests of maintaining public peace, law, and order requires, the 
authorized state administration offices may also:
1. Introduce a limitation on freedom of movement of inhabitants in 
specified times and places through the introduction of a curfew or a 
prohibition on the arrival in or departure from specified 
voivodeships, towns, and parishes.
2. Introduce the obligation to obtain prior permission from the 
appropriate regional state administration office to change one's place 
of residence by moving to another locality for a period exceeding 48 
hours and an obligation to report to the militia immediately upon 
arriving in a new place of residence.
3. Suspend the activities of those associations, trade unions as 
well as social and vocational associations whose activity threatens 
the security of the state, with the exception of Churches and 
religious associations.
4. Introduce censorship of mail of all kinds, telecommunications, 
and telephone conversations.
5. Place an obligation on owners of radio transmitters, as as well 
as transceiver sets to hand them in for safe-keeping in designated 
places.
6. Require the owners of firearms of any kind as well as hunting 
and sporting guns and owners of ammunition and explosives to hand them 
over for safe-keeping in designated places.
7. Ban the taking of photographs and films as well as television 
pictures of specified buildings and in specific places or regions.
8. Prohibit the wearing of specific uniforms and badges.
9. Stop or limit the work of specified communication equipment and 
postal communications and telecommunication services.
10. Suspend or limit the transport of persons and objects by means of 
road, rail, and water, as well as motor vehicle traffic on public 
roads.
11. Stop or limit the movement of persons and goods through border 
crossing points.
For the duration of the period that martial law is in force, all 
persons transgressing the principles, orders, duties and limitations 
being introduced will be subject to more stringent penal regulations 
applied by summary and accelerated court proceedings.
People over 17 years of age, in relation to whom there are 
justified suspicions that, if they remain at liberty, they will engage 
in activity which threatens the security of the state, may be interned 
in isolation centres for the duration of state of martial law, on the 
basis of a decision by the voivodeship commandant of the Citizen's 
militia.
People fulfilling military service, service in military units and 
service in civil defence, will be tried before military courts for 
offences committed in connection with that service, in accordance with 
the regulation which apply to soldiers on active military service 
during.a war.
It is also announced to the public that, in case of a collective or 
individual threat to the life, health, or freedom of citizens or to 
public or personal property of considerable value, and also threats to 
or the occupation of buildings belonging to the state administration
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and political organizations and major edifices and installations of 
the national economy or buildings or objects important for the defence 
or security of the state, in addition to the individual and collective 
action by Citizens' Militia functionaries and other formations set up 
to protect public law and order, units and sub-units of the Armed 
Forces may be brought in. All these forces are authorized to use means 
of direct coercion in order to restore calm, and public law and order.
All citizens are called upon to observe absolutely the introduced 
bans, orders and limitations, to carry out the other obligations 
imposed and also to obey all orders of the proper authorities, issued 
in order to guarantee calm and public law and order and to strengthen 
social discipline.
Chairman of the Council of State of the Polish People's 
Republic.
Wojciech Jaruzelski.
Source: Trybuna Ludu, 14 December 1982.
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To the PRL
11;II;82
17; v; 82 
9; IX; 82
16;vill;83
26; x; 83
25: XI; 83 
30; XI;83 
(CMEA)
2; IV;84
9;IV;84 
6; VI; 84
27; V; 84
23; VI;84 
2; VII;84
APPENDIX D
Selected high-level visits to and from the PRL
1982-1987.
(Excluding all Vestern visits)
1982
from the PPL
Hungarian Foreign Minister
Rusakov 
Col. Gadhafi
i;I;82
29; I; 82 
31; I; 82
1; III;82 
29;III;82 
5;iv;82 
21;IV;82
11; v; 82 
20;v;82
4; vi;82
6;x;82
10; XI; 82 
14; XI; 82
20;XII;82 
1983
Uojna heads Sejn 
Foreign Affairs 
Committee to France 
Uojna, Vienna 
Czyrek, Paris, FCP 
Congress
Jaruzelski to Moscow 
J a r u z e l s k i  .t o,. G Q R  
Jaruzelski to CSSR 
J a r u z e l s k i  .t o.,. H u n g a r y  
Rakowski in Austria 
J a r u z e l s k i  i n  B u l g a r i a  
J a r u z e l s k i  in R o m a n i a  
Olszowski in Columbia/ 
Venezuela
Olszowski in India 
Olszowski in Kuweit 
Jaruzelski in Moscow 
( B r e z h n e v ' s . d a a i h l  
J a r u z e l s k i  i n  M o s c o w
Honecker
Kadar.
Chebrikov
Husak
4,* I; 83 
12; IV,* 83 
28; VI; 83
19; X; 83 
15/30; XI; 83
Prague meeting of UT0 
Olszowski in Angola 
Moscow Conference of 
Party 
leaders
Jaruzelski in Berlin
Olszowski in Vietnao, 
Kanpuchea, Laos, 
Indonesia, Thailand,
Zhiylflx. 
A n g o l a n  v i s i t  
Ceaucescu
North Korean President
N i c a r a g u a .
Yugoslav President
1984
13;II;84
4; v;84 
10; VI;84
12; VI; 84
14; VI; 84 
15; IX; 84 
9; XI;84
J a r u z e l s k i . i n  M o s c o w .  
( A n d r o p o v ‘,5 d e a t h ) .  
J a r u z e l s k i  i n  M o s c o w  
Olszowski in 
Afghanistan 
J a r u z e l s k i .  i n  M o s c o w  
L C M E A 1
Olszowski in Mongolia 
Olszowski in Cuba 
Jaruzelski 6-hour visit 
to Hungary and a couple
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6; VIII;84 Kampuchean President of 16;XI;84
Council of Ministers
13; xil; 84
19; I X ; 8 4  A f g h a n i s t a n
12; XI; 8 4  Sflklli Y e m e n
1 9 8 5
ll;II;85 
4;III;85 
12;III;85
26;IV;85 Gorbachev attends 11; VI; 85
WTO Renewal 20;VI;85
7; V; 85 Rizkhov 8; VII; 85
28; VI I; 85
20;IX;85 
25;IX;85 
21;XI;85
22; xi; 85 
1; XII;85 
2;XII;85 
3;XII;85
4;xil;85 
5; xn; 85 
9;XI I;85
1986
22;I;86 Hungarian Foreign Minister 18;11;66
17; III;86 Soviet Foreign Minister 25; II;86
28; III; 86 Kadar 7; IV;86
27:V;86 Husak 14;IV;86
13; VI; 86 Zimbabwe President 3/8;V;86
16;VI;86 Mongolia Foreign Minister 15;V:86
30;VI;86 6orbatchev attends Xth PZPR 5;VI;86
Congress 10;Vi;86
6;vill;86 
4;IX;86 
5;IX;86 
20/20; IX;86
9; X; 86 
23; X; 86
10; xi; 86
19;XI;86
of hours in CSSR 
Jaruzelski in Easl 
B e r l i n
J a r u z e l s k i  in C S S R
Jaruzelski
.in iiLuia
in Bulgaria
Jaruzelski^ in Moscow
( C h e r n e n k o ' s  d e a t h )
Olszowski in Austria 
Olszowski in Italy 
Jaruzelski in 
Y u g o s l a v i a
Olszowski in Helsinki 
(CSCE)
Jaruzelski in Cuba 
Jaruzelski at UN 
Prague meeting of Party 
leaders
Jaruzelski in Roaania 
J a r u z e l s k i  in L y b i a  
Jaruzelski in A l g e r i a  
Jaruzelski neats 
flitter and in Paris 
Jaruzelski in Tunisia 
Orzechowski in Moscow 
Orzechowski in Finland
Messner in USSR 
Orzechowski in 6reece 
Jaruzelski attends..2.7111 
CPSU Congress. Visits 
Vilno on 18th 
Orzechowski in FRG 
Messner in CSSR 
Orzechowski in Egypt/ 
Malta
Orzechowski in Mexico 
SejBi delegation to PRC 
Jaruzelski in Budapest..
(Via)
Orzechowski in Moscow 
Messner in Hungary 
Orzechowski in CSSR 
Jaruzelski in Mongolia, 
North Korea. PRC 
Messner in GDR 
Orzechowski in 
Australia i Philippines 
J a r u z e l s k i .  in M o s c o w  
(CilEAl
Orzechowski in Japan
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9; iv; 87 
5; v; 87
8; vil;87 
23; VII; 87 
10; ix; 87
20;xi;86 
16;xii;86
1987
12; i; 87 
2; m ; 87 
9;ll;87 
3;ill;87
ZhiyksY. ll; iv; 87
Ethiopian Foreign Minister 21;IV;87
29; v; 87
2; Vi; 87 
28; vi; 87
C e a u c e s c u  1 6 ; I X ; 8 7
1;XI;87
Cambodgian visit 10;XI;87
11; XI; 87
USSR Defence Minister 15;XI;87
2;XII;87 
8;XII;87 
10; 12; 87
6orywoda in PRC 
Orzechowski on Belgium
Jaruzelski in Lilly 
Orzechowski in Iran 
Orzechowski in Moscow 
Czyrek in USA 
Messner in Egypt 
Jaruzelski in USSR 
J a r u z e l s k i  in B e r l i n  
M O l
Orzechowski in Sweden 
Jaruzelski in Japan 
J a r u z e l s k i  in GQfi 
Jaruzelski in Moscow 
Orzechowski in PRC 
Jaruzelski in Greece 
Orzechowski in North 
Korea
Jaruzelski in Hungary 
Orzechowski in UK 
Berlin WTO Leaders 
Meeting
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APPENDIX E
Lays passed by the Sejm from January 1982 to December 1983.
1. January 25, 1982
2. January 26, 1982
3. February 26, 1982
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10 .
12. February 27, 1982
29.
30.
13.
14.
15.
—  II —
16. - " -
17. March 26 1982
18. - " -
19. - " -
20. 
2 1 .
22. -  "
23 - "
24. May 4, 1982
25. - " -
26. - “ -
27. May 26, 1982
28. - " -
—  •* —
—  *1 —
31. July 6, 1982
32. - " -
Law on Specific Law Regulations during the 
State of War.
Law on Teachers' Charter.
Law on Social Economic Planning.
Law on Prices.
Law on establishing the Office of Minister of 
Prices
Law on Financial Economy of State Enterprises. 
Law on the Taxation of Socialized Economic 
Entities.
Banking Law.
Law on The Statute of the Polish National 
Bank.
Law on State Statistics.
Law on the Right to engage in Foreign Trade 
Activities.
Amendments to the Law on Old-Age Pensions for 
Miners and their Families.
Amendments to the Law on Orders and 
Decorations.
Amendments to the Law on Old Age Pensions for 
Workers and their Families.
Law on The Setting up of the Honourific Title 
"Deserving Docker of the PRL".
Law establishing the State Atomic Agency.
Law on the Conservation of Forests and the 
Protection of Cultivable Land.
Law on the Regrouping of Agricultural 
Holdings.
Amendments to the Civil Code and Abrogation of 
Laws Regulating the Economic Property of 
Farmers.
Amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure. 
Amendments to the Polish People's Republic 
Constitution.
Law on the State Tribunal.
Law on the Uniformity concerning the Deadline 
for People's Regional and People's Councils' 
Terms.
Law on the National Council of Culture and on 
the Fund for the Development of Culture.
Law establishing the Office of the Ministry of 
Culture and Arts.
Law on Higher Education.
Law on Special Entitlements for Combattants. 
Amendments to the Law on establishing the 
Office of the Ministry for Combattants.
Law on the Bar.
Amendments to the Penal Law and the Law on 
Petty Offences.
Law on Law Councillors.
Law on Principles of Conduct of Business 
Activity in Small Industry by Foreign 
Corporate Bodies and Natural Persons on the
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33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
54.
55.
56.
57.
September 16, 1982
—  •• —
October 8, 1982 
— •! —
41. October 9, 1982
October 26, 1982
II _
December 3, 1982 
December 14, 1982
53. December 18, 1982
_ M _
December 29, 1982
—  II —
_ II _
Territory of the PRL.
Law on the Land and Mortgage Registers.
1982 Budgetary Law.
Co-operative Law.
Amendments to the Law on the Practise and 
Organization of Crafts.
Law on Employees of the State Administration. 
Amendments to the Law on Costs of Court 
Proceedings in Civil Cases.
Law on Trade Unions.
Law on Socio-Professional Farmers' 
Organizations.
Amendments to the Law on Combating 
Speculation.
Amendments to the Law on the Alimentary Fund. 
Law on Procedures against People evading work. 
Law on Procedures in Youth cases.
Law on Education in Sobriety and against 
Alcoholism.
Amendments ot the Regulations on renting 
Premises.
Law on Pensions for Old-Age pensioneers and 
their families.
Amendments to the Law on War and Army Invalids 
Pensions and their Families.
Law on the Social Insurance of Individual 
farmers and their Families.
Law on the Employment of Graduates.
Law on the Protection of State Secrets.
Law on Changes in Special Law Regulations 
during Martial Law.
Amendments conerning the Special Law 
Regulations during Martial Law.
1983 Budgetary Law.
Law on the Office of the Finance Ministry and 
the Treasury Office.
Amendments to the Law on Fees in Penal Cases. 
Amendments to the Law on the Structure of the 
Board judging Petty Offences and Code of Petty 
Offences' Procedure.
Source: Rocznik Polityczny i Gospodarczy 1981-1983, PWE, Warszawa,
1984, pp. 92-94.
* As a comparison, in the period between May 22, 1986 to May 27, 1987,
13 Laws only were passed by the Sejm.
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APPENDIX F
Selected Non-CHEA Visits to the PRL since December 1981.
None in 1382 and 1223,i
1984 (6)
18; II; 84 UN General Secretary, Perez de Cuellar.
16;X;84 Austrian Foreign Minister, Leopold Gratz,
22,X;84 Greek Priae Minister, Papandreou (First NATO State visit since 1382),
29;X;84 Finnish Foreign Minister, P. Vaeyrynen,
3;XI;84 UK Minister of State at Foreign Office, Malcolm Rifkind,
21;XI;84 Postponement of Uest 6ermany's Foreign Minister's visit,
20;XII;84 Italian Foreign Minister, G. Andreotti.
1985 <7)
6;III;85 Uest Germany Foreign Minister, D. Genscher.
11;IV;85 UK Foreign Minister, G. Howe.
l;V;85 Postponement of Belgian Foreign Minister's visit,
28;V;85 Italian Prime Minister, Benitto Craxi (2 hour visit on his way to
Moscow),
10;VI;85 Japanese Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe (First visit for 18 years),
Postponement of Irish Foreign Minister's visit scheduled in July,
20;VI;85 Postponement of Spanish Foreign Minister's visit,
Norwegian Foreign Minister postpones visit due on October 6th,
28;VI;85 Egyptian Foreign Minister, Esaat A. Meguid,
3;IX;85 Dutch Foreign Minister, F. Bolkestein,
7;XII;85 Head of the SPD, Willy Brandt.
1986 (4)
13;VI;86 President of Ziabawe, S.B. Banana.
20;VI;86 Argentinian Vice-President, V. Martinez.
30;X; Foraer Uest Geraan Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt,
6;XI;86 Indian President,
Senator Robert Kennedy refused entry into the PRL,
1987 (22)
15;1:87 Japanese Priae Minister, Nakasone,
28;I;87 US Dept. Secretary Of State, John Uhitehead,
5;11;87 UK Minister of State at Foreign Office, Timothy Renton,
3;III;87 Spanish Foreign Minister, Ordonez,
10; III; 87 Chinese Foreign Minister (First for 33 years),
2;IV;87 Indian Foreign Minister.
10;IV;87 French Foreign Minister,
3;V;87 Canadian Foreign Minister,
16;V;87 Thailand Foreign Minister.
17;V;87 Belgian Foreign Minister, Leo Tindeaanns,
18;V;87 Mexican Dep, FM, Ricardo Vallero,
22;V;87 Senator Robert Kennedy,
21;V;87 Private Visit by Zbigniew Brzezinski,
26;V;87 FRG Finance Minister, M.Bangeaann,
4;VI;87 Chinese ler and 1st secretary,
8; VI;87 John Paul II (3rd visit),
24;VI;87 Moroccan Foreign Minister; Columbian Foreign Minister,
31;VIII;87 Dutch Foreign Minister,
4;IX;87 Uruguay Foreign Minister.
20;IX;87 Frantz Vranitzky, Austrian Federal Chancellor,
26;IX; US Vice-President George Bush,
2;XI;87 Dannish Foreign Minister.
23;XI;87 Australian Foreign Minister,
26;XI;87 Austrian Foreign Minister.
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STATE COUNCIL
ChiirMan 
Deputy Chairuen
Secretary
fteabers
ChairMan 
Deputy Chair Men
APPENDIX G
Governmental Changes in the PRL, 1981-1987:
a) State Council.
b) Council Of Ministers.
c) Government
<* denotes new nomination)
1981 1982 1983 1984
Oct
Jablofiski Jablofiski Jablofiski Jablofiski
Miyficzak rtiyhczak Miyficzak Miyficzak
Seconski Seconski Seconski Secoaski
Tonal Tonal Tonal iStruzek
Ziftek Zi^ tek Zi^ tek Zi$tek
Quda Duda Szynanek Szymanek
Bare ikowsk i Bare ikowsk i Bare ikowski Bare ikowsk i
Grendys Grendys Grendys Grendys
Kenpara TKania Kania Kania
Kolodziej Ketapara Keapara Kenpara
Marszalek-Mln, iKlafkovski Klafkowski Klafkowski
Qzga-Michalski Kolodziej Kolodziej Kolodziej
Reiff MarszaLek-Mln. Qzga-Michalski Ozga-Michalski
Rog-swiostek Qzga-Michalski Moravski horauski
Szafrafiski JMorawski Rog-swiostek Rog-iwiostek
Szczepanski Rog-$wiostek iStavski Stawski
Urofiski Szaf ransk i Szafrafiski Szafrafiski
Yrofiski Wrohsk i Urofiski
1985 1986 1987 1988
Dec, Nov, Sept. Jan,
Jaruzelski Jaruzelski Jaruzelski Jaruzelski
B^arcikowski Barcikowski Barcikowski Barcikowski
ZKoaender Konender Koaender Konender
Mlynczak Mlynczak Mlynczak Mlynczak
iSzelachowski Szelachowski Szelachovski Szelachowsk
Secretary
JSuroviec Suroviec Suroviec Suroviec
fleecers
C^iborowski Ciborowski Ciborowski Ciborowski
iGacek Gacek Gacek Gacek
iJonkisz Lipski Legatowicz Jonkisz
Jonkisz Jonkisz Lipski Legatowicz
*Lipski Moravski *Legatovicz Lipski
JMiodovicz Nawrocki Moravski Moravski
Moravski SecoLski Nawrocki Nawrocki
4Nawrocki Stefanski Secoaski Secoaski
ISecoaski Szyaanski Stefanski Stefanski
IStefanski JUzieablo Szyaanski Szyaanski
JSzyaanski Zawadzki Uzieablo Uzieablo
iZawadzki Zawadzki Zawadzki
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
1981 1982 1983 1984
Priae flinis ter Jaruzelski Jaruzelski Jaruzelski Jaruzelski
Deputy Priae Ministers
Jagielski JKoaender Koaender *Gorywoda
Jedynak JKowalczyk Kowalczyk Koaender
flach Madej Madej Kowalczyk
Madej Malinowski Malinowski Malinowski
Malinowski JQbodovski Obodowski fMessner
Ozdovski Rakovski Rakovski Obodowski
Rakovski ISzalajda Szalajda Rakowski
Szalajda
Cnairaan, Supreae Chaaber of Control
Moczar Moczar IHupalovski Hupalowski
Chairaan, Planning Coaaission
Made j JQbodovski Obodowski G^orywoda
Minister eithout porfolio, responsible for trade union affairs
Ciosek Ciosek Ciosek Ciosek
Meaber of Covernaent Presidiua and
Covernaent plenipotentiary for the econoaic refora
Baka Baka Baka Baka
1985 1986 1987 1988
Dec, Nov, Sept, Jan.
Priae Minister
Messner Messner Messner Messner
Deputy Priae Ministers
*6ertycM Gertych Gorywoda Koziol
Gorywoda 6oryvoda Gviazda Sadowski
JGviazda Gwiadza Koziol Szalajda
iKoziol Koziol JSadowski
Szalajda Szalajda Szalajda
Chairaan, Supreae Chaaber of control
Hupalowsk i Hupalowski Hupalowski Hupalowski
Chair a an, Planning Coaaission
6oryvoda Gorywoda 
Head of the office of the Council of Ministers
Gorywoda *Sadovski
Janiszewski Janiszewski Janiszewski
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GOVERNMENT
1981 1982 1983 1984
Ads in, /Loc, Econ, / 
Protect, Envir, K?pa ZHupaiowski ZOliwa Oliwa
Agri, /Food Ind, Uojtecki Uojtecki ZZi^ ba Zi?ba
Chea,/Light Ind. Knapik Z6rzywa Grzywa Grzywa
Coaaunications Hajewski Hajewski Hajewski Majewski
Const, /Build, Brzostek ZKukuryka Kukuryka Kukuryka
Cul ture/ar ts Tejchaa Z^ ygulski 2ygulski 2ygulski
Doaestic Trade Ukoisiiec Ukoaiec Ukoaiec ZK^ dzierska
Finance Krzak ZNieckarz Nieckarz Nieckarz
Foreign Affairs Czyrek Olszowski Olszowski Olszowski
Foreign trade Karski Nestorowicz Nestorowicz Nestorowicz
Forestry/Haber Kozlowski Kozlowski Kozlowski Kozlowski
Health J Velfare Szelachowski Szelachowski Szelachowski Szelachowski
Education Faron Faron Faron Faron
Interior Hilewski Kiszczak Kiszczak Kiszcak
Iron/steel/Eng Szalajda Ztukosz tukosz ZHaciejewicz
Justice Zawadzki Zawadzki Zawadzki ZDoaeracki
Labour/i/ages Obodowski ZBury ZCiosek Z6ebala
Mining/Energy Piotrowski Piotrowski Piotrowsk i Piotrowski
National Defence Jaruzelski Jaruzelski Jaruzelski ZSiwicki
Raw Material Szyr ZAntosik ZUoZniak UoZniak
Science/HiEduc, Nawrocki ZHiSkiewicz Hiskiewicz Hiskiewicz
Transporta tion Zajfryd ZKaiaihski Kaainski Kanihski
Religious aff, Kuberski Ztopatka Lopatka topatka
Maritime Economy Bejger ZKorzonek Korzonek Korzonek
Head Office prices - Krasinski Krasinski Krasinski
JOSS 1386 1387 1388
Agricu, /Food Ind/
Forestry, Zi?ba Zi?ba Zi$ba Zi$ba
Chen, /Light Ind, Grzywa Grzywa - -
Coaaunications Hajewski Hajewski Hajewski
Const, /Territ, &
Coaaunal a an, ZNiewiadoaski ZBajszczak Bajszczak -
Cul ture/arts 2ygulski ZKrawczuk Krawczuk Krawczuk
Doaestic Trade ZJozwiak JdZwiak JdZwiak JdZwiak
Envir, Pro tec, J
Natural res sour. ZJarz^ bski Jarzfbsk i Jarzjbski ZHichna
Finance Nieckarz ZSaaojlik Saaojlik Saaojlik
Foreign Affairs ZQrzechowski Orzechowski Orzechowski Orzechowski
Foreign trade zUdjcik Udjcik Uojcik ZGwiazda
Health & Uelfare Cybulko Cybulko Cybulko ZKooaender
Education Hichalowska-
Guaowska Hichalowska Hichalowska -
Interior Kiszczak Kiszczak Kiszczak Kiszcak
Iron/steel Ind, Haciejewicz Haciejewicz Haciejewicz -
Industry Bilip
Justice Qoaeracki Doaarevski Doaarewski Doaarewski
Labour/Oages Gebala Gebala ZPawlowski Pawlowski
Mining/Energy Piotrowski ZSzlachta Szlachta -
National Defence Siwicki Siwicki Siwicki Siwicki
Raw Material Uozniak Uozniak UoZniak -
Science/HiEduc. Hiskiewicz HiSkiewicz Hiskiewicz -
Transportation *■
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naviga/Coaaun, 87 Kaainski Kaainski
Religious aff, topatka topatka
/laritine Econoay JNowotnik Nowotnik
Head of five Scient, /Tech 
Progress & iapl, *Tott Tott
Kaainski
topatka
Nowotnik
Tott
Kaainski
*Loranc
Tott
APPENDIX H
Politburo
-378- 
Changes 1981-1988
1981 (July) 1982 (Oct,) 1983 (Sept,) 1984 (Oct,)
members (fan venters undifliMdl'
Kania Jaruzelski Jaruzelski Jaruzelski
Barcikowski Barcikowski Barcikowski Barcikowski
Czechowicz Czechowicz Czechowicz Czechowicz
Czyrek Czyrek Czyrek Czyrek
Grzyb Grzyb Grzyb Grzyb
Jaruzelski Kalkus Kalkus
Kubiak Kubiak Kubiak Kubiak
Labecki rtessner rtessner rtessner
rtessner rtilewski rtilewski rtilewski
rtilewski Olszowski Opalko Opalko
Olszowski Opalko Por^ bski Olszowski
Opalko Por^ bski Rotianik Por ijfbsk i
Por§bski Roaanik Siwak Romanik
Rotaanik Siwak Uozniak Siwak
Siwak Uozniak Olszowski Uozniak
DEPUTY MEMBERS:
Glbwczyk Be j flee. Bejger Bejger
flokrzyszczak Glbwczyk Glbwczyk Glbwczyk
K i s z c z a k Kiszczak Kiszczak
rtokrzyszczak rtokrzyszczak rtokrzyszczak
S i w i c k i . Siwicki Orzechowski
Siwicki
1985 (Dec.) 1986 (Nov.) 1987 (Sept.) 1988 (Jan,)
Jaruzelski Jaruzelski Jaruzelski Jaruzelski
Barcikowski Barcikowski Barcikowski Barcikowski
Czechowicz B a r y U L J I a y S S J Baryla Baryla
Czyrek Czyrek Czyrek Czyrek
Grzyb Glowczyk Glbwczyk Glbwczyk
Kalkus K i s z c x a k U i m B i l Kiszczak Kiszczak
Kubiak rtessner rtessner rtessner
rtessner r t i b d o v i c z i J u n S B l rtiodowicz rtiodowicz
Opalko r t o k r z y s z c z a k rtokrzyszczak rtokrzyszczak
Porfbski r t u r a n s k i rturahski rturanski
Roaanik Q r z e c h Q u s k i C J u a S B l Orzechowski Orzechowski
Siwak Por^ bski Por^ bski Porgbski
Uozniak SiwickiCJun861 Siwicki R a k o v s k i
SivP.ian St§pien Siwicki
Uozniak UoZniak St$pien
Uozniak
Baka
Bejger Bejger Bejger Bejger
Glowczyk Ferensztain[Jun861 Ferensztajn Gorywoda
Kiszczak KubasiewiczCJunSbl Kubasievicz Kubasiewicz
rtokrzyszczak i l i c h a U k U u n B i l rtichalek rtichalek
Orzechowski
Siwicki
R e a b i s z C U . u n 8 . 6 1 Reabisz Reabisz
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Central Committee Changes 1981-1984.
1981
FIRST SECRETARY: 
Kania
SECRETARIES;
Czyrek
Kubiak
rtichalek
rtilewski
Olszowski
Uozniak
1982
sept,
1983
Sept,
1984
KKP CHAIRMAN: 
Urbanski 
CKR CHAIRMAN: 
rtorawski
1985
FIRST SECRETARY:
Jaruzelski
SECRETARIES:
Bedbarski
Czyrek
Glbwczyk
rtichalek
rtokrzyszczak
Por^ bski
Swirgon
Wozniak CNov853
CKKP CHAIRMAN: 
Urbanski
CKR CHAIRMAN:
Jaruzelski Jaruzelski Jaruzelski
Barcikowski Barcikowski Barcikowski
Czyrek C z y r e k Bednarsk.ilii2y.831
G l o a c z y k . Glbwczyk Czyrek
G o r y u o d a Gorywoda Glbwczyk
rtichalek rtichalek rtichalek
rtilewski rtilewski rtilewski
rt o k r z y s z c z a k . rtokrzyszczak rtokrzyszczak
Orzechowski Orzechowski Por^ bski
S i i n g o n Swirgon
S t e p i e i i C F e b 8 4 3
Urbanski Urbanski Urbanski
rtorawski rtorawski rtorawski
Central Committee Changes 1985-1988.
1986 1987 1988
Jaruzelski Jaruzelski Jaruzelski
B a r y l a C D e c G G l Baryla Barula
Bednarski Bednarski Ciosek
Cio s e k . Ciosek Cypryniak
. C y p r y n i a k Cypryniak Czyrek
Czyrek Czyrek Glbwczyk
Glbwczyk Glbwczyk rtichalek
rtichalek rtichalek Por^ bski
Por^ bski Porfbski Uasilewski
Uasilewski Uasilewski Uozniak
Uozniak Uozniak
r t o k r z y s z c z a k .
(CKKP+CKR=CKKR)
rtokrzyszczak rtokrzyszczak
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